第23章

Thereis，however，anotherwayinwhichthehabitofmindnecessarilyresultingfromthecontinualpracticeofhedonisticcomparisonissometimesthoughttobeunfavourabletotheattainmentofthehedonisticend:fromasupposedincompatibilitybetweenthehabitofreflectivelyobservingandexaminingpleasure，andthecapacityforexperiencingpleasureinnormalfulnessandintensity。Anditcertainlyseemsimportanttoconsiderwhateffectthecontinualattentiontoourpleasures，inordertoobservetheirdifferentdegrees，islikelytohaveonthesefeelingsthemselves。Theinquiryatfirstsightseemstoleadtoirreconcilablecontradictioninourviewofpleasure。Forifpleasureonlyexistsasitisfelt，themoreconsciousweareofit，themorepleasurewehave:anditwouldseemthatthemoreourattentionisdirectedtowardsit，themorefullyweshallbeconsciousofit。OntheotherhandHamilton’sstatementthat``knowledgeandfeeling’’(cognitionandpleasureorpainarealways``inacertaininverseproportiontoeachother’’，correspondsprimafacietoourcommonexperience:forthepurelycognitiveelementofconsciousnessseemstobeneitherpleasurablenorpainful，sothatthemoreourconsciousnessisoccupiedwithcognition，thelessroomthereseemstobeforfeeling。

Thisview，however，restsontheassumptionthatthetotalintensityofourconsciousnessisaconstantquantity；sothatwhenoneelementofitpositivelyincreases，therestmustpositively——aswellasrelatively——diminish。Anditdoesnotappeartomethatexperiencegivesusanyvalidgroundformakingthisgeneralassumption:itratherseemsthatatcertaintimesinourlifeintellectandfeelingaresimultaneouslyfeeble；sothatthesamementalexcitementmayintensifybothsimultaneously。

Stillitseemstobeafactthatanyverypowerfulfeeling，reaching，tothefullintensityofwhichourconsciousnessisnormallycapable，iscommonlydiminishedbyacontemporaneousstrokeofcognitiveeffort:henceitisageneraldifficultyinthewayofexactobservationofouremotionsthattheobjectcognisedseemstoshrinkanddwindleinproportionasthecognitiveregardgrowskeenandeager。Howthenarewetoreconcilethiswiththepropositionfirstlaiddown，thatpleasureonlyexistsasweareconsciousofit？Theanswerseemstobethatthemereconsciousnessofapresentfeeling——apartfromanydistinctrepresentativeelements——cannotdiminishthefeelingofwhichitisanindispensableandinseparablecondition:butinintrospectivecognitionwegobeyondthepresentfeeling，comparingandclassifyingitwithrememberedorimaginedfeelings；andtheeffortofrepresentingandcomparingtheseotherfeelingstendstodecreasethemerepresentativeconsciousnessoftheactualpleasure。

Iconclude，then，thatthereisarealdangerofdiminishingpleasurebytheattempttoobserveandestimateit。Butthedangerseemsonlytoariseinthecaseofveryintensepleasures，andonlyiftheattemptismadeatthemomentofactualenjoyment；andsincethemostdelightfulperiodsoflifehavefrequentlyrecurringintervalsofnearlyneutralfeeling，inwhichthepleasuresimmediatelypastmaybecomparedandestimatedwithoutanysuchdetriment，Idonotregardtheobjectionfoundedonthisdangerasparticularlyimportant。

Moreserious，inmyopinion，aretheobjectionsurgedagainstthepossibilityofperforming，withdefiniteandtrustworthyresults，thecomprehensiveandmethodicalcomparisonofpleasuresandpainswhichtheadoptionoftheHedonisticstandardinvolves。Icannotindeeddoubtthatmenhabituallycomparepleasuresandpainsinrespectoftheirintensity:that(e。g。)whenwepassfromonestateofconsciousnesstoanother，orwheninanywayweareledtorecallastatelongpast，weoftenunhesitatinglydeclarethepresentstatetobemoreorlesspleasantthanthepast:orthatwedeclaresomepleasantexperiencestohavebeen`worth’，andothers`notworth’，thetroubleittooktoobtainthem，orthepainthatfollowedthem。But，granti