下载辰思小说免费APP
havesightthattheymaysee。Andsimilarlymenhavetheartof
buildingthattheymaybuild，andtheoreticalsciencethattheymay
theorize；buttheydonottheorizethattheymayhavetheoretical
science，exceptthosewhoarelearningbypractice；andthesedonot
theorizeexceptinalimitedsense，orbecausetheyhavenoneedto
theorize。Further，matterexistsinapotentialstate，justbecauseit
maycometoitsform；andwhenitexistsactually，thenitisinits
form。Andthesameholdsgoodinallcases，eventhoseinwhichthe
endisamovement。Andso，asteachersthinktheyhaveachieved
theirendwhentheyhaveexhibitedthepupilatwork，naturedoes
likewise。Forifthisisnotthecase，weshallhavePauson’sHermes
overagain，sinceitwillbehardtosayabouttheknowledge，asabout
thefigureinthepicture，whetheritiswithinorwithout。Forthe
actionistheend，andtheactualityistheaction。Andsoeventhe
word’actuality’isderivedfrom’action’，andpointstothe
completereality。
Andwhileinsomecasestheexerciseistheultimatething(e。g。
insighttheultimatethingisseeing，andnootherproductbesides
thisresultsfromsight)，butfromsomethingsaproductfollows(e。g。
fromtheartofbuildingthereresultsahouseaswellastheactof
building)，yetnonethelesstheactisintheformercasetheendand
inthelattermoreofanendthanthepotencyis。Fortheactof
buildingisrealizedinthethingthatisbeingbuilt，andcomesto
be，andis，atthesametimeasthehouse。
Where，then，theresultissomethingapartfromtheexercise，
theactualityisinthethingthatisbeingmade，e。g。theactof
buildingisinthethingthatisbeingbuiltandthatofweavingin
thethingthatisbeingwoven，andsimilarlyinallothercases，and
ingeneralthemovementisinthethingthatisbeingmoved；butwhere
thereisnoproductapartfromtheactuality，theactualityispresent
intheagents，e。g。theactofseeingisintheseeingsubjectand
thatoftheorizinginthetheorizingsubjectandthelifeisinthe
soul(andthereforewell-beingalso；foritisacertainkindof
life)。
Obviously，therefore，thesubstanceorformisactuality。
Accordingtothisargument，then，itisobviousthatactualityis
priorinsubstantialbeingtopotency；andaswehavesaid，one
actualityalwaysprecedesanotherintimerightbacktothe
actualityoftheeternalprimemover。
But(b)actualityispriorinastrictersensealso；foreternal
thingsarepriorinsubstancetoperishablethings，andnoeternal
thingexistspotentially。Thereasonisthis。Everypotencyisat
oneandthesametimeapotencyoftheopposite；for，whilethatwhich
isnotcapableofbeingpresentinasubjectcannotbepresent，
everythingthatiscapableofbeingmaypossiblynotbeactual。
That，then，whichiscapableofbeingmayeitherbeornotbe；the
samething，then，iscapablebothofbeingandofnotbeing。And
thatwhichiscapableofnotbeingmaypossiblynotbe；andthatwhich
maypossiblynotbeisperishable，eitherinthefullsense，orinthe
precisesenseinwhichitissaidthatitpossiblymaynotbe，i。e。in
respecteitherofplaceorofquantityorquality；’inthefullsense’
means’inrespectofsubstance’。Nothing，then，whichisinthefull
senseimperishableisinthefullsensepotentiallyexistent(though
thereisnothingtopreventitsbeingsoinsomerespect，e。g。
potentiallyofacertainqualityorinacertainplace)；all
imperishablethings，then，existactually。Norcananythingwhichis
ofnecessityexistpotentially；yetthesethingsareprimary；forif
thesedidnotexist，nothingwouldexist。Nordoeseternalmovement，
iftherebesuch，existpotentially；and，ifthereisaneternal
mobile，itisnotinmotioninvirtueofapotentiality，exceptin
respectof’whence’and’whither’(thereisnothingtoprevent
