第62章

andwhich，findingthemetaphysicalargumentdangerous，wasinclinedtofallbackuponthemerelyempiricalargumentofPaley。Ihaveshown，atfullysufficientlength，howbysubstitutinganantinomyforaparalogism，Hamiltonmanagesverballytoevadethisdifficulty；andbyextendingthesphereofbeliefbeyondthesphereofreason，justifiesbeliefinaGodwhoisatonceunknowableandyetmaybeanobjectofworship。

Mansel’saudaciousextensionofthistothehistoricalandmythologicalcreeds，andtheconsequentidentificationofJehovahwiththeAbsoluteandInfinite，canonlyberegardedasalogicalcuriosity。Theonlyresultswere，ontheonehand，MrHerbertSpencer’sagnosticism，andontheother，perhaps，someimpulsetothespeculationoftherisinggeneration。HamiltonandManseldidsomething，bytheirdenunciationsofGermanmysticismandontology，tocallattentiontothedoctrinesattacked。TheGermansmightafterallgivetherightclue；anditmightbepossible，bysubstitutinganewdialecticfortheoldlogic，toregardtheuniverseasstillwovenoutofreason，andtopreserveatheologicaloratleastanidealistmodeofconception。Withthat，however，Ihavenoconcern。

VII。MILLONTHEOLOGY

Hamilton’stheoryatleastrecognisedtheinevitablefailureoftheempiricalorPaleytheologywhichvirtuallymakestheologyadepartmentofscience。Mill，asathoroughempiricist，mighthavebeenexpectedtoabandontheologyalongwithalltranscendentalismandontology。Infact，however，hispositionwasdifferent。IhavealreadypointedoutthatatonepartofhisargumentheappearstobedefendingorthodoxviewsoftheologyasagainstMansel。Thisargumentmightappeartobemerelyadhominem，asintendedtoshowtheabsurdityofMansel’sdoctrineofinconceivability；nottodenytheinconceivabilityitself。

Mill，however，reallygoesfurther。HeapprovesHamilton’sstrangeassertionthat’religiousdisbeliefandphilosophicalscepticismarenotmerelynotthesame，buthavenonaturalconnection，’(122*)andholdsthatalltherealargumentsfortheexistenceofGodandtheimmortalityofthesoulremainunaffectedbytheassociationtheory。InhisLogicMillhadacceptedComte’s’lawofthethreestages’；butinhislaterstudyofComteheexpresslydeclaresthatthisdoctrineisreconcilablewiththebeliefina’creatorandsupremegovernoroftheworld。’Itimpliesabeliefina’constantorder，’butthatordermaybeduetoaprimitivecreation，andevenconsistentwiththecontinualsuperintendenceofan，intelligentgovernor。’(123*)Intheposthumousessaysthispositionwasdevelopedinsuchawayastogivesomescandaltohisdisciples。(124*)Henotonlyleavesroomfortheisticbeliefs，butheseemseventosanctiontheiracceptance。

IntheThreeEssaysonReligionMillisclearlytreadingunfamiliarground。HereferstotheargumentsofLeibniz，Kant，andButler，but，asProfessorBainremarks，(125*)wasacomparativestrangertothewholesphereofspeculation。HeisnotsomuchathomewithhissubjectashewasintheLogicorthePoliticalEconomy；andthereforescarcelyappreciatescertainconditionsofsuccessfulnavigationoftheseregionsmadesufficientlyobviousbythehistoryofpreviousadventurers。Yethiscandourandhisresolutiontogivefairconsiderationtoalldifficultiesareasconspicuousashiswishtoappreciatethehighestmotivesofhisantagonists。Ofthethreeessays，thefirsttwo，writtenbefore1858(On’Nature’andthe’UtilityofReligion’)，showlessdispositionthanthelast(upon’Theism’)

tocompromisewithorthodoxy；andyettheirprinciplesareessentiallythesame。Mill，ofcourse，isstillathoroughempiricist。Oneversionoftheologyisthereforeinconsistentwithhismostessentialtenets。Theso-calledaprioriorontologicalargumentisforhimworthless。Itinvolves，hethinks，theunjustifiableassumptionthatwecaninfer’objectivefactsfromideasorconvictionsofourminds。’The’FirstCauseargument，’again，canonlyuponhisviewofcausationsuggestanindefiniteseriesofantecedents，andoneinwhicht