第59章

believeintheexistenceofCalcutta，ImeanthatIbelievethatifIweretransportedtothebanksoftheHoogly，IshouldhavethesensationsfromwhichCalcuttaisinferrible。(72*)Inotherwords，inmakingastatementabouttheexternalworld，I

constructahypotheticalanduniversalconsciousness。WhenI

exchangethegeocentricfortheheliocentricview，IamimaginingwhatIshouldseeifIwereuponthesuninsteadoftheearth。

Insteadofregardingmyownseriesofsensationsasthebasefromwhichtomeasure，Iregardthemasdeduciblefromtheserieswhichwouldbepresentedtoadifferentand，ofcourse，incomparablymoreextendedconsciousness。Icanthusfillupthegapsinmyownexperienceandgetaregularseriesinsteadofonefullofbreachesandinterruptions。ThatIdothissomehoworotherisMill’sview，andIshouldadmitwithhimthatIdonomore。But，then，thequestionremainswhetherMillcanaccountformydoingeventhis。Itsupposes，atleast，apowerofformingwhatCliffordcalled’ejects，’asdistinguishedfrom’objects。’I

mustbeabletothinknotofthingsoutsideconsciousnessbutofmyownconsciousnessunderotherconditions，andofothercentresofconsciousnessthanmine。Butthisabilityisnotexplicablefromsensations，asultimateatoms，combinedinvariouswaysby’association’；forthatprocess，itwouldseem，mighttakeplacewithoutinanywaysuggestinganexternalworldoradifferentconsciousness。HereMill，likehisfather，istryingtoexplainthoughtsbydealingwithsensationsasthingsandrefusingtoadmitanyactionofthemindinordertokeeptotheunsophisticatedfacts。Hewillnotallowthemindtohaveevenanorganisingpower，eventhoughitbeapowerwhichcannotbeseparatelyrevealedorgiverisetoindependenttruths，butappearssimplyasimpliedinitsproducts。Themindistheclusterofatomicsensations。Itmustnottamperwiththefactsinanyway，onpenaltyofcausingillusion。Icanonlyassociatesimpleatoms，andtheworldremainsachaosofindependentandincoherentfragments。Theysticktogethersomehow，butthedivisionintotheexternalandtheinternalworldstillremainsanunsolvedproblem。The’attribute’willnotdistinguishitselffromthe’sensation。’Wearestillunable，thatis，toexplainthemetaphysicalpuzzleleftunsolvedintheLogic。

Anotherquestionarises：Iftheworldisstillanincoherentheapof’attributes’or’sensations，’whatarewetosayofthemind？WithhisusualcandourMillapplieshisprinciplestotheproblem。Weget，asheadmits，toarealdifficulty。Themind，inthephraseadoptedfromhisfather，isa’threadofconsciousness。’Itisaseriesoffeelingswiththecuriouspeculiaritythatbesides’presentsensations’ithas’memoriesandexpectations。’Whatarethese？heasks。Theyinvolvebeliefsinsomething’beyondthemselves。’Ifwecallthemind’aseriesoffeelings，’wehavetoaddthatitisaserieswhichis’awareofitselfaspastandfuture。’Isit，then，somethingdifferentfromthefeelings，ormustweaccepttheparadoxthatsomething’whichinhypothesisisaseriesoffeelingscanbeawareofitselfasaseries？’Hereisthefinal’inexplicability’whichmustarrive，asheadmitswithHamilton，whenwegettoanultimatefact。The’wisestthingwecandoistoaccepttheinexplicablefactwithoutanytheoryofhowittakesplace。’(73*)

Thatwhatwecallpersonalidentityis’inexplicable’willhardlybedenied。YetMill’spositionseemstomaketheparadoxsomethingnearlyapproachingtoacontradiction。Ifthementalprocessesaretobedescribedasfeelings，separablebutsimplyformingclustersmoreorlesscomplicatedandlinkedtoeachother，weseemtogetridnotonlyofasomethingwhichorganisesexperience，butoforganisationitself。Itbecomesdifficulttounderstandnotmerelywhatthemindorsoulcanbe，butwhatarethementalprocessestowhichtheconceptioncorresponds。This，however，leadstoadifferentsetofquestionsandoneoffargreaterinterest。

IV。THEORIESOFTHEABSOLUTE

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