第32章

Butnoone，Ithink，willcontendthatwecanalwayssuppressentirelyastrongemotion；andsuchsuppressionwillbeespeciallydifficultifwearetodotheacttowhichthewrongimpulseprompts；whileyet，ifthatactbeclearlyadutywhichnooneelsecansoproperlyperform，itwouldbeabsurdtosaythatweoughttoomititbecausewecannotaltogetherexcludeanobjectionablemotive。Itissometimessaidthat，thoughwemaynotbeableindoingourdutytoexcludeabadmotivealtogetherfromourminds，itisstillpossibletorefusetoactfromit。ButIthinkthatthisisonlypossiblesofarasthedetailsofactiontowhicharightmotivewouldpromptdiffertosomeextentfromthosetowhichawrongmotivewouldprompt。Nodoubtthisisoftenthecase:——thus，inBentham’sexample，amalevolentprosecutormaybepromptedtotakeunfairadvantageofhisenemy，orcausehimneedlesspainbystudiedinsults；anditisobviouslypossibleforhim——andhisduty——toresistsuchpromptings。Butsofaraspreciselythesameactionispromptedbytwodifferentmotives，bothpresentinmyconsciousness，Iamnotconsciousofanypowertocausethisactiontobedeterminedbyoneofthetwomotivestotheexclusionoftheother。Inotherwords，whileamancanresolvetoaimatanyendwhichheconceivesasapossibleresultofhisvoluntaryaction，hecannotsimultaneouslyresolvenottoaimatanyotherendwhichhebelieveswillbepromotedbythesameaction；andifthatotherendbeanobjectofdesiretohim，hecannot，whileaimingatit，refusetoactfromthisdesire。[4]

Onthewhole，then，Iconclude(1)thatwhilemanyactionsarecommonlyjudgedtobemadebetterorworsebythepresenceorabsenceofcertainmotives，ourjudgmentsofrightandwrongstrictlyspeakingrelatetointentions，asdistinguishedfrommotives；and(2)thatwhileintentionsaffectingtheagent’sownfeelingsandcharacteraremorallyprescribednolessthanintentionstoproducecertainexternaleffects，still，thelatterformtheprimary——thoughnotthesole——contentofthemainprescriptionsofduty，ascommonlyaffirmedandunderstood:buttheextenttowhichthisisthecase，willbecomemoreclearasweproceed。

Ithasindeedbeenmaintainedbymoralistsofinfluencethatthemoralvalueofourconductdependsuponthedegreetowhichweareactuatedbytheonemotivewhichtheyregardastrulymoral:viz。thedesireorfreechoiceofdoingwhatisrightassuch，realisingdutyorvirtuefordutyorvirtue’ssake:andthataperfectlygoodactmustbedoneentirelyfromthismotive。

Ithink，however，thatitisdifficulttocombinethisview——whichImayconvenientlydistinguishasStoical——withthebelief，whichmodernorthodoxmoralistshaveusuallybeenconcernedtomaintain，thatitisalwaysaman’strueinteresttoactvirtuously。Idonotmeanthatamanwhoholdsthisbeliefmustnecessarilybeanegoist:butitseemstomeimpossibleforhimtoexcludefromhismotivesaregardforhisowninterest，whileyetbelievingthatitwillbepromotedbytheactwhichheiswillingIf，therefore，weholdthatthisself-regardimpairsthemoralvalueofanactotherwisevirtuous，andatthesametimeholdthatvirtueisalwaysconducivetothevirtuousagent’sinterest，weseemdriventotheconclusionthatknowledgeofthetruerelationbetweenvirtueandhappinessisaninsuperableobstacletotheattainmentofmoralperfection。Icannotacceptthisparadox:andinsubsequentchaptersIshalltrytoshowthattheStoicalviewofmoralgoodnessisnotonthewholesustainedbyacomprehensivesurveyandcomparisonofcommonmoraljudgments:sinceinsomecasesactsappeartohavethequalityofvirtueevenmorestrikinglywhenperformedfromsomemotiveotherthantheloveofvirtueassuch。ForthepresentIwishrathertopointoutthatthedoctrineabovestatedisdiametricallyopposedtotheviewthattheuniversalornormalmotivesofhumanactionareeitherparticulardesiresofpleasureoraversionstopainfortheagenthimself，orthemoregeneralregardtohishappinessonthewholewhichItermSelf-lovethatitalsoexcludesthelessextremedoctrinethatdutiesmaybetosomeextentproperlydonefromsuchself-regardingmotives；andthatoneorotherofthesepositionshasfrequentlybeenheldbywriterswhohaveexpresslyadoptedanIntuitionalmethodofEthics。

Forinstance，wefindLockelayingdown，withoutreserveorqualification，that``goodandevilarenothingbutpleasureandpain，orthatwhichoccasionsorprocurespleasureorpaintous’’[6]:sothat``itwouldbeutterlyinvaintosupposearulesettothefreeactionsofman，withoutannexingittosomerewardorpunishmenttodeterminehiswill’’。Ontheotherhand，heexpresses，wi