第49章

Thereis，however，onemethodofexhibitingaprioritheabsolutedutyofTruth，whichwemustnotoverlook；

as，ifitbevalid，itwouldseemthattheexceptionsandqualificationsabovementionedhavebeenonlyadmittedbyCommonSensefrominadvertenceandshallownessofthought。

Itissaidthatifitwereoncegenerallyunderstoodthatlieswerejustifiableundercertaincircumstances，itwouldimmediatelybecomequiteuselesstotellthelies，becausenoonewouldbelievethem；andthatthemoralistcannotlaydownarulewhich，ifgenerallyaccepted，wouldbesuicidal。

Tothisthereseemtobethreeanswers。Inthefirstplaceitisnotnecessarilyanevilthatmen’sconfidenceineachother’sassertionsshould，undercertainpeculiarcircumstances，beimpairedordestroyed:itmayevenbetheveryresultwhichweshouldmostdesiretoproduce:e。g。itisobviouslyamosteffectiveprotectionforlegitimatesecretsthatitshouldbeuniversallyunderstoodandexpectedthatthosewhoaskquestionswhichtheyhavenorighttoaskwillhaveliestoldthem:nor，again，shouldweberestrainedfrompronouncingitlawfultomeetdeceitwithdeceit，merelybythefearofimpairingthesecuritywhichroguesnowderivefromtheveracityofhonestmen。Nodoubttheultimateresultofgeneralunveracityunderthecircumstanceswouldbeastateofthingsinwhichsuchfalsehoodswouldnolongerbetold:butunlessthisultimateresultisundesirable，theprospectofitdoesnotconstituteareasonwhythefalsehoodsshouldnotbetoldsolongastheyareuseful。But，secondly，sincethebeliefsofmeningeneralarenotformedpurelyonrationalgrounds，experienceshowsthatunveracitymaylongremainpartiallyeffectiveundercircumstanceswhereitisgenerallyunderstoodtobelegitimate。Weseethisinthecaseofthelaw-courts。Forthoughjurymenareperfectlyawarethatitisconsideredthedutyofanadvocatetostateasplausiblyaspossiblewhateverhehasbeeninstructedtosayonbehalfofanycriminalliemaydefend，stillaskilfulpleadermayoftenproduceanimpressionthathesincerelybelieveshisclienttobeinnocent:anditremains，aquestionofcasuistryhowfarthiskindofhypocrisyisjustifiable。But，finally，itcannotbeassumedascertainthatitisneverrighttoactuponamaximofwhichtheuniversalapplicationwouldbeanundoubtedevil。Thisassumptionmayseemtobeinvolvedinwhatwaspreviouslyadmittedasanethicalaxiom，thatwhatisrightformemustberightfor`allpersonsundersimilarconditions’。[1]

Butreflectionwillshowthatthereisaspecialcasewithintherangeoftheaxiominwhichitsapplicationisnecessarilyself-limiting，andexcludesthepracticaluniversalitywhichtheaxiomappearstosuggest:i。e。wheretheagent’sconditionsinclude(1)theknowledgethathismaximisnotuniversallyaccepted，and(2)areasonedconvictionthathisactwillnottendtomakeitso，toanyimportantextent。Forinthiscasetheaxiomwillpracticallyonlymeanthatitwillberightforallpersonstodoastheagentdoes，iftheyaresincerelyconvincedthattheactwillnotbewidelyimitated；andthisconvictionmustvanishifitiswidelyimitated。Itcanhardlybesaidthattheseconditionsareimpossible:

andiftheyarepossible，theaxiomthatwearediscussingcanonlyserve，initspresentapplication，todirectourattentiontoanimportantdangerofunveracity，whichconstitutesastrong——butnotformallyconclusive——utilitariangroundforspeakingthetruth。{Note}

MEBook3Chapter7Section3Note3

Note——Mr。Stephen(ScienceofEthics，chap。v。§；33)explainstheexceptionstotheruleoftruth-speakingasfollows:——

``Therule，`Lienot’，istheexternalrule，andcorrespondsapproximatelytotheinternalrule，`Betrustworthy’。Casesoccurwheretherulesdiverge，andinsuchcasesitistheinternalrulewhichismorallyapproved。Truthfulnessistherulebecauseinthevastmajorityofcaseswetrustamaninsofarashespeaksthetruth；intheexceptionalcases，themutualconfidencewouldbeviolatedwhenthetruth，notwhenthelie，isspoken。’’

Thisexplanationseemstomeforseveralreasonsinadequate。(1)ifwemaysometimeslietodefendthelifeorsecretsofothers，itisparadoxicaltosaythatwemaynotdosotodefendourown；butafalsehoodinself-defenceobviouslycannotbejustifiedasanapplicationofthemaxim``betrustworthy’’。(2)Evenwhenthefalsehoodisinlegitimatedefenceofothersagainstattacks，wecannotsaythatthespeakermanifests``trustworthiness’’withoutqualification；forthedeceivedas