第61章

IfthenUltimateGoodcanonlybeconceivedasDesirableConsciousness——includingtheConsciousnessofVirtueasapartbutonlyasapart——arewetoidentifythisnotionwithHappinessorPleasure，andsaywiththeUtilitariansthatGeneralGoodisgeneralhappiness？Manywouldatthispointofthediscussionregardthisconclusionasinevitable:tosaythatallotherthingscalledgoodareonlymeanstotheendofmakingconsciouslifebetterormoredesirable，seemstothemthesameassayingthattheyaremeanstotheendofhappiness。Butveryimportantdistinctionsremaintobeconsidered。

Accordingtotheviewtakeninapreviouschapter，inaffirmingUltimateGoodtobeHappinessorPleasure，weimply(1)thatnothingisdesirableexceptdesirablefeelings，and(2)thatthedesirabilityofeachfeelingisonlydirectlycognisablebythesentientindividualatthetimeoffeelingit，andthatthereforethisparticularjudgmentofthesentientindividualmustbetakenasfinalonthequestionhowfareachelementoffeelinghasthequalityofUltimateGood。Nownoone，Iconceive，wouldestimateinanyotherwaythedesirabilityoffeelingconsideredmerelyasfeeling:

butitmaybeurgedthatourconsciousexperienceincludesbesidesFeelings，CognitionsandVolitions，andthatthedesirabilityofthesemustbetakenintoaccount，andisnottobeestimatedbythestandardabovestated。

Ithink，however，thatwhenwereflectonacognitionasatransientfactofanindividual’spsychicalexperience，distinguishingitontheonehandfromthefeelingthatnormallyaccompaniesit，andontheotherhandfromthatrelationoftheknowingmindtotheobjectknownwhichisimpliedintheterm``true’’or``validcognition’’——itisseentobeanelementofconsciousnessquiteneutralinrespectofdesirability:andthesamemaybesaidofVolitions，whenweabstractfromtheirconcomitantfeelings，andtheirrelationtoanobjectivenormorideal，aswellasfromalltheirconsequences。Itisnodoubttruethatinordinarythoughtcertainstatesofconsciousness——suchasCognitionofTruth，ContemplationofBeauty，VolitiontorealiseFreedomorVirtue——aresometimesjudgedtobepreferableonothergroundsthantheirpleasantness:butthegeneralexplanationofthisseemstobe(aswassuggestedinBookii。chap。ii。§；2)thatwhatinsuchcaseswereallypreferisnotthepresentconsciousnessitself，buteithereffectsonfutureconsciousnessmoreorlessdistinctlyforeseen，orelsesomething，intheobjectiverelationsoftheconsciousbeing，notstrictlyincludedinhispresentconsciousness。

Thesecondofthesealternativesmayperhapsbemadeclearerbysomeillustrations。Amanmaypreferthementalstateofapprehendingtruthtothestateofhalf-relianceongenerallyaccreditedfictions，[4]whilerecognisingthattheformerstatemaybemorepainfulthanthelatter，andindependentlyofanyeffectwhichheexpectseitherstatetohaveuponhissubsequentconsciousness。Here，onmyview，therealobjectofpreferenceisnottheconsciousnessofknowingtruth，consideredmerelyasconsciousness，——theelementofpleasureorsatisfactioninthisbeingmorethanoutweighedbytheconcomitantpain，——buttherelationbetweenthemindandsomethingelse，which，astheverynotionof`truth’implies，iswhateveritisindependentlyofourcognitionofit，andwhichIthereforecallobjective。Thismaybecomemoreclearifweimagineourselveslearningafterwardsthatwhatwetookfortruthisnotreallysuch:forinthiscaseweshouldcertainlyfeelthatourpreferencebadbeenmistaken——whereasifourchoicehadreallybeenbetweentwoelementsoftransientconsciousness，itsreasonablenesscouldnotbeaffectedbyanysubsequentdiscovery。

Similarly，amanmaypreferfreedomandpenurytoalifeofluxuriousservitude，notbecausethepleasantconsciousnessofbeingfreeoutweighsinprospectallthecomfortsandsecuritiesthattheotherlifewouldafford，butbecausehehasapredominantaversiontothatrelationbetweenhiswillandthewillofanotherwhichwecallslavery:or，again，aphilosophermaychoosewhatheconceivesas`innerfreedom’——theconsistentself-determinationofthewill——ratherthanthegratificationsofappetite；thoughrecognisingthatthelatteraremoredesirable，consideredmerelyastransientfeelings。Ineithercase，hewillbeledtoregardhispreferenceasmistaken，ifhebeafterwardspersuadedthathisconceptionofFreedomorself-determinationwasillusory；

thatweareallslavesofcircumstances，destiny，etc。

Soagain，thepreferenceofconformitytoVirtue，orcontemplation。ofBeauty，toastateofconsciousnessrecognisedasmorepleasantseemstodependonabeliefthatone’sconceptionofVirtueorBea