第66章

ThisdecisionIcausedtobeannulledbythecourtthathadrenderedit；andthepresentpoweroftheNationalGovernmenttodealeffectivelywiththetrustsisduesolelytothesuccessoftheAdministrationinsecuringthisreversalofitsformerdecisionbytheSupremeCourt。

TheConstitutionwasformedverylargelybecauseithadbecomeimperativetogivetosomecentralauthoritythepowertoregulateandcontrolinterstatecommerce。Atthattimewhencorporationswereintheirinfancyandbigcombinationsunknown，therewasnodifficultyinexercisingthepowergranted。Intheory，therightoftheNationtoexercisethispowercontinuedunquestioned。Butchangingconditionsobscuredthematterinthesightofthepeopleasawhole；andtheconsciousandtheunconsciousadvocatesofanunlimitedanduncontrollablecapitalismgraduallysecuredthewhittlingawayoftheNationalpowertoexercisethistheoreticalrightofcontroluntilitpracticallyvanished。AftertheCivilWar，withtheportentousgrowthofindustrialcombinationsinthiscountry，cameaperiodofreactionarydecisionsbythecourtswhich，asregardscorporations，culminatedinwhatisknownastheKnightcase。

TheShermanAnti-TrustLawwasenactedin1890becausetheformationoftheTobaccoTrustandtheSugarTrust，theonlytwogreattruststheninthecountry(asidefromtheStandardOilTrust，whichwasagradualgrowth)，hadawakenedapopulardemandforlegislationtodestroymonopolyandcurbindustrialcombinations。ThisdemandtheAnti-TrustLawwasintendedtosatisfy。TheAdministrationsofMr。

HarrisonandMr。Clevelandevidentlyconstruedthislawasprohibitingsuchcombinationsinthefuture，notascondemningthosewhichhadbeenformedpriortoitsenactment。In1895，however，theSugarTrust，whoseoutputoriginallywasaboutfifty-fivepercentofallsugarproducedintheUnitedStates，obtainedcontrolofthreeothercompaniesinPhiladelphiabyexchangingitsstockfortheirs，andthusincreaseditsbusinessuntilitcontrolledninety-eightpercentoftheentireproduct。UnderCleveland，theGovernmentbroughtproceedingsagainsttheSugarTrust，invokingtheAnti-TrustLaw，tosetasidetheacquisitionofthesecorporations。ThetestcasewasontheabsorptionoftheKnightCompany。TheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates，withbutonedissentingvote，heldadverselytotheGovernment。TheytookthegroundthatthepowerconferredbytheConstitutiontoregulateandcontrolinterstatecommercedidnotextendtotheproductionormanufactureofcommoditieswithinaState，andthatnothingintheShermanAnti-TrustLawprohibitedacorporationfromacquiringallthestockofothercorporationsthroughexchangeofitsstockfortheirs，suchexchangenotbeing“commerce“

intheopinionoftheCourt，eventhoughbysuchacquisitionthecorporationwasenabledtocontroltheentireproductionofacommoditythatwasanecessaryoflife。TheeffectofthisdecisionwasnotmerelytheabsolutenullificationoftheAnti-TrustLaw，sofarasindustrialcorporationswereconcerned，butwasalsoineffectadeclarationthat，undertheConstitution，theNationalGovernmentcouldpassnolawreallyeffectiveforthedestructionorcontrolofsuchcombinations。

ThisdecisionlefttheNationalGovernment，thatis，thepeopleoftheNation，practicallyhelplesstodealwiththelargecombinationsofmodernbusiness。ThecourtsinothercasesassertedthepoweroftheFederalGovernmenttoenforcetheAnti-TrustLawsofarastransportationratesbyrailwaysengagedininterstatecommercewereconcerned。ButsolongasthetrustswerefreetocontroltheproductionofcommoditieswithoutinterferencefromtheGeneralGovernment，theywerewellcontenttoletthetransportationofcommoditiestakecareofitself——especiallyasthelawagainstrebateswasatthattimeadeadletter；andtheCourtbyitsdecisionintheKnightcasehadinterdictedanyinterferencebythePresidentorbyCongresswiththeproductionofcommodities。ItwasontheauthorityofthiscasethatpracticallyallthebigtrustsintheUnitedStates，exceptingthosealreadymentioned，wereformed。Usuallytheywereorganizedas“holding“companies，eachoneacquiringcontrolofitsconstituentcorporationsbyexchangingitsstockfortheirs，anoperationwhichtheSupremeCourthadthusdecidedcouldnotbeprohibited，controlled，regulated，orevenquestionedbytheFederalGovernment。

SuchwastheconditionofourlawswhenIaccededtothePresidency。

Justbeforemyaccession，asmallgroupoffinanciers，desiringtoprofitbythegovernmentalimpotencetowhichwehadbeenreducedbytheKnightdecision，hadarrang