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Fromthelawyer’spointofview，again，theimportanceisobvious。Healwayswishestoknowpreciselyatwhatpointthelawcanbebroughttobear。whetherarulewillbeenforcedbythecourts，orgenerallyUnderwhatcircumstancesacustomwillbeacceptedasalaw。Theanswernecessarilyleadstomuchlegalsubtlety。Thecustommaybetreatedasconstructivelyalaw。Thesovereignhasnotactuallymadenor’sanctioned’it；butvirtuehassomehowgoneoutofhimbyimplication，andhisrecognitionisequivalenttoimpositionoftherule。Thoughthe’sovereign’

hasnotreally’made’thelaw，hemaybeconsideredashavingmadeitbyametaphysicalfiction。InthisdirectionAustinbecomesthetwelfthcenturyschoolman，andhastosplithairstoforcehisdefinitionuponthefacts。Theinquiry，thoughnecessaryfromthelawyer’spointofview，becomesirrelevantfromthesociologist’s。Thesocialactionisthesame，whethertheruleobeyedbeacustomoralawstrictlysocalled。

Confusionthereforefollowswhenthequestionoflegalvalidityissubstitutedforthequestionofrealefficacy。Primitivesocietiesobeyimplicitlyavarietyofelaborate’laws’or’customs，’thoughtheyhavenoconceptionoflegislation。Theobediencetotheruleisinstinctive，andtheruleregardedasabsolutelyunalterable。Aresuchrules’laws’——thoughnotmadebyasovereign——ormere’customs，’thoughobeyedasstrictlyasthemosteffective’laws’？Austinanswersconsistentlythattheyarenotlawsatall。Therearepeople，hesays，in’astateofnature，’(4*)suchasthesavagesinNewHollandorNorthAmerica。

Theirlife，inHobbes’sfamousphrase，is’solitary，poor，nasty，brutish，andshort。’Theirlawscorrespondtomere’positivemoralityorthelawsetbypublicopinion，’whichisnecessarilysouncertainthatitcannotserveasacompleteguideofconduct，norcanitbesufficientlyminuteordetailed。(5*)Savages，itseems，formherdsnotsocieties，andmaybesimplyleftoutofconsiderationbythephilosophicaljurist。Austin，ofcourse。

couldnotbeexpectedtoanticipatemorerecentinvestigationsintoarchaicinstitutions；buthewasunluckyinthussummarilycondemningthembyanticipation。Inanycasethepositionindicatesanimportantgapinhissystem。Whatwasthelegalbondwhichconvertedtheherdsintopoliticalsocieties？Theproblemoftheformationofsocietyhadbeensolvednotbyhistoricalinquirybutbythe’socialcontracttheory。’AustinfollowsBenthamandHume。Theyhadshownconclusivelynotonlythatthecontractwasafigmenthistorically，butthatitcouldnotsupplywhatwaswanted。Itprofessedtoaddthesanctityofapromisetothesocialbond，whereasthesanctityofapromiseitselfrequiresexplanation。Thetheorysimplyamounted，asBenthamhadurged，toaroundaboutwayofintroducingutility。Anysortofcontract，asAustinurges，(6*)presupposesaformedpoliticalsociety。Clearlyitcannototherwisebeacontractinhissense——anobligationenforcedbyasanction——whenitisitselftobethefoundationofsovereigntyorsanctions。AustinthereforerejectscontemptuouslythedoctrineofnaturallawacceptedbyhisGermanteachers。Thetheorythatthereissomehoworotherabodyoflaw，deduciblebythepurereason，andyetcapableofoverridingordeterminingthe’lawproper，’ishisgreatexampleofontological’jargon’and’fustian。’Austin’sdiscipleshold(7*)thathismainservicetothephilosophyoflawwaspreciselyhisexposureofthefallacy。The’Natur-Recht’is’jargon。’Itismostdesirabletodiscussideallawasmeaningthelawwhichitwouldbeusefultoadopt；buttospeakasifithadalreadysometranscendentalrealityistoconfuse’ought’

with’is’or，asAustinwouldsay，thequestionofutilitywiththequestionofactualexistence。The’naturallaw’correspondstothelegalfictionsdenouncedbyBentham，underwhich，whenreallymakinglaw，judgespretendedtobeonlyapplyinganexistinglaw；andtothetheoriesattackedintheAnarchicalFallacies，accordingtowhichthisideallawcouldoverridetheactuallaw。Austin’spolemicwasnodoubtdirectedagainstatheoryfertileinconfusionandfallacies。

Stillthesocialcontract，thoughexploded，leavesaproblemforsolution。Somehoworotherthesocialorganismhasbeenputtogether，or，inA