第65章

noticed，astothechoicebetweenSubjectiveandObjectiverightnessintheexceptionalcaseinwhichalonethetwocanbepresentedasalternatives，——i。e。whenweareconsideringwhetherweshallinfluenceanothertoactcontrarytohisconvictionastowhatisright。Autilitarianwoulddecidethequestionbyweighingthefelicificconsequencesoftheparticularrightactagainsttheinfelicificresultstobeapprehendedhereafterfromthemoraldeteriorationofthepersonwhoseconscientiousconvictionswereoverbornebyothermotives:

unlesstheformereffectswereveryimportanthewouldreasonablyregardthedangertocharacterasthegreater:butiftheother’smistakensenseofdutythreatenedtocauseagravedisaster，hewouldnothesitatetooverbearitbyanymotiveswhichitwasinhispowertoapply。AndinpracticeIthinkthattheCommonSenseofmankindwouldcometosimilarconclusionsbymorevagueandsemi-consciousreasoningofthesamekind。

Inorder，however，toformapreciseestimateoftheextenttowhichUtilitarianismagreesordisagreeswithCommonSense，itseemsbesttoexaminethemoredefinitejudgmentsofrightandwronginconduct，undertheparticularheadsrepresentedbyourcommonnotionsofvirtuesandduties。Imaybeginbypointingoutoncemorethatsofarasanyadequatelyprecisedefinitionsofthesenotionsarefoundtoinvolve，implicitlyorexplicitly，thenotionof`good’orof`right’supposedalreadydeterminate，theycanaffordnogroundforopposingaUtilitarianinterpretationofthesefundamentalconceptions。Forexample，wesawthistobethecasewiththechiefoftheintellectualexcellencesdiscussedinBookiii。chap。

iii。Wisdom，ascommonlyconceived，isnotexactlythefacultyofchoosingtherightmeanstotheendofuniversalhappiness；rather，aswesaw，itsnotioninvolvesanuncriticalsynthesisofthedifferentendsandprinciplesthataredistinguishedandseparatelyexaminedinthepresenttreatise。

ButifitsimportisnotdistinctlyUtilitarian，itiscertainlynotanythingelseasdistinctfromUtilitarian:ifwecanonlydefineitasthefacultyorhabitofchoosingtherightorbestmeanstotherightorbestend，forthatveryreasonourdefinitionleavesitquiteopentoustogivethenotions`good’and`right’aUtilitarianimport。

LetusthenexaminefirstthegroupofvirtuesanddutiesdiscussedinBookiii。chap。iv。，undertheheadofBenevolence。Asregardsthegeneralconceptionoftheduty，thereis，Ithink，nodivergencethatweneedconsiderbetweentheIntuitionalandUtilitariansystems。ForthoughBenevolencewouldperhapsbemorecommonlydefinedasadispositiontopromotetheGoodofone’sfellow-creatures，ratherthantheirHappiness(asdefinitelyunderstoodbyUtilitarians)；still，asthechiefelementinthecommonnotionofgood(besideshappiness)ismoralgoodorVirtue，ifwecanshowthattheothervirtuesare——speakingbroadly——allqualitiesconducivetothehappinessoftheagenthimselforofothers，itisevidentthatBenevolence，whetheritpromptsustopromotethevirtueofothersortheirhappiness，willaimdirectlyorindirectlyattheUtilitarianend。[2]

Nor，further，doesthecomprehensiverangewhichUtilitariansgivetoBenevolence，instatingastheirultimateendthegreatesthappinessofallsentientbeings，seemtobereallyopposedtoCommonSense；forinsofarascertainIntuitionalmoralistsrestrictthescopeofthedirectdutyofBenevolencetohumanbeings，andregardourdutiestobruteanimalsasmerelyindirectandderived``fromthedutyofSelf-culture’’，theyratherthantheirUtilitarianopponentsappearparadoxical。Andif，inlayingdownthateachagentistoconsiderallotherhappinessasequallyimportantwithhisown，UtilitarianismseemstogobeyondthestandardofdutycommonlyprescribedundertheheadofBenevolence，ityetcallscarcelybesaidtoconflictwithCommonSenseonthispoint。ForthepracticalapplicationofthistheoreticalimpartialityofUtilitarianismislimitedbyseveralimportantconsiderations。Inthefirstplace，generallyspeaking，eachmanisbetterabletoprovideforhisownhappinessthanforthatofotherpersons，fromhismoreintimateknowledgeofhisowndesiresandneeds，andhisgreateropportunitiesofgratifyingthem。Andbesides，itisunderthestimulusofself-interestthattheactiveenergiesofmostmenaremosteasilyandthoroughlydrawnout:andifthiswer