第36章

Fortheliteralsenseisthatwhichthelegislatorintendedshouldbytheletterofthelawbesignified。Nowtheintentionofthelegislatorisalwayssupposedtobeequity：foritwereagreatcontumelyforajudgetothinkotherwiseofthesovereign。Heoughttherefore，ifthewordofthelawdonotfullyauthorizeareasonablesentence，tosupplyitwiththelawofnature；orifthecasebedifficult，torespitejudgementtillhehavereceivedmoreampleauthority。Forexample，awrittenlawordaineththathewhichisthrustoutofhishousebyforceshallberestoredbyforce。Ithappensthatamanbynegligenceleaveshishouseempty，andreturningiskeptoutbyforce，inwhichcasethereisnospeciallawordained。Itisevidentthatthiscaseiscontainedinthesamelaw；

forelsethereisnoremedyforhimatall，whichistobesupposedagainsttheintentionofthelegislator。Again，thewordofthelawcommandethtojudgeaccordingtotheevidence。Amanisaccusedfalselyofafactwhichthejudgehimselfsawdonebyanother，andnotbyhimthatisaccused。Inthiscaseneithershalltheletterofthelawbefollowedtothecondemnationoftheinnocent，norshallthejudgegivesentenceagainsttheevidenceofthewitnesses，becausetheletterofthelawistothecontrary；butprocureofthesovereignthatanotherbemadejudge，andhimselfwitness。Sothattheincommoditythatfollowsthebarewordsofawrittenlawmayleadhimtotheintentionofthelaw，wherebytointerpretthesamethebetter；thoughnoincommoditycanwarrantasentenceagainstthelaw。ForeveryjudgeofrightandwrongisnotjudgeofwhatiscommodiousorincommodioustotheCommonwealth。

Theabilitiesrequiredinagoodinterpreterofthelaw，thatistosay，inagoodjudge，arenotthesamewiththoseofanadvocate；

namely，thestudyofthelaws。Forajudge，asheoughttotakenoticeofthefactfromnonebutthewitnesses，soalsoheoughttotakenoticeofthelawfromnothingbutthestatutesandconstitutionsofthesovereign，allegedinthepleading，ordeclaredtohimbysomethathaveauthorityfromthesovereignpowertodeclarethem；andneednottakecarebeforehandwhatheshalljudge；foritshallbegivenhimwhatheshallsayconcerningthefact，bywitnesses；andwhatheshallsayinpointoflaw，fromthosethatshallintheirpleadingsshowit，andbyauthorityinterpretitupontheplace。TheLordsofParliamentinEnglandwerejudges，andmostdifficultcauseshavebeenheardanddeterminedbythem；yetfewofthemweremuchversedinthestudyofthelaws，andfewerhadmadeprofessionofthem；andthoughtheyconsultedwithlawyersthatwereappointedtobepresentthereforthatpurpose，yettheyalonehadtheauthorityofgivingsentence。Inlikemanner，intheordinarytrialsofright，twelvemenofthecommonpeoplearethejudgesandgivesentence，notonlyofthefact，butoftheright；andpronouncesimplyforthecomplainantorforthedefendant；thatistosay，arejudgesnotonlyofthefact，butalsooftheright；andinaquestionofcrime，notonlydeterminewhetherdoneornotdone，butalsowhetheritbemurder，homicide，felony，assault，andthelike，whicharedeterminationsoflaw：butbecausetheyarenotsupposedtoknowthelawofthemselves，thereisonethathathauthoritytoinformthemofitintheparticularcasetheyaretojudgeof。Butyetiftheyjudgenotaccordingtothathetellsthem，theyarenotsubjecttherebytoanypenalty；unlessitbemadeappeartheydiditagainsttheirconsciences，orhadbeencorruptedbyreward。

Thethingsthatmakeagoodjudgeorgoodinterpreterofthelawsare，first，arightunderstandingofthatprincipallawofnaturecalledequity；which，dependingnotonthereadingofothermen’swritings，butonthegoodnessofaman’sownnaturalreasonandmeditation，ispresumedtobeinthosemostthathadmostleisure，andhadthemostinclinationtomeditatethereon。Secondly，contemptofunnecessaryrichesandpreferments。Thirdly，tobeableinjudgementtodivesthimselfofallfear，anger，hatred，love，andcompassion。

Fourthly，andlastly，patiencetohear，diligentattentioninhearing，andmemorytoretain，digest，andapplywhathehathheard。

Thedifferenceanddivisionofthelawshasbeenmadeindiversemanners，accordingtothedifferentmethodsofthosementhathavewrittenofthem。Foritisathingthatdependethonnature，butonthescopeofthewriter，andissubservienttoeveryman’spropermethod。I