第67章

Now，first，aconstantpartofthenotion，whichappearsinitevenwhentheJustisnotdistinguishedfromtheLegal，isimpartialityorthenegationofarbitraryinequality。Thisimpartiality，aswesaw(whetherexhibitedintheestablishmentorintheadministrationoflaws)，ismerelyaspecialapplicationofthewidermaximthatitcannotberighttotreattwopersonsdifferentlyiftheircasesaresimilarinallmaterialcircumstances。AndUtilitarianism，aswesaw，admitsthismaximnolessthanothersystemsofEthics。Atthesametime，thisnegativecriterionisclearlyinadequateforthecompletedeterminationofwhatisjustinlaws，orinconductgenerally；whenwehaveadmittedthis，itstillremainstoask，``Whataretheinequalitiesinlaws，andinthedistributionofpleasuresandpainsoutsidethesphereoflaw，whicharenotarbitraryandunreasonable？andtowhatgeneralprinciplescantheybereduced？’’

Hereinthefirstplacewemayexplain，onutilitarianprinciples，whyapparentlyarbitraryinequalityinacertainpartoftheconductofindividualsisnotregardedasinjusticeoreven——insomecases——asinanywaycensurable。Forfreedomofactionisanimportantsourceofhappinesstotheagents，andasociallyusefulstimulustotheirenergies:henceitisobviouslyexpedientthataman’sfreechoiceinthedistributionofwealthorkindservicesshouldnotberestrainedbythefearoflegalpenalties，orevenofsocialdisapprobation，beyondwhattheinterestsofothersclearlyrequire；andtherefore，whendistinctlyrecognisedclaimsaresatisfied，itisprotantoexpedientthatthemerepreferencesofanindividualshouldbetreatedbyothersaslegitimategroundsforinequalityinthedistributionofhispropertyorservices。Nay，aswehavebeforeseen，itiswithincertainlimitsexpedientthateachindividualshouldpracticallyregardhisownunreasonedimpulsesasreasonablegroundsofaction:asintherenderingofservicespromptedbysuchaffectionsasarenormallyandproperlyspontaneousandunforced。

Passingtoconsiderthegeneralprinciplesuponwhich`justclaims’ascommonlyrecognisedappeartobebased，wenoticethatthegroundsofanumberofsuchclaimsmaybebroughtunderthegeneralheadof`normalexpectations’；

butthatthestringencyofsuchobligationsvariesmuchindegree，accordingastheexpectationsarebasedupondefiniteengagements，oronsomevaguemutualunderstanding，oraremerelysuchasanaveragemanwouldformfrompastexperienceoftheconductofothermen。IntheselattercasesCommonSenseappearedtobesomewhatperplexedastothevalidityoftheclaims。

ButfortheUtilitarianthedifficultyhasceasedtoexist。Hewillholdanydisappointmentofexpectationstobeprotantoanevil，butagreaterevilinproportiontotheprevioussecurityoftheexpectantindividual，fromthegreatershockthusgiventohisrelianceontheconductofhisfellow-mengenerally:andmanytimesgreaterinproportionastheexpectationisgenerallyrecognisedasnormalandreasonable，asinthiscasetheshockextendstoallwhoareinanywaycognisantofhisdisappointment。

Theimportancetomankindofbeingabletorelyoneachother’sactionsissogreat，thatinordinarycasesofabsolutelydefiniteengagementsthereisscarcelyanyadvantagethatcancounterbalancetheharmdonebyviolatingthem。Still，wefoundthatseveralexceptionsandqualificationstotheruleofGoodFaithweremoreorlessdistinctlyrecognisedbyCommonSense:andmostofthesehaveautilitarianbasis，whichitdoesnotneedmuchpenetrationtodiscern。Tobegin，wemaynoticethatthesuperficialviewoftheobligationofapromisewhichmakesitdependontheassertionofthepromiser，andnot，asUtilitarianshold，ontheexpectationsproducedinthepromisee，cannotfairlybeattributedtoCommonSense:whichcertainlycondemnsabreachofpromisemuchmorestronglywhenothershaveactedinrelianceonit，thanwhenitsobservancedidnotdirectlyconcernothers，sothatitsbreachinvolvesforthemonlytheindirectevilofabadprecedent，aswhenamanbreaksapledgeoftotalabstinence。Wesee，again，howtheutilitarianreasonsforkeepingapromisearediminishedbyamaterialchangeofcircumstances，forinthatcasetheexpectationsdisappointedbybreakingitareatleastnotthosewhichthepromiseoriginallycreated。

Itisobvious，too，thatitisadisadvantagetothecommunitythatmenshouldbeabletorelyontheperformanceofpromisesprocuredbyfraudorunlawfulforce，sofarasencouragementistherebygiventotheuseoffraudorforceforthisend。Wes