下载辰思小说免费APP
WEhavetreatedofthatwhichisprimarilyandtowhichallthe
othercategoriesofbeingarereferred-i。e。ofsubstance。Foritisin
virtueoftheconceptofsubstancethattheothersalsoaresaidto
be-quantityandqualityandthelike;forallwillbefoundtoinvolve
theconceptofsubstance,aswesaidinthefirstpartofourwork。
Andsince’being’isinonewaydividedintoindividualthing,
quality,andquantity,andisinanotherwaydistinguishedin
respectofpotencyandcompletereality,andoffunction,letusnow
addadiscussionofpotencyandcompletereality。Andfirstletus
explainpotencyinthestrictestsense,whichis,however,notthe
mostusefulforourpresentpurpose。Forpotencyandactuality
extendbeyondthecasesthatinvolveareferencetomotion。Butwhen
wehavespokenofthisfirstkind,weshallinourdiscussionsof
actuality’explaintheotherkindsofpotencyaswell。
Wehavepointedoutelsewherethat’potency’andtheword’can’
haveseveralsenses。Ofthesewemayneglectallthepotenciesthat
aresocalledbyanequivocation。Forsomearecalledsobyanalogy,
asingeometrywesayonethingisorisnota’power’ofanotherby
virtueofthepresenceorabsenceofsomerelationbetweenthem。But
allpotenciesthatconformtothesametypeareoriginativesourcesof
somekind,andarecalledpotenciesinreferencetooneprimarykind
ofpotency,whichisanoriginativesourceofchangeinanother
thingorinthethingitselfquaother。Foronekindisapotencyof
beingactedon,i。e。theoriginativesource,intheverythingacted
on,ofitsbeingpassivelychangedbyanotherthingorbyitselfqua
other;andanotherkindisastateofinsusceptibilitytochangefor
theworseandtodestructionbyanotherthingorbythethingitself
quaotherbyvirtueofanoriginativesourceofchange。Inallthese
definitionsisimpliedtheformulaifpotencyintheprimary
sense-Andagaintheseso-calledpotenciesarepotencieseitherof
merelyactingorbeingactedon,orofactingorbeingactedon
well,sothatevenintheformulaeofthelattertheformulaeofthe
priorkindsofpotencyaresomehowimplied。
Obviously,then,inasensethepotencyofactingandofbeing
actedonisone(forathingmaybe’capable’eitherbecauseitcan
itselfbeactedonorbecausesomethingelsecanbeactedonbyit),
butinasensethepotenciesaredifferent。Fortheoneisinthe
thingactedon;itisbecauseitcontainsacertainoriginative
source,andbecauseeventhematterisanoriginativesource,thatthe
thingactedonisactedon,andonethingbyone,anotherby
another;forthatwhichisoilycanbeburnt,andthatwhichyieldsin
aparticularwaycanbecrushed;andsimilarlyinallothercases。But
theotherpotencyisintheagent,e。g。heatandtheartofbuilding
arepresent,oneinthatwhichcanproduceheatandtheotherinthe
manwhocanbuild。Andso,insofarasathingisanorganicunity,
itcannotbeactedonbyitself;foritisoneandnottwodifferent
things。And’impotence’and’impotent’standfortheprivationwhichis
contrarytopotencyofthissort,sothateverypotencybelongstothe
samesubjectandreferstothesameprocessasacorresponding
impotence。Privationhasseveralsenses;foritmeans(1)thatwhich
hasnotacertainqualityand(2)thatwhichmightnaturallyhaveit
buthasnotit,either(a)ingeneralor(b)whenitmightnaturally
haveit,andeither(a)insomeparticularway,e。g。whenithasnot
itcompletely,or(b)whenithasnotitatall。Andincertain
casesifthingswhichnaturallyhaveaqualityloseitbyviolence,we
saytheyhavesufferedprivation。
Sincesomesuchoriginativesourcesarepresentinsoulless
things,andothersinthingspossessedofsoul,andinsoul,andin
therationalpartofthesoul,clearlysomepotencieswill,be
non-rationalands