第59章

Amonglatermoralists，Kantisespeciallynotedforhisrigourinseparatingthepurelyrationalelementofthemoralcode:andhisethicalviewalsoappearstometocoincidetoaconsiderableextent，ifnotcompletely，withthatsetforthintheprecedingsection。Ihavealreadynoticedthathisfundamentalprincipleofdutyisthe`formal’ruleof``actingonamaximthatonecanwilltobelawuniversal’’；which，dulyrestricted，isanimmediatepracticalcorollaryfromtheprinciplethatIfirstnoticedintheprecedingsection。Andwefindthatwhenhecomestoconsidertheendsatwhichvirtuousactionisaimed，theonlyreallyultimateendwhichhelaysdownistheobjectofRationalBenevolenceascommonlyconceived——thehappinessofothermen。[7]Heregardsitasevidentapriorithateachmanasarationalagentisboundtoaimatthehappinessofothermen:indeed，inhisview，itcanonlybestatedasadutyformetoseekmyownhappinesssofarasIconsideritasapartofthehappinessofmankindingeneral。Idisagreewiththenegativesideofthisstatement，asIholdwithButlerthat``one’sownhappinessisamanifestobligation’’

independentlyofone’srelationtoothermen；but，regardedonitspositiveside，Kant’sconclusionappearstoagreetoagreatextentwiththeviewofthedutyofRationalBenevolencethatIhavegiven:——thoughIamnotaltogetherabletoassenttotheargumentsbywhichKantarrivesathisconclusion。

1mustnowpointout——ifithasnotlongbeenapparenttothereader——thattheself-evidentprincipleslaiddownin§；3donotspeciallybelongtoIntuitionisminthe，restrictedsensewhich，forcleardistinctionofmethods，Igavetothistermattheoutsetofourinvestigation。TheaxiomofPrudence，asIhavegivenit，isaself-evidentprinciple，impliedinRationalEgoismascommonlyaccepted。

Again，theaxiomofJusticeorEquityasabovestated——`thatsimilarcasesoughttobetreatedsimilarly’——belongsinallitsapplicationstoUtilitarianismasmuchastoanysystemcommonlycalledIntuitional:whiletheaxiomofRationalBenevolenceis，inmyview，requiredasarationalbasisfortheUtilitariansystem。

Accordingly，IfindthatIarrive，inmysearchforreallyclearandcertainethicalintuitions，atthefundamentalprincipleofUtilitarianism。Imust，however，admitthatthethinkerswhoinrecenttimeshavetaughtthislattersystem，havenot，forthemostpart，expresslytriedtoexhibitthetruthoftheirfirstprinciplebymeansofanysuchprocedureasthatabovegiven。Still，whenIexaminethe``proof’’ofthe``principleofUtility’’presentedbythemostpersuasiveandprobablythemostinfluentialamongEnglishexpositorsofUtilitarianism，——J。S。

Mill，——Ifindtheneedofsomesuchproceduretocompletetheargumentveryplainandpalpable。

Millbeginsbyexplainingthatthough``questionsofultimateendsarenotamenable’’

to``proofintheordinaryandpopularmeaningoftheterm’’，thereisalargermeaningofthewordproof’’inwhichtheyareamenabletoit。

Thesubject’’，hesays，is``withinthecognisanceoftherationalfaculty？onsiderationsmaybepresentedcapableofdeterminingtheintellecttoaccept’’theUtilitarianformula。HesubsequentlymakesclearthatbyacceptanceoftheUtilitarianformula’’hemeanstheacceptance，notoftheagent’sowngreatesthappiness，butof``thegreatestamountofhappinessaltogether’’astheultimate``endofhumanaction’’and``standardofmorality’’:topromotewhichis，intheUtilitarianview，thesupremedirectiveruleofhumanconduct’’。Thenwhenhecomestogivetheproof’’——inthelargersensebeforeexplained——ofthisruleorformula，heoffersthefollowingargument。``Thesoleevidenceitispossibletoproducethatanythingisdesirable，isthatpeopledoactuallydesireit？Noreasoncanbegivenwhythegeneralhappinessisdesirable，exceptthateachperson，sofarashebelievesittobeattainable，desireshisownhappiness。This，however，beingafact，wehavenotonlyalltheproofwhichthecaseadmitsof，butallwhichitispossibletorequire，thathappinessisagood:

thateachperson’shappinessisagoodtothatperson，andthegeneralhappiness，therefore，agoodtotheaggregateofpersons。’’[2]Hethengoesontoarguethatpleasure，andpleasurealone，iswhatallmenactuallydodesire。

Now，aswehaveseen，itisasa``standardofrightandwrong’’，or``directiveruleofconduct’’，thattheutilitarianprincipleisputforwardbyMill:hence，ingivingasastatementofthisprinciplethat``thegeneralhappinessisdesirable’’，hemustbeunderstoodtomean(andhiswholetreatiseshowsthathedoesmean)thatitiswhateachindividualoughttodesire，oratleast——inth