第64章

Hestill，thatis，requiresabreathing-spacefortheimagination。’Truthistheprovinceofreason，’but’intheregulationoftheimaginationliteraltruthoffactsisnottheonlythingtobeconsidered。’(156*)Reasonmustkeepthefortress，butthe’imaginationmaysafelyfollowitsownendanddoitsbesttomakelifepleasantandlovelyinsidethecastle。’

Thus，thoughweareonlyentitledtohopeastothegovernmentoftheworldandalifeafterdeath，thebarehopemayhaveabeneficialeffect。’Itmakeslifeandhumannatureafargreaterthingtothefeelings，andgivesgreaterstrengthandsolemnitytoallthesentimentswhichareawakenedinusbyourfellow-creaturesandmankindatlarge。’Aspirationsarenolongercheckedbythedisastrousfeelingof’notworthwhile。’Religion，too，hasatbeforeusa’DivinePerson，asastandardofexcellenceandamodelforimitation。’(157*)Theideal，itistrue，wouldremain，evenifthepersonwereheldtobeimaginary；

andwouldnotbeencumberedbytheologicaldifficulties。Yetthereisanadvantageinthebeliefthataperfectbeingreallyexistsandrepresentstheruleroftheuniverse，whichcannotbesharedbytherationalist。(158*)Henceas，afterall，thetruthofthebeliefispossible，itmaybecombinedwiththeReligionofHumanity。Thatreligion，’withorwithoutsupernaturalsanctions，’willbethereligionofthefuture；butitwillbestrengthenedbythefeelingthatweare’helpingGod’andsupplying’cooperation’which’he，notbeingomnipotent，reallyneeds。’(159*)Truly，Millwasnearlyqualifiedforaplaceamongtheprophets。

Mill’sarbitraryassumptions，likethemetaphysicalwiredrawingsofMansel，areratherunprofitableinthemselves：fewpeoplewillcaretofollowthemindetail；andneithercouldboastofmanyconverts。BelieverssoonbecameawareoftherealscepticismofMansel’sposition；andpositivistssawthatMillleftanopeningforsuperstition。BothManselandMillweretroubledabouttheReligionofNature。Itisabundantlyclear，asMillmighthaveforeseen，thatsuchatheologyashecontemplatescouldbeofnorealvalue。Itdependsessentiallyuponcompromisesandarbitrarydistinctions。Itisstillwithinthesphereofscience，thoughdoomedtodisappearasscienceadvances，andfromthefirstisinconsistentwiththeveryaimswhichareproposedbytheology。Godisadmittedlynotomnipotent，andhisexistenceisnoguaranteeformoralityoroptimism。AndhencethereisanoddapproximationbetweenMillandMansel。

Millobserves(160*)thatthemoralcharacterofanallegedrevelationcannotbeofitselfaproofofitsdivinity。Theimportanceofthe’internalevidence’istherefore’principallynegative。’SosaysMansel。’Theevidencederivedfromtheinternalcharacterofareligion，whatevermaybeitsvaluewithinitsproperlimits，is，asregardsthedivineoriginofthereligion，purelynegative。’(161*)Whereisthedifference？Ifthemoralityofarevelationbebad，Millarguesthattherevelationmustbeatoncerejected。Manselthinksthatalthoughthemoralitybenotclearlygood，itmayinsomewayrepresentadivinecommand。Immorallawscannotbedivine，saysMill，thoughagoodlawmaybehuman。Alawapparentlybad，repliesMansel，maybedivine，though，ofcourse，thebadnesscanonlybeapparent。Here，aselsewhere，thebelieverintheempiricalcharacterofmoralityappearstoattributemostcertaintytothemoraljudgment。Thesolutionsdifferaccordingly。MillsupposesthatGodmustbegood，butreconcilesthistofactsbyassumingthatGodisnotall-powerful。Manselwillnotgiveupthepower，andtopreservethegoodnesshastoassumearadicalincapacityintheintellect——anecessityofbelievingwherethereisanimpotenceofconceiving。Mill，thatis，iscontentwiththeempiricaldeity，whoisnecessarilylimited；andManselkeepsthedeityofontologybutadmitsthathecannotbeknown。Mill’sconceptionispurelyarbitrary，thoughhekeepswithinthelimitsofconceivableexperience；whileManselpreservesthelanguageappropriatetotheconceptionofabsoluteunity，andyetadmitsthatitcanmeannothingforus。’Agnosticism’seemstobeaneasierandmorerationalalternative；ifitmeansanopenadmissionthatweknownothing，whenwecanonl