第45章

goodactisthatwhichagoodmanwouldperform。Ifabadman，undercompulsion，actsinthesameway，heactsfromfear，andhisactisthereforemorallyneutral，andtocallhimgoodonaccountofhisactionisthereforeamistake。Hesimplyshowsthatheisaman，anddislikeshangingevenmorethanhehateshisfellow-men。

An’externalsanction’reallymeansamotiveforactingasthoughyouweregoodevenifyouarenotgood。Thatsuchsanctionsareessentialtosociety，thattheyprovideashelterunderwhichtruemoralitymayormustgrowup，isobvious。Itistrue，also，thatinearlystagesthedistinctionbetweenthelawwhichrestsuponforceandthatwhichrestsuponthecharacterisnotmanifest。Butultimatelymoralitymeansnothingbuttheexpressionofthecharacteritself。Hencetofindauniversal’sanction’formoralityischimerical。Suchasanctionwouldbe’amotive’whichwouldapplytoallmengoodorbad；thatis，itwouldnotbeamoralmotive。Fearofhellorthegallowsmayindirectlyhelp(orhinder)thedevelopmentofamoralcharacter；

butinitselfthefearisneithergoodnorbad。Theveryattempt，therefore，tofindsucha’sanction’impliesthe’external’oressentiallyinadequateviewofmorality，intowhichtheUtilitarianswiththeirlegalprepossessionsweretooapttofall。Thelaw，restinguponexternalsanctions，maybeusefulorprejudicialtomorals，butmustalwaysbesubordinate；foritsapplicationdependsuponinstinctsbywhichitisguidedandwhichitcannotcreate。

Millrecognisesthis，virtually，thoughnotexplicitly，inhisdiscussionofthe’Utilitariansanction。’Hedeclaresinratherawkwardphrasethatthe’ultimatesanctionofallmorality(externalmotivesapart)’is’asubjectivefeelinginourownminds。’(Whereelsecansuchafeelingbe，andwhatis’anobjectivefeeling’？)Thesefeelingsexist，asheargues，equallyfortheUtilitarianandthe’Transcendentalist，’thoughthe’Transcendentalists’thinkthattheirexistence’inthemind’

impliesthattheyhavea’rootoutofthemind。’(81*)The’conscience，’thatis，paininbreakingthemorallaw，existsasafact，whateveritsorigin。If’innate’itcanstillbeopposed，andthequestion，’WhyshouldIobeyit？’isequallydifficulttoanswer。Evenifinnate，again，itmaybeaninnateregardforothermen’spainsandpleasures，andsocoincidewiththeUtilitarianview。Hearguesaccordingly，that，inpointoffact，wemayacquirethat’feelingofunity’withotherswhichgivesthereally’ultimatesanction’tothe’Happinessmorality。’(82*)

WiththisresultIatleastcanhavenoquarrel。Iholdittobeperfectlycorrectandasgoodanaccountofmoralityascanbegiven。Thefaultisinplacingthe’externalsanction’onthesamelevelwiththe’internal’andfailingtoseethatitisnotproperly’moral’atall。Buthere，oncemore，itisnecessarytolookatthedifficultyofderivinghisconclusionfromthepremisesinheritedfromhisteachers。Theessentialdifficultyliesinthepsychologicalanalysisandthetheoryofassociation。

WeareagainatJamesMill’spointofview。Conductisdeterminedbypainandpleasure。Anactionsupposesanend，andthat’end’

mustbeapleasure。Ifweask，pleasuretowhom？theanswermustbe，pleasuretotheagent。Allconduct，itwouldseem，mustbedirectlyorindirectlyself-regarding，forthe’end’mustalwaysbemyownpleasure。Millmaintainsthat’virtue’may，fortheUtilitarianaswellasforothers，bea’thingdesirableinitself。’(83*)Thatisa’psychologicalfact，’independentlyoftheexplanation。Butatt