第24章

ThedifferencebetweenthesethreekindsofCommonwealthconsisteth，notinthedifferenceofpower，butinthedifferenceofconvenienceoraptitudetoproducethepeaceandsecurityofthepeople；forwhichendtheywereinstituted。Andtocomparemonarchywiththeothertwo，wemayobserve：first，thatwhosoeverbeareththepersonofthepeople，orisoneofthatassemblythatbearsit，bearethalsohisownnaturalperson。Andthoughhebecarefulinhispoliticpersontoprocurethecommoninterest，yetheismore，ornoless，carefultoprocuretheprivategoodofhimself，hisfamily，kindredandfriends；andforthemostpart，ifthepublicinterestchancetocrosstheprivate，hepreferstheprivate：forthepassionsofmenarecommonlymorepotentthantheirreason。Fromwhenceitfollowsthatwherethepublicandprivateinterestaremostcloselyunited，thereisthepublicmostadvanced。Nowinmonarchytheprivateinterestisthesamewiththepublic。Theriches，power，andhonourofamonarchariseonlyfromtheriches，strength，andreputationofhissubjects。Fornokingcanberich，norglorious，norsecure，whosesubjectsareeitherpoor，orcontemptible，ortooweakthroughwant，ordissension，tomaintainawaragainsttheirenemies；whereasinademocracy，oraristocracy，thepublicprosperityconfersnotsomuchtotheprivatefortuneofonethatiscorrupt，orambitious，asdothmanytimesaperfidiousadvice，atreacherousaction，oracivilwar。

Secondly，thatamonarchreceivethcounselofwhom，when，andwherehepleaseth；andconsequentlymayheartheopinionofmenversedinthematteraboutwhichhedeliberates，ofwhatrankorqualitysoever，andaslongbeforethetimeofactionandwithasmuchsecrecyashewill。Butwhenasovereignassemblyhasneedofcounsel，noneareadmittedbutsuchashavearighttheretofromthebeginning；

whichforthemostpartareofthosewhohavebeenversedmoreintheacquisitionofwealththanofknowledge，andaretogivetheiradviceinlongdiscourseswhichmay，anddocommonly，excitementoaction，butnotgoverntheminit。Fortheunderstandingisbytheflameofthepassionsneverenlightened，butdazzled：noristhereanyplaceortimewhereinanassemblycanreceivecounselsecrecy，becauseoftheirownmultitude。

Thirdly，thattheresolutionsofamonarcharesubjecttonootherinconstancythanthatofhumannature；butinassemblies，besidesthatofnature，therearisethaninconstancyfromthenumber。Fortheabsenceofafewthatwouldhavetheresolution，oncetaken，continuefirm(whichmayhappenbysecurity，negligence，orprivateimpediments)，orthediligentappearanceofafewofthecontraryopinion，undoestodayallthatwasconcludedyesterday。

Fourthly，thatamonarchcannotdisagreewithhimself，outofenvyorinterest；butanassemblymay；andthattosuchaheightasmayproduceacivilwar。

Fifthly，thatinmonarchythereisthisinconvenience；thatanysubject，bythepowerofoneman，fortheenrichingofafavouriteorflatterer，maybedeprivedofallhepossesseth；whichIconfessisagreataninevitableinconvenience。Butthesamemayaswellhappenwherethesovereignpowerisinanassembly：fortheirpoweristhesame；andtheyareassubjecttoevilcounsel，andtobeseducedbyorators，asamonarchbyflatterers；andbecomingoneanother’sflatterers，serveoneanother’scovetousnessandambitionbyturns。

Andwhereasthefavouritesofmonarchsarefew，andtheyhavenoneelsetoadvancebuttheirownkindred；thefavouritesofanassemblyaremany，andthekindredmuchmorenumerousthanofanymonarch。

Besides，thereisnofavouriteofamonarchwhichcannotaswellsuccourhisfriendsashurthisenemies：butorators，thatistosay，favouritesofsovereignassemblies，thoughtheyhavegreatpowertohurt，havelittletosave。Fortoaccuserequireslesseloquence(suchisman’snature)thantoexcuse；andcondemnation，thanabsolution，moreresemblesjustice。

Sixthly，thatitisaninconveniencein