第22章

oursoleconcernatpresentiswithobjectionstendingtoshowtheintrinsicimpracticabilityofHedonismasarationalmethod。

Wearemet，inthefirstplace，byanobjectionwhich，ifvalidatall，mustbeadmittedtobedecisive。IthasbeenaffirmedbyGreenthat``pleasureasfeeling，indistinctionfromitsconditionsthatarenotfeelings，cannotbeconceived’’。Ifso，RationalHedonismwouldcertainlybeimpossible:

butthepropositionseemsequallyopposedtocommonsense，andtotheuniversalassumptionofempiricalpsychologists；who，ininvestigatingelaboratelyandsystematicallytheconditions，mentalandphysical，ofpleasureandpain，necessarilyassumethatthesefeelingscanbedistinguishedinthoughtfromtheir``conditionswhicharenotfeelings’’。IalsofindthatthewriterhimselffromwhomIhavequoted，inalatertreatise，conductslongargumentsrespectingpleasurewhichareonlyintelligibleifthedistinctionbetweenpleasureanditsconditionsisthoroughlygraspedandsteadilycontemplated。Indeedhecarriesadistinctionofthiskindtoanextremepointofsubtlety；asberequiresustodistinguishthe``self-satisfactionsoughtinalldesirethatamountstowill’’fromthe``pleasure’’that``thereisinallself-satisfactionifattained’’:whereasothermoralistsregardself-satisfactionasaspeciesofpleasure。Tomaintainthatwecandistinguishpleasurefromself-satisfactionandcannotdistinguishitfromitsconditions，seemstometooviolentaparadoxtoneedrefutation。

ItispossiblethatGreenmayonlymeanthatpleasurecannotbethoughttoexistapartfromconditionswhicharenotfeelings，andthatitnecessarilyvarieswithanyvariationinitsconditions。ThestatementthusinterpretedIdonotdeny:butitisquiteirrelevanttothequestionwhetherpleasurecanbeestimatedseparatelyfromitsconditions，orwhetherpleasuresreceivedunderdifferentconditionscanbequantitativelycompared。Icannothavethepleasureofwitnessingatragedyorthepleasureofwitnessingafarce，withouthavingalongwitheitheracomplexofinnumerablethoughtsandimages，verydiverseinqualityinthetwocases:butthisdoesnotpreventmefromdecidingconfidentlywhetherthetragedyorthefarcewillaffordmemostpleasureonthewhole。

passtoanotherobjectionmadebythesamewritertotheHedonisticconceptionofthesupremeendofactionas``thegreatestpossiblesumofpleasures’’。

(Itshouldbe``thegreatestpossiblesurplusofpleasureoverpain’’:

butthedifferenceisunimportantforthepresentargument。)Thephrase，hesays，is``intrinsicallyunmeaning’’:buthisjustificationforthisstatementappearstobedifferentindifferenttreatises。Atfirstheboldlyaffirmedthat``pleasantfeelingsarenotquantitiesthatcanbeadded’’，[5]

apparentlybecause``eachisoverbeforetheotherbegins’’。Thelatterstatement，however，isequallytrueofthepartsoftime:butitwouldbeobviouslyabsurdtosaythathours，days，yearsare``notquantitiesthatcanbeadded’’。PossiblythisconsiderationoccurredtoGreenbeforewritingtheProlegomenatoEthics:atanyrateinthelattertreatiseheadmitsthatstates``ofpleasantfeeling’’canbeaddedtogetherin``thought’’，onlydenyingthattheycanbeadded``inenjoymentorimaginationofenjoyment’’。[6]ButthisconcedesallthatisrequiredfortheHedonisticvaluationoffuturefeelings；noHedonisteversupposedthatthehappinessheaimsatmakingasgreataspossiblewassomethingtobeenjoyedallatonce，oreverwantedtoimagineitassoenjoyed。Andunlessthetransiencyofpleasurediminishesitspleasantness——apointwhichIwillpresentlyconsider——IcannotseethatthepossibilityofrealisingtheHedonisticendisatallaffectedbythenecessityofrealisingitinsuccessiveparts。

Green，inanotherpassage，appearstolaydownthat``anend’’whichis``toservethepurposeofacriterion’’must``enableustodistinguishactionsthatbringmennearertoitfromthosewhichdonot’’。This，however，wouldonlybethecaseifbyan``end’’isnecessarilymeantagoalorconsummation，which，aftergraduallydrawingnearertoit，wereachallatonce:butthisisnot，Iconceive，thesenseinwhichthewordisordinarilyunderstoodbyethicalwriters:andcertainlyallthatImeanbyitisanobjectofrationalaim——whetherattainedinsuccessivepartsornot——whichisnotsoughtasameanstotheattainmentofanyulteriorobject，butforitself。Andsolongasanyone’sprospectivebalanceofpleasureoverpainadmitsofbeingmadegreaterorlessbyimmediateactioninonewayoranother，thereseemsnoreasonwhy`MaximumHappines