第76章

subordinatetothatpre-eminentlycertainandirrefragableintuition-whichstandsasthefirstprincipleofUtilitarianism；then，ofcourse，itwillbetheUtilitarianCodetowhichweshallbelievetheDivineSanctionstobeattached。

Or，again，wemayarguethus。If——asalltheologiansagree——wearetoconceiveGodasactingforsomeend，wemustconceivethatendtobeUniversalGood，and，ifUtilitariansareright，UniversalHappiness:andwecannotsupposethatinaworldmorallygoverneditcanbeprudentforanymantoactinconsciousoppositiontowhatwebelievetobetheDivineDesign。HenceifinanycaseaftercalculatingtheconsequencesoftwoalternativesofconductwechoosethatwhichseemslikelytobelessconducivetoHappinessgenerally，weshallbeactinginamannerforwhichwecannotbutexpecttosuffer。

Tothisithasbeenobjected，thatobservationoftheactualworldshowsusthatthehappinessofsentientbeingsissoimperfectlyattainedinit，andwithsolargeanintermixtureofpainandmisery，thatwecannotreallyconceiveUniversalHappinesstobeGod’send，unlessweadmitthatHeisnotOmnipotent。AndnodoubttheassertionthatGodisomnipotentwillrequiretobeunderstoodwithsomelimitation；butperhapswithnogreaterlimitationthanhasalwaysbeenimplicitlyadmittedbythoughtfultheologians。FortheseseemalwaystohaveallowedthatsomethingsareimpossibletoGod:as，forexample，tochangethepast。AndperhapsifourknowledgeoftheUniversewerecomplete，wemightdiscernthequantumofhappinessultimatelyattainedinittobeasgreatascouldbeattainedwithouttheaccomplishmentofwhatweshouldthenseetobejustasinconceivableandabsurdaschangingthepast。This，however，isaviewwhichitbelongsrathertothetheologiantodevelop。IshouldratherurgethattheredoesnotseemtobeanyotheroftheordinaryinterpretationsofGoodaccordingtowhichitwouldappeartobemorecompletelyrealisedintheactualuniverse。Forthewonderfulperfectionsofworkthatweadmireinthephysicalworldareyeteverywheremingledwithimperfection，andsubjecttodestructionanddecay:andsimilarlyintheworldofhumanconductVirtueisatleastasmuchbalancedbyViceasHappinessisbymisery。Sothat，iftheethicalreasoningthatledustointerpretUltimateGoodasHappinessissound，thereseemsnoargumentfromNaturalTheologytosetagainstit。

If，then，wemayassumetheexistenceofsuchaBeing，asGod，bytheconsensusoftheologians，isconceivedtobe，itseemsthatUtilitariansmaylegitimatelyinfertheexistenceofDivinesanctionstothecodeofsocialdutyasconstructedonaUtilitarianbasis；andsuchsanctionswould，ofcourse，sufficetomakeitalwayseveryone’sinteresttopromoteuniversalhappinesstothebestofhisknowledge。Itis，however，desirable，beforeweconclude，toexaminecarefullythevalidityofthisassumption，insofarasitissupportedonethicalgroundsalone。Forbytheresultofsuchanexaminationwillbedetermined，aswenowsee，theveryimportantquestionwhetherethicalsciencecanbeconstructedonanindependentbasis；orwhetheritisforcedtoborrowafundamentalandindispensablepremissfromTheologyorsomesimilarsource。Inorderfairlytoperformthisexamination，letusreflectupontheclearestandmostcertainofourmoralintuitions。IfindthatIundoubtedlyseemtoperceive，asclearlyandcertainlyasIseeanyaxiominArithmeticorGeometry，thatitis`right’and`reasonable’formetotreatothersasIshouldthinkthatImyselfoughttobetreatedundersimilarconditions，andtodowhatIbelievetobeultimatelyconducivetouniversalGoodorHappiness。ButIcannotfindinseparablyconnectedwiththisconviction，andsimilarlyattainablebymerereflectiveintuition，anycognitionthatthereactuallyisaSupremeBeingwhowilladequatelyrewardmeforobeyingtheserulesofduty，orpunishmeforviolatingthem。

Or，——omittingthestrictlytheologicalelementoftheproposition，——I

maysaythatIdonotfindinmymoralconsciousnessanyintuition，claimingtobeclearandcertain，thattheperformanceofdutywillbeadequatelyrewardedanditsviolationpunished。[3]Ifeelindeedadesire，apparentlyinseparablefromthemoralsentiments，thatthisresultmayberealisednotonlyinmyowncasebutuniversally；butthemereexistenceofthedesirewouldnotgofartoestablishtheprobabilityofitsfulfilment，consideringthelargeproportionofhumandesiresthatexperienceshowstobedoomedtodisappointment。Ialsojudgethatinacertainsensethisresultoughttoberealised:inthisjudgment，however，Ioughtisnotusedinastrictlyethicalmeaning；itonlyexpressesthevitalneedthatourPracticalReasonfeelsofprovingorpostulatingthisconnexionofVirtueandself-interest，ifitistobemadeconsistentwithitself。

ForthenegationoftheconnexionmustforceustoadmitanultimateandfundamentalcontradictioninourapparentintuitionsofwhatisReasonableinconduct；andfromthisadmissionitwouldseemtofollowthattheap