第74章

But，aswasbeforenoticedintheparticularcaseofveracity，wemustadmitanapplicationofthisprinciple，whichimportantlymodifiesitspracticalforce:wemustadmitthecasewherethebeliefthattheactioninquestionwillnotbewidelyimitatedisanessentialqualificationofthemaximwhichtheKantianprincipleisappliedtotest。Forthisprinciple，——atleastsofarasIhaveaccepteditasself-evident——meansnomorethanthatanact，ifrightforanyindividual，mustberightongeneralgrounds，andthereforeforsomeclassofpersons；itthereforecannotpreventusfromdefiningthisclassbytheabove-mentionedcharacteristicofbelievingthattheactwillremainanexceptionalone。Ofcourseifthisbeliefturnsouttobeerroneous，seriousharmmaypossiblyresult；butthisisnomorethanmaybesaidofmanyotherUtilitariandeductions。NorisitdifficulttofindinstancesofconductwhichCommonSenseholdstobelegitimatesolelyonthegroundthatwehavenofearofitsbeingtoowidelyimitated。

Take，forexample，thecaseofCelibacy。AuniversalrefusaltopropagatethehumanspecieswouldbethegreatestofconceivablecrimesfromaUtilitarianpointofview；-thatis，accordingtothecommonlyacceptedbeliefinthesuperiorityofhumanhappinesstothatofotheranimals；——andhencetheprincipleinquestion，appliedwithoutthequalificationabovegiven，wouldmakeitacrimeinanyonetochoosecelibacyasthestatemostconducivetohisownhappiness。ButCommonSense(inthepresentageatleast)regardssuchpreferenceaswithinthelimitsofrightconduct；becausethereisnofearthatpopulationwillnotbesufficientlykeptup，asinfactthetendencytopropagateisthoughttoexistratherinexcessthanotherwise。

Inthiscaseitisanon-moralimpulseontheaveragestrengthofwhichwethinkwemayreckon:buttheredoesnotappeartobeanyformaloruniversalreasonwhythesameprocedureshouldnotbeappliedbyUtilitarianstoanactuallyexistingmoralsentiment。TheresultwouldbeadiscrepancyofapeculiarkindbetweenUtilitarianismandCommon-Sensemorality；astheveryfirmnesswithwhichthelatterisestablishedwouldbetheUtilitariangroundforrelievingtheindividualofitsobligations。

Wearesupposedtoseethatgeneralhappinesswillbeenhanced(justastheexcellenceofametricalcompositionis)byaslightadmixtureofirregularityalongwithageneralobservanceofreceivedrules；andhencetojustifytheirregularconductofafewindividuals，onthegroundthatthesupplyofregularconductfromothermembersofthecommunitymayreasonablybeexpectedtobeadequate。

Itdoesnotseemtomethatthisreasoningcanbeshowntobenecessarilyunsound，asappliedtohumansocietyasatpresentconstituted:butthecasesinwhichitcouldreallybethoughttobeapplicable，byanyonesincerelydesirousofpromotingthegeneralhappiness，mustcertainlyberare。Foritshouldbeobservedthatitmakesafundamentaldifferencewhetherthesentimentinmankindgenerally，onwhichwerelytosustainsufficientlyageneralrulewhileadmittingexceptionsthereto，ismoralornon-moral；becauseamoralsentimentisinseparablefromtheconvictionthattheconducttowhichitpromptsisobjectivelyright——i。e。rightwhetherornotitisthoughtorfelttobeso——foroneselfandallsimilarpersonsinsimilarcircumstances；itcannotthereforecoexistwithapprovalofthecontraryconductinanyoneme，unlessthiscaseisdistinguishedbysomematerialdifferenceotherthanthemerenon-existenceintheagentoftheordinarymoralsentimentagainsthisconduct。Thus，assumingthatgeneralunveracityandgeneralcelibacywouldbothbeevilsoftheworstkind，wemaystillallregarditaslegitimateformeningeneraltoremaincelibateiftheylike，onaccountofthestrengthofthenaturalsentimentspromptingtomarriage，becausetheexistenceofthesesentimentsinordinaryhumanbeingsisnotaffectedbytheuniversalrecognitionofthelegitimacyofcelibacy:butwecannotsimilarlyallregarditaslegitimateformentotellliesiftheylike，howeverstrongtheactuallyexistingsentimentagainstlyingmaybe，becauseassoonasthislegitimacyisgenerallyrecognisedthesentimentmustbeexpectedtodecayandvanish。IfthereforewewereallenlightenedUtilitarians，itwouldbeimpossibleforanyonetojustifyhimselfinmakingfalsestatementswhileadmittingittobeinexpedientforpersonssimilarlyconditionedtomakethem；ashewouldhavenogroundforbelievingthatpersonssimilarlyconditionedwouldactdifferentlyfromhimself。Thecase，nodoubt，isdifferentinsocietyasactuallyconstituted；

itisconceivablethatthepracticallyeffectivemoralityinsuchasociety，restingonabasisindependentofutilitarianoranyotherreasonings，maynotbemateriallyaffectedbytheparticularactorexpressedopinionofaparticularindividual:butthecircumstancesare，Iconceive，veryrare，inwhichareallyconscientiouspersoncouldfeelsosureofthisastoconcludethatbyapprovingaparticularviolationofarule，ofwhichthegeneral(thoughnotuniversal)observanceisplainlyexpedient，hewillnotprobablydoharmonthewhole。Especiallyasalltheobjectionstoinnovation，noticedintheprevioussection，applywithincreasedforceiftheinnovatordoesnotevenclaimtobeintroducinganewandbettergeneralrule。

Itappearstome，therefore，thatthecasesinwhichpracticaldoubtsarelikelytoarise，astowhetherexceptionsshouldbepermittedfromordinaryrulesonUtilitarianprinciples，willmostlybethosewhichIdiscussedinthefirstparagraphofthissection:

wheretheexceptionsarenotclaimedforafewindividuals，onthemeregroundoftheirprobablefewness，buteitherforpersonsgenerallyunderexceptionalcircumstances，orforaclassofpersonsdefinedbyexceptionalqualitiesofintellect，temperament，orcharacter。InsuchcasestheUtilitarianmayhavenodoubtthatinacommunityconsistinggenerallyofenlightenedUtilitarians，thesegroundsforexceptionalethicaltreatmentwouldberegardedasvalid；stillhemay，asIhavesaid，doubtwhetherthemorerefinedandcomplicatedrulewhichrecognisessuchexceptionsisadaptedforthecommunityinwhichheisactuallyliving；andwhethertheattempttointroduceitisnotlikelytodomoreharmbyweakeningcurrentmoralitythangoodbyimprovingitsquality。Supposingsuchadoubttoarise，eitherinacaseofthiskind，orinoneoftherarecasesdiscussedintheprecedingparagraph，itbecomesnecessarythattheUtilitarianshouldconsidercarefullytheextenttowhichhisadviceorexamplearelikelytoinfluencepersonstowhomtheywouldbedangerous:anditisevidentthattheresultofthisconsiderationmaydependlargelyonthedegreeofpublicitywhichhegivestoeitheradviceorexample。Thus，onUtilitarianprinciples，itmayberighttodoandprivatelyrecommend，undercertaincircumstances，whatitwouldnotberighttoadvocateopenly；itmayberighttoteachopenlytoonesetofpersonswhatitwouldbewrongtoteachtoothers；itmaybeconceivablyrighttodo，ifitcanbedonewithcomparativesecrecy，whatitwouldbewrongtodointhefaceoftheworld；andeven，ifperfectsecrecycanbereasonablyexpected，whatitwouldbewrongtorecommendbyprivateadviceorexample。Theseconclusionsareallofaparadoxicalcharacter:thereisnodoubtthatthemoralconsciousnessofaplainmanbroadlyrepudiatesthegeneralnotionofanesotericmorality，differingfromthatpopularlytaught；anditwouldbecommonlyagreedthatanactionwhichwouldbebadifdoneopenlyisnotrenderedgoodbysecrecy。Wemayobserve，however，thattherearestrongutilitarianreasonsformaintaininggenerallythislattercommonopinion；foritisobviouslyadvantageous，generallyspeaking，thatactswhichitisexpedienttorepressbysocialdisapprobationshouldbecomeknown，asotherwisethedisapprobationcannotoperate；sothatitseemsinexpedienttosupportbyanymoralencouragementthenaturaldispositionofmeningeneraltoconcealtheirwrongdoings；

besidesthattheconcealmentwouldinmostcaseshaveimportantlyinjuriouseffectsontheagent’shabitsofveracity。ThustheUtilitarianconclusion，carefullystated，wouldseemtobethis；thattheopinionthatsecrecymayrenderanactionrightwhichwouldnototherwisebesoshoulditselfbekeptcomparativelysecret；andsimilarlyitseemsexpedientthatthedoctrinethatesotericmoralityisexpedientshoulditselfbekeptesoteric。

Orifthisconcealmentbedifficulttomaintain，itmaybedesirablethatCommonSenseshouldrepudiatethedoctrineswhichitisexpedienttoconfinetoanenlightenedfew。AndthusaUtilitarianmayreasonablydesire，onUtilitarianprinciples，thatsomeofhisconclusionsshouldberejectedbymankindgenerally；oreventhatthevulgarshouldkeepalooffromhissystemasawhole，insofarastheinevitableindefinitenessandcomplexityofitscalculationsrenderitlikelytoleadtobadresultsintheirh