第68章

ThedutyofTruth-speakingissometimestakenasastrikinginstanceofamoralrulenotrestingonaUtilitarianbasis。

Butacarefulstudyofthequalificationswithwhichthecommonopinionofmankindactuallyinculcatesthisdutyseemstoleadustoanoppositeresult:fornotonlyisthegeneralutilityoftruth-speakingsomanifestastoneednoproof，butwhereverthisutilityseemstobeabsent，oroutweighedbyparticularbadconsequences，wefindthatCommonSenseatleasthesitatestoenforcetherule。Forexample，ifamanbepursuingcriminalends，itisprimafacieinjurioustothecommunitythatheshouldbeaidedinhispursuitbybeingabletorelyontheassertionsofothers。Here，then，deceptionisprimafacielegitimateasaprotectionagainstcrime:thoughwhenweconsiderthebadeffectsonhabit，andthroughexample，ofevenasingleactofunveracity，thecaseisseentobe，onUtilitarianprinciples，doubtful:andthisisjusttheviewofCommonSense。Again，thoughitisgenerallyaman’sinteresttoknowthetruth，thereareexceptionalcasesinwhichitisinjurioustohim——aswhenaninvalidhearsbadnews——andhere，too，CommonSenseisdisposedtosuspendtherule。Again，wefounditdifficulttodefineexactlywhereinVeracityconsists；forwemayeitherrequiretruthinthespokenwords，orintheinferenceswhichthespeakerforeseeswillbedrawnfromthem，orinboth。PerfectCandour，nodoubt，wouldrequireitinboth:butinthevariouscircumstanceswherethisseemsinexpedient，weoftenfindCommonSenseatleasthalf-willingtodispensewithoneorotherpartofthedoubleobligation。Thuswefoundarespectableschoolofthinkersmaintainingthatareligioustruthmayproperlybecommunicatedbymeansofahistoricalfiction:and，ontheotherhand，theunsuitabilityofperfectfranknesstoourexistingsocialrelationsisrecognisedinthecommonrulesofpoliteness，whichimposeonusnotunfrequentlythenecessityofsuppressingtruthsandsuggestingfalsehoods。IwouldnotsaythatinanyofthesecasesCommonSensepronouncesquitedecidedlyinfavourofunveracity:butthenneitherisUtilitarianismdecided，astheutilityofmaintainingageneralhabitoftruth-speakingissogreat，thatitisnoteasytoproveittobeclearlyoutweighedbyevenstrongspecialreasonsforviolatingtherule。

YetitmaybeworthwhiletopointouthowthedifferentviewsastothelegitimacyofMalevolentimpulses，outofwhichwefoundithardtoframeaconsistentdoctrineforCommonSense，exactlycorrespondtodifferentforecastsoftheconsequencesofgratifyingsuchimpulses。Primafacie，thedesiretoinjureanyoneinparticularisinconsistentwithadeliberatepurposeofbenefitingasmuchaspossiblepeopleingeneral；accordingly，wefindthatwhatImaycallSuperficialCommonSensepassesasweepingcondemnationonsuchdesires。Butastudyoftheactualfactsofsocietyshowsthatresentmentplaysanimportantpartinthatrepressionofinjurieswhichisnecessarytosocialwellbeing；

accordingly，thereflectivemoralistshrinksfromexcludingitaltogether。

Itisevident，however，thatpersonalill-willisaverydangerousmeanstothegeneralhappiness:foritsdirectendistheexactoppositeofhappiness；

andthoughtherealisationofthisendmayincertaincasesbetheleastoftwoevils，stilltheimpulseifencouragedislikelytoprompttotheinflictionofpainbeyondthelimitsofjustpunishment，andtohaveaninjuriousreactiononthecharacteroftheangryperson。Accordingly，themoralistisdisposedtoprescribethatindignationbedirectedalwaysagainstacts，andnotagainstpersons；andifindignationsorestrictedwouldbeefficientinrepressinginjuries，thiswouldseemtobethestateofmindmostconducivetothegeneralhappiness。Butitisdoubtfulwhetheraveragehumannatureiscapableofmaintainingthisdistinction，andwhether，ifitcouldbemaintained，themorerefinedaversionwouldbyitselfbesufficientlyefficacious:accordingly，CommonSensehesitatestocondemnpersonalill-willagainstwrong-doers——evenifitincludesadesireofmalevolentsatisfaction。

Finally，itis