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composedofthemarealsouniversal，ornon-substancewillbepriorto
substance；fortheuniversalisnotasubstance，buttheelementor
principleisuniversal，andtheelementorprincipleispriortothe
thingsofwhichitistheprincipleorelement。
Allthesedifficultiesfollownaturally，whentheymakethe
Ideasoutofelementsandatthesametimeclaimthatapartfromthe
substanceswhichhavethesameformthereareIdeas，asingleseparate
entity。Butif，e。g。inthecaseoftheelementsofspeech，thea’s
andtheb’smayquitewellbemanyandthereneedbenoa-itselfand
b-itselfbesidesthemany，theremaybe，sofarasthisgoes，an
infinitenumberofsimilarsyllables。Thestatementthatan
knowledgeisuniversal，sothattheprinciplesofthingsmustalso
beuniversalandnotseparatesubstances，presentsindeed，ofall
thepointswehavementioned，thegreatestdifficulty，butyetthe
statementisinasensetrue，althoughinasenseitisnot。For
knowledge，liketheverb’toknow’，meanstwothings，ofwhichone
ispotentialandoneactual。Thepotency，being，asmatter，
universalandindefinite，dealswiththeuniversalandindefinite；but
theactuality，beingdefinite，dealswithadefiniteobject，beinga
’this’，itdealswitha’this’。Butperaccidenssightsees
universalcolour，becausethisindividualcolourwhichitseesis
colour；andthisindividualawhichthegrammarianinvestigatesis
ana。Foriftheprinciplesmustbeuniversal，whatisderivedfrom
themmustalsobeuniversal，asindemonstrations；andifthisis
so，therewillbenothingcapableofseparateexistence-i。e。no
substance。Butevidentlyinasenseknowledgeisuniversal，andina
senseitisnot。
thiskindofsubstance，whatwehavesaidmustbe
takenassufficient。Allphilosophersmakethefirstprinciples
contraries:asinnaturalthings，soalsointhecaseof
unchangeablesubstances。Butsincetherecannotbeanythingpriorto
thefirstprincipleofallthings，theprinciplecannotbethe
principleandyetbeanattributeofsomethingelse。Tosuggestthis
islikesayingthatthewhiteisafirstprinciple，notquaanything
elsebutquawhite，butyetthatitispredicableofasubject，i。e。
thatitsbeingwhitepresupposesitsbeingsomethingelse；thisis
absurd，forthenthatsubjectwillbeprior。Butallthingswhich
aregeneratedfromtheircontrariesinvolveanunderlyingsubject；a
subject，then，mustbepresentinthecaseofcontraries，ifanywhere。
Allcontraries，then，arealwayspredicableofasubject，andnonecan
existapart，butjustasappearancessuggestthatthereisnothing
contrarytosubstance，argumentconfirmsthis。Nocontrary，then，is
thefirstprincipleofallthingsinthefullsense；thefirst
principleissomethingdifferent。
Butthesethinkersmakeoneofthecontrariesmatter，some
makingtheunequalwhichtheytaketobetheessenceof
plurality-matterfortheOne，andothersmakingpluralitymatterfor
theOne。(Theformergeneratenumbersoutofthedyadofthe
unequal，i。e。ofthegreatandsmall，andtheotherthinkerwehave
referredtogeneratesthemoutofplurality，whileaccordingtoboth
itisgeneratedbytheessenceoftheOne。)Foreventhephilosopher
whosaystheunequalandtheOnearetheelements，andtheunequal
isadyadcomposedofthegreatandsmall，treatstheunequal，or
thegreatandthesmall，asbeingone，anddoesnotdrawthe
distinctionthattheyareoneindefinition，butnotinnumber。But
theydonotdescriberightlyeventheprincipleswhichtheycall
elements，forsomenamethegreatandthesmallwiththeOneandtreat
thesethreeaselementsofnumbers，twobeingmatter，onetheform；
whileothersnamethemanyandfew，becausethegreatandthesmall
aremoreappropriateintheirnaturetomagnitudethantonumber；
andothersnamerathertheuniversalcharactercommontothese-’that
whichexceedsandthatwhichisexceeded’。Noneofthesevarieties
ofopinionmakesanydifferencetospeakof，inviewofsomeofthe
consequences；theyaffectonlytheabstractobjections，whichthese
thinkerstakecaretoavoidbecausethed
