下载辰思小说免费APP
Again，upontheassumptionthat’moral’isequivalentto’felicific，’wegetageneralruleentitledtooverrideanyindividualtastesorfancies，suchasMillsupposestobemeantbythe’MoralSense。’Theruleisderivedfromtheinterestsofall，andgivesanultimate’objectivecriterion。’
J。S。Mill，describinghisfather’ssystem，observesthattheteachingofsuchamanwasnotlikelytoerron’thesideoflaxityorindulgence。’131Itcertainlydidnot。And，infact，hiscriterion，howeverobtained，hadinhiseyesthecertaintyofascientificlaw。Thisorthatisrightassurelyasthisorthatfoodiswholesome。Mytastehasnothingtodowithit。And，moreover，thecriterioncertainlygivesamoralground。IfIknowthatanyconductwillproducemorehappinessthanmiserythatisamoralreasonforadoptingit。A’moralsense’whichshouldberadicallyinconsistentwiththatcriterion，whichshouldordermetoinflictsufferingassuffering，orwithoutsomeulteriorreason，wouldbecertainlyatfault。Mackintoshindeedwouldhaveagreedtothis，though，ifMillwasright，attheexpenseofconsistency。
Mill，however，deducesfromhiscriteriondoctrineswhichinvolvearemarkableparadox。Themodeinwhichheisledtothemischaracteristicofthewholemethod。Mill，likeBentham，putsmoralityuponthesameplanewithlaw。Conductisinfluencedeitherbythe’communityinitsconjunctcapacity’——thatis，bylaw；
orby’individualsintheirindividualcapacity’——thatis，bymorality。132Thesanctionofone，wemayinfer，isforce；oftheother，approvalanddisapproval。WiththiswemusttakeanotherBenthamitedoctrine，ofwhichIhavealreadyspoken。133’Mr。Benthamdemonstrated，’saysMill，’thatthemoralityofanactdoesnotdependuponthemotive，’and，further，thatit’isaltogetherdependentontheintention。’134Uponthisheconstantlyinsists。Mackintosh’sviewthatvirtuedependsuponmotivewillbe’scornedbyeverymanwhohasanyknowledgeofthephilosophyofthehumanmind……Thevirtuedoesnotdependuponthemotive。Thereisnobadmotive。Everymotiveisthedesireofgood；totheagenthimselfortosomeoneelse。’135Hegivesananalysisofactiontoputthepointbeyonddoubt。Actionsupposesa’motive，’a’volition，’andan’externalact’ormuscularcontraction。Sofarthereisnothingmoral。
Butthenanacthasconsequences，goodorbad，tohumanbeings，whichconstituteitsutility。Tomakeitmoral，theagentmustanticipate’beneficialconsequences，’
andmusthavenoreasontoanticipateabalanceofevilconsequences。Intentionmeansthecalculationofconsequences，andwithoutthatcalculationtherecanbenomorality。136Hencethemoralityisequivalenttoa’convictionofthegeneralutility’oftheaction。137’Allthis，’
heconcludes，’issettledbyuniversalconsent。Itisvain，therefore，tothinkofdisputingit。’Onemay，however，askwhatitmeans。Ihavealreadyobservedthattheviewofthenon-moralcharacterofmotivewasanaturalcorollaryfromthepurelylegalpointofview。Imustnowconsidertheresultsofapplyingitunreservedlyintheinappropriatesphereofethics。
Inthefirstplace，thedenialofanymoralqualityinmotiveseemstobeinconsistentwithMill’sownprinciples。TheUtilitarian，accordingtohim，holdsthatthemorallawisessentiallythestatementthatcertainconductproducesgeneralhappiness。
If，then，weask，Whoisagoodman?wefirstreplythatheisamanwhoseconductproduceshappiness。Anotherconclusionisobviouslynecessary，andisimpliedinMill’sstatementthatthe’intention’isessentialtomorality。Theman，thatis，mustforeseethathisconductwillproducehappiness。The’calculation’ispreciselywhatmakesanactionmoralaswellasaccidentallyuseful。Inotherwords，themanisgoodtowhomtheknowledgethatanactwillproducehappinessisthesamethingasacommandtoperformtheact。The’intention’couldnotaffectconductwithoutthecorrespondingmotive，andMillcanattimesrecognisetheobviousconsequence。
The’physicallaw’(meaningthelawenforcedbyphysicalcoercion)，hesaysincidentally，has’extrinsic’sanctions；138themorallawisdifferent，becauseitsanctionsgoodactionsfortheirgoodness。’Moralapproval’mustthereforeincludeapprovalofcharacter。Aman，tobemoral，mustbeonewhodoesusefulthingssimplybecausetheyareuseful。Hemustthen，itwouldseem，beatleastbenevolent。Thesamethingisimpliedbythedoctrineof’intention’or’calculation。’Anactionmaybeusefulorthereversewithoutbeingmora
