第9章

ThepartisansofcentralizationinEuropearewonttomaintainthattheGovernmentdirectstheaffairsofeachlocalitybetterthanthecitizenscoulddoitforthemselves;thismaybetruewhenthecentralpowerisenlightened，andwhenthelocaldistrictsareignorant;whenitisasalertastheyareslow;

whenitisaccustomedtoact，andtheytoobey。Indeed，itisevidentthatthisdoubletendencymustaugmentwiththeincreaseofcentralization，andthatthereadinessoftheoneandtheincapacityoftheothersmustbecomemoreandmoreprominent。

ButIdenythatsuchisthecasewhenthepeopleisasenlightened，asawaketoitsinterests，andasaccustomedtoreflectonthem，astheAmericansare。Iampersuaded，onthecontrary，thatinthiscasethecollectivestrengthofthecitizenswillalwaysconducemoreefficaciouslytothepublicwelfarethantheauthorityoftheGovernment。Itisdifficulttopointoutwithcertaintythemeansofarousingasleepingpopulation，andofgivingitpassionsandknowledgewhichitdoesnotpossess;itis，Iamwellaware，anarduoustasktopersuadementobusythemselvesabouttheirownaffairs;anditwouldfrequentlybeeasiertointeresttheminthepunctiliosofcourtetiquettethanintherepairsoftheircommondwelling。Butwheneveracentraladministrationaffectstosupersedethepersonsmostinterested，Iaminclinedtosupposethatitiseithermisledordesiroustomislead。Howeverenlightenedandhoweverskilfulacentralpowermaybe，itcannotofitselfembraceallthedetailsoftheexistenceofagreatnation。Suchvigilanceexceedsthepowersofman。Andwhenitattemptstocreateandsetinmotionsomanycomplicatedsprings，itmustsubmittoaveryimperfectresult，orconsumeitselfinbootlessefforts。

Centralizationsucceedsmoreeasily，indeed，insubjectingtheexternalactionsofmentoacertainuniformity，whichatleastcommandsourregard，independentlyoftheobjectstowhichitisapplied，likethosedevoteeswhoworshipthestatueandforgetthedeityitrepresents。Centralizationimpartswithoutdifficultyanadmirableregularitytotheroutineofbusiness;

providesforthedetailsofthesocialpolicewithsagacity;

repressesthesmallestdisorderandthemostpettymisdemeanors;

maintainssocietyinastatusquoalikesecurefromimprovementanddecline;andperpetuatesadrowsyprecisionintheconductofaffairs，whichishailedbytheheadsoftheadministrationasasignofperfectorderandpublictranquillity:*sinshort，itexcelsmoreinpreventionthaninaction。Itsforcedesertsitwhensocietyistobedisturbedoracceleratedinitscourse;andifoncetheco—operationofprivatecitizensisnecessarytothefurtheranceofitsmeasures，thesecretofitsimpotenceisdisclosed。Evenwhilstitinvokestheirassistance，itisontheconditionthattheyshallactexactlyasmuchastheGovernmentchooses，andexactlyinthemanneritappoints。Theyaretotakechargeofthedetails，withoutaspiringtoguidethesystem;theyaretoworkinadarkandsubordinatesphere，andonlytojudgetheactsinwhichtheyhavethemselvescooperatedbytheirresults。:These，however，arenotconditionsonwhichtheallianceofthehumanwillistobeobtained;itscarriagemustbefreeanditsactionsresponsible，or（suchistheconstitutionofman）thecitizenhadratherremainapassivespectatorthanadependentactorinschemeswithwhichheisunacquainted。

[Footnotes:Chinaappearstometopresentthemostperfectinstanceofthatspeciesofwell—beingwhichacompletelycentraladministrationmayfurnishtothenationsamongwhichitexists。

TravellersassureusthattheChinesehavepeacewithouthappiness，industrywithoutimprovement，stabilitywithoutstrength，andpublicorderwithoutpublicmorality。Theconditionofsocietyisalwaystolerable，neverexcellent。Iamconvincedthat，whenChinaisopenedtoEuropeanobservation，itwillbefoundtocontainthemostperfectmodelofacentraladministrationwhichexistsintheuniverse。]

ItisundeniablethatthewantofthoseuniformregulationswhichcontroltheconductofeveryinhabitantofFranceisnotunfrequentlyfeltintheUnitedStates。Grossinstancesofsocialindifferenceandneglectaretobemetwith，andfromtimetotimedisgracefulblemishesareseenincompletecontrastwiththesurroundingcivilization。Usefulundertakingswhichcannotsucceedwithoutperpetualattentionandrigorousexactitudeareveryfrequentlyabandonedintheend;forinAmerica，aswellasinothercountries，thepeopleissubjecttosuddenimpulsesandmomentaryexertions。TheEuropeanwhoisaccustomedtofindafunctionaryalwaysathandtointerferewithallheundertakeshassomedifficultyinaccustominghimselftothecomplexmechanismoftheadministrationofthetownships。Ingeneralitmaybeaffirmedthatthelesserdetailsofthepolice，whichrenderlifeeasyandcomfortable，areneglectedinAmerica;butthattheessentialguaranteesofmaninsocietyareasstrongthereaselsewhere。InAmericathepowerwhichconductstheGovernmentisfarlessregular，lessenlightened，andlesslearned，butanhundredfoldmoreauthoritativethaninEurope。

Innocountryintheworlddothecitizensmakesuchexertionsforthecommonweal;andIamacquaintedwithnopeoplewhichhasestablishedschoolsasnumerousandasefficacious，placesofpublicworshipbettersuitedtothewantsoftheinhabitants，orroadskeptinbetterrepair。Uniformityorpermanenceofdesign，theminutearrangementofdetails，*tandtheperfectionofaningeniousadministration，mustnotbesoughtforintheUnitedStates;butitwillbeeasytofind，ontheotherhand，thesymptomsofapowerwhich，ifitissomewhatbarbarous，isatleastrobust;andofanexistencewhichischeckeredwithaccidentsindeed，butcheeredatthesametimebyanimationandeffort。

[Footnotet:Awriteroftalent，who，inthecomparisonwhichhehasdrawnbetweenthefinancesofFranceandthoseoftheUnitedStates，hasprovedthatingenuitycannotalwayssupplytheplaceofaknowledgeoffacts，veryjustlyreproachestheAmericansforthesortofconfusionwhichexistsintheaccountsoftheexpenditureinthetownships;andaftergivingthemodelofadepartmentalbudgetinFrance，headds:—"Weareindebtedtocentralization，thatadmirableinventionofagreatman，fortheuniformorderandmethodwhichprevailalikeinallthemunicipalbudgets，fromthelargesttowntothehumblestcommune。"Whatevermaybemyadmirationofthisresult，whenIseethecommunesofFrance，withtheirexcellentsystemofaccounts，plungedintothegrossestignoranceoftheirtrueinterests，andabandonedtosoincorrigibleanapathythattheyseemtovegetateratherthantolive;when，ontheotherhand，Iobservetheactivity，theinformation，andthespiritofenterprisewhichkeepsocietyinperpetuallabor，inthoseAmericantownshipswhosebudgetsaredrawnupwithsmallmethodandwithstilllessuniformity，Iamstruckbythespectacle;fortomymindtheendofagoodgovernmentistoensurethewelfareofapeople，andnottoestablishorderandregularityinthemidstofitsmiseryanditsdistress。IamthereforeledtosupposethattheprosperityoftheAmericantownshipsandtheapparentconfusionoftheiraccounts，thedistressoftheFrenchcommunesandtheperfectionoftheirbudget，maybeattributabletothesamecause。AtanyrateIamsuspiciousofabenefitwhichisunitedtosomanyevils，andIamnotaversetoanevilwhichiscompensatedbysomanybenefits。]

GrantingforaninstantthatthevillagesandcountiesoftheUnitedStateswouldbemoreusefullygovernedbyaremoteauthoritywhichtheyhadneverseenthanbyfunctionariestakenfromthemidstofthem—admitting，forthesakeofargument，thatthecountrywouldbemoresecure，andtheresourcesofsocietybetteremployed，ifthewholeadministrationcentredinasinglearm—stillthepoliticaladvantageswhichtheAmericansderivefromtheirsystemwouldinducemetopreferittothecontraryplan。Itprofitsmebutlittle，afterall，thatavigilantauthorityshouldprotectthetranquillityofmypleasuresandconstantlyavertalldangersfrommypath，withoutmycareormyconcern，ifthissameauthorityistheabsolutemistressofmylibertyandofmylife，andifitsomonopolizesalltheenergyofexistencethatwhenitlanguisheseverythinglanguishesaroundit，thatwhenitsleepseverythingmustsleep，thatwhenitdiestheStateitselfmustperish。

IncertaincountriesofEuropethenativesconsiderthemselvesasakindofsettlers，indifferenttothefateofthespotuponwhichtheylive。Thegreatestchangesareeffectedwithouttheirconcurrenceand（unlesschancemayhaveapprisedthemoftheevent）withouttheirknowledge;naymore，thecitizenisunconcernedastotheconditionofhisvillage，thepoliceofhisstreet，therepairsofthechurchoroftheparsonage;forhelooksuponallthesethingsasunconnectedwithhimself，andasthepropertyofapowerfulstrangerwhomhecallstheGovernment。

Hehasonlyalife—interestinthesepossessions，andheentertainsnonotionsofownershiporofimprovement。Thiswantofinterestinhisownaffairsgoessofarthat，ifhisownsafetyorthatofhischildrenisendangered，insteadoftryingtoaverttheperil，hewillfoldhisarms，andwaittillthenationcomestohisassistance。Thissameindividual，whohassocompletelysacrificedhisownfreewill，hasnonaturalpropensitytoobedience;hecowers，itistrue，beforethepettiestofficer;buthebravesthelawwiththespiritofaconqueredfoeassoonasitssuperiorforceisremoved:hisoscillationsbetweenservitudeandlicenseareperpetual。Whenanationhasarrivedatthisstateitmusteitherchangeitscustomsanditslawsorperish:thesourceofpublicvirtueisdry，and，thoughitmaycontainsubjects，theraceofcitizensisextinct。Suchcommunitiesareanaturalpreytoforeignconquests，andiftheydonotdisappearfromthesceneoflife，itisbecausetheyaresurroundedbyothernationssimilarorinferiortothemselves:itisbecausetheinstinctivefeelingoftheircountry’sclaimsstillexistsintheirhearts;andbecauseaninvoluntaryprideinthenameitbears，oravaguereminiscenceofitsbygonefame，sufficestogivethemtheimpulseofself—preservation。

Norcantheprodigiousexertionsmadebytribesinthedefenceofacountrytowhichtheydidnotbelongbeadducedinfavorofsuchasystem;foritwillbefoundthatinthesecasestheirmainincitementwasreligion。Thepermanence，theglory，ortheprosperityofthenationwerebecomepartsoftheirfaith，andindefendingthecountrytheyinhabitedtheydefendedthatHolyCityofwhichtheywereallcitizens。TheTurkishtribeshavenevertakenanactiveshareintheconductoftheaffairsofsociety，buttheyaccomplishedstupendousenterprisesaslongasthevictoriesoftheSultanwerethetriumphsoftheMohammedanfaith。Inthepresentagetheyareinrapiddecay，becausetheirreligionisdeparting，anddespotismonlyremains。Montesquieu，whoattributedtoabsolutepoweranauthoritypeculiartoitself，didit，asIconceive，anundeservedhonor;fordespotism，takenbyitself，canproducenodurableresults。Oncloseinspectionweshallfindthatreligion，andnotfear，haseverbeenthecauseofthelong—livedprosperityofanabsolutegovernment。

Whateverexertionsmaybemade，notruepowercanbefoundedamongmenwhichdoesnotdependuponthefreeunionoftheirinclinations;andpatriotismandreligionaretheonlytwomotivesintheworldwhichcanpermanentlydirectthewholeofabodypolitictooneend。

Lawscannotsucceedinrekindlingtheardorofanextinguishedfaith，butmenmaybeinterestedinthefateoftheircountrybythelaws。Bythisinfluencethevagueimpulseofpatriotism，whichneverabandonsthehumanheart，maybedirectedandrevived;andifitbeconnectedwiththethoughts，thepassions，andthedailyhabitsoflife，itmaybeconsolidatedintoadurableandrationalsentiment。

Letitnotbesaidthatthetimefortheexperimentisalreadypast;fortheoldageofnationsisnotliketheoldageofmen，andeveryfreshgenerationisanewpeoplereadyforthecareofthelegislator。

ItisnottheadministrativebutthepoliticaleffectsofthelocalsystemthatImostadmireinAmerica。IntheUnitedStatestheinterestsofthecountryareeverywherekeptinview;

theyareanobjectofsolicitudetothepeopleofthewholeUnion，andeverycitizenisaswarmlyattachedtothemasiftheywerehisown。Hetakesprideinthegloryofhisnation;heboastsofitssuccess，towhichheconceiveshimselftohavecontributed，andherejoicesinthegeneralprosperitybywhichheprofits。ThefeelingheentertainstowardstheStateisanalogoustothatwhichuniteshimtohisfamily，anditisbyakindofegotismthatheinterestshimselfinthewelfareofhiscountry。

TheEuropeangenerallysubmitstoapublicofficerbecauseherepresentsasuperiorforce;buttoanAmericanherepresentsaright。InAmericaitmaybesaidthatnoonerendersobediencetoman，buttojusticeandtolaw。Iftheopinionwhichthecitizenentertainsofhimselfisexaggerated，itisatleastsalutary;heunhesitatinglyconfidesinhisownpowers，whichappeartohimtobeall—sufficient。Whenaprivateindividualmeditatesanundertaking，howeverdirectlyconnecteditmaybewiththewelfareofsociety，heneverthinksofsolicitingtheco—operationoftheGovernment，buthepublisheshisplan，offerstoexecuteithimself，courtstheassistanceofotherindividuals，andstrugglesmanfullyagainstallobstacles。

UndoubtedlyheisoftenlesssuccessfulthantheStatemighthavebeeninhisposition;butintheendthesumoftheseprivateundertakingsfarexceedsallthattheGovernmentcouldhavedone。

Astheadministrativeauthorityiswithinthereachofthecitizens，whomitinsomedegreerepresents，itexcitesneithertheirjealousynortheirhatred;asitsresourcesarelimited，everyonefeelsthathemustnotrelysolelyonitsassistance。

Thus，whentheadministrationthinksfittointerfere，itisnotabandonedtoitselfasinEurope;thedutiesoftheprivatecitizensarenotsupposedtohavelapsedbecausetheStateassistsintheirfulfilment，buteveryoneisready，onthecontrary，toguideandtosupportit。Thisactionofindividualexertions，joinedtothatofthepublicauthorities，frequentlyperformswhatthemostenergeticcentraladministrationwouldbeunabletoexecute。ItwouldbeeasytoadduceseveralfactsinproofofwhatIadvance，butIhadrathergiveonlyone，withwhichIammorethoroughlyacquainted。*uInAmericathemeanswhichtheauthoritieshaveattheirdisposalforthediscoveryofcrimesandthearrestofcriminalsarefew。TheStatepolicedoesnotexist，andpassportsareunknown。ThecriminalpoliceoftheUnitedStatescannotbecomparedtothatofFrance;themagistratesandpublicprosecutorsarenotnumerous，andtheexaminationsofprisonersarerapidandoral。Neverthelessinnocountrydoescrimemorerarelyeludepunishment。Thereasonis，thateveryoneconceiveshimselftobeinterestedinfurnishingevidenceoftheactcommitted，andinstoppingthedelinquent。

DuringmystayintheUnitedStatesIwitnessedthespontaneousformationofcommitteesforthepursuitandprosecutionofamanwhohadcommittedagreatcrimeinacertaincounty。InEuropeacriminalisanunhappybeingwhoisstrugglingforhislifeagainsttheministersofjustice，whilstthepopulationismerelyaspectatoroftheconflict;inAmericaheislookeduponasanenemyofthehumanrace，andthewholeofmankindisagainsthim。

[Footnoteu:SeeAppendix，I。]

Ibelievethatprovincialinstitutionsareusefultoallnations，butnowheredotheyappeartometobemoreindispensablethanamongstademocraticpeople。Inanaristocracyordercanalwaysbemaintainedinthemidstofliberty，andastherulershaveagreatdealtoloseorderistothemafirst—rateconsideration。Inlikemanneranaristocracyprotectsthepeoplefromtheexcessesofdespotism，becauseitalwayspossessesanorganizedpowerreadytoresistadespot。

Butademocracywithoutprovincialinstitutionshasnosecurityagainsttheseevils。Howcanapopulace，unaccustomedtofreedominsmallconcerns，learntouseittemperatelyingreataffairs？

Whatresistancecanbeofferedtotyrannyinacountrywhereeveryprivateindividualisimpotent，andwherethecitizensareunitedbynocommontie？Thosewhodreadthelicenseofthemob，andthosewhofeartheruleofabsolutepower，oughtaliketodesiretheprogressivegrowthofprovincialliberties。

Ontheotherhand，Iamconvincedthatdemocraticnationsaremostexposedtofallbeneaththeyokeofacentraladministration，forseveralreasons，amongstwhichisthefollowing。TheconstanttendencyofthesenationsistoconcentrateallthestrengthoftheGovernmentinthehandsoftheonlypowerwhichdirectlyrepresentsthepeople，becausebeyondthepeoplenothingistobeperceivedbutamassofequalindividualsconfoundedtogether。ButwhenthesamepowerisalreadyinpossessionofalltheattributesoftheGovernment，itcanscarcelyrefrainfrompenetratingintothedetailsoftheadministration，andanopportunityofdoingsoissuretopresentitselfintheend，aswasthecaseinFrance。IntheFrenchRevolutionthereweretwoimpulsesinoppositedirections，whichmustneverbeconfounded—theonewasfavorabletoliberty，theothertodespotism。UndertheancientmonarchytheKingwasthesoleauthorofthelaws，andbelowthepowerofthesovereigncertainvestigesofprovincialinstitutions，halfdestroyed，werestilldistinguishable。Theseprovincialinstitutionswereincoherent，illcompacted，andfrequentlyabsurd;inthehandsofthearistocracytheyhadsometimesbeenconvertedintoinstrumentsofoppression。TheRevolutiondeclareditselftheenemyofroyaltyandofprovincialinstitutionsatthesametime;

itconfoundedallthathadprecededit—despoticpowerandthecheckstoitsabuses—inindiscriminatehatred，anditstendencywasatoncetooverthrowandtocentralize。ThisdoublecharacteroftheFrenchRevolutionisafactwhichhasbeenadroitlyhandledbythefriendsofabsolutepower。CantheybeaccusedoflaboringinthecauseofdespotismwhentheyaredefendingthatcentraladministrationwhichwasoneofthegreatinnovationsoftheRevolution？*vInthismannerpopularitymaybeconciliatedwithhostilitytotherightsofthepeople，andthesecretslaveoftyrannymaybetheprofessedadmireroffreedom。

[Footnotev:SeeAppendixK。]

Ihavevisitedthetwonationsinwhichthesystemofprovinciallibertyhasbeenmostperfectlyestablished，andI

havelistenedtotheopinionsofdifferentpartiesinthosecountries。InAmericaImetwithmenwhosecretlyaspiredtodestroythedemocraticinstitutionsoftheUnion;inEnglandI

foundotherswhoattackedthearistocracyopenly，butIknowofnoonewhodoesnotregardprovincialindependenceasagreatbenefit。InbothcountriesIhaveheardathousanddifferentcausesassignedfortheevilsoftheState，butthelocalsystemwasnevermentionedamongstthem。Ihaveheardcitizensattributethepowerandprosperityoftheircountrytoamultitudeofreasons，buttheyallplacedtheadvantagesoflocalinstitutionsintheforemostrank。AmItosupposethatwhenmenwhoarenaturallysodividedonreligiousopinionsandonpoliticaltheoriesagreeononepoint（andthatoneofwhichtheyhavedailyexperience），theyareallinerror？Theonlynationswhichdenytheutilityofprovinciallibertiesarethosewhichhavefewestofthem;inotherwords，thosewhoareunacquaintedwiththeinstitutionaretheonlypersonswhopassacensureuponit。

ChapterVI:JudicialPowerInTheUnitedStatesChapterSummaryTheAnglo—Americanshaveretainedthecharacteristicsofjudicialpowerwhicharecommontoallnations—Theyhave，however，madeitapowerfulpoliticalorgan—How—InwhatthejudicialsystemoftheAnglo—Americansdiffersfromthatofallothernations—

WhytheAmericanjudgeshavetherightofdeclaringthelawstobeunconstitutional—Howtheyusethisright—Precautionstakenbythelegislatortopreventitsabuse。

JudicialPowerInTheUnitedStatesAndItsInfluenceOnPoliticalSocietyIhavethoughtitessentialtodevoteaseparatechaptertothejudicialauthoritiesoftheUnitedStates，lesttheirgreatpoliticalimportanceshouldbelessenedinthereader’seyesbyamerelyincidentalmentionofthem。ConfederationshaveexistedinothercountriesbesideAmerica，andrepublicshavenotbeenestablishedupontheshoresoftheNewWorldalone;therepresentativesystemofgovernmenthasbeenadoptedinseveralStatesofEurope，butIamnotawarethatanynationoftheglobehashithertoorganizedajudicialpowerontheprinciplenowadoptedbytheAmericans。ThejudicialorganizationoftheUnitedStatesistheinstitutionwhichastrangerhasthegreatestdifficultyinunderstanding。Hehearstheauthorityofajudgeinvokedinthepoliticaloccurrencesofeveryday，andhenaturallyconcludesthatintheUnitedStatesthejudgesareimportantpoliticalfunctionaries;nevertheless，whenheexaminesthenatureofthetribunals，theyoffernothingwhichiscontrarytotheusualhabitsandprivilegesofthosebodies，andthemagistratesseemtohimtointerfereinpublicaffairsofchance，butbyachancewhichrecurseveryday。

WhentheParliamentofParisremonstrated，orrefusedtoenregisteranedict，orwhenitsummonedafunctionaryaccusedofmalversationtoitsbar，itspoliticalinfluenceasajudicialbodywasclearlyvisible;butnothingofthekindistobeseenintheUnitedStates。TheAmericanshaveretainedalltheordinarycharacteristicsofjudicialauthority，andhavecarefullyrestricteditsactiontotheordinarycircleofitsfunctions。

Thefirstcharacteristicofjudicialpowerinallnationsisthedutyofarbitration。Butrightsmustbecontestedinordertowarranttheinterferenceofatribunal;andanactionmustbebroughttoobtainthedecisionofajudge。Aslong，therefore，asthelawisuncontested，thejudicialauthorityisnotcalledupontodiscussit，anditmayexistwithoutbeingperceived。

Whenajudgeinagivencaseattacksalawrelatingtothatcase，heextendsthecircleofhiscustomaryduties，withouthoweversteppingbeyondit;sinceheisinsomemeasureobligedtodecideuponthelawinordertodecidethecase。Butifhepronouncesuponalawwithoutrestinguponacase，heclearlystepsbeyondhissphere，andinvadesthatofthelegislativeauthority。

Thesecondcharacteristicofjudicialpoweristhatitpronouncesonspecialcases，andnotupongeneralprinciples。Ifajudgeindecidingaparticularpointdestroysageneralprinciple，bypassingajudgmentwhichtendstorejectalltheinferencesfromthatprinciple，andconsequentlytoannulit，heremainswithintheordinarylimitsofhisfunctions。Butifhedirectlyattacksageneralprinciplewithouthavingaparticularcaseinview，heleavesthecircleinwhichallnationshaveagreedtoconfinehisauthority，heassumesamoreimportant，andperhapsamoreuseful，influencethanthatofthemagistrate，butheceasestobearepresentativeofthejudicialpower。

Thethirdcharacteristicofthejudicialpowerisitsinabilitytoactunlessitisappealedto，oruntilithastakencognizanceofanaffair。Thischaracteristicislessgeneralthantheothertwo;but，notwithstandingtheexceptions，Ithinkitmayberegardedasessential。Thejudicialpowerisbyitsnaturedevoidofaction;itmustbeputinmotioninordertoproducearesult。Whenitiscalledupontorepressacrime，itpunishesthecriminal;whenawrongistoberedressed，itisreadytoredressit;whenanactrequiresinterpretation，itispreparedtointerpretit;butitdoesnotpursuecriminals，huntoutwrongs，orexamineintoevidenceofitsownaccord。A

judicialfunctionarywhoshouldopenproceedings，andusurpthecensorshipofthelaws，wouldinsomemeasuredoviolencetothepassivenatureofhisauthority。

TheAmericanshaveretainedthesethreedistinguishingcharacteristicsofthejudicialpower;anAmericanjudgecanonlypronounceadecisionwhenlitigationhasarisen，heisonlyconversantwithspecialcases，andhecannotactuntilthecausehasbeendulybroughtbeforethecourt。Hispositionisthereforeperfectlysimilartothatofthemagistrateofothernations;andheisneverthelessinvestedwithimmensepoliticalpower。Ifthesphereofhisauthorityandhismeansofactionarethesameasthoseofotherjudges，itmaybeaskedwhencehederivesapowerwhichtheydonotpossess。ThecauseofthisdifferenceliesinthesimplefactthattheAmericanshaveacknowledgedtherightofthejudgestofoundtheirdecisionsontheconstitutionratherthanonthelaws。Inotherwords，theyhaveleftthematlibertynottoapplysuchlawsasmayappeartothemtobeunconstitutional。

Iamawarethatasimilarrighthasbeenclaimed—butclaimedinvain—bycourtsofjusticeinothercountries;butinAmericaitisrecognizedbyallauthorities;andnotaparty，norsomuchasanindividual，isfoundtocontestit。ThisfactcanonlybeexplainedbytheprinciplesoftheAmericanconstitution。

InFrancetheconstitutionis（oratleastissupposedtobe）

immutable;andthereceivedtheoryisthatnopowerhastherightofchanginganypartofit。InEnglandtheParliamenthasanacknowledgedrighttomodifytheconstitution;as，therefore，theconstitutionmayundergoperpetualchanges，itdoesnotinrealityexist;theParliamentisatoncealegislativeandaconstituentassembly。ThepoliticaltheoriesofAmericaaremoresimpleandmorerational。AnAmericanconstitutionisnotsupposedtobeimmutableasinFrance，norisitsusceptibleofmodificationbytheordinarypowersofsocietyasinEngland。Itconstitutesadetachedwhole，which，asitrepresentsthedeterminationofthewholepeople，isnolessbindingonthelegislatorthanontheprivatecitizen，butwhichmaybealteredbythewillofthepeopleinpredeterminedcases，accordingtoestablishedrules。InAmericatheconstitutionmaythereforevary，butaslongasitexistsitistheoriginofallauthority，andthesolevehicleofthepredominatingforce。*a[Footnotea:[ThefiftharticleoftheoriginalConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesprovidesthemodeinwhichamendmentsoftheConstitutionmaybemade。Amendmentsmustbeproposedbytwo—thirdsofbothHousesofCongress，andratifiedbytheLegislaturesofthree—fourthsoftheseveralStates。FifteenamendmentsoftheConstitutionhavebeenmadeatdifferenttimessince1789，themostimportantofwhicharetheThirteenth，Fourteenth，andFifteenth，framedandratifiedaftertheCivilWar。TheoriginalConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，followedbythesefifteenamendments，isprintedattheendofthisedition。

—Translator’sNote，1874。]]

ItiseasytoperceiveinwhatmannerthesedifferencesmustactuponthepositionandtherightsofthejudicialbodiesinthethreecountriesIhavecited。IfinFrancethetribunalswereauthorizedtodisobeythelawsonthegroundoftheirbeingopposedtotheconstitution，thesupremepowerwouldinfactbeplacedintheirhands，sincetheyalonewouldhavetherightofinterpretingaconstitution，theclausesofwhichcanbemodifiedbynoauthority。Theywouldthereforetaketheplaceofthenation，andexerciseasabsoluteaswayoversocietyastheinherentweaknessofjudicialpowerwouldallowthemtodo。

Undoubtedly，astheFrenchjudgesareincompetenttodeclarealawtobeunconstitutional，thepowerofchangingtheconstitutionisindirectlygiventothelegislativebody，sincenolegalbarrierwouldopposethealterationswhichitmightprescribe。Butitisbettertograntthepowerofchangingtheconstitutionofthepeopletomenwhorepresent（howeverimperfectly）thewillofthepeople，thantomenwhorepresentnoonebutthemselves。

ItwouldbestillmoreunreasonabletoinvesttheEnglishjudgeswiththerightofresistingthedecisionsofthelegislativebody，sincetheParliamentwhichmakesthelawsalsomakestheconstitution;andconsequentlyalawemanatingfromthethreepowersoftheStatecaninnocasebeunconstitutional。

ButneitheroftheseremarksisapplicabletoAmerica。

IntheUnitedStatestheconstitutiongovernsthelegislatorasmuchastheprivatecitizen;asitisthefirstoflawsitcannotbemodifiedbyalaw，anditisthereforejustthatthetribunalsshouldobeytheconstitutioninpreferencetoanylaw。

Thisconditionisessentialtothepowerofthejudicature，fortoselectthatlegalobligationbywhichheismoststrictlyboundisthenaturalrightofeverymagistrate。

InFrancetheconstitutionisalsothefirstoflaws，andthejudgeshavethesamerighttotakeitasthegroundoftheirdecisions，butweretheytoexercisethisrighttheymustperforceencroachonrightsmoresacredthantheirown，namely，onthoseofsociety，inwhosenametheyareacting。InthiscasetheState—motiveclearlyprevailsoverthemotivesofanindividual。InAmerica，wherethenationcanalwaysreduceitsmagistratestoobediencebychangingitsconstitution，nodangerofthiskindistobefeared。Uponthispoint，therefore，thepoliticalandthelogicalreasonsagree，andthepeopleaswellasthejudgespreservetheirprivileges。

WheneveralawwhichthejudgeholdstobeunconstitutionalisarguedinatribunaloftheUnitedStateshemayrefusetoadmititasarule;thispoweristheonlyonewhichispeculiartotheAmericanmagistrate，butitgivesrisetoimmensepoliticalinfluence。Fewlawscanescapethesearchinganalysisofthejudicialpowerforanylengthoftime，fortherearefewwhicharenotprejudicialtosomeprivateinterestorother，andnonewhichmaynotbebroughtbeforeacourtofjusticebythechoiceofparties，orbythenecessityofthecase。Butfromthetimethatajudgehasrefusedtoapplyanygivenlawinacase，thatlawlosesaportionofitsmoralcogency。Thepersonstowhoseinterestsitisprejudiciallearnthatmeansexistofevadingitsauthority，andsimilarsuitsaremultiplied，untilitbecomespowerless。Oneoftwoalternativesmustthenberesortedto:thepeoplemustaltertheconstitution，orthelegislaturemustrepealthelaw。ThepoliticalpowerwhichtheAmericanshaveintrustedtotheircourtsofjusticeisthereforeimmense，buttheevilsofthispowerareconsiderablydiminishedbytheobligationwhichhasbeenimposedofattackingthelawsthroughthecourtsofjusticealone。Ifthejudgehadbeenempoweredtocontestthelawsonthegroundoftheoreticalgeneralities，ifhehadbeenenabledtoopenanattackortopassacensureonthelegislator，hewouldhaveplayedaprominentpartinthepoliticalsphere;andasthechampionortheantagonistofaparty，hewouldhavearrayedthehostilepassionsofthenationintheconflict。Butwhenajudgecontestsalawappliedtosomeparticularcaseinanobscureproceeding，theimportanceofhisattackisconcealedfromthepublicgaze，hisdecisionbearsupontheinterestofanindividual，andifthelawisslighteditisonlycollaterally。Moreover，althoughitiscensured，itisnotabolished;itsmoralforcemaybediminished，butitscogencyisbynomeanssuspended，anditsfinaldestructioncanonlybeaccomplishedbythereiteratedattacksofjudicialfunctionaries。