下载辰思小说免费APP
But,further,allotherthingscannotcomefromtheFormsinany
oftheusualsensesof’from’。Andtosaythattheyarepatternsand
theotherthingsshareinthemistouseemptywordsandpoetical
metaphors。Forwhatisitthatworks,lookingtotheIdeas?Andany
thingcanbothbeandcomeintobeingwithoutbeingcopiedfrom
somethingelse,sothat,whetherSocratesexistsornot,amanlike
Socratesmightcometobe。Andevidentlythismightbesoevenif
Socrateswereeternal。Andtherewillbeseveralpatternsofthe
samething,andthereforeseveralForms;e。g。’animal’and
’two-footed’,andalso’man-himself’,willbeFormsofman。Again,the
Formsarepatternsnotonlyofsensiblethings,butofForms
themselvesalso;i。e。thegenusisthepatternofthevarious
forms-of-a-genus;thereforethesamethingwillbepatternandcopy。
Again,itwouldseemimpossiblethatsubstanceandthatwhose
substanceitisshouldexistapart;how,therefore,couldtheIdeas,
beingthesubstancesofthings,existapart?
InthePhaedothecaseisstatedinthisway-thattheFormsare
causesbothofbeingandofbecoming。YetthoughtheFormsexist,
stillthingsdonotcomeintobeing,unlessthereissomethingto
originatemovement;andmanyotherthingscomeintobeing(e。g。a
houseoraring)ofwhichtheysaytherearenoForms。Clearly
thereforeeventhethingsofwhichtheysaythereareIdeascanboth
beandcomeintobeingowingtosuchcausesasproducethethingsjust
mentioned,andnotowingtotheForms。ButregardingtheIdeasitis
possible,bothinthiswayandbymoreabstractandaccurate
arguments,tocollectmanyobjectionslikethosewehaveconsidered。
Sincewehavediscussedthesepoints,itiswelltoconsideragain
theresultsregardingnumberswhichconfrontthosewhosaythat
numbersareseparablesubstancesandfirstcausesofthings。Ifnumber
isanentityanditssubstanceisnothingotherthanjustnumber,as
somesay,itfollowsthateither(1)thereisafirstinitanda
second,eachbeingdifferentinspecies,-andeither(a)thisistrue
oftheunitswithoutexception,andanyunitisinassociablewith
anyunit,or(b)theyareallwithoutexceptionsuccessive,andanyof
themareassociablewithany,astheysayisthecasewith
mathematicalnumber;forinmathematicalnumbernooneunitisin
anywaydifferentfromanother。Or(c)someunitsmustbeassociable
andsomenot;e。g。supposethat2isfirstafter1,andthencomes3
andthentherestofthenumberseries,andtheunitsineachnumber
areassociable,e。g。thoseinthefirst2areassociablewithone
another,andthoseinthefirst3withoneanother,andsowiththe
othernumbers;buttheunitsinthe’2-itself’areinassociablewith
thoseinthe’3-itself’;andsimilarlyinthecaseoftheother
successivenumbers。Andsowhilemathematicalnumberiscounted
thus-after1,2(whichconsistsofanother1besidestheformer1),
and3whichconsistsofanother1besidesthesetwo),andtheother
numberssimilarly,idealnumberiscountedthus-after1,adistinct
2whichdoesnotincludethefirst1,anda3whichdoesnotinclude
the2andtherestofthenumberseriessimilarly。Or(2)onekind
ofnumbermustbelikethefirstthatwasnamed,onelikethatwhich
themathematiciansspeakof,andthatwhichwehavenamedlastmustbe
athirdkind。
Again,thesekindsofnumbersmusteitherbeseparablefrom
things,ornotseparablebutinobjectsofperception(nothowever
inthewaywhichwefirstconsidered,inthesensethatobjectsof
perceptionconsistsofnumberswhicharepresentinthem)-eitherone
kindandnotanother,orallofthem。
Theseareofnecessitytheonlywaysinwhichthenumberscan
exist。Andofthosewhosaythatthe1isthebeginningand
substanceandelementofallthings,andthatnumberisformedfrom
the1andsomethingelse,almosteveryonehasdescribednumberinone
oftheseways;onlynoonehassaidalltheunitsareinassociable。
Andthishashappenedreasonablyenough;fortherecanbenoway