第13章

[Footnoted:TheUnionwasdividedintodistricts，ineachofwhicharesidentFederaljudgewasappointed，andthecourtinwhichhepresidedwastermeda"DistrictCourt。"EachofthejudgesoftheSupremeCourtannuallyvisitsacertainportionoftheRepublic，inordertotrythemostimportantcausesuponthespot;thecourtpresidedoverbythismagistrateisstyleda"CircuitCourt。"Lastly，allthemostseriouscasesoflitigationarebroughtbeforetheSupremeCourt，whichholdsasolemnsessiononceayear，atwhichallthejudgesoftheCircuitCourtsmustattend。ThejurywasintroducedintotheFederalCourtsinthesamemanner，andinthesamecases，asintothecourtsoftheStates。

ItwillbeobservedthatnoanalogyexistsbetweentheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesandtheFrenchCourdeCassation，sincethelatteronlyhearsappealsonquestionsoflaw。TheSupremeCourtdecidesupontheevidenceofthefactaswellasuponthelawofthecase，whereastheCourdeCassationdoesnotpronounceadecisionofitsown，butrefersthecausetothearbitrationofanothertribunal。SeethelawofSeptember24，1789，"LawsoftheUnitedStates，"byStory，vol。i。p。53。]

MeansOfDeterminingTheJurisdictionOfTheFederalCourtsDifficultyofdeterminingthejurisdictionofseparatecourtsofjusticeinconfederations—ThecourtsoftheUnionobtainedtherightoffixingtheirownjurisdiction—InwhatrespectthisruleattackstheportionofsovereigntyreservedtotheseveralStates—ThesovereigntyoftheseStatesrestrictedbythelaws，andtheinterpretationofthelaws—Consequently，thedangeroftheseveralStatesismoreapparentthanreal。

AstheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesrecognizedtwodistinctpowersinpresenceofeachother，representedinajudicialpointofviewbytwodistinctclassesofcourtsofjustice，theutmostcarewhichcouldbetakenindefiningtheirseparatejurisdictionswouldhavebeeninsufficienttopreventfrequentcollisionsbetweenthosetribunals。Thequestionthenarosetowhomtherightofdecidingthecompetencyofeachcourtwastobereferred。

Innationswhichconstituteasinglebodypolitic，whenaquestionisdebatedbetweentwocourtsrelatingtotheirmutualjurisdiction，athirdtribunalisgenerallywithinreachtodecidethedifference;andthisiseffectedwithoutdifficulty，becauseinthesenationsthequestionsofjudicialcompetencyhavenoconnectionwiththeprivilegesofthenationalsupremacy。

ButitwasimpossibletocreateanarbiterbetweenasuperiorcourtoftheUnionandthesuperiorcourtofaseparateStatewhichwouldnotbelongtooneofthesetwoclasses。Itwas，therefore，necessarytoallowoneofthesecourtstojudgeitsowncause，andtotakeortoretaincognizanceofthepointwhichwascontested。TograntthisprivilegetothedifferentcourtsoftheStateswouldhavebeentodestroythesovereigntyoftheUniondefactoafterhavingestablisheditdejure;fortheinterpretationoftheConstitutionwouldsoonhaverestoredthatportionofindependencetotheStatesofwhichthetermsofthatactdeprivedthem。TheobjectofthecreationofaFederaltribunalwastopreventthecourtsoftheStatesfromdecidingquestionsaffectingthenationalinterestsintheirowndepartment，andsotoformauniformbodyofjurisprudenefortheinterpretationofthelawsoftheUnion。ThisendwouldnothavebeenaccomplishedifthecourtsoftheseveralStateshadbeencompetenttodecideuponcasesintheirseparatecapacitiesfromwhichtheywereobligedtoabstainasFederaltribunals。TheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStateswasthereforeinvestedwiththerightofdeterminingallquestionsofjurisdiction。*e[Footnotee:Inordertodiminishthenumberofthesesuits，itwasdecidedthatinagreatmanyFederalcausesthecourtsoftheStatesshouldbeempoweredtodecideconjointlywiththoseoftheUnion，thelosingpartyhavingthenarightofappealtotheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates。TheSupremeCourtofVirginiacontestedtherightoftheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatestojudgeanappealfromitsdecisions，butunsuccessfully。

See"Kent’sCommentaries，"vol。i。p。300，pp。370etseq。;

Story’s"Commentaries，"p。646;and"TheOrganicLawoftheUnitedStates，"vol。i。p。35。]

ThiswasasevereblowupontheindependenceoftheStates，whichwasthusrestrictednotonlybythelaws，butbytheinterpretationofthem;byonelimitwhichwasknown，andbyanotherwhichwasdubious;byarulewhichwascertain，andarulewhichwasarbitrary。ItistruetheConstitutionhadlaiddownthepreciselimitsoftheFederalsupremacy，butwheneverthissupremacyiscontestedbyoneoftheStates，aFederaltribunaldecidesthequestion。Nevertheless，thedangerswithwhichtheindependenceoftheStateswasthreatenedbythismodeofproceedingarelessseriousthantheyappearedtobe。WeshallseehereafterthatinAmericatherealstrengthofthecountryisvestedintheprovincialfarmorethanintheFederalGovernment。TheFederaljudgesareconsciousoftherelativeweaknessofthepowerinwhosenametheyact，andtheyaremoreinclinedtoabandonarightofjurisdictionincaseswhereitisjustlytheirownthantoassertaprivilegetowhichtheyhavenolegalclaim。

DifferentCasesOfJurisdictionThematterandthepartyarethefirstconditionsoftheFederaljurisdiction—Suitsinwhichambassadorsareengaged—SuitsoftheUnion—OfaseparateState—Bywhomtried—CausesresultingfromthelawsoftheUnion—WhyjudgedbytheFederaltribunals—CausesrelatingtotheperformanceofcontractstriedbytheFederalcourts—Consequenceofthisarrangement。

AfterhavingappointedthemeansoffixingthecompetencyoftheFederalcourts，thelegislatorsoftheUniondefinedthecaseswhichshouldcomewithintheirjurisdiction。Itwasestablished，ontheonehand，thatcertainpartiesmustalwaysbebroughtbeforetheFederalcourts，withoutanyregardtothespecialnatureofthecause;and，ontheother，thatcertaincausesmustalwaysbebroughtbeforethesamecourts，withoutanyregardtothequalityofthepartiesinthesuit。ThesedistinctionswerethereforeadmittedtobethebasisoftheFederaljurisdiction。

AmbassadorsaretherepresentativesofnationsinastateofamitywiththeUnion，andwhateverconcernsthesepersonagesconcernsinsomedegreethewholeUnion。Whenanambassadorisapartyinasuit，thatsuitaffectsthewelfareofthenation，andaFederaltribunalisnaturallycalledupontodecideit。

TheUnionitselfmaybeinvokedinlegalproceedings，andinthiscaseitwouldbealikecontrarytothecustomsofallnationsandtocommonsensetoappealtoatribunalrepresentinganyothersovereigntythanitsown;theFederalcourts，therefore，takecognizanceoftheseaffairs。

WhentwopartiesbelongingtotwodifferentStatesareengagedinasuit，thecasecannotwithproprietybebroughtbeforeacourtofeitherState。ThesurestexpedientistoselectatribunallikethatoftheUnion，whichcanexcitethesuspicionsofneitherparty，andwhichoffersthemostnaturalaswellasthemostcertainremedy。

Whenthetwopartiesarenotprivateindividuals，butStates，animportantpoliticalconsiderationisaddedtothesamemotiveofequity。Thequalityofthepartiesinthiscasegivesanationalimportancetoalltheirdisputes;andthemosttriflinglitigationoftheStatesmaybesaidtoinvolvethepeaceofthewholeUnion。*f[Footnotef:TheConstitutionalsosaysthattheFederalcourtsshalldecide"controversiesbetweenaStateandthecitizensofanotherState。"Andhereamostimportantquestionofaconstitutionalnaturearose，whichwas，whetherthejurisdictiongivenbytheConstitutionincasesinwhichaStateisapartyextendedtosuitsbroughtagainstaStateaswellasbyit，orwasexclusivelyconfinedtothelatter。ThequestionwasmostelaboratelyconsideredinthecaseofChisholmv。Georgia，andwasdecidedbythemajorityoftheSupremeCourtintheaffirmative。ThedecisioncreatedgeneralalarmamongtheStates，andanamendmentwasproposedandratifiedbywhichthepowerwasentirelytakenaway，sofarasitregardssuitsbroughtagainstaState。SeeStory’s"Commentaries，"p。624，orinthelargeeditionSection1677。]

Thenatureofthecausefrequentlyprescribestheruleofcompetency。ThusallthequestionswhichconcernmaritimecommerceevidentlyfallunderthecognizanceoftheFederaltribunals。*gAlmostallthesequestionsareconnectedwiththeinterpretationofthelawofnations，andinthisrespecttheyessentiallyinteresttheUnioninrelationtoforeignpowers。

Moreover，astheseaisnotincludedwithinthelimitsofanypeculiarjurisdiction，thenationalcourtscanonlyhearcauseswhichoriginateinmaritimeaffairs。

[Footnoteg:Asforinstance，allcasesofpiracy。]

TheConstitutioncomprisesunderoneheadalmostallthecaseswhichbytheirverynaturecomewithinthelimitsoftheFederalcourts。Therulewhichitlaysdownissimple，butpregnantwithanentiresystemofideas，andwithavastmultitudeoffacts。ItdeclaresthatthejudicialpoweroftheSupremeCourtshallextendtoallcasesinlawandequityarisingunderthelawsoftheUnitedStates。

Twoexampleswillputtheintentionofthelegislatorintheclearestlight:

TheConstitutionprohibitstheStatesfrommakinglawsonthevalueandcirculationofmoney:If，notwithstandingthisprohibition，aStatepassesalawofthiskind，withwhichtheinterestedpartiesrefusetocomplybecauseitiscontrarytotheConstitution，thecasemustcomebeforeaFederalcourt，becauseitarisesunderthelawsoftheUnitedStates。Again，ifdifficultiesariseinthelevyingofimportdutieswhichhavebeenvotedbyCongress，theFederalcourtmustdecidethecase，becauseitarisesundertheinterpretationofalawoftheUnitedStates。

ThisruleisinperfectaccordancewiththefundamentalprinciplesoftheFederalConstitution。TheUnion，asitwasestablishedin1789，possesses，itistrue，alimitedsupremacy;

butitwasintendedthatwithinitslimitsitshouldformoneandthesamepeople。*hWithinthoselimitstheUnionissovereign。

Whenthispointisestablishedandadmitted，theinferenceiseasy;forifitbeacknowledgedthattheUnitedStatesconstituteoneandthesamepeoplewithintheboundsprescribedbytheirConstitution，itisimpossibletorefusethemtherightswhichbelongtoothernations。Butithasbeenallowed，fromtheoriginofsociety，thateverynationhastherightofdecidingbyitsowncourtsthosequestionswhichconcerntheexecutionofitsownlaws。TothisitisansweredthattheUnionisinsosingularapositionthatinrelationtosomemattersitconstitutesapeople，andthatinrelationtoalltherestitisanonentity。Buttheinferencetobedrawnis，thatinthelawsrelatingtothesematterstheUnionpossessesalltherightsofabsolutesovereignty。Thedifficultyistoknowwhatthesemattersare;andwhenonceitisresolved（andwehaveshownhowitwasresolved，inspeakingofthemeansofdeterminingthejurisdictionoftheFederalcourts）nofurtherdoubtcanarise;

forassoonasitisestablishedthatasuitisFederal—thatistosay，thatitbelongstotheshareofsovereigntyreservedbytheConstitutionoftheUnion—thenaturalconsequenceisthatitshouldcomewithinthejurisdictionofaFederalcourt。

[Footnoteh:ThisprinciplewasinsomemeasurerestrictedbytheintroductionoftheseveralStatesasindependentpowersintotheSenate，andbyallowingthemtovoteseparatelyintheHouseofRepresentativeswhenthePresidentiselectedbythatbody。Buttheseareexceptions，andthecontraryprincipleistherule。]

WheneverthelawsoftheUnitedStatesareattacked，orwhenevertheyareresortedtoinself—defence，theFederalcourtsmustbeappealedto。ThusthejurisdictionofthetribunalsoftheUnionextendsandnarrowsitslimitsexactlyinthesameratioasthesovereigntyoftheUnionaugmentsordecreases。Wehaveshownthattheprincipalaimofthelegislatorsof1789wastodividethesovereignauthorityintotwoparts。IntheonetheyplacedthecontrolofallthegeneralinterestsoftheUnion，intheotherthecontrolofthespecialinterestsofitscomponentStates。TheirchiefsolicitudewastoarmtheFederalGovernmentwithsufficientpowertoenableittoresist，withinitssphere，theencroachmentsoftheseveralStates。Asforthesecommunities，theprincipleofindependencewithincertainlimitsoftheirownwasadoptedintheirbehalf;andtheywereconcealedfromtheinspection，andprotectedfromthecontrol，ofthecentralGovernment。Inspeakingofthedivisionofauthority，I

observedthatthislatterprinciplehadnotalwaysbeenheldsacred，sincetheStatesarepreventedfrompassingcertainlawswhichapparentlybelongtotheirownparticularsphereofinterest。WhenaStateoftheUnionpassesalawofthiskind，thecitizenswhoareinjuredbyitsexecutioncanappealtotheFederalcourts。

ThusthejurisdictionoftheFederalcourtsextendsnotonlytoallthecaseswhichariseunderthelawsoftheUnion，butalsotothosewhichariseunderlawsmadebytheseveralStatesinoppositiontotheConstitution。TheStatesareprohibitedfrommakingexpostfactolawsincriminalcases，andanypersoncondemnedbyvirtueofalawofthiskindcanappealtothejudicialpoweroftheUnion。TheStatesarelikewiseprohibitedfrommakinglawswhichmayhaveatendencytoimpairtheobligationsofcontracts。*iIfacitizenthinksthatanobligationofthiskindisimpairedbyalawpassedinhisState，hemayrefusetoobeyit，andmayappealtotheFederalcourts。

*j[Footnotei:Itisperfectlyclear，saysMr。Story（"Commentaries，"p。503，orinthelargeeditionSection1379），thatanylawwhichenlarges，abridges，orinanymannerchangestheintentionoftheparties，resultingfromthestipulationsinthecontract，necessarilyimpairsit。HegivesinthesameplaceaverylongandcarefuldefinitionofwhatisunderstoodbyacontractinFederaljurisprudence。AgrantmadebytheStatetoaprivateindividual，andacceptedbyhim，isacontract，andcannotberevokedbyanyfuturelaw。AchartergrantedbytheStatetoacompanyisacontract，andequallybindingtotheStateastothegrantee。TheclauseoftheConstitutionherereferredtoinsures，therefore，theexistenceofagreatpartofacquiredrights，butnotofall。Propertymaylegallybeheld，thoughitmaynothavepassedintothepossessor’shandsbymeansofacontract;anditspossessionisanacquiredright，notguaranteedbytheFederalConstitution。]

[Footnotej:AremarkableinstanceofthisisgivenbyMr。Story（p。508，orinthelargeeditionSection1388）:"DartmouthCollegeinNewHampshirehadbeenfoundedbyachartergrantedtocertainindividualsbeforetheAmericanRevolution，anditstrusteesformedacorporationunderthischarter。ThelegislatureofNewHampshirehad，withouttheconsentofthiscorporation，passedanactchangingtheorganizationoftheoriginalprovincialcharterofthecollege，andtransferringalltherights，privileges，andfranchisesfromtheoldchartertrusteestonewtrusteesappointedundertheact。Theconstitutionalityoftheactwascontested，and，aftersolemnarguments，itwasdeliberatelyheldbytheSupremeCourtthattheprovincialcharterwasacontractwithinthemeaningoftheConstitution（Art。I。Section10），andthattheemendatoryactwasutterlyvoid，asimpairingtheobligationofthatcharter。

Thecollegewasdeemed，likeothercollegesofprivatefoundation，tobeaprivateeleemosynaryinstitution，endowedbyitscharterwithacapacitytotakepropertyunconnectedwiththeGovernment。Itsfundswerebestoweduponthefaithofthecharter，andthosefundsconsistedentirelyofprivatedonations。

Itistruethattheuseswereinsomesensepublic，thatis，forthegeneralbenefit，andnotforthemerebenefitofthecorporators;butthisdidnotmakethecorporationapubliccorporation。Itwasaprivateinstitutionforgeneralcharity。

Itwasnotdistinguishableinprinciplefromaprivatedonation，vestedinprivatetrustees，forapubliccharity，orforaparticularpurposeofbeneficence。AndtheStateitself，ifithadbestowedfundsuponacharityofthesamenature，couldnotresumethosefunds。"]

ThisprovisionappearstometobethemostseriousattackupontheindependenceoftheStates。TherightsawardedtotheFederalGovernmentforpurposesofobviousnationalimportancearedefiniteandeasilycomprehensible;butthosewithwhichthislastclauseinvestsitarenoteitherclearlyappreciableoraccuratelydefined。Fortherearevastnumbersofpoliticallawswhichinfluencetheexistenceofobligationsofcontracts，whichmaythusfurnishaneasypretextfortheaggressionsofthecentralauthority。

ChapterVIII:TheFederalConstitution—PartIV

ProcedureOfTheFederalCourtsNaturalweaknessofthejudiciarypowerinconfederations—

Legislatorsoughttostriveasmuchaspossibletobringprivateindividuals，andnotStates，beforetheFederalCourts—HowtheAmericanshavesucceededinthis—DirectprosecutionofprivateindividualsintheFederalCourts—IndirectprosecutionoftheStateswhichviolatethelawsoftheUnion—ThedecreesoftheSupremeCourtenervatebutdonotdestroytheprovinciallaws。

IhaveshownwhattheprivilegesoftheFederalcourtsare，anditisnolessimportanttopointoutthemannerinwhichtheyareexercised。Theirresistibleauthorityofjusticeincountriesinwhichthesovereigntyinundividedisderivedfromthefactthatthetribunalsofthosecountriesrepresenttheentirenationatissuewiththeindividualagainstwhomtheirdecreeisdirected，andtheideaofpoweristhusintroducedtocorroboratetheideaofright。Butthisisnotalwaysthecaseincountriesinwhichthesovereigntyisdivided;inthemthejudicialpowerismorefrequentlyopposedtoafractionofthenationthantoanisolatedindividual，anditsmoralauthorityandphysicalstrengthareconsequentlydiminished。InfederalStatesthepowerofthejudgeisnaturallydecreased，andthatofthejusticiablepartiesisaugmented。TheaimofthelegislatorinconfederateStatesoughtthereforetobetorenderthepositionofthecourtsofjusticeanalogoustothatwhichtheyoccupyincountrieswherethesovereigntyisundivided;inotherwords，hiseffortsoughtconstantlytotendtomaintainthejudicialpoweroftheconfederationastherepresentativeofthenation，andthejusticiablepartyastherepresentativeofanindividualinterest。

Everygovernment，whatevermaybeitsconstitution，requiresthemeansofconstrainingitssubjectstodischargetheirobligations，andofprotectingitsprivilegesfromtheirassaults。AsfarasthedirectactionoftheGovernmentonthecommunityisconcerned，theConstitutionoftheUnitedStatescontrived，byamaster—strokeofpolicy，thatthefederalcourts，actinginthenameofthelaws，shouldonlytakecognizanceofpartiesinanindividualcapacity。For，asithadbeendeclaredthattheUnionconsistedofoneandthesamepeoplewithinthelimitslaiddownbytheConstitution，theinferencewasthattheGovernmentcreatedbythisConstitution，andactingwithintheselimits，wasinvestedwithalltheprivilegesofanationalgovernment，oneoftheprincipalofwhichistherightoftransmittingitsinjunctionsdirectlytotheprivatecitizen。

When，forinstance，theUnionvotesanimpost，itdoesnotapplytotheStatesforthelevyingofit，buttoeveryAmericancitizeninproportiontohisassessment。TheSupremeCourt，whichisempoweredtoenforcetheexecutionofthislawoftheUnion，exertsitsinfluencenotuponarefractoryState，butupontheprivatetaxpayer;and，likethejudicialpowerofothernations，itisopposedtothepersonofanindividual。ItistobeobservedthattheUnionchoseitsownantagonist;andasthatantagonistisfeeble，heisnaturallyworsted。

ButthedifficultyincreaseswhentheproceedingsarenotbroughtforwardbybutagainsttheUnion。TheConstitutionrecognizesthelegislativepoweroftheStates;andalawsoenactedmayimpairtheprivilegesoftheUnion，inwhichcaseacollisioninunavoidablebetweenthatbodyandtheStatewhichhaspassedthelaw:anditonlyremainstoselecttheleastdangerousremedy，whichisveryclearlydeduciblefromthegeneralprinciplesIhavebeforeestablished。*k[Footnotek:SeeChapterVI。on"JudicialPowerinAmerica。"]

Itmaybeconceivedthat，inthecaseunderconsideration，theUnionmighthaveusedtheStatebeforeaFederalcourt，whichwouldhaveannulledtheact，andbythismeansitwouldhaveadoptedanaturalcourseofproceeding;butthejudicialpowerwouldhavebeenplacedinopenhostilitytotheState，anditwasdesirabletoavoidthispredicamentasmuchaspossible。TheAmericansholdthatitisnearlyimpossiblethatanewlawshouldnotimpairtheinterestsofsomeprivateindividualbyitsprovisions:theseprivateinterestsareassumedbytheAmericanlegislatorsasthegroundofattackagainstsuchmeasuresasmaybeprejudicialtotheUnion，anditistothesecasesthattheprotectionoftheSupremeCourtisextended。

SupposeaStatevendsacertainportionofitsterritorytoacompany，andthatayearafterwardsitpassesalawbywhichtheterritoryisotherwisedisposedof，andthatclauseoftheConstitutionwhichprohibitslawsimpairingtheobligationofcontractsviolated。Whenthepurchaserunderthesecondactappearstotakepossession，thepossessorunderthefirstactbringshisactionbeforethetribunalsoftheUnion，andcausesthetitleoftheclaimanttobepronouncednullandvoid。*lThus，inpointoffact，thejudicialpoweroftheUnioniscontestingtheclaimsofthesovereigntyofaState;butitonlyactsindirectlyanduponaspecialapplicationofdetail:itattacksthelawinitsconsequences，notinitsprinciple，anditratherweakensthandestroysit。

[Footnotel:SeeKent’s"Commentaries，"vol。i。p。387。]

ThelasthypothesisthatremainedwasthateachStateformedacorporationenjoyingaseparateexistenceanddistinctcivilrights，andthatitcouldthereforesueorbesuedbeforeatribunal。ThusaStatecouldbringanactionagainstanotherState。InthisinstancetheUnionwasnotcalledupontocontestaprovinciallaw，buttotryasuitinwhichaStatewasaparty。

Thissuitwasperfectlysimilartoanyothercause，exceptthatthequalityofthepartieswasdifferent;andherethedangerpointedoutatthebeginningofthischapterexistswithlesschanceofbeingavoided。TheinherentdisadvantageoftheveryessenceofFederalconstitutionsisthattheyengenderpartiesinthebosomofthenationwhichpresentpowerfulobstaclestothefreecourseofjustice。

HighRankOfTheSupremeCourtAmongstTheGreatPowersOfStateNonationeverconstitutedsogreatajudicialpowerastheAmericans—Extentofitsprerogative—Itspoliticalinfluence—

ThetranquillityandtheveryexistenceoftheUniondependonthediscretionofthesevenFederalJudges。

WhenwehavesuccessivelyexaminedindetailtheorganizationoftheSupremeCourt，andtheentireprerogativeswhichitexercises，weshallreadilyadmitthatamoreimposingjudicialpowerwasneverconstitutedbyanypeople。TheSupremeCourtisplacedattheheadofallknowntribunals，bothbythenatureofitsrightsandtheclassofjusticiablepartieswhichitcontrols。

InallthecivilizedcountriesofEuropetheGovernmenthasalwaysshownthegreatestrepugnancetoallowthecasestowhichitwasitselfapartytobedecidedbytheordinarycourseofjustice。ThisrepugnancenaturallyattainsitsutmostheightinanabsoluteGovernment;and，ontheotherhand，theprivilegesofthecourtsofjusticeareextendedwiththeincreasinglibertiesofthepeople:butnoEuropeannationhasatpresentheldthatalljudicialcontroversies，withoutregardtotheirorigin，canbedecidedbythejudgesofcommonlaw。

InAmericathistheoryhasbeenactuallyputinpractice，andtheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesisthesoletribunalofthenation。Itspowerextendstoallthecasesarisingunderlawsandtreatiesmadebytheexecutiveandlegislativeauthorities，toallcasesofadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdiction，andingeneraltoallpointswhichaffectthelawofnations。Itmayevenbeaffirmedthat，althoughitsconstitutionisessentiallyjudicial，itsprerogativesarealmostentirelypolitical。ItssoleobjectistoenforcetheexecutionofthelawsoftheUnion;andtheUniononlyregulatestherelationsoftheGovernmentwiththecitizens，andofthenationwithForeignPowers:therelationsofcitizensamongstthemselvesarealmostexclusivelyregulatedbythesovereigntyoftheStates。

Asecondandstillgreatercauseofthepreponderanceofthiscourtmaybeadduced。InthenationsofEuropethecourtsofjusticeareonlycalledupontotrythecontroversiesofprivateindividuals;buttheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatessummonssovereignpowerstoitsbar。Whentheclerkofthecourtadvancesonthestepsofthetribunal，andsimplysays，"TheStateofNewYorkversustheStateofOhio，"itisimpossiblenottofeelthattheCourtwhichheaddressesisnoordinarybody;

andwhenitisrecollectedthatoneofthesepartiesrepresentsonemillion，andtheothertwomillionsofmen，oneisstruckbytheresponsibilityofthesevenjudgeswhosedecisionisabouttosatisfyortodisappointsolargeanumberoftheirfellow—citizens。

Thepeace，theprosperity，andtheveryexistenceoftheUnionarevestedinthehandsofthesevenjudges。Withouttheiractiveco—operationtheConstitutionwouldbeadeadletter:theExecutiveappealstothemforassistanceagainsttheencroachmentsofthelegislativepowers;theLegislaturedemandstheirprotectionfromthedesignsoftheExecutive;theydefendtheUnionfromthedisobedienceoftheStates，theStatesfromtheexaggeratedclaimsoftheUnion，thepublicinterestagainsttheinterestsofprivatecitizens，andtheconservativespiritoforderagainstthefleetinginnovationsofdemocracy。Theirpowerisenormous，butitisclothedintheauthorityofpublicopinion。Theyaretheall—powerfulguardiansofapeoplewhichrespectslaw，buttheywouldbeimpotentagainstpopularneglectorpopularcontempt。Theforceofpublicopinionisthemostintractableofagents，becauseitsexactlimitscannotbedefined;anditisnotlessdangeroustoexceedthantoremainbelowtheboundaryprescribed。

TheFederaljudgesmustnotonlybegoodcitizens，andmenpossessedofthatinformationandintegritywhichareindispensabletomagistrates，buttheymustbestatesmen—

politicians，notunreadinthesignsofthetimes，notafraidtobravetheobstacleswhichcanbesubdued，norslowtoturnasidesuchencroachingelementsasmaythreatenthesupremacyoftheUnionandtheobediencewhichisduetothelaws。

ThePresident，whoexercisesalimitedpower，mayerrwithoutcausinggreatmischiefintheState。CongressmaydecideamisswithoutdestroyingtheUnion，becausetheelectoralbodyinwhichCongressoriginatesmaycauseittoretractitsdecisionbychangingitsmembers。ButiftheSupremeCourtisevercomposedofimprudentmenorbadcitizens，theUnionmaybeplungedintoanarchyorcivilwar。

Therealcauseofthisdanger，however，doesnotlieintheconstitutionofthetribunal，butintheverynatureofFederalGovernments。Wehaveobservedthatinconfederatepeoplesitisespeciallynecessarytoconsolidatethejudicialauthority，becauseinnoothernationsdothoseindependentpersonswhoareabletocopewiththesocialbodyexistingreaterpowerorinabetterconditiontoresistthephysicalstrengthoftheGovernment。Butthemoreapowerrequirestobestrengthened，themoreextensiveandindependentitmustbemade;andthedangerswhichitsabusemaycreateareheightenedbyitsindependenceanditsstrength。Thesourceoftheevilisnot，therefore，intheconstitutionofthepower，butintheconstitutionofthoseStateswhichrenderitsexistencenecessary。

InWhatRespectsTheFederalConstitutionIsSuperiorToThatOfTheStatesInwhatrespectstheConstitutionoftheUnioncanbecomparedtothatoftheStates—SuperiorityoftheConstitutionoftheUnionattributabletothewisdomoftheFederallegislators—

LegislatureoftheUnionlessdependentonthepeoplethanthatoftheStates—Executivepowermoreindependentinitssphere—

Judicialpowerlesssubjectedtotheinclinationsofthemajority—Practicalconsequenceofthesefacts—ThedangersinherentinademocraticgovernmenteludedbytheFederallegislators，andincreasedbythelegislatorsoftheStates。

TheFederalConstitutiondiffersessentiallyfromthatoftheStatesintheendswhichitisintendedtoaccomplish，butinthemeansbywhichtheseendsarepromotedagreateranalogyexistsbetweenthem。TheobjectsoftheGovernmentsaredifferent，buttheirformsarethesame;andinthisspecialpointofviewthereissomeadvantageincomparingthemtogether。

IamofopinionthattheFederalConstitutionissuperiortoalltheConstitutionsoftheStates，forseveralreasons。

ThepresentConstitutionoftheUnionwasformedatalaterperiodthanthoseofthemajorityoftheStates，anditmayhavederivedsomeameliorationsfrompastexperience。Butweshallbeledtoacknowledgethatthisisonlyasecondarycauseofitssuperiority，whenwerecollectthatelevennewStates*nhavebeenaddedtotheAmericanConfederationsincethepromulgationoftheFederalConstitution，andthatthesenewrepublicshavealwaysratherexaggeratedthanavoidedthedefectswhichexistedintheformerConstitutions。

[Footnoten:[ThenumberofStateshasnowrisento46（1874），besidestheDistrictofColumbia。]]

ThechiefcauseofthesuperiorityoftheFederalConstitutionlayinthecharacterofthelegislatorswhocomposedit。AtthetimewhenitwasformedthedangersoftheConfederationwereimminent，anditsruinseemedinevitable。Inthisextremitythepeoplechosethemenwhomostdeservedtheesteem，ratherthanthosewhohadgainedtheaffections，ofthecountry。IhavealreadyobservedthatdistinguishedasalmostallthelegislatorsoftheUnionwerefortheirintelligence，theywerestillmoresofortheirpatriotism。Theyhadallbeennurturedatatimewhenthespiritoflibertywasbracedbyacontinualstruggleagainstapowerfulandpredominantauthority。

Whenthecontestwasterminated，whilsttheexcitedpassionsofthepopulacepersistedinwarringwithdangerswhichhadceasedtothreatenthem，thesemenstoppedshortintheircareer;theycastacalmerandmorepenetratinglookuponthecountrywhichwasnowtheirown;theyperceivedthatthewarofindependencewasdefinitelyended，andthattheonlydangerswhichAmericahadtofearwerethosewhichmightresultfromtheabuseofthefreedomshehadwon。Theyhadthecouragetosaywhattheybelievedtobetrue，becausetheywereanimatedbyawarmandsincereloveofliberty;andtheyventuredtoproposerestrictions，becausetheywereresolutelyopposedtodestruction。*o[Footnoteo:AtthistimeAlexanderHamilton，whowasoneoftheprincipalfoundersoftheConstitution，venturedtoexpressthefollowingsentimentsin"TheFederalist，"No。71:—

"TherearesomewhowouldbeinclinedtoregardtheservilepliancyoftheExecutivetoaprevailingcurrent，eitherinthecommunityorintheLegislature，asitsbestrecommendation。Butsuchmenentertainverycrudenotions，aswellofthepurposesforwhichgovernmentwasinstitutedasofthetruemeansbywhichthepublichappinessmaybepromoted。TheRepublicanprincipledemandsthatthedeliberativesenseofthecommunityshouldgoverntheconductofthosetowhomtheyentrustthemanagementoftheiraffairs;butitdoesnotrequireanunqualifiedcomplaisancetoeverysuddenbreezeofpassion，ortoeverytransientimpulsewhichthepeoplemayreceivefromtheartsofmenwhoflattertheirprejudicestobetraytheirinterests。Itisajustobservation，thatthepeoplecommonlyintendthepublicgood。Thisoftenappliestotheirveryerrors。Buttheirgoodsensewoulddespisetheadulatorwhoshouldpretendthattheyalwaysreasonrightaboutthemeansofpromotingit。Theyknowfromexperiencethattheysometimeserr;andthewonderisthattheysoseldomerrastheydo，beset，astheycontinuallyare，bythewilesofparasitesandsycophants;bythesnaresoftheambitious，theavaricious，thedesperate;bytheartificesofmenwhopossesstheirconfidencemorethantheydeserveit，andofthosewhoseektopossessratherthantodeserveit。Whenoccasionspresentthemselvesinwhichtheinterestsofthepeopleareatvariancewiththeirinclinations，itisthedutyofpersonswhomtheyhaveappointedtobetheguardiansofthoseintereststowithstandthetemporarydelusion，inordertogivethemtimeandopportunityformorecoolandsedatereflection。

Instancesmightbecitedinwhichaconductofthiskindhassavedthepeoplefromveryfatalconsequencesoftheirownmistakes，andhasprocuredlastingmonumentsoftheirgratitudetothemenwhohadcourageandmagnanimityenoughtoservethemattheperiloftheirdispleasure。"]