第32章

Sofarwehavewhatseemstobethelogicalandconsistentresultoftheindividualistview。ButMill，thoughheremainsan’individualist’philosophically，isalsoledtoconclusionsveryfarfromtheordinaryindividualisttheory。Thelastpartofhistreatiseisdevotedtoadiscussionofthelimitsofgovernmentinterference。Heurgesenergeticallythatthereshouldbesomespaceinhuman’existenceentrenchedroundandsacredfromauthoritativeintrusion，’(139*)adoctrineinheritedfromhisteachersandeloquentlyexpandedinhisLiberty。Itmarksthepointoftransitionfromhiseconomictohisethicalandpoliticalteaching。Afterrepeatingtheordinaryargumentsagainstexcessiveinterferencebywayofprotection，usurylawsandthelike，hestatesasageneralprinciplethattheburdenofproofisontheadvocatesofinterference，andthat’lettingaloneshouldbethegeneralpractice。’(140*)Allcoercion，asBenthamhadsaid，isanevil，but，incertaincases，itistheleastpossibleevil；andMill，asbecomesanempiricist，decliningtolaydownanabsoluterule，onlyaskswhataretheparticularcasesinwhichtheevilisover-balancedbythegoodofinterference。But，here，ifweconsiderthelistofexceptions，wemustadmitthatthegeneralprincipleisremarkablyflexible。Somecaseshavebeenalreadynoticed。Millnotonlyallowedbutstronglyadvocatedanationalsystemofeducation。(141*)Heapprovedagreatnationalschemeofemigration(142*)andaschemeforhomecolonisation，andthisexpresslywithaviewtoliftingthepoor，notgraduallybutimmediatelyintoahigherlevelofcomfort。Heheldthatlawsinrestraintofimprudentmarriagewerenotwronginprinciple，thoughtheymightbeinexpedientundermanyormostcircumstances。Heapprovedofmeasurestendingtoequalisationofwealth。Heproposedthattherightofbequestshouldbelimitedbyforbiddinganyonetoacquiremorethanacertainsum，andsocounteractingthetendencytotheaccumulationoflargefortunes。(143*)Heheldthatgovernmentshouldtakemeasuresforalleviatingthesufferingsoflabourersdisplacedbynewinventionsortheexcessivechangeof’circulating’，into’fixedcapital。’(144*)Henotonlyapprovedofmeasuresforformingapeasant-proprietary，but，inhislastyears，becamepresidentofanassociationforalteringthewholesystemoflandtenure。Hethoughtthatgovernmentshouldretainapropertyincanalsandrailways，thoughtheworkingshouldbeleasedtoprivatecompanies。Heapproved，asIhavesaid，ofthepoor-lawinitsnewform。Thefactorylegislationalonewasstilluncongenialtohisprinciples，thoughonmoralgroundsheaccepttheprotectionofchildren。Eveninthisdirectionheincidentallymakesaremarkableconcession。Apointtowhichpoliticaleconomistshadnot，hethinks，sufficientlyattendedisillustratedbythecaseofthe’NineHoursBill。’(145*)Assuming，thoughonlyforthesakeofargument，thatareductionoflabourhoursfromtentoninewouldbetotheadvantageoftheworkmen，shouldthelaw，heasks，interferetoenforcereduction？Thedo-nothingpartywouldreply，No；becauseifbeneficial，theworkmenwouldadopttherulespontaneously。Thisanswer，saysMill，isinconclusive。Theinterestoftheindividualwouldbeopposedtotheinterestofthe’classcollectively。’Competitionmightenforcethelongerhours；andthusclassesmayneedtheassistanceofthelaw，togiveeffecttotheirdeliberatecollectiveopinionoftheirowninterest。’HereagainMillseemstobeadmittingasan’exception’aprinciplewhichgoesmuchfurtherthanheobserved。

Heismainlyinterestedbytheethicalproblem，Isiteverrighttoforceamantoactagainsthisownwishesinamatterprimarilyconcerninghimselfalone？Heconcludesthatitmayberight，becauseeachmanmaywishforaruleonconditionthateveryoneelseobeysit。Inthatcase，thelawonlygiveseffecttotheuniversaldesire。Buttheargumentreallyinvolvesanexceptiontothebeneficentactionofcompetition。Thecaseisoneinwhich，uponhisassumptions，freecompetitionofindividualsmayleadtodegenerationinsteadofabetterdevelopment。Insuchcases，itispossiblethatassociation，enforcedbylaw，mayleadtobenefitsunattainablebytheindependentunits。ThisadmissionwouldgofarintheSocialistdirection。Itwouldjustifytheprincipleof’collectivebargaining’tosanctionthecollectiveinterests。Inthesamewayhisjustificationofthefactoryactsinthecaseofchildrenleadsbeyondthemoraltoeconomicgrounds。Mill’sview，sofarashegoes，wouldfallinwiththeopinionthattherewashereanecessaryconflictbetweenChristianmoralityandpoliticaleconomy；ortheadmissionthateconomiclossmustbeincurredformoralconsideratio