第28章

andexperienceseemstoshowusmanyexamplesofpersonswhoatleastapproximateascloselytothistypeasanyoneelsedoestotheidealoftheorthodoxmoralist。HenceiftheregulationofConsciencebedemonstrablythebestmeanstotheindividual’shappiness，itmustbebecausetheorderkeptbySelf-loveinvolvesasacrificeofpleasureonthewhole，ascomparedwiththeorderkeptbyConscience。Andifthisisthecase，itwouldseemthatitcanonlybeonaccountofthespecialemotionalpleasureattendingthesatisfactionofthemoralsentiments，orspecialpainorlossofhappinessconsequentontheirrepressionandviolation。

Before，however，weproceedfurther，afundamentaldifficultymustberemovedwhichhasprobablysometimesincesuggesteditselftothereader。Ifamanthinksitreasonabletoseekhisowninterest，itisclearthathecannothimselfdisapproveofanyconductthatcomesunderthisprincipleorapproveoftheopposite。AndhenceitmayappearthatthepleasuresandpainsofconsciencecannotenterintothecalculationwhetheracertaincourseofconductisorisnotinaccordancewithRationalEgoism，becausetheycannotattachthemselvesintheegoist’smindtoanymodesofactionwhichhavenotbeenalreadydecided，onothergrounds，tobereasonableorthereverse。Andthisistoacertainextenttrue；

butwemusthererecurtothedistinction(indicatedinBooki。chap。iii，§；1)betweenthegeneralimpulsetodowhatwebelievetobereasonable，andspecialsentimentsoflikingoraversionforspecialkindsofconduct，independentoftheirreasonableness。Inthemoralsentimentsastheyexistinordinarymen，thesetwokindsoffeelingareindistinguishablyblended；

becauseitiscommonlybelievedthattherulesofconducttowhichthecommonmoralsentimentsareattachedareinsomewayorotherreasonable。

Wecan，however，conceivethetwoseparated:andinfact，aswasbeforesaid，wehaveexperienceofsuchseparationwheneveramanisledbyaprocessofthoughttoadoptadifferentviewofmoralityfromthatinwhichhehasbeentrained；forinsuchacasetherewillalwaysremaininhismindsomequasi-morallikingsandaversions，nolongersustainedbyhisdeliberatejudgmentofrightandwrong。Andthusthereiseveryreasontobelievethatmostmen，howeverfirmlytheymightadopttheprinciplesofEgoisticHedonism，wouldstillfeelsentimentspromptingtotheperformanceofsocialduty，ascommonlyrecognisedintheirsociety，independentlyofanyconclusionthattheactionspromptedbysuchsentimentswerereasonableandright。Forsuchsentimentswouldalwaysbepowerfullysupportedbythesympathyofothers，andtheirexpressionsofpraiseandblame，likingandaversion:andsinceitisagreedthattheconductcommonlyrecognisedasvirtuousisgenerallycoincidentwiththatwhichenlightenedself-lovewoulddictate，arationalegoist’shabitsofconductwillbesuchasnaturallyto，fosterthese(forhim)`quasi-moral’feelings。Thequestionthereforearises——notwhethertheegoistshouldcherishandindulgethesesentimentsuptoacertainpoint，whichallwouldadmit——butwhetherhecanconsistentlyencouragethemtogrowtosuchapitchthattheywillalwaysprevailoverthestrongestopposingconsiderations；or，toputitotherwise，whetherprudencerequireshimtogivethemthereinandletthemcarryhimwhithertheywill。WehavealreadyseengroundforbelievingthatRationalSelf-lovewillbestattainitsendbylimitingitsconsciousoperationandallowingfreeplaytodisinterestedimpulses:canweacceptthefurtherparadoxthatitisreasonableforittoabdicatealtogetheritssupremacyoversomeoftheseimpulses？

Onacarefulconsiderationofthematter，itwillappear，Ithink，thatthisabdicationofself-loveisnotreallyapossibleoccurrenceinthemindofasaneperson，whostillregardshisowninterestasthereasonableultimateendofhisactions。Suchamanmay，nodoubt，resolvethathewilldevotehimselfunreservedlytothepracticeofvirtue，withoutanyparticularconsiderationofwhatappearstohimtobehisinterest:

hemayperformaseriesofactsinaccordancewiththisresolution，andthesemaygraduallyforminhimstronghabitualtendenciestoactsofasimilarkind。Butitdoesnotseemthatthesehabitsofvirtuecaneverbecomesostrongastogainirresistiblecontroloverasaneandreasonablewill。Whentheoccasioncomesonwhichvirtuedemandsfromsuchamananextremesacrifice——theimprudenceofwhichmustforceitselfuponhisnotice，howeverlittlehemaybeinthehabitofweighinghisownpleasuresandpains——hemustalwaysbeabletodeliberateafresh，andtoact(asfarasthecontrolofhiswillextends)withoutreferencetohispastactions。

Itmay，however，besaidthat，thoughanegoistretaininghisbeliefinrationalegoismcannotthusabandonhiswilltotheswayofmoralenthusiasm，still，supposingitpossibleforhimtochangehisconvictionandpreferdutytointerest，——orsupposingwecomparehimwithanothermanwhomakesthischoice——weshallfindthatagaininhappinessonthewholeresultsfromthispreference。Itmaybeheldthatthepleasurableemotionsattendantuponsuchvirtuousorqua