第34章

Before，however，weattempttodefineparticularvirtuesordepartmentsofduty，itwillbewelltoexaminefurtherthenotionsofDutyandVirtueingeneral，andtherelationsbetweenthetwo，aswefindthemimplicitlyconceivedbythecommonsenseofmankind，whichweareendeavouringtoexpress。HithertoIhavetakenDutytobebroadlyconvertiblewithRightconduct:Ihavenoticed，however，thattheformerterm——like``ought’’and``moralobligation’’——impliesatleastthepotentialpresenceofmotivespromptingtowrongconduct；andisthereforenotapplicabletobeingstowhomnosuchconflictofmotivescanbeattributed。ThusGodisnotconceivedasperformingduties，thoughHeisconceivedasrealisingJusticeandotherkindsofRightnessinaction。Forasimilarreason，wedonotcommonlyapplytheterm`duty’torightactions——howevernecessaryandimportant——whenwearesostronglyimpelledtothembynon-moralinclinationsthatnomoralimpulseisconceivedtobenecessaryfortheirperformance。

Thuswedonotsaygenerallythatitisadutytoeatanddrinkenough:

thoughwedooftensaythistoinvalidswhohavelosttheirappetite。WeshouldthereforeperhapskeepmostclosetousageifwedefinedDutiesas`thoseRightactionsorabstinences，fortheadequateaccomplishmentofwhichamoralimpulseisconceivedtobeatleastoccasionallynecessary’。

Butasthislineofdistinctionisvague，andcontinuallyvarying，Ishallnotthinkitnecessarytodrawattentiontoitinthedetaileddiscussionofduties:itseemssufficienttopointoutthatweshallbechieflyconcernedwithsuchrightconductascomeswithinthedefinitionjustsuggested。

Itmaybesaid，however，thatthereisanotherimplicationintheterm``duty’’whichIhavesofaroverlooked，butwhichitsderivation-andthatoftheequivalentterm`obligation’plainlyindicates:

viz。thatitis``due’’orowedtosomeone。ButIthinkthatherethederivationdoesnotgoverntheestablishedusage:rather，itiscommonlyrecognisedthatdutiesowedtopersons，or``relative’’duties，areonlyonespecies，andthatsomeduties——as(e。g。)Truth-speaking——havenosuchrelativity。Nodoubtitispossibletoviewanydutyasrelativetothepersonorpersonsimmediatelyaffectedbyitsperformance；butitisnotusualtodothiswheretheimmediateeffectsareharmful——aswheretruth-speakingcausesaphysicallyinjuriousshocktothepersonaddressed——:

andthoughitmaystillbeconceivedtobeultimatelygoodforsociety，andso``due’’tothecommunityortohumanityatlarge，thattruthshouldeveninthiscasebespoken，thisconceptionhardlybelongstotheintuitionalviewthat`truthshouldbespokenregardlessofconsequences’。Again，itmaybethoughtbyreligiouspersonsthattheperformanceofdutiesisowednottothehumanorotherlivingbeingsaffectedbythem，buttoGodastheauthorofthemorallaw。AndIcertainlywouldnotdenythatourcommonconceptionofdutyinvolvesanimpliedrelationofanindividualwilltoauniversalwillconceivedasperfectlyrational:butIamnotpreparedtoaffirmthatthisimplicationisnecessary，andanadequatediscussionofthedifficultiesinvolvedinitwouldleadtometaphysicalcontroversieswhichIamdesirousofavoiding。Ipropose，therefore，inthisexpositionoftheIntuitionalmethod，toabstractfromthisrelationofDutygenerallytoaDivineWill:and，forreasonspartlysimilar，toleaveoutofconsiderationtheparticular``dutiestoGod’’whichIntuitionistshaveoftendistinguishedandclassified。Ourviewofthegeneralrulesof``dutytoman’’(ortootheranimals)——sofarassuchrulesareheldtobecognisablebymoralintuition——will，Iconceive，remainthesame，whetherornotweregardsuchrulesasimposedbyaSupremeRationalWill:sinceinanycasetheywillbesuchasweholditrationalforallmentoobey，andthereforesuchasaSupremeReasonwouldimpose。Ishallnotthereforetreattheterm``Duty’’asimplyingnecessarilyarelationeithertoauniversalImponentortotheindividualsprimarilyaffectedbytheperformanceofduties:butshalluseitasequivalentgenerallytoRightconduct，whilepracticallyconcentratingattentiononactsandabstinencesforwhichamoralimpulseisthoughttobemoreorlessrequired。

ThenotionofVirtuepresentsmorecomplexityanddifficulty，andrequirestobediscussedfromdifferentpointsofview。Wemaybeginbynoticingthatthereseemtobesomeparticularvirtues(suchasGenerosity)whichmayberealisedinactsobjectively——thoughnotsubjectively——wrong，fromwantofinsightintotheirconsequences:

andevensome(suchasCourage)whichmaybeexhibitedinwrongactsthatareknownbytheagenttobesuch。Butthoughthecontemplationofsuchactsexcitesinusaquasi-moraladmir