第36章

WisdomwasalwaysplacedbytheGreekphilosophersfirstinthelistofvirtues，andregardedasinamannercomprehendingalltheothers:infactinthepost-AristotelianschoolsthenotionoftheSageorideallyWiseman(sophos)wasregularlyemployedtoexhibitinaconcreteformtherulesoflifelaiddownbyeachsystem。IncommonGreekusage，however，thetermjustmentionedwouldsignifyexcellenceinpurelyspeculativescience，nolessthanpracticalwisdom:andtheEnglishtermWisdomhas，tosomeextent，thesameambiguity。

Itis，however，chieflyusedinreferencetopractice:andevenwhenappliedtotheregionofpurespeculationsuggestsespeciallysuchintellectualgiftsandhabitsasleadtosoundpracticalconclusions:namely，comprehensivenessofview，thehabitofattendingimpartiallytoanumberofdiverseconsiderationsdifficulttoestimateexactly，andgoodjudgmentastotherelativeimportanceofeach。Atanyrate，itisonlyPracticalWisdomwhichwecommonlyclassamongVirtues，asdistinguishedfrompurelyintellectualexcellences。HowthenshallwedefinePracticalWisdom？Themostobviouspartofitsmeaningisatendencytodiscern，intheconductoflifegenerally，thebestmeanstotheattainmentofanyendsthatthenaturalplayofhumanmotivesmayleadustoseek。ascontrastedwithtechnicalskill，orthefacultyofselectingthebestmeanstogivenendsinacertainlimitedandspecialdepartmentofhumanaction。Suchskillinthespecialartsispartlycommunicablebymeansofdefiniterules，andpartlyamatteroftactorinstinct，dependingsomewhatonnaturalgiftsandpredispositions，buttoagreatextentacquiredbyexerciseandimitation；andsimilarlypracticalWisdom，ifunderstoodtobeSkillintheArtofLife，wouldinvolveacertainamountofscientificknowledge，theportionsofdifferentsciencesbearingdirectlyonhumanaction，togetherwithempiricalrulesrelatingtothesamesubject-matter；

andalsothetactortrainedinstinctjustmentioned，whichwouldevenbemoreprominenthere，onaccountoftheextremecomplexityofthesubject-matter。

Butitdoesnotappearfromthisanalysiswhythisskillshouldberegardedasavirtue:andreflectionwillshowthatwedonotordinarilymeanbywisdommerelythefacultyoffindingthebestmeanstoanyends:forweshouldnotcallthemostaccomplishedswindlerwise；whereasweshouldnothesitatetoattributetohimcleverness，ingenuity，andotherpurelyintellectualexcellences。Soagainweapplytheterm``worldly-wise’’toamanwhoskilfullychoosesthebestmeanstotheendofambition；butweshouldnotcallsuchaman`wise’withoutqualification。Wisdom，inshort，appearstometoimplyrightjudgmentinrespectofendsaswellasmeans。

Here，however，asubtlequestionarises。Fortheassumptiononwhichthistreatiseproceedsisthatthereareseveralultimateendsofaction，whichallclaimtoberationalends，suchaseverymanoughttoadopt。Hence，ifWisdomimpliesrightjudgmentastoends，itisclearthatapersonwhoregardssomeoneendasthesolerightorrationalultimateendwillnotconsideramanwisewhoadoptsanyotherultimateend。CanwesaythenthatinthecommonuseofthewordWisdomanyoneultimateendisdistinctlyimpliedtotheexclusionofothers？Itmaybesuggested，perhaps，thatinthemoralviewofCommonSensewhichwearenowtryingtomakeclear，sinceWisdomitselfisprescribedorcommendedasaqualityofconductintuitivelydiscernedtoberightorgood，theultimateendwhichthewisemanprefersmustbejustthisattainmentofrightnessorgoodnessinconductgenerally；ratherthanpleasureforhimselforothers，oranyotherulteriorend。Ithink，however，thatinthecaseofthisnotionitisimpossibletocarryoutthatanalysisofordinarypracticalreasoningintoseveraldistinctmethods，eachadmittingandneedingseparatedevelopment，uponwhichtheplanofthistreatiseisfounded。

For，aswesaw，itischaracteristicofCommonSensetoassumecoincidenceorharmonyamongthesedifferentcompetingmethods。Andhence，whileasregardsmostparticularvirtuesandduties，theexerciseofmoraljudgmentinordinarymenisprimafacieindependentofhedonisticcalculations，andoccasionallyinapparentconflictwiththeirresults，——sothatthereconciliationofthedifferentprocedurespresentsitselfasaproblemtobesolved——inthecomprehensivenotionofWisdomtheantagonismislatent。CommonSenseseemstomeanbyaWiseman，amanwhoattainsatonceallthedifferentrationalends；whobyconductinperfectconformitywiththetruemoralcodeattainsthegreatesthappinesspossiblebothforhimselfandformankind(orthatportionofmankindtowhichhiseffortsarenecessarilyrestricted)。B