第11章

60。Publishedin1848beforetheappearanceofMill’sPoliticalEconomy。Millreadtheproofsofhisfriend’sbook。Bain’sJ。S。

Mill，p。86n。

61。Autobiography，p。231。Thedatesofthesechangesarerathervaguelyindicated。

62。Autobiography，p。235。

63。Ibid。p。236。

64。ArticleinDissertations，ii，republishedfromWestminsterReviewofApril1849。

65。Autobiography，p。238。

66。SeereferencetoMrsMillinthesuppresseddedicationofthePoliticalEconomygiveninBain’sJ。S。Mill，p。175；thededicationoftheLiberty；thenoteinDissertation，ii，412；andAutobiography，pp。184-90and240-45。

67。Bain’sJ。S。Mill，p。167。

68。Bain’sJ。S。Mill，p。173。

69。Autobiography，p。229。

70。Autobiography，p。244-47。

71。Autobiography，p。262。

72。FirstinFraser’sMagazinein1861；republishedin1863。

73。FirstintheWestminsterfor1864，reprintedseparatelyin1865。

74。TheessaysuponNatureandTheUtilityofReligionarestatedtohavebeenwrittenbetween1850and1858；thatuponTheismbetween1868and1870。

75。Autobiography，p。230。HedefendsthisreticenceinalettertoComteof18thDecember1841——Correspondence，p。12。

76。Autobiography，p。240。

77。Publishedin1869。

78。ArticleinFraser’sMagazine，January1861。

79。IheardsomehisfirstspeechesfromthepressgalleryoftheHouseofCommons。

80。Autobiography，p。289。

81。Disraeliissaidtohavesummeduptheimpressionmadeuponpracticalpoliticiansbycallinghima’politicalfinishinggoverness’。

82。Seehispamphlet，EnglandandIreland，1869。

83。Autobiography，p。286。

84。Autobiography，p。308。

85。Green’sMiscellaneousWorks，iii，cxliv。

86。Miscellanies(secondseries)。

87。Autobiography，p。109。

ChapterII

Mill’sLogicI。IntuitionismandEmpiricismMill’sSystemofLogicmayberegardedasthemostimportantmanifestoofUtilitarianphilosophy。ItlaysdownexplicitlyandintheirripestformtheprinciplesimplicitlyassumedbyBenthamandtheelderMill。Itmodifiesaswellasexpounds。ItrepresentstheprocessbywhichJ。S。Mill，onbecomingawareofcertaindefectsintheUtilitarians’philosophy，endeavouredtorestatethefirstprinciplessoastoavoidtheerroneousconclusions。Thecoincidencewithhispredecessorsremainsfarcloserthanthedivergence。Thefundamentaltenetsaredevelopedratherthanwithdrawn。TheLogicthusmostdistinctlyraisestheultimateissues。Ithastheimpressivenesswhichbelongsinsomedegreetoeverygenuineexertionofapowerfulmind。Millisstrugglingwithrealdifficulties；nottryingtobolsterupatheorycommendedtohimbyextraneousconsiderations。Heisdoinghisbesttogiveananswertohisproblem；nottohideanevasion。Hishonourablecandourincidentallyrevealstheweaknessasfranklyasthestrengthofhisposition。Heneithershirksnorhidesdifficulties，andifweareforcedtoadmitthatsomeofhisreasoningisfallacious，theadmissionscarcelyaddstothestatementthatheiswritingatreatiseuponphilosophicalproblems。Hisfranknesshasmadethetaskofcriticscomparativelyeasy。Ittakessomanyvolumestosettlewhatsomephilosophershavemeantthatwescarcelyreachthequestionwhethertheirmeaning，orratheranyoftheirmanypossiblemeanings，wasright。InthecaseofMill，thatpreparatorylabourisnotrequired。Hisbook，too，hasbeensufficientlytestedbytimetoenableustomarkthepointsatwhichhisstructurehasfailedtostandthewearandtearofgeneraldiscussion。Imusttrytobringoutthevitalpointsofthedoctrine。

Mill，Ihavesaid，hadaverydefinitepurposebeyondthepurelyphilosophical。’Badinstitutions，’hesays，(1*)aresupportedbyfalsephilosophy。Thefalsephilosophytowhichherefersisthatoftheso-called’intuitionistschool。’Its’stronghold，’hethought，layinappealstothemathematicalandphysicalsciences。Todriveitfromthispositionwastodepriveitof’speculativesupport’；and，thoughitcouldstillappealtoprejudice，thedestructionofthissupportwasanindispenSablesteptocompletevictory。Millwishedtoprovidealogicalarmouryforallassailantsofestablisheddogmatism，andhissuccessasapropagandistsurprisedhim。Thebookwasread，tohisastonishment，evenintheuniversities。Indeed，IcantestifyfrompersonalobservationthatitbecameakindofsacredbookforstudentswhoclaimedtobegenuineLiberals。Itgavethephilosophicalcreedofanimportantsectionoftherisinggeneration，partlybiassed，itmaybe，bytheapplicationto’badinstitutions。’Mill’slogic，thatis，fellinwiththeonemaincurrentofpoliticalopinion。HisreadingsinlogicwithGroteandotherfriendsenabledhimtofashiontheweaponsneededfortheassault。Thusinitsoriginandbyitsexecutionthetaskwasinfactanattempttogiveanorganisedstatementofsoundphilosophyinaformapplicabletosocialandpoliticalspeculations。

Millconsideredthattheschoolofmetaphysicianswhichheattackedhadlongpredominatedinthiscountry。(2*)WhenTainecalledhisviewspeciallyEnglish，Millprotested。TheScottishreactionagainstHume，hesaid，which’assumedlongagotheGermanform，’hadendedby’prevailinguniversally’inthiscountry。Whenhefirstwrotehewasalmostaloneinhisopinions，andtherewerestill’twentyaprioriandspiritualistphilosophersforeverypartisanofthedoctrineofExperience。’(3*)Thephilosophicalworld，hesayselsewhere，(4*)

is’bisected’bythelinebetweenthe’Intuitional’andthe’Experiential’schools。Mill’sconvictionthatamajorityofEnglishmenwerereally’intuitionists’inanyshapeissignificant，Ithink，ofhisisolatedposition。UndoubtedlymostEnglishmendislikedUtilitarians，andrespectableprofessorsofphilosophywereanxioustodisavowsympathywithcovertatheism。

Yetthegeneraltendencyofthoughtwas，Isuspect，farmorecongenialtoMill’sdoctrinethanheadmitted。Englishmenwerepractically，ifnotavowedly，predisposedtoempiricism。Inanycase，hewascarryingonthetraditionwhichTainerightly，asI

shouldsay，regardedasspecificallyEnglish。ItsadherentstraceditsoriginbackthroughJamesMilltoHartley，Hume，Locke，Hobbes，andFrancisBacon，andperhapsitmightevencountamongitsremoterancestorssuchmenasWilliamofOckhamandRogerBacon。Theseriesofnamessuggestssomepermanentcongenialitytothenationalcharacter。(5*)Although，moreover，thistraditionhadinlatertimesbeenbrokenbyReidandhisfollowers，theircondemnationdidnotreallyimplysofundamentalanantithesisofthoughtasMillsupposed。Theyandtheempiricistshad，intheirownopinionatleast，acommonancestorinBacon，ifnotinLocke。But，howeverthismaybe，theScottishschoolhadmaintainedthepositionswhichMillthoughthimselfconcernedtoattack；andforhimrepresentedtherejectionof’experience。’

Experienceisawordwhichrequiresexposition；butinageneralwaytheaimoftheUtilitariansisabundantlyclear。Theyattacked’intuitions’asLockehadattacked’innateideas。’Thegreaterrorofphilosophy，accordingtothem，asaccordingtoLocke，hasbeentheattempttotranscendthelimitsofhumanintelligence，andsotowanderintotheregionsofmysticism；toseekknowledgebyspinninglogicalstructureswhich，havingnobaseinfact，endedinmerescholasticlogomachy；ortooverrideexperiencebyclaimingabsoluteauthorityfortheorieswhichdispensewithfurtherproofforthesimplereasonthatnoproofofthemcanbegiven。Tolimitspeculationandtomakeitfruitfulbyforcingitfromthefirsttodealwithfacts；totraceallitsevidencetoexperienceortheobservationoffacts；

andtoinsistuponitsverificationbycomparisonwithfacts，isthemainandsurelythelegitimatepurposeoftheUtilitariansasofalltheirphilosophicalcongeners。Thegulfbetweentheworldofspeculationandtheworldoffactisthegreatopprobriumofphilosophy。Thenecessityforfindingabasisoffactwasemphasisedatthistimebytherapiddevelopmentofthescienceswhichmaybecalledpurelyempirical，andwhichhadsprung，inanycase，frommethodsofdirectobservation。ThisdevelopmentsuggestedtheelaboratetreatisewrittenfromadifferentpointofviewbyWhewell。ThegreatambitionoftheBenthamiteshadbeentoapplyscientificmethodstoalltheproblemsoflegislation，jurisprudence，economics，ethics，andphilosophy。

Millcouldnowshow，withtheinvoluntaryhelpofWhewell，whatthosemethodsreallyimpliedThequestionsremain：Whatarefacts？and，Whatisexperience？and，Whataretheconsequentconditionsofreasoningaboutfacts？Admittingthat，somehoworother，avastandrapidlygrowingbodyofknowledgehasbeenattainedinthephysicalsciences，wemayaskhowithasbeengained，andproceedtoapplythemethodsinwhathavebeencalledthemoralsciences。Kant’sfamousproblemwas，Howisapriorisyntheticknowledgepossible？Milldeniesthatanysuchknowledgeexists。Hisproblemistherefore，Howcanknowledgebeexplainedwithoutapriorielements？Whenthiscanbesatisfactorilydone，weshallbeabletoshowhowbothmoralandphysicalsciencecanbefairlybaseduponexperience。

Mill’sviewoftheproperlimitsofhisinquiryischaracteristic。HeacceptsBacon’saccountoflogic。It，isthearsartium，thescienceofscienceitself。’(6*)Itimpliesaninvestigationintotheprocessesofinferencegenerally。Itisnotlimitedtotheoldformallogic，butincludeseveryoperationbywhichknowledgeisextended。Itisthus，asheafterwardsputsit，the’theoryofproof。’(7*)Thebook，indeed，owesitsinteresttothewidthofthefieldcovered。Ithasnottherepulsivedrynessofformallogic，butwouldleadtoanaturalhistoryofthewholegrowthofknowledge，andmakesconstantreferencetotheactualdevelopmentofthought。Ontheotherhand，Millgivesnoticethathehasnomoretodowithmetaphysicsthanwithanyofthespecialsciences。Logic，hedeclares，iscommongroundforallschoolsofphilosophy。Itis，hesays，theofficeofmetaphysicstodecidewhatareultimatefacts，butforthelogicianitisneedlesstogointothisanalysis。(8*)Accordingly，heofteninthecourseofthebookconsidershimselfentitledtohandovervariousproblemstothemetaphysicians。(9*)Thepossibilityofreallykeepingtothisdistinctionisdoubtful。SinceMill’sveryaimistoshowthatallknowledgecomesfromobservationof’facts，’itisapparentlyrelevanttoinquirewhatarethese’ultimatefacts。’Indeed，hisstatement，thoughmadeinallsincerity，almostsuggestsacontroversialartifice。Logic，asMillofcourseadmits，affectsmetaphysicsasitaffectsallsciences；butinonewayitaffectsthemverydifferently。Itjustifiesastronomy，butitapparentlymakesmetaphysicssuperfluous。Inquiryintothe’ultimatefacts’