第33章

Underthesecircumstances，tosaythatallsuchpersonsactrightly——intheobjectivesense——becausetheirmaximsallconformtoKant’sfundamentalrule，wouldobliteratealtogetherthedistinctionbetweensubjectiveandobjectiverightness；itwouldamounttoaffirmingthatwhateveranyonethinksrightisso，unlessheisinerrorastothefactsofthecasetowhichhisjudgmentapplies。Butsuchanaffirmationisinflagrantconflictwithcommonsense；andwouldrendertheconstructionofascientificcodeofmoralityfutile:astheveryobjectofsuchacodeistosupplyastandardforrectifyingmen’sdivergentopinions。

Wemayconcludethenthatthemoraljudgmentswhichthepresentmethodattemptstosystematiseareprimarilyandforthemostpartintuitionsoftherightnessorgoodness(orthereverse)ofparticularkindsofexternaleffectsofhumanvolition，presumedtobeintendedbytheagent，butconsideredindependentlyoftheagent’sownviewastotherightnessorwrongnessofhisintention；thoughthequalityofmotives，asdistinctfromintentions，hasalsotobetakenintoaccount。

Butthequestionmayberaised，whetheritislegitimatetotakeforgranted(asIhavehithertobeendoing)theexistenceofsuchintuitions？And，nodoubt，therearepersonswhodeliberatelydenythatreflectionenablesthemtodiscoveranysuchphenomenonintheirconsciousexperienceasthejudgmentorapparentperceptionthatanactisinitselfrightorgood，inanyothersensethanthatofbeingtherightorfitmeanstotheattainmentofsomeulteriorend。Ithink，however，thatsuchdenialsarecommonlyrecognisedasparadoxical，andopposedtothecommonexperienceofcivilisedmen:——atanyrateifthepsychologicalquestion，astotheexistenceofsuchmoraljudgmentsorapparentperceptionsofmoralqualities，iscarefullydistinguishedfromtheethicalquestionastotheirvalidity，andfromwhatwemaycallthe`psychogonical’questionastotheirorigin。Thefirstandsecondofthesequestionsaresometimesconfounded，owingtoanambiguityintheuseoftheterm``intuition’’；

whichhassometimesbeenunderstoodtoimplythatthejudgmentorapparentperceptionsodesignatedistrue。Iwishthereforetosayexpressly，thatbycallinganyaffirmationastotherightnessorwrongnessofactions``intuitive’’，Idonotmeantoprejudgethequestionastoitsultimatevalidity，whenphilosophicallyconsidered:Ionlymeanthatitstruthisapparentlyknownimmediately，andnotastheresultofreasoning。Iadmitthepossibilitythatanysuch``intuition’’mayturnouttohaveanelementoferror，whichsubsequentreflectionandcomparisonmayenableustocorrect；

justasmanyapparentperceptionsthroughtheorganofvisionarefoundtobepartiallyillusoryandmisleading:indeedthesequelwillshowthatIholdthistobetoanimportantextentthecasewithmoralintuitionscommonlysocalled。

Thequestionastothevalidityofmoralintuitionsbeingthusseparatedfromthesimplequestion`whethertheyactuallyexist’，itbecomesobviousthatthelattercanonlybedecidedforeachpersonbydirectintrospectionorreflection。Itmustnotthereforebesupposedthatitsdecisionisasimplematter，introspectionbeingalwaysinfallible:onthecontrary，experienceleadsmetoregardmenasoftenliabletoconfoundwithmoralintuitionsotherstatesoractsofmindessentiallydifferentfromthem，——blindimpulsestocertainkindsofactionorvaguesentimentsofpreferenceforthem，orconclusionsfromrapidandhalf-unconsciousprocessesofreasoning，orcurrentopinionstowhichfamiliarityhasgivenanillusoryairofself-evidence。Butanyerrorsofthiskind，duetocarelessorsuperficialreflection，canonlybecuredbymorecarefulreflection。

Thismayindeedbemuchaidedbycommunicationwithotherminds；itmayalsobeaided，inasubordinateway，byaninquiryintotheantecedentsoftheapparentintuition，whichmaysuggesttothereflectivemindsourcesoferrortowhichasuperficialviewofitisliable。Stillthequestionwhetheracertainjudgmentpresentsitselftothereflectivemindasintuitivelyknowncannotbedecidedbyanyinquiryintoitsantecedentsorcauses。

Itis，however，stil