第35章

Itfurtherappearstomethatinthecaseofmanyimportantvirtueswedonotcommonlyconsidertheultimatespringofaction——whetheritbesomeemotionalimpulseortherationalchoiceofdutyasduty——inattributingaparticularvirtuetoparticularpersons:whatweregardasindispensableismerelyasettledresolvetowillacertainkindofexternaleffects。Thuswecallamanveraciousifhisspeechexhibits，inanoteworthydegree，asettledendeavourtoproduceinthemindsofothersimpressionsexactlycorrespondenttothefacts，whateverhismotivemaybeforsodoing:

whetherheismoved，solelyormainly，byaregardforvirtue，orasenseofthedegradationoffalsehood，oraconvictionthattruth-speakingisinthelongrunthebestpolicy，orasympatheticaversiontotheinconvenienceswhichmisleadingstatementscausetootherpeople。Idonotmeanthatweregardthesemotivesasofequalmoralvalue:butthatthepresenceorabsenceofanyoneorotherofthemisnotimpliedinourattributionofthevirtueofveracity。SimilarlyweattributeJustice，ifamanhasasettledhabitofweighingdiverseclaimsandfulfillingthemintheratiooftheirimportance；GoodFaithifhehasasettledhabitofstrictlykeepingexpressortacitengagements:andsoforth。Evenwhereweclearlytakemotivesintoaccount，injudgingofthedegreeofvirtueitisoftenrathertheforceofseductivemotivesresistedthantheparticularnatureoftheprevailingspringsofactionwhichweconsider。Thuswecertainlythinkvirtuehasbeenmanifestedinahigherdegreeinjustorveraciousconduct，whentheagenthadstrongtemptationstobeunjustorunveracious；andinthesamewaytherearecertaindispositionsorhabitstendingtogoodconductwhicharecalledvirtueswhentherearepowerfulseductivemotivesoperatingandnototherwise；e。g。whenweattributethevirtueoftemperancetoamanwhoeatsanddrinksaproperamount，itisbecausewealsoattributetohimappetitespromptingtoexcess。

AtthesametimeIadmitthatCommonSenseseemsliabletosomeperplexityastotherelationofvirtuetothemoraleffortrequiredforresistingunvirtuousimpulses。Ontheonehandageneralassentwouldbegiventothepropositionthatvirtueisespeciallydrawnoutandexhibitedinasuccessfulconflictwithnaturalinclination:andperhapseventothemoreextremestatementthatthereisnovirtueindoingwhatonelikes。OntheotherhandweshouldsurelyagreewithAristotlethatVirtueisimperfectsolongastheagentcannotdothevirtuousactionwithoutaconflictofimpulses；sinceitisfromawrongbentofnaturalimpulsethatwefindithardtodowhatisbest，anditseemsabsurdtosaythatthemorewecureourselvesofthiswrongbent，thelessvirtuouswegrow。PerhapswemaysolvethedifficultybyrecognisingthatourcommonideaofVirtueincludestwodistinctelements，theonebeingthemostperfectidealofmoralexcellencethatweareabletoconceiveforhumanbeings，whiletheotherismanifestedintheeffortofimperfectmentoattainthisideal。Thusinproportionasamancomestolikeanyparticularkindofgoodconductandtodoitwithoutmoraleffort，weshallnotsaythathisconductbecomeslessvirtuousbutrathermoreinconformitywithatruemoralideal；whileatthesametimeweshallrecognisethatinthisdepartmentofhislifehehaslessroomtoexhibitthatotherkindofvirtuewhichismanifestedinresistancetoseductiveimpulses，andintheenergeticstrivingofthewilltogetnearertoidealperfection。

SofarIhavebeenconsideringthemanifestationofvirtueinemotionsandvolitions，andhavenotexpresslyadvertedtotheintellectualconditionsofvirtuousacts:thoughinspeakingofsuchactsitisofcourseimpliedthatthevolitionisaccompaniedwithanintellectualrepresentationoftheparticulareffectswilled。Itisnot，however，impliedthatinwillingsucheffectswemustnecessarilythinkofthemasrightorgood:andIdonotmyselfthinkthat，intheviewofcommonsense，thisisanindispensableconditionofthevirtuousnessofanact；foritseemsthatsomekindsofvirtuousactsmaybedonesoentirelywithoutdeliberationthatnomoraljudgmentwaspassedonthembytheagent。Thismightbethecase，forinstance，withanactofheroiccourage，promptedbyanimpulseofsympathywithafellow-creatureinsuddenperil。Butitis，Iconceive，clearlynecessarythatsuchanactshouldnotbeevenvaguelythoughttobebad。AsIhavealreadysaid，itismoredoubtfulhowfaranactwhichisconceivedbytheagenttobegood，butwhichisreallybad，iseverjudgedbycommonsensetobevirtuous:bu