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theoracletowhomallmenmightappealwithconfidence，thoughalittletoo，apttofindoutthatallsideswereintheright。WhenhewenttoIndiahetookwithhimsomeofthescholasticwritersandtheworksofKantandFichte，thenknowntofewEnglishmen。OneofMacaulay’sexperiencesatHollandHousewasavisionofMackintoshverifyingaquotationfromAquinas。104Itmusthavebeendelightful。Theethical’dissertation，’
however，hadtobeshortenedbyomittingallreferencetoGermanphilosophy，andtheaccountoftheschoolmeniscursory。ItiseasytoseewhythesuaveandamiableMackintoshappearedtoMilltobea’dandy’philosopher，anunctuousspinnerofplatitudestoimposeuponthefrequentersofHollandHouse，andhopelesslyconfusedintheattempttomakecompromisesbetweencontradictorytheories。ItisequallyeasytoseewhytoMackintoshthethoroughgoingandstrenuousMillappearedtobeaone-sidedfanatic，blindtothemeritsofallsystemsoutsidethenarrowlimitsofBenthamism，andmakingevenphilanthropyhateful。HadMackintoshlivedtoreadMill’sFragment，hewouldcertainlyhavethoughtitaproofthattheUtilitarianswereasdogmaticandacridashehadeverasserted。
Mackintosh’spositioninethicsexplainsMill’santagonism。NeitherAquinasnorKantnorFichteinfluencedhim。HisdoctrineisthenaturaloutcomeoftheScottishphilosophy。
HutchesonhadbothinventedBentham’ssacredformula，andtaughtthe’MoralSense’theorywhichBenthamattacked。Tostudythemoralityfromthepointofviewof’inductivepsychology’istostudythemoralfaculty，andtorejectthepurely’intellectual’system。Toassignthepositionofthemoralfacultyinthepsychologicalsystemistoshowitsutility。Ontheotherhand，itwastheveryaimoftheschooltoavoidthescepticalconclusionsofHumeinphilosophy，andinethicstoavoidthecompleteidentificationofmoralitywithutility。Theremustbeadistinctionbetweenthejudgments，’thisisright，’and’thisisuseful’even’usefultomeningeneral。’
Hence，ontheonehand，moralityisimmediatelydictatedbyaspecialsenseorfaculty，andyetitsdictatescoincidewiththedictatesofutility。
IhavespokenofthisviewasrepresentedbyDugaldStewart；andBrownhad，accordingtohiscustom，movedastepfurtherbydiminishingthelistoforiginalfirstprinciples，andmaking’virtue’simplyequivalentto’feelings’ofapprovalanddisapproval。105Virtue，hesaid，isuseful；theutility’accompaniesourmoralapprobation；buttheperceptionofthatutilitydoesnotconstituteourmoralapprobation，norisitnecessarilypresupposedbyit。’106HecomparesthecoincidencebetweenvirtueandutilitytoLeibniz’spre-establishedharmony。107Thepositionisfamiliar。Theadaptationofanorganismtoitsconditionsmaybetakeneitherasanexplanationofitsdevelopmentorasaproofofacreativepurpose。
Mackintoshtakesnearlythesameposition。Ethicalinquiries，hesays，relateto’twoperfectlydistinctsubjects。’Wehavetheproblemofthe’criterion’(Whatisthedistinctionbetweenrightandwrong?)andtheproblemofthe’moralsentiments’(Whatarethefeelingsproducedbythecontemplationofrightandwrong?)。Intreatingofthefeelings，again，wemustavoidtheconfusioncausedintheolderphilosophybythereductionof’feeling’to’thought。’108Reasonandsensationaredistinctthoughinseparablycombined；andhence，heargues，itisafallacytospeakwithClarkeasifreasoncouldbyitselfbeamotive。Anargumenttoinfluenceconductmustalwaysbeinthelastresortanappealtoa’feeling。’109Itisidletotellamanthatconductisinfamousunlesshefeelsinfamytobepainful。Wehavethentoaskwhatarethefeelingswhichprompttomorality。Sofarasthecriterionisconcerned，MackintoshfullyagreeswithHume，whosetheorythat’generalutilityconstitutesageneralgroundofmoraldistinctionscanneverbeimpugneduntilsomeexamplecanbeproducedofavirtuegenerallyperniciousoravicegenerallybeneficial。’110Hume，however，overlooksthe’rightfulsupremacyofthemoralfacultyovereveryoth
