第64章

Ithasbeenbeforeobserved(Booki。chap。vi。)thatthetwosidesofthedoublerelationinwhichUtilitarianismstandstotheMoralityofCommonSensehavebeenrespectivelyprominentattwodifferentperiodsinthehistoryofEnglishethicalthought。SinceBenthamwehavebeenchieflyfamiliarwiththenegativeoraggressiveaspectoftheUtilitariandoctrine。

ButwhenCumberland，replyingtoHobbes，putforwardthegeneraltendencyofthereceivedmoralrulestopromotethe``commonGoodofallRationals’’

hisaimwassimplyConservative:itneveroccurstohimtoconsiderwhethertheserulesascommonlyformulatedareinanywayimperfect，andwhetherthereareanydiscrepanciesbetweensuchcommonmoralopinionsandtheconclusionsofRationalBenevolence。SoinShaftesbury’ssystemthe``Moral’’

or``ReflexSense’’issupposedtobealwayspleasedwiththat``balance’’

oftheaffectionswhichtendstothegoodorhappinessofthewhole，anddispleasedwiththeopposite。InHume’streatisethiscoincidenceisdrawnoutmoreindetail，andwithamoredefiniteassertionthattheperceptionofutility(orthereverse)isineachcasethesourceofthemorallikings(oraversions)whichareexcitedinusbydifferentqualitiesofhumancharacterandconduct。AndwemayobservethatthemostpenetratingamongHume’scontemporarycritics，AdamSmith，admitsunreservedlytheobjectivecoincidenceofRightnessorApprovednessandUtility:thoughhemaintains，inoppositiontoHume，that``itisnottheviewofthisutilityorhurtfulness，whichiseitherthefirstortheprincipalsourceofourapprobationordisapprobation’’。AfterstatingHume’stheorythat``noqualitiesofthemindareapprovedofasvirtuous，butsuchasareusefuloragreeableeithertothepersonhimselfortoothers，andnoqualitiesaredisapprovedofasviciousbutsuchashaveacontrarytendency’’；heremarksthat``Natureseemsindeedtohavesohappilyadjustedoursentimentsofapprobationanddisapprobationtotheconveniencybothoftheindividualandofthesociety，thatafterthestrictestexaminationitwillbefound，Ibelieve，thatthisisuniversallythecase。’’

AndnoonecanreadHume’sInquiryintotheFirstPrinciplesofMoralswithoutbeingconvincedofthisatleast，thatifalistweredrawnupofthequalitiesofcharacterandconductthataredirectlyorindirectlyproductiveofpleasuretoourselvesortoothers，itwouldincludeallthatarecommonlyknownasvirtues。Whateverbetheoriginofournotionofmoralgoodnessorexcellence，thereisnodoubtthat``Utility’’isageneralcharacteristicofthedispositionstowhichweapplyit:andthat，sofar，theMoralityofCommonSensemaybetrulyrepresentedasatleastunconsciouslyUtilitarian。Butitmaystillbeobjected，thatthiscoincidenceismerelygeneralandqualitative，andthatitbreaksdownwhenweattempttodrawitoutindetail，withthequantitativeprecisionwhichBenthamintroducedintothediscussion。

Andnodoubtthereisagreatdifferencebetweentheassertionthatvirtueisalwaysproductiveofhappiness，andtheassertionthattherightactionisunderallcircumstancesthatwhichwillproducethegreatestpossiblehappinessonthewhole。ButitmustbeborneinmindthatUtilitarianismisnotconcernedtoprovetheabsolutecoincidenceinresultsoftheIntuitionalandUtilitarianmethods。Indeed，ifitcouldsucceedinprovingasmuchasthis，itssuccesswouldbealmostfataltoitspracticalclaims；astheadoptionoftheUtilitarianprinciplewouldthenbecomeamatterofcompleteindifference。UtilitariansarerathercalledupontoshowanaturaltransitionfromtheMoralityofCommonSensetoUtilitarianism，somewhatlikethetransitioninspecialbranchesofpracticefromtrainedinstinctandempiricalrulestothetechnicalmethodthatembodiesaridappliestheconclusionsofscience:sothatUtilitarianismmaybepresentedasthescientificallycompleteandsystematicallyreflectiveformofthatregulationofconduct，whichthroughthewholecourseofhumanhistoryhasalwaystendedsubstantiallyinthesamedirection。Forthispurposeitisnotnecessarytoprovethatexistingmoralrulesaremoreconducivetothegeneralhappinessthananyothers:butonlytopointoutineachcasesomemanifestfelicifictendencywhichtheypossess。

Hume’sdissertation，however，incidentallyexhibitsmuchmorethanasimpleandgeneralharmonybetweenthemoralsentimentswithwhichwecommonlyregardactionsandtheirforeseenpleasurableandpainfulconsequences。And，infact，theUtilitarianargumentcannotbefairlyjudgedunlesswetakefullyintoaccountthecumulativeforcewhichitderivesfromthecomplexcharacterofthecoinc