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Asallpotenciesareeitherinnate，likethesenses，orcomeby
practice，likethepowerofplayingtheflute，orbylearning，like
artisticpower，thosewhichcomebypracticeorbyrationalformulawe
mustacquirebypreviousexercisebutthisisnotnecessarywiththose
whicharenotofthisnatureandwhichimplypassivity。
Sincethatwhichis’capable’iscapableofsomethingandat
sometimeinsomeway(withalltheotherqualificationswhichmustbe
presentinthedefinition)，andsincesomethingscanproducechange
accordingtoarationalformulaandtheirpotenciesinvolvesucha
formula，whileotherthingsarenonrationalandtheirpotenciesare
non-rational，andtheformerpotenciesmustbeinalivingthing，
whilethelattercanbebothinthelivingandinthelifeless；as
regardspotenciesofthelatterkind，whentheagentandthepatient
meetinthewayappropriatetothepotencyinquestion，theonemust
actandtheotherbeactedon，butwiththeformerkindofpotency
thisisnotnecessary。Forthenonrationalpotenciesareall
productiveofoneeffecteach，buttherationalproducecontrary
effects，sothatiftheyproducedtheireffectsnecessarilytheywould
producecontraryeffectsatthesametime；butthisisimpossible。
Theremust，then，besomethingelsethatdecides；Imeanbythis，
desireorwill。Forwhicheveroftwothingstheanimaldesires
decisively，itwilldo，whenitispresent，andmeetsthepassive
object，inthewayappropriatetothepotencyinquestion。Therefore
everythingwhichhasarationalpotency，whenitdesiresthatfor
whichithasapotencyandinthecircumstancesinwhichithasthe
potency，mustdothis。Andithasthepotencyinquestionwhenthe
passiveobjectispresentandisinacertainstate；ifnotitwill
notbeabletoact。(Toaddthequalification’ifnothingexternal
preventsit’isnotfurthernecessary；forithasthepotencyonthe
termsonwhichthisisapotencyofacting，anditisthisnotin
allcircumstancesbutoncertainconditions，amongwhichwillbethe
exclusionofexternalhindrances；forthesearebarredbysomeof
thepositivequalifications。)Andsoevenifonehasarational
wish，oranappetite，todotwothingsorcontrarythingsatthe
sametime，onewillnotdothem；foritisnotonthesetermsthatone
hasthepotencyforthem，norisitapotencyofdoingbothatthe
sametime，sinceonewilldothethingswhichitisapotencyof
doing，onthetermsonwhichonehasthepotency。
Sincewehavetreatedofthekindofpotencywhichisrelatedto
movement，letusdiscussactuality-what，andwhatkindofthing，
actualityis。Forinthecourseofouranalysisitwillalsobecome
clear，withregardtothepotential，thatwenotonlyascribe
potencytothatwhosenatureitistomovesomethingelse，ortobe
movedbysomethingelse，eitherwithoutqualificationorinsome
particularway，butalsousethewordinanothersense，whichisthe
reasonoftheinquiryinthecourseofwhichwehavediscussedthese
previoussensesalso。Actuality，then，istheexistenceofathingnot
inthewaywhichweexpressby’potentially’；wesaythatpotentially，
forinstance，astatueofHermesisintheblockofwoodandthe
half-lineisinthewhole，becauseitmightbeseparatedout，andwe
calleventhemanwhoisnotstudyingamanofscience，ifheis
capableofstudying；thethingthatstandsincontrasttoeachof
theseexistsactually。Ourmeaningcanbeseenintheparticularcases
byinduction，andwemustnotseekadefinitionofeverythingbutbe
contenttograsptheanalogy，thatitisasthatwhichisbuilding
istothatwhichiscapableofbuilding，andthewakingtothe
sleeping，andthatwhichisseeingtothatwhichhasitseyesshutbut
hassight，andthatwhichhasbeenshapedoutofthemattertothe
matter，andthatwhichhasbeenwroughtuptotheunwrought。Let
actualitybedefinedbyonememberofthisantithesis，andthe
potentialbytheother。Butallthingsarenotsaidinthesame
sensetoexistactually，butonlybyanalogy-asAisinBortoB，C
isinDortoD；forsomeareasmovementtopotency，andtheothers
assubstancetosomesortofmatter。
Butalsotheinfiniteandthevoidandallsimilarthingsaresaid
toexistpotentiallyandactuallyinadifferentsensefromthatwhich
appliestomanyotherthings，e。g。tothatwhichseesorwalksoris
s
