第58章

Nobody’s’consciousness，’wemaybesure，evertoldhimthatheperceivednotthesunbuttheactionofraysoflightonhiseye。

Hamiltonhasdivergedfromaconsiderationoftheconsciousnessitselftoaconsiderationofthephysicalconditionsofconsciousness。HavingstartedwithReid，henextadmitsKanttobeconclusive，andendsbyescapingtowhatisonlyexpressibleintermsofmaterialism。Thedeliveranceofconsciousnesshascometobeastatementthatmyfingersaredifferentfrommytoes，andthat，asIamfingersandtoes，Iamawareofthefact。

IwillnotaskwhetheritispossiblebyanyinterpretationtoputatenableconstructionuponHamilton’slanguage。Hamiltonbeginsbydiscardingthephilosopher’scrotchetthatthedifferencebetweenmindandmatterpreventsthemfromaffectingeachother；andnowheseemstoadmititsforcesofullythatheconceivesofthenervousorganismasakindofamalgamofmindandmatter。(61*)

IhavefollowedHamiltonsofarinordertoillustratethewayinwhich，bysuperposinginsteadofreconcilingtwodifferentsetsofdogma，hebecamehopelesslyconfused。TheoldScottishdoctrinereallybecomesbankruptinhisversion。HamiltonisstillstrugglingwithReid’soldproblem，andattackingthe’cosmotheticidealism’asReidattackedtheidealsystem。Howarewetocrossthegulfbetweenmindandmatter，especiallywhenweknownothingabouteithermindormattertakenapartfrommatterormind？Theproblemisinsolubleonthesetermsbecauseitisreallymeaningless。TheanswersuggestedbyKantwaseffectiveprecisely——asItakeit——becauseitdrewthelinedifferently，andthereforealteredthewholequestion。Kantdidnotprovideanewbridge，butpointedoutthatthechasmwasnotrightlyconceived。Totrytosettlewhetherthe’primaryqualities’belongto’thingsexternaltothemind’isidle。Itleadstotheinevitabledilemma。Ifthe’primaryqualities’

belongtothethingsortheobject，geometrybecomesempiricalanddeducibleonlyfromparticularexperiments，likeotherphysicalsciences。Thenwecannotaccountforitsuniquecharacteranditsatleastapparent’necessity。’If，ontheotherhand，theprimaryqualitiesbelongtothemind，wecanunderstandhowthemindevolvesorconstructs，butitisatthecostofadmittingthemtobeafterallunreal，because’subjective，’orderivingknowledgeoffactfromasimpleanalysisofthought。Butthedilemmaisreallyillusory。Wecannotsaythatthetruthsofgeometryrefereithertothings’outofthemind’ortothings’inthemind。’Theyare’subjective’inthesensethattheyareconstructedbythemindintheveryactofexperiencing。Theyarenotsubjectiveinthesenseofvaryingfromoneexperiencetoanotherorfromonemindtoanother。Theybelongtoperceptionasperception，ortotheperceiverasperceiving。Itis，therefore，meaninglesstoaskwhethertheyare’objective’or’subjective，’

ifthatistobeansweredbydeciding，asHamiltonwoulddecide，whatpartisduetothesubjectandwhatparttotheobject。Thatfeatcouldonlybeperformedifwecouldgetoutsideofourminds，whichwealwayscarryaboutwithus，oroutsideoftheuniversetowhichwearestrictlyconfined。Thenwemightperhapsunderstandwhateachfactoris，consideredapartfromtheother。

Asitis，wecanonlysaythatthetruthsareuniversalasbelongingtoexperienceingeneral，andnecessaryascorrespondingtoidenticalmodesofcombiningourexperience。Butwemustabandonthefruitlessattempttoseparateobjectfromsubject，andthentoconstructabridgetocrossthegulfwehavemade。

III。MILLONTHEEXTERNALWORLD

UponthisIhavespokensufficientlyinconsideringMill’sLogic。Mill’sfailuretoappreciatethechangeintherealissuesmadebytheKantiandoctrineinthisandotherquestionsisasourceofperplexityinhiscriticismofHamilton。(62*)HisstraightforwardstatementofhisownviewisareliefafterHamilton’scomplexandtortuousmodeofforciblycombininginconsistent