第62章

ofreason。Butgrantingtheallegeddifference，Idonotseethatitconstitutesanargumentagainsttheviewheremaintained，sincetheindividualisessentiallyandfundamentallydifferentfromthelargerwhole——theuniverseofsentientbeings——ofwhichheisconsciousofbeingapart；justbecausehehasaknownrelationtosimilarpartsofthesamewhole，whilethewholeitselfhasnosuchrelation。Iaccordinglyseenoinconsistencyinholdingthatwhileitwouldbereasonablefortheaggregateofsentientbeings，ifitcouldactcollectively，toaimatitsownhappinessonlyasanultimateend——andwouldbereasonableforanyindividualtodothesame，ifheweretheonlysentientbeingintheuniverse——itmayyetbeactuallyreasonableforanindividualtosacrificehisownGoodorhappinessforthegreaterhappinessofothers。

AtthesametimeIadmitthat，intheearlierageofethicalthoughtwhichGreekphilosophyrepresents，mensometimesjudgedanacttobe`good’fortheagent，evenwhilerecognisingthatitsconsequenceswouldbeonthewholepainfultohim，——as(e。g。)aheroicexchangeofalifefullofhappinessforapainfuldeathatthecallofduty。Iattributethispartlytoaconfusionofthoughtbetweenwhatitisreasonableforanindividualtodesire，whenheconsidershisownexistencealone，andwhathemustrecogniseasreasonablytobedesired，whenhetakesthepointofviewofalargerwhole:partly，again，toafaithdeeplyrootedinthemoralconsciousnessofmankind，thattherecannotbereallyandultimatelyanyconflictbetweenthetwokindsofreasonableness。Butwhen`ReasonableSelf-love’hasbeenclearlydistinguishedfromConscience，asitisbyButlerandhisfollowers，wefinditisnaturallyunderstoodtomeandesireforone’sownHappiness:sothatinfacttheinterpretationof`one’sowngood’，whichwasalmostpeculiarinancientthoughttotheCyrenaicandEpicureanheresies，isadoptedbysomeofthemostorthodoxofmodernmoralists。

Indeeditoftendoesnotseemtohaveoccurredtotheselatterthatthisnotioncanhaveanyotherinterpretation。[4]If，then，whenanyonehypotheticallyconcentrateshisattentiononhimself，GoodisnaturallyandalmostinevitablyconceivedtobePleasure，wemayreasonablyconcludethattheGoodofanynumberofsimilarbeings，whatevertheirmutualrelationsmaybe，cannotbeessentiallydifferentinquality。

IV。Butlastly，fromtheuniversalpointofviewnolessthanfromthatoftheindividual，itseemstruethatHappinessislikelytobebetterattainediftheextenttowhichwesetourselvesconsciouslytoaimatitbecarefullyrestricted。Andthisnotonlybecauseactionislikelytobemoreeffectiveifoureffortistemporarilyconcentratedontherealisationofmorelimitedends——thoughthisisnodoubtanimportantreason:——butalsobecausethefullestdevelopmentofhappylifeforeachindividualseemstorequirethatheshouldhaveotherexternalobjectsofinterestbesidesthehappinessofotherconsciousbeings。Andthuswemayconcludethatthepursuitoftheidealobjectsbeforementioned，Virtue，Truth，Freedom，Beauty，etc。，fortheirownsakes，isindirectlyandsecondarily，thoughnotprimarilyandabsolutely，rational；onaccountnotonlyofthehappinessthatwillresultfromtheirattainment，butalsoofthatwhichspringsfromtheirdisinterestedpursuit。Whileyetifweaskforafinalcriterionofthecomparativevalueofthedifferentobjectsofmen’senthusiasticpursuit，andofthelimitswithinwhicheachmaylegitimatelyengrosstheattentionofmankind，weshallnonethelessconceiveittodependuponthedegreeinwhichtheyrespectivelyconducetoHappiness。

If，however，thisviewberejected，itremainstoconsiderwhetherwecanframeanyothercoherentaccountofUltimateGood。IfwearenottosystematisehumanactivitiesbytakingUniversalHappinessastheircommonend，onwhatotherprinciplesarewetosystematisethem？Itshouldbeobservedthattheseprinciplesmustnotonlyenableustocompareamongthemselvesthevaluesofthedifferentnon-hedonisticendswhichwehavebeenconsidering，butmustalsoprovideacommonstandardforcomparingthesevalueswiththatofHappiness；unlesswearepreparedtoadopttheparadoxicalpositionofrejectinghappinessasabsolutelyvalueless。Forwehaveapracticalneedofdeterminingnotonly