第46章

But，again，tolaydownabsolutelythatthelawsofanycommunityoughttoexpressthewillofthemajorityofitsmembersseemsincompatiblewiththeviewsovigorouslymaintainedbySocratesandhismostfamousdisciples，thatlawsoughttobemadebypeoplewhounderstandlaw-making。Forthoughthemajorityofarepresentativeassemblyinaparticularcountryataparticulartimemaybemorefittomakelawsfortheircountrythananysetofexpertsotherwiseselected，itiscertainlynotself-evidentthatthiswillbeuniversallythecase。YetsurelytheSocraticproposition(whichismerelyaspecialapplicationoftheprinciplenoticedinthelatterpartoftheprecedingchapter，`thatfunctionshouldbeallottedtothefittest’)hasasmuchclaimtobeconsideredaprimaryintuitionastheonethatwehavebeendiscussing。Indeed，thesecularcontroversybetweenAristocracyandDemocracyseemsultimatelyreducibletoaconflictbetweenthosetwoprinciples:aconflictofwhichitisimpossibletofindasolution，solongastheargumentremainsintheaprioriregion。

However，todiscussthisexhaustivelywouldcarryustoofarbeyondtherangeofEthicsproper:butwemayperhapsconcludethatitisimpossibletoelicitfromCommonSenseanyclearandcertainintuitionsastotheprinciplesonwhichanidealconstitutionshouldbeconstructed。Andthereisanequalwantofagreementastotheintrinsiclawfulnessofintroducingsuchaconstitutioninviolationofthetraditionalandestablishedorderinanycommunity。Forsomethinkthatanationhasanaturalrighttoagovernmentapproximatelyconformedtotheideal，andthatthisrightmaybemaintainedbyforceinthelastresort。Others，however，holdthat，thoughtheidealpolitymayrightlybeputforwardandcommended，andeverymeansusedtopromoteitsrealisationwhichtheestablishedgovernmentinanycountrypermits，——still，rebellioncanneverbejustifiableforthispurposealone。Whileothers，——perhapsthemajority，——woulddecidethequestionongroundsofexpediency，balancingtheadvantagesofimprovementagainsttheevilsofdisorder。

Butfurther，aswesaw，itisnotsoeasytosaywhattheestablishedgovernmentis。Forsometimesanauthoritydeclaredbylawtobeillegitimateissuesordinancesandcontrolstheadministrationofjustice。Thequestionthenarises，howfarobedienceisduetosuchanauthority。Allareagreedthatusurpationoughttoberesisted；butastotherightbehaviourtowardsanestablishedgovernmentwhichhassprungfromasuccessfulusurpation，thereisagreatdifferenceofopinion。Somethinkthatitshouldberegardedaslegitimate，assoonasitisfirmlyestablished:othersthatitoughttobeobeyedatonce，butunderprotest，withthepurposeofrenewingtheconflictonafavourableopportunity:

othersthinkthatthislatteristherightattitudeatfirst，butthatausurpinggovernment，whenfirmlyestablished，losesitsillegitimacygradually，andthatitbecomes，afterawhile，ascriminaltorebelagainstitasitwasoriginallytoestablishit。Andthislastseems，onthewhole，theviewofCommonSense；butthepointatwhichthemetamorphosisisthoughttotakeplacecanhardlybedeterminedotherwisethanbyconsiderationsofexpediency。

Butagain，itisonlyinthecaseofanabsolutegovernment，wherecustomaryobedienceisunconditionallyduetooneormorepersons，thatthefundamentaldifficultiesofascertainingthelegitimacyofauthorityareofthesimplekindjustdiscussed。Inaconstitutionallygovernedstatenumerousothermoraldisagreementsarise。

For，insuchastate，whileitisofcourseheldthatthesovereignismorallyboundtoconformtotheconstitution，[1]itisstilldisputedwhetherthesubjects’obligationtoobedienceisproperlyconceivedasconditionaluponthisconformity:andwhethertheyhavethemoralright(1)torefuseobediencetoanunconstitutionalcommand；and(2)eventoinflictonthesovereignthepenaltyofrebellionforviolatingtheconstitut