第57章

TocarryoutthistheoryisthecentralaimofHamilton’s’NaturalRealism。’Reid’sstatementmightseemtobenotablunder，butatruism。’Iamconsciousoftherose’meansprecisely’IhavecertainsensationswhichIregardasimplyingtheexistenceofapermanentexternalreality。’Butthisistointerpretperceptionasinvolvingan’inference，’andtherefore，accordingtoHamilton，istoabandontheessentialdoctrineofNaturalRealism。(29*)Itmayseemstrange，headmits，butitistrue，’thatthesimpleandprimaryactofintelligenceshouldbeajudgment，whichphilosophersingeneralhavereceivedasacompoundandderivativeoperation。’(30*)’Knowing’and’knowingthatweknow’arethesamething；asconceivingthesidesandanglesofatrianglearethesameprocess，distinguishableinthought，but’innature，oneandindivisible。’(31*)What，then，isthisessentialjudgment？Inanactofsensibleperception，saysHamilton，Iamconsciousofmyselfandofsomethingdifferentfrommyself。(32*)Thismightseemtodefinethedistinctionbetween’consciousness’and’perception。’theobjectofmythoughtmay，asHamiltonremarks，bea’modeofmind’aswellasa’modeofmatter。’(33*)Consciousnessofself，weshouldinfer，differsfromconsciousnessofthenot-self，anditisjustthepresenceofthenot-selfwhichdistinguishesperceptionfromsimpleconsciousness。Hamilton，however，arguesthatperceptionissimpleconsciousness；orthatthedistinction，forhispurpose，isirrelevant。Thereisa’logical’butnota’psychological’difference。(34*)Everyactofconsciousnessimpliesaconceptionoftheego。But’thescienceofoppositesisone。’thereforeconsciousnessoftheegoinvolvesconsciousnessofthenon-ego，or，inthesimplestpossibleactofintelligenceImustbetakentoaffirmtheexistencebothofanegoandanon-ego。

IfIcannoteventhinkaboutmyselfwithoutaffirmingtheexistenceofanexternalworld，itwouldbesuperfluoustolookaboutforfurtherproofsofitsexistence。Buthereoccursasingulardifficulty。Hamiltonhastoguardagainstthetranscendentalistaswellasagainstthesceptic。Heisthereforenotonlya’realist，’butwithequalemphasisa’relativist。’

thatourknowledgeisessentiallyrelativeisoneofthepointsuponwhichheinsistsmostemphatically，andconfirmsasusualbyacatenaofauthorities。Itis，hesays，thetruth’mostharmoniouslyre-echoedbyeveryphilosopherofeveryschool，exceptthemodernGermans。’(35*)Thephraserelativityhasmorethanonemeaning；butaccordingtoHamiltonmeansatleastthis：

’ourwholeknowledgeofmindandmatterisrelative——

conditioned——relativelyconditioned。’Ofmindandmatter’inthemselves’weonlyknowthattheyare’incognisable。’’Allthatweknowisthereforephenomenal——phenomenaloftheunknown。’

This，then，isacardinaldoctrine。HowisitcompatiblewiththeDoctrinethattheegoandnon-egoaregivenineveryactofconsciousness？Mindandmatter，aswehaveseen，areseparated’bythewholediameterofbeing。’theyexpress’twoseriesofphenomena，knownless’(？not)’inthemselvesthan’(？but)，incontradistinctionfromeachother。’(36*)Whatisgivenisnottwofacts，theegoandthenon-ego，butthe’relation。’Somehow，theconsciousactimpliesthepresenceoftwofactors，unknowableinthemselves。The’scienceofopposites’maybe’thesame，’but，ifIknowneitheropposite，therecanbeverylittlescience。

Strangely，Hamiltonseemstoconfusethedifferencebetweenknowingarelationandknowingthetwothingsrelated。Hetellsusasaroughillustration，thatifweconsidertheperceptionofabooktobemadeupoftwelveparts，fourmaybegivenbythebook，fourbythesight，andfourby’allthatintervenes。’(37*)

Heinfers，presently，thatthe’greatproblemofphilosophy’isto’distinguishwhatelementsarecontributedbytheknowingsubject，whatelementsbytheobjectknown。’(38*)Betweenthesestatementswehavearenewedandemphaticassertionofthe’relativityofknowledge。’Hamilton，thatis，speaksasiffromthefactthatlifesupposesbreathingwecouldinferhowfarlifedependsuponthelungsandhowfarupontheair。Fromarelationbetweentwothings，unknowableinthemselves，wecansurelylearnnothingastothethingsseparately。Equalityoftwoquantitiesiscompatiblewithindefinitevariationintheequalquantities。(39*)Thedif