第32章

Inthisdivisionoftherightsofsovereignty，theshareoftheUnionseemsatfirstsighttobemoreconsiderablethanthatoftheStates;butamoreattentiveinvestigationshowsittobelessso。TheundertakingsoftheGovernmentoftheUnionaremorevast，buttheirinfluenceismorerarelyfelt。Thoseoftheprovincialgovernmentsarecomparativelysmall，buttheyareincessant，andtheyservetokeepalivetheauthoritywhichtheyrepresent。TheGovernmentoftheUnionwatchesthegeneralinterestsofthecountry;butthegeneralinterestsofapeoplehaveaveryquestionableinfluenceuponindividualhappiness，whilstprovincialinterestsproduceamostimmediateeffectuponthewelfareoftheinhabitants。TheUnionsecurestheindependenceandthegreatnessofthenation，whichdonotimmediatelyaffectprivatecitizens;buttheseveralStatesmaintaintheliberty，regulatetherights，protectthefortune，andsecurethelifeandthewholefutureprosperityofeverycitizen。

TheFederalGovernmentisveryfarremovedfromitssubjects，whilsttheprovincialgovernmentsarewithinthereachofthemall，andarereadytoattendtothesmallestappeal。ThecentralGovernmenthasuponitssidethepassionsofafewsuperiormenwhoaspiretoconductit;butuponthesideoftheprovincialgovernmentsaretheinterestsofallthosesecond—rateindividualswhocanonlyhopetoobtainpowerwithintheirownState，andwhoneverthelessexercisethelargestshareofauthorityoverthepeoplebecausetheyareplacednearesttoitslevel。TheAmericanshavethereforemuchmoretohopeandtofearfromtheStatesthanfromtheUnion;and，inconformitywiththenaturaltendencyofthehumanmind，theyaremorelikelytoattachthemselvestotheformerthantothelatter。Inthisrespecttheirhabitsandfeelingsharmonizewiththeirinterests。

Whenacompactnationdividesitssovereignty，andadoptsaconfederateformofgovernment，thetraditions，thecustoms，andthemannersofthepeopleareforalongtimeatvariancewiththeirlegislation;andtheformertendtogiveadegreeofinfluencetothecentralgovernmentwhichthelatterforbids。

Whenanumberofconfederatestatesunitetoformasinglenation，thesamecausesoperateinanoppositedirection。IhavenodoubtthatifFranceweretobecomeaconfederaterepubliclikethatoftheUnitedStates，thegovernmentwouldatfirstdisplaymoreenergythanthatoftheUnion;andiftheUnionweretoalteritsconstitutiontoamonarchylikethatofFrance，I

thinkthattheAmericanGovernmentwouldbealongtimeinacquiringtheforcewhichnowrulesthelatternation。WhenthenationalexistenceoftheAnglo—Americansbegan，theirprovincialexistencewasalreadyoflongstanding;necessaryrelationswereestablishedbetweenthetownshipsandtheindividualcitizensofthesameStates;andtheywereaccustomedtoconsidersomeobjectsascommontothemall，andtoconductotheraffairsasexclusivelyrelatingtotheirownspecialinterests。

TheUnionisavastbodywhichpresentsnodefiniteobjecttopatrioticfeeling。TheformsandlimitsoftheStatearedistinctandcircumscribed;sinceitrepresentsacertainnumberofobjectswhicharefamiliartothecitizensandbelovedbyall。

Itisidentifiedwiththeverysoil，withtherightofpropertyandthedomesticaffections，withtherecollectionsofthepast，thelaborsofthepresent，andthehopesofthefuture。

Patriotism，then，whichisfrequentlyamereextensionofindividualegotism，isstilldirectedtotheState，andisnotexcitedbytheUnion。Thusthetendencyoftheinterests，thehabits，andthefeelingsofthepeopleistocentrepoliticalactivityintheStates，inpreferencetotheUnion。

Itiseasytoestimatethedifferentforcesofthetwogovernments，byremarkingthemannerinwhichtheyfulfiltheirrespectivefunctions。WheneverthegovernmentofaStatehasoccasiontoaddressanindividualoranassemblyofindividuals，itslanguageisclearandimperative;andsuchisalsothetoneoftheFederalGovernmentinitsintercoursewithindividuals，butnosoonerhasitanythingtodowithaStatethanitbeginstoparley，toexplainitsmotivesandtojustifyitsconduct，toargue，toadvise，and，inshort，anythingbuttocommand。Ifdoubtsareraisedastothelimitsoftheconstitutionalpowersofeachgovernment，theprovincialgovernmentprefersitsclaimwithboldness，andtakespromptandenergeticstepstosupportit。InthemeanwhiletheGovernmentoftheUnionreasons;itappealstotheinterests，tothegoodsense，tothegloryofthenation;ittemporizes，itnegotiates，anddoesnotconsenttoactuntilitisreducedtothelastextremity。Atfirstsightitmightreadilybeimaginedthatitistheprovincialgovernmentwhichisarmedwiththeauthorityofthenation，andthatCongressrepresentsasingleState。

TheFederalGovernmentis，therefore，notwithstandingtheprecautionsofthosewhofoundedit，naturallysoweakthatitmorepeculiarlyrequiresthefreeconsentofthegovernedtoenableittosubsist。ItiseasytoperceivethatitsobjectistoenabletheStatestorealizewithfacilitytheirdeterminationofremainingunited;and，aslongasthispreliminaryconditionexists，itsauthorityisgreat，temperate，andeffective。TheConstitutionfitstheGovernmenttocontrolindividuals，andeasilytosurmountsuchobstaclesastheymaybeinclinedtooffer;butitwasbynomeansestablishedwithaviewtothepossibleseparationofoneormoreoftheStatesfromtheUnion。

IfthesovereigntyoftheUnionweretoengageinastrugglewiththatoftheStatesatthepresentday，itsdefeatmaybeconfidentlypredicted;anditisnotprobablethatsuchastrugglewouldbeseriouslyundertaken。AsoftenasasteadyresistanceisofferedtotheFederalGovernmentitwillbefoundtoyield。ExperiencehashithertoshownthatwheneveraStatehasdemandedanythingwithperseveranceandresolution，ithasinvariablysucceeded;andthatifaseparategovernmenthasdistinctlyrefusedtoact，itwaslefttodoasitthoughtfit。

*z[Footnotez:SeetheconductoftheNorthernStatesinthewarof1812。"Duringthatwar，"saysJeffersoninalettertoGeneralLafayette，"fouroftheEasternStateswereonlyattachedtotheUnion，likesomanyinanimatebodiestolivingmen。"]

ButeveniftheGovernmentoftheUnionhadanystrengthinherentinitself，thephysicalsituationofthecountrywouldrendertheexerciseofthatstrengthverydifficult。*aTheUnitedStatescoveranimmenseterritory;theyareseparatedfromeachotherbygreatdistances;andthepopulationisdisseminatedoverthesurfaceofacountrywhichisstillhalfawilderness。

IftheUnionweretoundertaketoenforcetheallegianceoftheconfederateStatesbymilitarymeans，itwouldbeinapositionveryanalogoustothatofEnglandatthetimeoftheWarofIndependence。

[Footnotea:TheprofoundpeaceoftheUnionaffordsnopretextforastandingarmy;andwithoutastandingarmyagovernmentisnotpreparedtoprofitbyafavorableopportunitytoconquerresistance，andtakethesovereignpowerbysurprise。[Thisnote，andtheparagraphinthetextwhichprecedes，havebeenshownbytheresultsoftheCivilWartobeamisconceptionofthewriter。]]

Howeverstrongagovernmentmaybe，itcannoteasilyescapefromtheconsequencesofaprinciplewhichithasonceadmittedasthefoundationofitsconstitution。TheUnionwasformedbythevoluntaryagreementoftheStates;and，inunitingtogether，theyhavenotforfeitedtheirnationality，norhavetheybeenreducedtotheconditionofoneandthesamepeople。IfoneoftheStateschosetowithdrawitsnamefromthecontract，itwouldbedifficulttodisproveitsrightofdoingso;andtheFederalGovernmentwouldhavenomeansofmaintainingitsclaimsdirectly，eitherbyforceorbyright。InordertoenabletheFederalGovernmenteasilytoconquertheresistancewhichmaybeofferedtoitbyanyoneofitssubjects，itwouldbenecessarythatoneormoreofthemshouldbespeciallyinterestedintheexistenceoftheUnion，ashasfrequentlybeenthecaseinthehistoryofconfederations。

IfitbesupposedthatamongsttheStateswhichareunitedbythefederaltietherearesomewhichexclusivelyenjoytheprincipaladvantagesofunion，orwhoseprosperitydependsonthedurationofthatunion，itisunquestionablethattheywillalwaysbereadytosupportthecentralGovernmentinenforcingtheobedienceoftheothers。ButtheGovernmentwouldthenbeexertingaforcenotderivedfromitself，butfromaprinciplecontrarytoitsnature。Statesformconfederationsinordertoderiveequaladvantagesfromtheirunion;andinthecasejustalludedto，theFederalGovernmentwouldderiveitspowerfromtheunequaldistributionofthosebenefitsamongsttheStates。

IfoneoftheconfederateStateshaveacquiredapreponderancesufficientlygreattoenableittotakeexclusivepossessionofthecentralauthority，itwillconsidertheotherStatesassubjectprovinces，anditwillcauseitsownsupremacytoberespectedundertheborrowednameofthesovereigntyoftheUnion。GreatthingsmaythenbedoneinthenameoftheFederalGovernment，butinrealitythatGovernmentwillhaveceasedtoexist。*bInboththesecases，thepowerwhichactsinthenameoftheconfederationbecomesstrongerthemoreitabandonsthenaturalstateandtheacknowledgedprinciplesofconfederations。

[Footnoteb:ThustheprovinceofHollandintherepublicoftheLowCountries，andtheEmperorintheGermanicConfederation，havesometimesputthemselvesintheplaceoftheunion，andhaveemployedthefederalauthoritytotheirownadvantage。]

InAmericatheexistingUnionisadvantageoustoalltheStates，butitisnotindispensabletoanyoneofthem。Severalofthemmightbreakthefederaltiewithoutcompromisingthewelfareoftheothers，althoughtheirownprosperitywouldbelessened。AstheexistenceandthehappinessofnoneoftheStatesarewhollydependentonthepresentConstitution，theywouldnoneofthembedisposedtomakegreatpersonalsacrificestomaintainit。Ontheotherhand，thereisnoStatewhichseemshithertotohaveitsambitionmuchinterestedinthemaintenanceoftheexistingUnion。Theycertainlydonotallexercisethesameinfluenceinthefederalcouncils，butnooneofthemcanhopetodomineerovertherest，ortotreatthemasitsinferiorsorasitssubjects。

ItappearstomeunquestionablethatifanyportionoftheUnionseriouslydesiredtoseparateitselffromtheotherStates，theywouldnotbeable，norindeedwouldtheyattempt，topreventit;andthatthepresentUnionwillonlyla