第60章

Nor，Iconceive，canthisargumentbeevadedbyadoptingtheviewofwhatIhavecalled`Æ；stheticIntuitionism’andregardingVirtuesasexcellencesofconductclearlydiscerniblebytrainedinsight，althoughtheirnaturedoesnotadmitofbeingstatedindefiniteformulæ；。Forournotionsofspecialvirtuesdonotreallybecomemoreindependentbybecomingmoreindefinite:theystillcontain，thoughperhapsmorelatently，thesamereferenceto`Good’or`Wellbeing’asanultimatestandard。Thisappearsclearlywhenweconsideranyvirtueinrelationtothecognatevice——oratleastnon-virtue——intowhichittendstopassoverwhenpushedtoanextremeorexhibitedunderinappropriateconditions。Forexample，CommonSensemayseemtoregardLiberality，Frugality，Courage，Placability，asintrinsicallydesirable:butwhenweconsidertheirrelationrespectivelytoProfusion，Meanness，Foolhardiness，Weakness，wefindthatCommonSensedrawsthelineineachcasenotbyimmediateintuition，butbyreferenceeithertosomedefinitemaximofduty，ortothegeneralnotionof`Good’orWellbeing:andsimilarlywhenweaskatwhatpointCandour，Generosity，Humilityceasetobevirtuesbybecoming`excessive’。Otherqualitiescommonlyadmired，suchasEnergy，Zeal，Self-control，Thoughtfulness，areobviouslyregardedasvirtuesonlywhentheyaredirectedtogoodends。Inshort，theonlyso-calledVirtueswhichcanbethoughttobeessentiallyandalwayssuch，andincapableofexcess，aresuchqualitiesasWisdom，UniversalBenevolence，and(inasense)Justice；ofwhichthenotionsmanifestlyinvolvethisnotionofGood，supposedalreadydeterminate。

WisdomisinsightintoGoodandthemeanstoGood；Benevolenceisexhibitedinthepurposiveactionscalled``doingGood’’:Justice(whenregardedasessentiallyandalwaysaVirtue)liesindistributingGood(orevil)

impartiallyaccordingtorightrules。IfthenweareaskedwhatisthisGoodwhichitisexcellenttoknow，tobestowonothers，todistributeimpartially，itwouldbeobviouslyabsurdtoreplythatitisjustthisknowledge，thesebeneficentpurposes，thisimpartialdistribution。

Nor，again，canIperceivethatthisdifficultyisinanywaymetbyregardingVirtueasaqualityof``character’’ratherthanof``conduct’’，andexpressingthemorallawintheform，``Bethis’’，insteadoftheform``Dothis’’。[2]Fromapracticalpointofview，indeed，Ifullyrecognisetheimportanceofurgingthatmenshouldaimatanidealofcharacter，andconsideractioninitseffectsoncharacter。ButIcannotinferfromthisthatcharacteranditselements——faculties，habits，ordispositionsofanykind——aretheconstituentsofUltimateGood。Itseemstomethattheoppositeisimpliedintheveryconceptionofafacultyordisposition；itcanonlybedefinedasatendencytoactorfeelinacertainwayundercertainconditions；andsuchatendencyappearstomeclearlynotvaluableinitselfbutfortheactsandfeelingsinwhichittakeseffect，orfortheulteriorconsequencesofthese，——whichconsequences，again，cannotberegardedasUltimateGood，solongastheyaremerelyconceivedasmodificationsoffaculties，dispositions，etc。

When，therefore，Isaythateffectsoncharacterareimportant，itisasummarywayofsayingthatbythelawsofourmentalconstitutionthepresentactorfeelingisacausetendingtomodifyimportantlyouractsandfeelingsintheindefinitefuture:thecomparativelypermanentresultsupposedtobeproducedinthemindorsoul，beingatendencythatwillshowitselfinanindefinitenumberofparticularactsandfeelings，mayeasilybemoreimportant，inrelationtotheultimateend，thanasingleactorthetransientfeelingofasinglemoment:butitscomparativepermanenceappearstomenogroundforregardingitasitselfaconstituentofultimategood。

Sofar，however，Ihavebeenspeakingonlyofparticularvirtues，asexhibitedinconductjudgedtobeobjectivelyright:anditmaybearguedthatthisistooexternalaviewoftheVirtuethatclaimstoconstituteUltimateGood。ItmaybesaidthatthedifficultythatIhavebeenurgingvanishesifwepenetratebeyondtheparticularvirtuestotherootandessenceofvirtueingeneral，——thedeterminationofthewilltodowhateverisjudgedtoberightandtoai