第54章

Indeed，allareagreedthattheyoughttobedisobeyedwhentheycommandwhatiswrong:thoughwedonotseemabletoelicitanycleargeneralviewastowhatremainswrongafterithasbeencommandedbythesovereign。

And，again，thepositivelawsthatoughttobeobeyedassuchmustbethecommandsissuedbya(morally)rightfulauthority:andthoughthesewillordinarilycoincidewiththecommandslegallyenforced，wecannotsaythatthisisalwaysthecaseforthecourtsmaybetemporarilysubservienttoausurper；or，again，thesovereignhithertohabituallyobeyedmaybeoneagainstwhomithasbecomerighttorebel(sinceitisgenerallyadmittedthatthisissometimesright)。Werequire，then，principlesfordeterminingwhenusurpationbecomeslegitimateandwhenrebellionisjustifiable:andwedonotseemabletoelicitthesefromCommonSense——exceptsofarasitmaybefairlysaidthatonthiswholesubjectCommonSenseinclinesmoretotheUtilitarianmethodthanitdoesinmattersofprivatemorality。

Stilllesscanwestatethegeneraldutyofsatisfying`naturalexpectations’——i。e。suchexpectationsasanaveragemanwouldformundergivencircumstances——intheformofaclearandprecisemoralaxiom。Nodoubtajustmanwillgenerallysatisfycustomaryclaims:

butitcanhardlybemaintainedthatthemereexistenceofacustomrendersitclearlyobligatorythatanyoneshouldconformtoitwhohasnotalreadypromisedtodoso；especiallysincebadcustomscanonlybeabolishedbyindividualsventuringtodisregardthem。

Wehavestilltoexamine(whetherasabranchofJusticeorunderaseparatehead)thedutyoffulfillingexpresspromisesanddistinctunderstandings。Thepeculiarconfidencewhichmoralistshavegenerallyfeltinthisprincipleisstrikinglyillustratedbythoseendeavourstoextenditsscopewhichwehavejusthadoccasiontonotice:anditcertainlyseemstosurpassinsimplicity，certainty，anddefinitenessthemoralrulesthatwehavehithertodiscussed。Here，then，ifanywhere，weseemlikelytofindoneofthoseethicalaxiomsofwhichweareinsearch。NowwesawthatthenotionofaPromiserequiresseveralqualificationsnotcommonlynoticedtomakeitprecise:butthisaloneisnoreasonwhyitmaynotbefitlyusedinframingamaxim，whichwhenenunciatedandunderstoodwillproperlyclaimuniversalacceptanceasself-evident。Forsimilarlytheuninstructedmajorityofmankindcouldnotdefineacircleasafigureboundedbyalineofwhicheverypointisequidistantfromthecentre:butnevertheless，whenthedefinitionisexplainedtothem，theywillacceptitasexpressingtheperfecttypeofthatnotionofroundnesswhichtheyhavelonghadintheirminds。Andthesamepotentialuniversalityofacceptancemay，Ithink，befairlyclaimedforthepropositionsthatthepromisewhichtheCommonSenseofmankindrecognisesasbindingmustbeunderstoodbypromiserandpromiseeinthesamesenseatthetimeofpromising，andthatitisrelativetothepromiseeandcapableofbeingannulledbyhim，andthatitcannotoverridedeterminatepriorobligations。

Butthecaseisdifferentwiththeotherqualificationswhichwehadtodiscuss。Whenoncethequestionofintroducingthesehasbeenraised，weseethatCommonSenseisclearlydividedastotheanswer。Ifweask(e。g。)howfarourpromiseisbindingifitwasmadeinconsequenceoffalsestatements，onwhich，however，itwasnotunderstoodtobeconditional；orifimportantcircumstanceswereconcealed，orwewereinanywayledtobelievethattheconsequencesofkeepingthepromisewouldbedifferentfromwhattheyturnouttobe；

orifthepromisewasgivenundercompulsion；orifcircumstanceshavemateriallyalteredsinceitwasgiven，andwefindthattheresultsoffulfillingitwillbedifferentfromwhatweforesawwhenwepromised；

orevenifitbeonlyourknowledgeofconsequenceswhichhasaltered，andwenowseethatfulfilm