第37章

WehaveseenthatthevirtueofPracticalWisdomcomprehendsallothers，sofarasvirtuousconductineachdepartmentnecessarilyresultsfromaclearknowledgeandchoiceofthetrueultimateendorendsofaction，andofthebestmeanstotheattainmentofsuchendorends。Fromthispointofviewwemayconsiderthenamesofthespecialvirtuesasdenotingspecialdepartmentsofthisknowledge；whichitisnowourbusinesstoexaminemoreclosely。

When，however，wecontemplatethese，wediscernthatthereareothervirtues，which，indifferentways，mayberegardedasnolesscomprehensivethanWisdom。Especiallyinmoderntimes，sincetherevivalofindependentethicalspeculation，therehavealwaysbeenthinkerswhohavemaintained，insomeform，theviewthatBenevolenceisasupremeandarchitectonicvirtue，

comprehendingandsummingupalltheothers，andfittedtoregulatethemanddeterminetheirproperlimitsandmutualrelations。ThiswidelysupportedclaimtosupremacyseemsanadequatereasonforgivingtoBenevolencethefirstplaceafterWisdom，inourexaminationofthecommonlyreceivedmaximsofDutyandVirtue。

ThegeneralmaximofBenevolencewouldbecommonlysaidtobe，``thatweoughttoloveallourfellow-men’’，or``allourfellow-creatures’’:but，aswehavealreadyseen，thereissomedoubtamongmoralistsastotheprecisemeaningoftheterm``love’’，inthisconnexion:since，accordingtoKantandothers，whatismorallyprescribedastheDutyofBenevolenceisnotstrictlytheaffectionofloveorkindness，sofarasthiscontainsanemotionalelement，butonlythedeterminationofthewilltoseekthegoodorhappinessofothers。

AndIagreethatitcannotbeastrictdutytofeelanemotion，sofarasitisnotdirectlywithinthepoweroftheWilltoproduceitatanygiventime。Still(asIhavesaid)itseemstomethatthisemotionalelementisincludedinourcommonnotionofCharityorPhilanthropy，regardedasaVirtue:andIthinkitparadoxicaltodenythatitraisesthemerebeneficentdispositionofthewilltoahigherdegreeofexcellence，andrendersitseffectsbetter。Ifthisbeso，itwillbeadutytocultivatetheaffectionsofarasitispossibletodoso:andindeedthiswouldseem(nolessthanthepermanentdispositiontodogood)tobeanormaleffectofrepeatedbeneficentresolvesandactions:since，ashasoftenbeenobserved，abenefittendstoexciteloveintheagenttowardstherecipientofthebenefit，nolessthanintherecipienttowardstheagent。Itmustbeadmitted，however，thatthiseffectislesscertainthantheproductionofthebenevolentdisposition；andthatsomemenarenaturallysounattractivetoothersthatthelattercanfeelnoaffection，thoughtheymayentertainbenevolentdispositions，towardstheformer。Atanyrate，itwouldseemtobeadutygenerally，andtillwefindtheeffortfruitless，tocultivatekindaffectionstowardsthosewhomweoughttobenefit；notonlybydoingkindactions，butbyplacingourselvesunderanynaturalinfluenceswhichexperienceshowstohaveatendencytoproduceaffection。

Butwehavestilltoascertainmoreparticularlythenatureoftheactionsinwhichthisaffectionordispositionofwillisshown。Theyaredescribedpopularlyas`doinggood’。

Nowwehavebeforenoticedthatthenotion`good’，inordinarythought，includes，undistinguishedandthereforeunharmonised，thedifferentconceptionsthatmenformoftheultimateendofrationalaction。Itfollowsthatthereisacorrespondingambiguityinthephrase`doinggood’:since，thoughmanywouldunhesitatinglytakeittomeanthepromotionofHappiness，thereareotherswho，holdingthatPerfectionandnotHappinessisthetrueultimateGood，consistentlymaintainthattherealwayto’dogood’topeopleistoincreasetheirvirtueoraidtheirprogresstowardsPerfection。Thereare，however，evenamonganti-Epicureanmoralists，some——suchasKant——who，takeinoppositeview，andarguethatmyneighbour’sVirtueorPerfectioncannotbeanendtome，becauseitdependsuponthefreeexerciseofhisownvolition，whichIcannothelporhinder。ButonthesamegroundsitmightequallywellbearguedthatIcannotcultivateVirtueinmyself，butonlypractiseitfrommomenttomoment:whereasevenKantdoesnotdenythatwecancultivatevirtuousdispositionsinourselves，andthatinotherwaysthanbytheperformanceofvirtuousacts:andCommonSensealwaysassumesthistobepossibleandprescribesitasaduty。Andsurelyitisequallyundeniablethatwecancultivatevirtueinothers:andindeedsuchcultivationisclearlythe