第11章

Tomentiononeexampleonlyofbigbarbarousexpressions，Kantcallshisphilosophy(KritikderreinenVernunft，p。19)aTranscendentalphilosophy，i。e。asystemofprinciplesofpurereasonwhichdemonstratetheuniversalandnecessaryelementsintheself-consciousunderstanding，withoutoccupyingthemselveswithobjectsorinquiringwhatuniversalityandnecessityare；thislastwouldbetranscendent。Transcendentandtranscendentalhaveaccordinglytobeclearlydistinguished。Transcendentmathematicssignifiesthemathematicsinwhichthedeterminationofinfinitudeismadeuseofinapreeminentdegree:inthissphereofmathematicswesay，forinstance，thatthecircleconsistsofaninfinitudeofstraightlines；theperipheryisrepresentedasstraight，andsincethecurveisrepresentedasstraightthispassesbeyondthegeometriccategoryandisconsequentlytranscendent。Kant，onthecontrary，definesthetranscendentalphilosophyasnotaphilosophywhichbymeansofcategoriespassesbeyonditsownsphere，butonewhichpointsoutinsubjectivethought，inconsciousness，thesourcesofwhatmaybecometranscendent。Thoughtwouldthusbetranscendentifthecategoriesofuniversality，ofcauseandeffect，werepredicatedoftheobject，forinthiswaymenwouldfromthesubjectiveelement‘transcend”intoanothersphere。Wearenotjustifiedinsodoingasregardstheresultnoreventobeginwith，sincewemerelycontemplatethoughtwithinthoughtitself。Thuswedonotdesiretoconsiderthecategoriesintheirobjectivesense，butinsofarasthoughtisthesourceofsuchsyntheticrelationships；thenecessaryanduniversalthusherereceivethesignificanceofrestinginourfacultiesofknowledge。

ButfromthisfacultyofknowledgeKantstillseparatestheimplicit，thething-in-itself，sothattheuniversalityandnecessityareallthetimeasubjectiveconditionmentofknowledgemerely，andreasonwithitsuniversalityandnecessitydoesnotattaintoaknowledgeofthetruth。(5)Foritrequiresperceptionandexperience，amaterialempiricallygiveninorder，assubjectivity，toattaintoknowledge。AsKantsays，theseformits“constituentparts”；onepartithasinitself，buttheotherisempiricallygiven。(6)Whenreasondesirestobeindependent，toexistinitselfandtoderivetruthfromitself，itbecomestranscendent；ittranscendsexperiencebecauseitlackstheotherconstituent，andthencreatesmerehallucinationsofthebrain。Itishencenotconstitutiveinknowledgebutonlyregulative；itistheunityandruleforthesensuousmanifold。Butthisunityonitsownaccountistheunconditioned，which，transcendingexperience，merelyarrivesatcontradictions。Inthepracticalspherealoneisreasonconstitutive。Thecritiqueofreasonisconsequentlynottheknowingofobjects，butofknowledgeanditsprinciples，itsrangeandlimitations，sothatitdoesnotbecometranscendent。(7)Thisisanextremelygeneralaccountofwhatweshallnowconsiderinitsseparatedetails。

IndealingwiththismatterKantadoptstheplanoffirstconsideringtheoreticreason，theknowledgewhichrelatestooutwardobjects。Inthesecondplaceheinvestigatesthewillasself-actualization；and，inthethirdplace，thefacultyofjudgment，thespecialconsiderationoftheunityoftheuniversalandindividual；howfarhegetsinthismatterweshalllikewisesee。Butthecritiqueofthefacultyofknowledgeisthematterofmainimportance。

1。Kant:KritikderreinenVernunft(sixthedition，Leipzig，1818)，pp。4，11，13，93。

2。Kant:KritikderreinenVernunft，pp。3-5。

3。Ibidem，Preface，pp。xviii。，xix。

4。Kant:KritikderreinenVernunft，pp。8，9，75，77，15。

5。Kant:KritikderreinenVernunft，pp。255，256。

6。Ibidem，p。107。

7。Ibidem，pp。497，498；Kritikderprakt。Vernunft(fourthedition，Riga，1797)，p。254；KritikderUrtheilskraft(thirdedition，Berlin，1799)，Preface，p。v。

SectionThree:RecentGermanPhilosophyC。Fichte。

Fichtecreatedagreatsensationinhistime；hisphilosophyistheKantianphilosophyinitscompletion，and，aswemustspeciallynotice，itissetforthinamorelogicalway。HedoesnotpassbeyondthefundamentalsofKant\'sphilosophy，andatfirstregardedhisownphilosophyasnomorethanasystematicworkingoutoftheother。(1)Inadditiontothesesystemsofphilosophies，andthatofSchelling，therearenone。Anythatpretendtobesuchmerelypickoutsomethingfromthese，andoverthistheyfightandwrangleamongthemselves。Ilssesontbattuslesflanes，pourêtredegrandshommes。ForinthosetimestherewereinGermanymanysystemsofphilosophy，suchasthoseofReinhold，Krug，Bouterweck，Fries，Schulze，&c。；butinthemthereisonlyanextremelylimitedpointofview，combinedwithboastfulness—astrangemedleyofstraythoughtsandconceptionsorfactswhichIfindwithinme。ButtheirthoughtsareallderivedfromFichte，Kant，orSchelling—thatisinsofarastherearethoughtstherepresentatall。

Orelsesomeslightmodificationisadded，andthisforthemostpartmerelyconsistsinmakingthegreatprinciplesbarren，whatpointsinthemwerelivingaredestroyed，orelsesubordinateformsarechanged，wherebyanotherprincipleissaidtobesetforth，thoughwhenwelookcloserwefindthattheseprinciplesarebuttheprinciplesofoneofthosephilosophiesthathavegonebefore。

Thismayserveasajustificationformynotspeakingfurtherofallthesephilosophies；anyexpositionofthemwouldbenomorethanademonstrationthateverythinginthemistakenfromKant，Fichte，orSchelling，andthatthemodificationinformisonlythesemblanceofachange，whilereallyitindicatesadeteriorationintheprinciplesofthosephilosophies。

JohannGottliebFichtewasbornonthe19thofMay，1762，atRammenau，nearBischoffswerda，inUpperLusatia。HestudiedatJena，andforsometimewasaprivatetutorinSwitzerland。HewroteatreatiseonReligion，termeda“CritiqueofallRevelation，”wheretheKantianphraseologyisemployedthroughout—somuchsothatitwasthoughttobetheworkofKant。Afterthishewasin1793summonedtoJenabyGoetheasProfessorofPhilosophy，whichappointmenthe，however，resignedintheyear1799，onaccountofanunpleasantnesswhichhadarisenthroughhisessay“OnthegroundofourBeliefinaDivineGovernmentoftheWorld。”ForFichtepublishedajournalinJena，andapaperinitwhichwasbysomeoneelsewasregardedasatheistical。Fichtemighthavekeptsilence，buthepublishedtheabove-mentionedessayasanintroductiontothearticle。Theauthoritieswishedaninvestigationtobemadeintothematter。ThenFichtewrotealetterwhichcontainedthreats，andrespectingitGoethesaidthataGovernmentoughtnottoallowitselftobethreatened。FichtenowtaughtprivatelyforsometimeinBerlin；in1805hebecameprofessoratErlangen，andin1809atBerlin，atwhichplacehediedonthe27thJanuary，1814。(2)

Wecannotheredealmoreparticularlywiththedetailsofhislife。

InwhatistermedthephilosophyofFichteadistinctionmustbemadebetweenhisproperly-speakingspeculativephilosophy，inwhichtheargumentismostconsistentlyworkedout，andwhichislesswellknown，andhispopularphilosophy，towhichbelongthelecturesdeliveredinBerlinbeforeamixedaudience，and，forexample，theworktermeda“GuidancetoaBlessedLife。”Theselasthavemuchinthemthatisaffectingandedifying—manywhocallthemselvesthedisciplesofFichteknowthissidealone—andtheyareexpressedinlanguagemostimpressivetoacultured，religioustemperament。InthehistoryofPhilosophy，however，suchcannotbetakenintoconsideration，althoughthroughtheirmattertheymayhavethehighestpossiblevalue；thecontenthastobespeculativelydeveloped，andthatisdoneinFichte\'searlierphilosophicworksalone。(3)

1。TheFirstPrinciplesofFichte\'sPhilosophy。

Aswementionedabove(p。478)，theshortcomingintheKantianphilosophywasitsunthinkinginconsistency，throughwhichspeculativeunitywaslackingtothewholesystem；andthisshortcomingwasremovedbyFichte。ItistheabsoluteformwhichFichtelaidholdof，orinotherwords，theabsoluteformisjusttheabsoluteBeing-for-self，absolutenegativity，notindividuality，buttheNotionofindividuality，andtherebytheNotionofactuality；Fichte\'sphilosophyisthusthedevelopmentofforminitself。Hemaintainedtheegotobetheabsoluteprinciple，sothatfromit，thedirectandimmediatecertaintyofself，allthematterintheuniversemustberepresentedasproduced；hence，accordingtoFichte，reasonisinitselfasynthesisofNotionandactuality。Butthisprincipleheoncemoreinanequallyone-sidedmannersetaside；itisfromtheverybeginningsubjective，conditionedbyanopposite，anditsrealizationisacontinualrushingonwardinfinitude，alookingbackatwhathasgonebefore。Theforminwhichitispresentedhasalsothedisadvantage，andindeed，therealdrawbackofbringingtheempiricegoeverbeforeone\'seyes，whichisabsurd，andquitedistractingtoone\'spointofview。

TheclaimsofPhilosophyhaveadvancedsofarthatinthefirstplaceself-consciousnessrefusesanylongertoregardabsoluteessenceasimmediatesubstancewhichdoesnotinitselfpossessdifference，reality，andactuality。Againstthissubstanceself-consciousnesseverstruggled，foritdoesnotfinditsexplicitBeingthere，andconsequentlyfeelsthelackoffreedom。Butbesidesthisitdemandedthatthisessence，objectivelypresented，shouldbepersonal，living，self-conscious，actual，andnotshutupinabstractmetaphysicalthoughtsalone。Ontheotherhandconsciousness，forwhichtheotheris，demandedthemomentofexternalactuality，Beingassuch，intowhichthoughtmustpass，truthinobjectiveexistence；andthisiswhatwemoreespeciallynoticedinconnectionwiththeEnglish。ThisNotion，whichisimmediatelyactuality，andthisactualitywhichisimmediatelyitsNotion，andthatindeedinsuchawaythatthereneitherisathirdthoughtabovethisunity，norisitanimmediateunitywhichdoesnotpossessdifference，separation，withinit，istheego；itistheself-distinctionofoppositeswithinitself。Thatwherebyitdistinguishesitselffromthesimplicityofthought，anddistinguishesthisother，islikewiseimmediatelyforit；itisidenticalwith，ornotdistinguishedfromit。(4)Henceitispurethought，ortheegoisthetruesyntheticjudgmentapriori，asKantcalledit。Thisprincipleisapprehendedactuality，forthetakingbackoftheother-Beingintoself-consciousnessisjustapprehension。TheNotionoftheNotionisfromthispointofviewfoundinthefactthatinwhatisapprehendedself-consciousnesshasthecertaintyofitself；whatisnotapprehendedissomethingforeigntoit。ThisabsoluteNotionorthisabsolutelyexistentinfinitudeitiswhichhastobedevelopedinknowledge，anditsdistinctionasthewholedistinctionoftheuniversehastoberepresentedfromitself，andthishasinitsdistinctiontoremainreflectedwithinitselfinequalabsoluteness。Nothingotherthantheegoanywhereexists，andtheegoistherebecauseitisthere；whatisthereisonlyintheegoandfortheego。(5)

NowFichtemerelysetforththisNotion；hedidnotbringittoascientificrealizationfromitself。

FortohimthisNotionmaintainsandassertsitselfasthisNotion；ithasabsolutenessforhiminsofarasitismerelytheunrealizedNotion，andthusindeedcomesoncemoreintooppositionwithreality。TheFichtianphilosophyhasthegreatadvantageofhavingsetforththefactthatPhilosophymustbeasciencederivedfromonesupremeprinciple，fromwhichalldeterminationsarenecessarilyderived。Theimportantpointisthisunityofprincipleandtheattempttodevelopfromitinascientificallyconsistentwaythewholecontentofconsciousness，or，ashasbeensaid，toconstructthewholeworld。(6)Beyondthisnoprogresswasmade。(7)ButthegreatnecessityinPhilosophyistopossessonelivingIdea；theworldisaflowerwhichiseternallyproducedfromonegrainofseed。ThusFichtedoesnot，likeKant，throwhisworkintonarrativeformbecausehebeginswiththeego；buthehasproceededfurther，inasmuchashesoughttobringaboutaconstructionofdeterminationsofknowledgefromtheego。Thewholeextentofknowledgeinalltheworldmustbedeveloped，andfurtherthisknowledgemustbetheconsequenceofthedevelopmentofdeterminations；butbecauseFichtesaysthatwhatisnotforusdoesnotconcernus，hehasnotgraspedthisprincipleoftheegoasIdea，butsolelyintheconsciousnessoftheactivitywhichweexerciseinknowing，andconsequentlyitisstilllaidholdofintheformofsubjectivity。

ThusasKanttreatsofcognition[Erkennen]，soFichtesetsforthrealknowledge[Wissen]。FichtestatesthatthetaskofPhilosophyistofindatheoryofknowledge；universalknowledgeisboththeobjectandthestarting-pointofPhilosophy。Consciousnessknows，thatisitsnature；theendofphilosophiclearningistheknowledgeofthisknowledge。HenceFichtecalledhisphilosophytheTheoryofKnowledge(BegriffderWissenschaftslehre，p。181)，thescienceofknowledge。Thatistosayordinaryconsciousnessastheactiveegofindsthisandthat，occupiesitself，notwithitself，butwithotherobjectsandinterests，butthenecessitythatIbringforthdeterminations，andwhichdeterminations—causeandeffect，forexample，—liesbeyondmyconsciousness:Ibringthemforthinstinctivelyandcannotgetbehindmyconsciousness。ButwhenIphilosophize，Imakemyordinaryconsciousnessitselfmyobject，becauseImakeapurecategorymyconsciousness。I

knowwhatmyegoisdoing，andthusIgotbehindmyordinaryconsciousness。FichtethusdefinesPhilosophyastheartificialconsciousness。(8)

a。WhereFichteinhissystemhasattainedthehighestdegreeofdeterminatenesshebegins，aswesawKantdidbefore(pp。437，438)，fromthetranscendentalunityofself-consciousness；initI—

asthis—amone，thisunityistoFichtethesameandtheoriginal。Egoisthereafact，saysFichte，butnotyetaproposition。Asproposition，asprinciple，theegomustnotremainbarren，norbeacceptedasone，fortoapropositionpertainsasynthesis。NowFichteproceedsinhissystemfromthefactthatPhilosophymustbeginwithanabsolutelyunconditioned，certainprinciple，withsomethingindubitablycertaininordinaryknowledge。“Itcannotbeprovedordefined，becauseitmust，beabsolutelythefirstprinciple。”(9)AccordingtoWendt\'saccount(Tennernann\'sGrundriss，§393，pp。494，495)Fichtegivesanexpositionofthenecessityofsuchaprincipleasfollows:“Scientificknowledgeisasystemofcognitionobtainedthroughasupremeprinciplewhichexpressesthecontentandformofknowledge。Thetheoryofknowledgeisthescienceofknowledgewhichsetsforththepossibilityandvalidityofallknowledge，andprovesthepossibilityofprinciplesinreferencetoformandcontent，theprinciplesthemselves，andtherebytheconnectionexistinginallhumanknowledge。Itmusthaveaprinciplewhichcanneitherbeprovedfromitnorfromanotherscience；foritissupreme。Ifthereisatheoryofknowledgetherealsoisasystem；ifthereisasystemthereisalsoatheoryofknowledgeandanabsolutefirstprinciple—

andsoonthroughaninevitablecircle。”(10)

Thesimpleprincipleofthisknowledgeiscertaintyofmyself，whichistherelationofmetomyself；

whatisinme，thatIknow。Thesupremeprinciple，asimmediateandnotderived，mustbecertainonitsownaccount；thatis，adeterminationoftheegoonly，foritisonlyfromtheegothatIcannotabstract。(11)Fichtethusbegins，likeDescartes，with\'Ithink，thereforeIam，\'andheexpresslybringsthispropositiontomind。TheBeingoftheegoisnotadead，butaconcreteBeing；butthehighestBeingisthought。Ego，asanexplicitlyself-existentactivityofthought，isthusknowledge，evenifitisonlyabstractknowledge，asinthebeginningatleastitcannothelpbeing。AtthesametimeFichtebeginsfromthisabsolutecertaintywithquiteothernecessitiesanddemands；forfromthisegonotonlyBeingbutalsothelargersystemofthoughthastobederived(supra，p。230)。

AccordingtoFichte，theegoisthesourceofthecategoriesandideas，butallconceptionsandthoughtsareamanifoldreducedtoasynthesisthroughThought。ThuswhilewithDescartesinconnectionwiththeegootherthoughtsappearwhichwesimplyfindalreadyinus，suchasGod，nature，&c。，Fichtesoughtforaphilosophyentirelyofapiece，inwhichnothingempiricwastobeadmittedfromwithout。Withthisreflectionafalsepointofviewwasatonceintroduced，namelythatcontainedintheoldconceptionofknowledge，ofcommencingwithprinciplesinthisformandproceedingfromthem；sothattherealitywhichisderivedfromsuchaprincipleisbroughtintooppositionwithit，andhenceintruthissomethingdifferent，i。e。itisnotderived:orthatprincipleforthissamereasonexpressesonlytheabsolutecertaintyofitselfandnotthetruth。Theegoiscertain，itcannotbedoubted；butPhilosophydesirestoreachthetruth。Thecertaintyissubjective，andbecauseitismadetoremainthebasis，allelseremainssubjectivealsowithouttherebeinganypossibilityofthisformbeingremoved。Fichtenowanalyzestheego，reducingittothreeprinciplesfromwhichthewholeofknowledgehastobeevolved。

Thefirstpropositionmustbesimple，initpredicateandsubjectmustbealike；forweretheyunlike，theirconnection—sinceinaccordancewiththeirdiversitythedeterminationsarenotdirectlyone—wouldhavetobefirstofallprovedbymeansofathird。Thefirstprinciplemustthusbeidentical。Fichtenowproceedsfurthertodistinguishinthisfirstprincipletheformandcontent；butinorderthatthissamemaybeimmediatelytruethroughitself，formandcontentmustbeagainthesame，andtheprincipleconditionedbyneither。ItsignifiesA=A，theabstractundeterminedidentity；thatisthepropositionofcontradiction，whereinAisanindifferentcontent。Fichtesays，“Thoughtisbynomeansessence，butonlyaparticulardeterminationofBeing；thereareoutsideofitmanyotherdeterminationsofourBeing。Imerelyremarkthis，thatwhen\'Iam\'isoverstepped，Spinozismisnecessarilyreached。Itsunityissomethingwhichoughttobeproducedthroughus，butwhichcannotbeso；itisnotanythingthatis。”ThefirstpropositionisthenthatIamidenticalwithmyself，Ego=Ego；(12)thatundoubtedlyisthedefinitionoftheego。Thesubjectandthepredicatearethecontent；andthiscontentofthetwosidesislikewisetheirrelation，i。e。form。

Relationrequirestwosides；therelatingandtherelatedarehere，however，thesame；foronaccountofthesimplicityoftheego，thereisnothingbutarelationoftheegototheego。Ihaveknowledgeofmyself；butinsofarasIamconsciousness，Iknowofanobjectwhichisdifferentfromme，andwhichisthenlikewisemine。Buttheegoisinsuchawayidenticalwithitsdifferencethatwhatisdifferentisimmediatelythesame，andwhatisidenticalislikewisedifferent；wehaveadifferencewithoutadifference。Self-consciousnessisnotdeadidentity，ornon-Being，buttheobjectwhichisidenticalwithme。Thisisimmediatelycertain；allelsemustbeascertaintome，inasmuchasitmustbemyrelationtomyself。Thecontentmustbetransformedintotheego，sothatinitIhavemydeterminationalone。Thisprincipleisatfirstabstractanddeficient，becauseinitnodifference，oraformaldifferenceonlyisexpressed；whereastheprincipleshouldpossessacontent:asubjectandapredicateareindeeddistinguishedinit，butonlyforuswhoreflectuponit，i。e。initselfthereisnodifference，andconsequentlynotruecontent。Inthesecondplace，thisprincipleisindeedtheimmediatecertaintyofself-consciousness，butself-consciousnessislikewiseconsciousness，andinitthereislikewisethecertaintythatotherthingsexisttowhichitstandsinanattitudeofopposition。Inthethirdplace，thatprinciplehasnotthetruthinit，fortheveryreasonthatthecertaintyofitselfpossessedbytheegohasnoobjectivity；ithasnottheformofthedifferentiatedcontentwithinit—oritstandsinoppositiontotheconsciousnessofan“other。”

Nowinorderthatdeterminationshouldcometopass，i。e。acontentanddifference，itisessentialforFichtethatasecondprincipleshouldbeestablished，whichinregardtoformisunconditioned，butthecontentofwhichisconditioned，becauseitdoesnotbelongtotheego。Thissecondprinciple，setforthunderthefirst，is，“Iassertanon-egoinoppositiontotheego，”andinthissomethingotherthanabsoluteself-consciousnessissetforth。(13)Tothispertainstheformthereinpresent，relation；butthecontentisthenon-ego，anothercontentfromtheego。Wemightsaythatthroughthiscontentthepropositionisindependent，sincethenegativethereinisanabsolute，astrulyasthereverse—thatitisindependentthroughtheformofoppositionwhichcannotbederivedfromtheoriginal。Here，then，wehavenomoretodowithderivation，althoughthisderivationofoppositionfromthefirstpropositionwasallthesamedemanded。InasmuchasIpositanotherinoppositiontotheego，Ipositmyselfasnotposited；thisnon-egoistheobjectgenerally，i。e。thatwhichisopposedtome。Thisotheristhenegativeoftheego；thuswhenFichtecalleditthenon-egohewasexpressinghimselfinaveryhappy，suitable，andconsistentmanner。Therehasbeenagooddealofridiculecastontheegoandnon-ego；theexpressionisnew，andthereforetousGermansitseemsstrangeatfirst。ButtheFrenchsayMoiandNon-moi，withoutfindinganythinglaughableinit。Inthisprinciplethepositingbelongs，however，totheego；butbecausethenon-egoisindependentoftheego，wehavetwosides，andself-consciousnessrelatesitselftoanother。ThissecondpropositionthussignifiesthatIpositmyselfaslimited，asnon-ego；butnon-egoissomethingquitenewtobeadded。Ontheonesidewethushavebeforeusafieldwhichismerelyappropriatedfromtheego；andinthiswaywehavebeforeusthenon-egoasourobject。

Totheseisaddedyetathirdproposition，inwhichInowmakethisdivisionintoegoandnon-ego:

itisthesyntheticprinciple，thepropositionofground，whichincontentisunconditioned，justasinthesecondwasthecaseinregardtoform。Thisthirdpropositionisthedeterminationofthefirsttwothroughoneanother，insuchawaythattheegolimitsthenon-ego。“Inandthroughtheegoboththeegoandthenon-egoarepositedascapableofbeingmutuallylimitedbymeansofoneanother，i。e。insuchawaythattherealityoftheoneabrogatestherealityoftheother。”Inlimitationbotharenegated，but“onlyinpart”；onlythusaresynthesisanddeductionpossible。I

positthenon-ego，whichisforme，inmyself，inmyidentitywithmyself；thusItakeitfromitsnon-identity，itsnot-being-I，thatistosayIlimitit。Thislimitationofthenon-egoFichteexpressesthus:“Iplaceinoppositiontotheego，”andindeed“tothedivisibleego，adivisiblenon-ego。”

Thenon-egoIdestroyasacompletesphere，whichitwasaccordingtothesecondprinciple，andposititasdivisible；Ilikewiseposittheegoasdivisibleinsofarasthenon-egoispresentinit。ThewholespherewhichIhavebeforemeissupposedindeedtobetheego，butinitIhavenotonebuttwo。Thepropositionofgroundisthustherelationofrealityandnegation，i。e。itislimitation；itcontainstheegolimitedbythenon-ego，andthenon-egolimitedbytheego。(14)Ofthissynthesisthereisnothing，properlyspeaking，containedinthetwoearlierpropositions。Eventhisfirstpresentationofthethreeprinciplesdoesawaywiththeimmanenceofrealknowledge。Thusthepresentationisherealsosubjecttoanoppositefromthefirst，asitiswithKant，evenifthesearetwoactsoftheegomerely，andweremainentirelyintheego。

Nowthatlimitationmaytakeplaceformeintwodifferentways:atonetimetheoneispassive，atanothertimetheotherisso。Inthislimitationtheegomaypositthenon-egoaslimitinganditselfaslimited，insuchawaythattheegopositsitselfasrequiringtohaveanobject；Iknowmyselfindeedasego，butdeterminedbythenon-ego；non-egoishereactiveandegopassive。Or，ontheotherhand，theego，asabrogatingother-being，isthatwhichlimits，andnon-egoisthelimited。Iknowmyselfthenasclearlydeterminingthenon-ego，astheabsolutecauseofthenon-egoassuch，forI

canthink。Thefirstisthepropositionofthetheoreticreason，ofintelligence:thesecondthepropositionofpracticalreason，ofwill。(15)Thewillisthis，thatIamconsciousofmyselfaslimitingtheobject；thusImakemyselfexerciseactivityupontheobjectandmaintainmyself。Thetheoreticpropositionisthattheobjectisbeforemeanditdeterminesme。Theegois，sinceIperceive，acontent，andIhavethiscontentinme，whichisthusoutsideofme。ThisisonthewholethesamethingaswemeetwithintheexperienceofKant:itcomestothesamethingwhetheritisbymatterorthenon-egothattheegoisheredetermined。

b。Inthetheoreticconsciousnesstheego，althoughtheassertivegenerally，findsitselflimitedbythenon-ego。Butitisidenticalwithitself；henceitsinfiniteactivityeversetsitselftoabrogatethenon-egoandtobringforthitself。Nowthedifferentmethodswherebytheegosetsforthitselfarethedifferentmethodsofitsactivity；thesewehavetounderstandintheirnecessity。Butsincephilosophicknowledgeistheconsiderationofconsciousnessitself(supra，p。483)，Icanonlyknowknowledge，theactoftheego。Fichtethusappealstoconsciousness，postulatesegoandnon-egointheirabstraction，andsincephilosophicknowledgeistheconsciousnessofconsciousness，itisnotsufficientthatIshouldfinditsdeterminationsinconsciousness，forI

producethemwithconsciousness。Commonconsciousness，indeed，likewisebringsforthallthedeterminationsoftheordinaryconceptionandofthought，butwithout—onthetheoreticsideatleast—havinganyknowledgeofit；foritisthefactofbeinglimitedalonethatispresenttoit。Thus，whenIseealargesquareobject，suchasawall，myordinaryconsciousnessacceptsthesedeterminationsastheyaregiventoit；theobjectis。InsodoingIdonotthinkofseeing，butoftheobject；seeing，however，ismyactivity，thedeterminationsofmyfacultyofsensationarethuspositedthroughme。(16)Theegoastheoreticis，indeed，awareinphilosophicconsciousnessthatitistheegowhichposits；buthereitpositsthatthenon-egopositssomewhatinme。Theegothuspositsitselfasthatwhichislimitedbythenon-ego。Imakethislimitationmine；thusisitformeinme，thispassivityoftheegoisitselftheactivityoftheego。Asamatteroffact，allrealitywhichappearsintheobjectfortheegoisadeterminationoftheego，(17)justasthecategoriesandotherdeterminationswereinKant\'scase。ThusitisheremoreespeciallythatweshouldexpectFichtetodemonstratethereturnofother-Beingintoabsoluteconsciousness。However，becauseafteralltheother-Beingwasregardedasunconditioned，asimplicit，thisreturndoesnotcometopass。Theegodeterminesthe\'other，\'indeed，butthisunityisanaltogetherfiniteunity；non-egohasthusimmediatelyescapedfromdeterminationoncemoreandgoneforthfromthisunity。Whatwefindismerelyanalternationbetweenself-consciousnessandtheconsciousnessofanother，andtheconstantprogressionofthisalternation，whichneverreachesanyend。(18)

Thedevelopmentoftheoreticreasonisthefollowing-outofthemanifoldrelationshipsbetweentheegoandnon-ego；theformsofthislimitationwhichFichtenowgoesthrougharethedeterminationsoftheobject。Theseparticularthought-determinationshecallscategories，andheseekstodemonstratethemintheirnecessity；fromthetimeofAristotleonwardsnoonehadthoughtofsodoing。Thefirstoftheseformsisthedeterminationofreciprocity，whichwealreadymetwithinthethirdproposition:“Bythedeterminationoftherealityornegationoftheego，thenegationorrealityofthenon-egoisequallydetermined；”thetwoinoneisreciprocalaction。Inthesecondplace，“Causalityisthesamedegreeofactivityintheoneasofpassivityintheother。”Insofarassomethingisconsideredastherealityofthenon-ego，theegoisconsideredaspassive，and，ontheotherhand，insofaras\'I\'amreal，theobjectispassive；thisrelation，thatthepassivityoftheobjectismyactivityorreality，andtheopposite，istheconceptionofCausality。“Asmanypartsofnegationastheegopositsinitself，somanypartsofrealityitpositsinthenon-ego；itthereforepositsitselfasself-determininginsofarasitisdetermined，andassufferingdeterminationinsofarasitdeterminesitself。Insofar，”inthethirdplace，“astheegoisregardedasembracingthewholeabsolutelydeterminedrealmofallreality，itissubstance；ontheotherhandwhenitispositedinanotabsolutelydeterminedsphereofthisrealm，insofarthereisanaccidenceintheego。”(19)Thatisthefirstrationalattemptthathaseverbeenmadetodeducethecategories；thisprogressfromonedeterminationtoanotheris，however，onlyananalysisfromthestandpointofconsciousness，andisnotinandforitself。

Theegoissofartheidealgroundofallconceptionsoftheobject；alldeterminationofthisobjectisadeterminationoftheego。Butinorderthatitmaybeobject，itmustbeplacedinoppositiontotheego，i。e。thedeterminationssetforththroughtheegoareanother，thenon-ego；thisplacingoftheobjectinoppositionistherealgroundofconceptions。Theegois，however，likewisetherealgroundoftheobject；foritislikewiseadeterminationoftheegothatthenon-egoasobjectissetinoppositiontotheego。Both，therealgroundandtheidealgroundoftheconception，arethusoneandthesame。(20)Regardingtheegoasidealprincipleandthenon-egoasrealprinciple，Krughaslikewisetalkedagreatdealofnonsense。Regardedfromtheonepointofview，theegoisactiveandthenon-egopurelypassive；whilefromtheothersidetheegoispassiveandtheobjectactiveandoperative。Butsincetheegointhenon-philosophicconsciousnessdoesnothavetheconsciousnessofitsactivityintheconceptionoftheobject，itrepresentstoitselfitsownactivityasforeign，i。e。asbelongingtothenon-ego。

Wehereseetheoppositionadoptingvariousforms:ego，non-ego；positing，settinginopposition；

twosortsofactivityoftheego，&c。ThefactthatIrepresentisundoubtedlymyactivity，butthematterofmainimportanceisthecontentofthepositinganditsnecessaryconnectionthroughitself。

Ifoneoccupiesoneselfonlywiththiscontent，thatformofsubjectivitywhichisdominantwithFichte，andwhichremainsinhisopposition，disappears。Astheegoisaffirmativeanddetermining，therenowisinthisdeterminationanegativelikewisepresent；Ifindmyselfdeterminedandatthesametimetheegoislikeitself，infinite，i。e。identicalwithitself。ThisisacontradictionwhichFichteindeedendeavourstoreconcile，butinspiteofitallheleavesthefalsebasisofdualismundisturbed。Theultimate，beyondwhichFichtedoesnotget，isonlyan\'ought，\'whichdoesnotsolvethecontradiction；forwhiletheegoshouldbeabsolutelyathomewithitself，i。e。free，itshouldatthesametimebeassociatedwithanother。ToFichtethedemandforthesolutionofthiscontradictionthusadoptstheattitudeofbeingademandedsolutiononly，ofsignifyingthatIeverhavetodestroythebarriers，thatIeverhavetoreachbeyondthelimitationintoutterinfinitude，andthatIeverfindanewlimit；acontinualalternationtakesplacebetweennegationandaffirmation，anidentitywithselfwhichagainfallsintonegation，andfromthisnegationiseveragainrestored。Tospeakoftheboundsofhumanreasonis，however，anunmeaningformofwords。

Thatthereasonofthesubjectislimitediscomprehensiblefromthenatureofthecase，butwhenwespeakofThought，infinitudeisnoneotherthanone\'sownrelationtoself，andnottoone\'slimit；

andtheplaceinwhichmanisinfiniteisThought。Infinitudemaythenbelikewiseveryabstract，andinthiswayitisalsooncemorefinite；buttrueinfinituderemainsinitself。

Fichtefurtherdeducestheordinaryconceptionthus:thefactthattheegoingoingforthatoncefindsitsactivitycheckedbyalimitation，andreturnsoncemoreintoitself，bringsabouttwooppositetendenciesinme，betweenwhichIwaver，andwhichItrytouniteinthefacultyofimagination。Inorderthatafixeddeterminationmayexistbetweenthetwo，Ihavetomakethelimitapermanentone，andwehavethatintheunderstanding。Allfurtherdeterminationsoftheobjectare，ascategoriesoftheunderstanding，modesofsynthesis；buteachsynthesisisanewcontradiction。Newmediationsarethusoncemorenecessary，andthesearenewdeterminations。

ThusFichtesays:Icanalwayscontinuetodeterminethenon-ego，tomakeitmyconception，i。e。

totakefromititsnegationasregardsme。Ihavetodealwithmyactivityalone；butthereisalwaysanexternalitythereinpresentwhichstillremains，andwhichisnotexplainedbymyactivity。ThisBeyondwhichaloneremainstotheundeterminedegoFichtecallstheinfinitecheckupontheego，withwhichiteverhastodeal，andbeyondwhichitcannotget；thustheactivitywhichproceedsintoinfinitudefindsitselfcheckedanddrivenbackbythisrepulsiveforce，andthenitreactsuponitself。“Theegoinitsself-determinationhasbeenconsideredbothasdetermininganddetermined；

ifwereflectonthefactthattheabsolutelydetermineddeterminingpowermustbeanabsolutelyindeterminate，andfurther，thategoandnon-egoareabsolutelyopposedtooneanother，intheonecaseegoistheindeterminateandintheothercasenon-ego。”(21)

Inasmuchastheegoheremakestheobjectitsconceptionandnegatesit，thisphilosophyisIdealism，inwhichphilosophyallthedeterminationsoftheobjectareideal。Everythingdeterminatewhichtheegopossessesithasthroughitsownpositing；IevenmakeacoatorabootbecauseI

putthemon。Thereremainsonlytheemptyrepulsiveforce，andthatistheKantianThing-in-itself，beyondwhichevenFichtecannotget，eventhoughthetheoreticreasoncontinuesitsdeterminationintoinfinitude。“Theegoasintelligence”ever“remainsdependentonanundeterminednon-ego；itisonlythroughthisthatitisintelligence。”(22)Thetheoreticsideisthusdependent。Initwehavenotthereforetodealwiththetruthinandforitselfbutwithacontingent，becauseegoislimited，notabsolute，asitsNotiondemands:intelligenceisnothereconsideredasspiritwhichisfree。ThisisFichte\'sstandpointasregardsthetheoreticside。

c。Practicalreasoncomesnext；thepointofviewfromwhichitstartsisthat“Theegopositsitselfasdeterminingthenon-ego。”Nowthecontradictionhasthustobesolvedofegobeingathomewithitself，sinceitdeterminesitsBeyond。Theegoisthusinfiniteactivity，and，asego=ego，theabsoluteego，itisundoubtedlyabstract。Butinordertohaveadetermination，anon-egomustexist；egoisthusactivity，causality，thepositingofthenon-ego。ButaswithKantsensuousnessandreasonremainopposed，thesamecontradictionispresenthere，onlyinamoreabstractform，andnotintherudeempiricismofKant。Fichtehereturnsandtwistsinallsortsofways，orhegivestheoppositionmanydifferentforms，thecrudestformisthategoispositedascausality，forinitanotherisnecessitatedonwhichitexercisesitsactivity。“Theabsoluteegohasaccordinglytobe”

now“thecauseofthenon-ego，i。e。onlyofthatinthenon-egowhichremainswhenweabstractfromalldemonstrableformsofrepresentationorconception—ofthattowhichisascribedthecheckgiventotheinfinitelyoperativeactivityoftheego；forthefactthattheintelligentegois，inaccordancewiththenecessarylawsoftheconception，thecauseoftheparticulardeterminationsofthatwhichisconceivedassuch，isdemonstratedinthetheoreticscienceofknowledge。”(23)

Thelimitsofintelligencemustbebrokenthrough，theegomustalonebeactive；theotherside，theinfiniterepulsion，mustberemoved，inorderthattheegomaybeliberated。

“Accordingtoourhypothesistheegomustnowpositanon-egoabsolutely，andwithoutanyground，i。e。absolutelyandwithoutanygrounditmustlimitorinpartnotposititself。”This，indeed，italreadydoesasintelligent。“Itmustthereforehavethegroundofnotpositingitself”

only“initself。”Theegois，however，justtheego，itpositsitself，“itmust”therefore“havetheprincipleofpositingitselfwithinit，andalsotheprincipleofnotpositingitself。Hencetheegoinitsessencewouldbecontradictoryandself-repellent；therewouldbeinitatwofoldorcontradictoryprinciple，whichassumptioncontradictsitself，forinthatcasetherewouldbenoprinciplewithinit。

Theegowould”consequently“notexist，foritwouldabrogateitself。Allcontradictionsarereconciledthroughthefurtherdeterminationofcontradictorypropositions。Theegomustbepositedinonesenseasinfinite，andinanotherasfinite。Wereittobepositedasinfiniteandfiniteinoneandthesamesense，thecontradictionwouldbeinsoluble；theegowouldnotbeonebuttwo。

Insofarastheegopositsitselfasinfinite，itsactivityisdirecteduponitselfandonnothingelsebutitself。Insofarastheegopositslimits，anditselfintheselimits，itsactivityisnotexerciseddirectlyonitself，butonanon-egowhichhastobeplacedinopposition，”uponanotherandagainuponanother，andsoonintoinfinitude；thatistheobject，andtheactivityoftheego“isobjectiveactivity。”(24)InthiswayFichteinthepracticalspherealsoremainsatopposition，onlythisoppositionnowhastheformoftwotendenciesintheego，bothofwhicharesaidtobeoneandthesameactivityoftheego。IamcalledupontoproceedtodeterminetheotherinrelationtowhichIamnegative，thenon-ego，inaccordancewithmyfreedomithasindeedalldeterminationsthroughtheactivityoftheego，butbeyondmydeterminationthesamenon-egoevercontinuestoappear。Theegoclearlypositsanobject，apointoflimitation，butwherethelimitationis，isundetermined。Imaytransferthesphereofmydetermination，andextendittoaninfinitedegree，buttherealwaysremainsapureBeyond，andthenon-egohasnopositiveself-existentdetermination。

Thelastpointinrespectofthepracticalsphereishencethis，thattheactivityoftheegoisayearningorstriving(25)—liketheKantian“ought”；Fichtetreatsthiswithgreatprolixity。TheFichtianphilosophyconsequentlyhasthesamestandpointastheKantian；theultimateisalwayssubjectivity，asexistentinandforitself。Yearning，accordingtoFichte，isdivine；inyearningIhavenotforgottenmyself，IhavenotforgottenthatIpossessasuperiorityinmyself；andthereforeitisaconditionofhappinessandsatisfaction。ThisinfiniteyearninganddesirehasthenbeenregardedaswhatishighestandmostexcellentintheBeautiful，andinreligiousfeelingslikewise；andwithitisconnectedtheironyofwhichwehavespokenbefore(Vol。I。pp。400，401)。Inthisreturntheegoismerelyaneffort，onitssideitisfixed，anditcannotrealizeitsendeavours。Strivingisthusanimperfectorimplicitlylimitedaction。Theultimateresultisconsequentlya“circle”whichcannotbebrokenthrough，sothat“thefinitespiritmustnecessarilypositanabsoluteoutsideitself(athing-in-itself)，andyetontheotherhanditmustrecognizethatthissameisonlythereforit(anecessarynoumenon)。”(26)Toputitotherwise，weseetheegoabsolutelydeterminedinoppositiononly，weseeitonlyasconsciousnessandself-consciousnesswhichdoesnotgotbeyondthis，andwhichdoesnotreachsofarastoSpirit。TheegoistheabsoluteNotioninsofarasitdoesnotyetreachtheunityofthought，orinthissimplicitydoesnotreachdifference，andinmotiondoesnothaverest；thatistosay，insofaraspositing，orthepureactivityoftheego，andsettinginopposition，arenotbyitcomprehendedasthesame。Ortheegodoesnotcomprehendtheinfiniterepulsion，thenon-ego；self-consciousnessdeterminesthenon-ego，butdoesnotknowhowtomakethisBeyonditsown。

ThedeficiencyintheFichtianphilosophyisthusfirstlythattheegoretainsthesignificanceoftheindividual，actualself-consciousness，asopposedtothatwhichisuniversalorabsolute，ortothespiritinwhichitisitselfamomentmerely；fortheindividualself-consciousnesssimplysignifiesstandingapartasfarasanotherisconcerned。Hence，iftheegowasevercalledabsoluteexistence，themostterribleoffencewasgiven，becausereallytheegoonlycamebeforeusassignifyingtheindividualsubjectasopposedtotheuniversal。

Inthesecondplace，FichtedoesnotattaintotheideaofReasonastheperfected，realunityofsubjectandobject，orofegoandnon-ego；itisonly，aswithKant，representedasthethoughtofaunioninabelieforfaith，andwiththisFichtelikewiseconcludes(GrundlagedergesammtenWissenschaftslehre，p。301)。Thisheworkedoutinhispopularwritings。Forbecausetheegoisfixedinitsoppositiontothenon-ego，andisonlyasbeingopposed，itbecomeslostinthatunity。

Theattainmentofthisaimishencesentfurtherandfurtherbackintothefalse，sensuousinfinitude:

itisaprogressionimplyingjustthesamecontradictionasthatfoundinKant，andhavingnopresentactualityinitself；fortheegohasallactualityinitsoppositiononly。TheFichtianphilosophyrecognizesthefinitespiritalone，andnottheinfinite；itdoesnotrecognizespiritasuniversalthought，astheKantianphilosophydoesnotrecognizethenot-true；oritisformal。Theknowledgeofabsoluteunityisapprehendedasfaithinamoraldispositionoftheworld，anabsolutehypothesisinaccordancewithwhichwehavethebeliefthateverymoralactionthatweperformwillhaveagoodresult。(27)AsinKant\'scase，thisIdeabelongstouniversalthought。“Inaword，whenanythingisapprehendeditceasestobeGod；andeveryconceptionofGodthatissetupisnecessarilythatofafalseGod。Religionisapracticalfaithinthemoralgovernmentoftheworld；

faithinasupersensuousworldbelongs，accordingtoourphilosophy，totheimmediateverities。”

(28)FichtethusconcludeswiththehighestIdea，withtheunionoffreedomandnature，butaunionofsuchanaturethat，immediatelyregarded，itisnotknown；theoppositionalonefallswithinconsciousness。ThisunionoffaithhelikewisefindsintheLoveofGod。Asbelievedandexperienced，thisformpertainstoReligion，andnottoPhilosophy，andouronlypossibleinterestistoknowthisinPhilosophy。ButwithFichteitisstillassociatedwithamostunsatisfyingexternalityofwhichthebasisisthenon-Idea，fortheonedeterminationisessentialonlybecausetheotherisso，andsoonintoinfinitude。“Thetheoryofknowledgeisrealistic—itshowsthattheconsciousnessoffinitebeingscanonlybeexplainedbypresupposinganindependentandwhollyoppositepower，onwhich，inaccordancewiththeirempiricalexistence，theythemselvesaredependent。Butitassertsnothingmorethanthisopposedpower，whichbyfinitebeingscanmerelybefeltandnotknown。Allpossibledeterminationsofthispowerorofthisnon-egowhichcancomeforthintoinfinityinourconsciousness，itpledgesitselftodeducefromthedeterminingfacultiesoftheego，anditmustactuallybeabletodeducethese，socertainlyasitisatheoryofknowledge。Thisknowledge，however，isnottranscendentbuttranscendental。Itundoubtedlyexplainsallconsciousnessfromsomethingindependentofallconsciousness，butitdoesnotforgetthatthisindependentsomewhatisagainaproductofitsownpowerofthought，andconsequentlysomethingdependentontheego，insofarasithastobetherefortheego。Everythingis，initsideality，dependentupontheego；butinitsrealityeventheegoisdependent。Thefactthatthefinitespiritmustpositforitselfsomewhatoutsideofitself，whichlastexistsonlyforit，isthatcirclewhichitmayinfinitelyextendbutneverbreakthrough。”Thefurtherlogicaldeterminationoftheobjectisthatwhichinsubjectandobjectisidentical，thetrueconnectionisthatinwhichtheobjectiveisthepossessionoftheego；asthought，theegoinitselfdeterminestheobject。ButFichte\'stheoryofknowledgeregardsthestruggleoftheegowiththeobjectasthatofthecontinuousprocessofdeterminingtheobjectthroughtheegoassubjectofconsciousness，withouttheidentityoftherestfullyself-developingNotion。

Thirdly，becausetheegoisthusfixedinitsone-sidedness，thereproceedsfromit，asrepresentingoneextreme，thewholeoftheprogressthatismadeinthecontentofknowledge；andthedeductionofthephilosophyofFichte，cognitioninitscontentandform，isaprogressionfromcertaindeterminationstootherswhichdonotturnbackintounity，orthroughasuccessionoffinitenesseswhichdonothavetheAbsoluteinthematall。Theabsolutepointofview，likeanabsolutecontent，iswanting。Thusthecontemplationofnature，forinstance，isacontemplationofitasofpurefinitenessesfromthepointofviewofanother，asthoughtheorganicbodywereregardedthus:“Consciousnessrequiresasphereentirelyitsownforitsactivity。Thissphereispositedthroughanoriginal，necessaryactivityoftheego，inwhichitdoesnotknowitselfasfree。Itisasensuousperception，adrawingoflines；thesphereofactivitytherebybecomessomethingextendedinspace。Asquiescent，continuous，andyetunceasinglychanging，thissphereismatter，which，asbody，hasanumberofpartswhichinrelationtooneanotherarecalledlimbs。Thepersoncanascribetohimselfnobodywithoutpositingitasbeingundertheinfluenceofanotherperson。ButitislikewiseessentialthatIshouldbeabletocheckthissameinfluence，andexternalmatterisalsopositedasresistingmyinfluencesonit，i。e。asatough，compactmatter。”(29)Thesetoughmattersmustfurtherbeseparatedfromoneanother—thedifferentpersonscannotholdtogetherlikeonemassofdough。For“mybodyismybodyandnotthatofanother；itmustfurtheroperateandbeactivewithoutmyworkingthroughit。ItisonlythroughtheoperationofanotherthatIcanmyselfbeactiveandrepresentmyselfasarationalbeingwhocanberespectedbyhim。

Buttheotherbeingshouldtreatmeimmediatelyasarationalbeing，Ishouldbeforhimarationalbeingevenbeforemyactivitybegins。Ormyformmustproduceaneffectthroughitsmereexistenceinspace，withoutmyactivity，i。e。itmustbevisible。Thereciprocaloperationofrationalbeingsmusttakeplacewithoutactivity；thusasubtlemattermustbeassumedinorderthatitwaybemodifiedbymeansofthemerelyquiescentform。InthiswayarededucedfirstLightandthenAir。”(30)Thisconstitutesaveryexternalmannerofpassingfromonesteptoanother，resemblingthemethodoftheordinaryteleology，whichmakesout，forinstance，thatplantsandanimalsaregivenforthenourishmentofmankind。Thisishowitisput:Manmusteat，andthustheremustbesomethingedible—consequentlyplantsandanimalsareatoncededuced；plantsmusthavetheirrootinsomething，andconsequentlytheearthisforthwithdeduced。Whatisaltogetherlackingisanyconsiderationoftheobjectaswhatitisinitself；itisplainlyconsideredonlyinrelationtoanother。Inthiswaytheanimalorganismappearsasatough，tenaciousmatterwhichis“articulated”andcanbemodified；lightisasubtlematterwhichisthemediumofcommunicationofmereexistence，&c。—justasintheothercaseplantsandanimalsaremerelyedible。Asregardsaphilosophicconsiderationofthecontentthereisnothingatalltobefound。

FichtelikewisewrotebothaScienceofMoralsandofNaturalRights，buthetreatsthemassciencespertainingtotheunderstandingonly，andhismethodofprocedureisdestituteofideasandcarriedonbymeansofalimitedunderstanding。TheFichtiandeductionoftheconceptionsofjusticeandmoralitythusremainswithinthelimitationsandrigidityofself-consciousness，asagainstwhichFichte\'spopularpresentationsofreligionandmoralitypresentinconsistencies。ThetreatiseonNaturalRightsisaspecialfailure，e。g。wherehe，aswehavejustseen(p。502)，deducesevennaturejustasfarasherequiresit。TheorganizationofthestatewhichisdescribedinFichte\'sScienceofRightsisfurthermoreasunspiritualaswasthedeductionofnaturalobjectsjustmentioned，andasweremanyoftheFrenchconstitutionswhichhaveappearedinmoderntimes—aformal，externalunitingandconnecting，inwhichtheindividualsassuchareheldtobeabsolute，orinwhichRightisthehighestprinciple。KantbegantogroundRightuponFreedom，andFichtelikewisemakesfreedomtheprincipleintheRightsofNature；but，itswasthecasewithRousseau，itisfreedomintheformoftheisolatedindividual。Thisisagreatcommencement，butinordertoarriveattheparticular，theyhavetoacceptcertainhypotheses。Theuniversalisnotthespirit，thesubstanceofthewhole，butanexternal，negativepowerofthefiniteunderstandingdirectedagainstindividuals。Thestateisnotapprehendedinitsessence，butonlyasrepresentingaconditionofjusticeandlaw，i。e。asanexternalrelationoffinitetofinite。Therearevariousindividuals；thewholeconstitutionofthestateisthusinthemaincharacterizedbythefactthatthefreedomofindividualsmustbelimitedbymeansofthefreedomofthewhole。(31)Theindividualsalwaysmaintainacoldattitudeofnegativityasregardsoneanother，theconfinementbecomescloserandthebondsmorestringentastimegoeson，insteadofthestatebeingregardedasrepresentingtherealizationoffreedom。

Thisphilosophycontainsnothingspeculative，butitdemandsthepresenceofthespeculativeelement。AsthephilosophyofKantseeksinunityitsIdeaoftheSupremeGood，whereintheoppositeshavetobeunited，sotheFichtianphilosophydemandsunionintheegoandintheimplicitudeoffaith；inthisself-consciousnessinallitsactionsmakesitsstarting-pointconviction，sothatinthemselvesitsactionsmaybringforththehighestendandrealizethegood。IntheFichtianphilosophynothingcanbeseenbeyondthemomentofself-consciousness，ofself-consciousBeing-within-self，asinthephilosophyofEnglandwefindexpressed—injustasone-sidedaway—themomentofBeing-for-another，orofconsciousness，andthatnotasamomentsimply，butastheprincipleofthetruth；inneitherofthetwoistheretheunityofboth—orspirit。

Fichte\'sphilosophyconstitutesasignificantepochinPhilosophyregardedinitsoutwardform。Itisfromhimandfromhismethodsthatabstractthoughtproceeds，deductionandconstruction。HencewiththeFichtianphilosophyarevolutiontookplaceinGermany。ThepublichadpenetratedasfarasthephilosophyofKant，anduntiltheKantianphilosophywasreachedtheinterestawakenedbyPhilosophywasgeneral；itwasaccessible，andmenwerecurioustoknowaboutit，itpertainedtotheordinaryknowledgeofamanofculture(supra，p。218)。Formerlymenofbusiness，statesmen，occupiedthemselveswithPhilosophy；now，however，withtheintricateidealismofthephilosophyofKant，theirwingsdroophelplesstotheground。HenceitiswithKantthatwefirstbegintofindalineofseparationwhichpartsusfromthecommonmodesofconsciousness；buttheresult，thattheAbsolutecannotbeknown，hasbecomeonegenerallyacknowledged。WithFichtethecommonconsciousnesshasstillfurtherseparateditselffromPhilosophy，andithasutterlydepartedfromthespeculativeelementthereinpresent。ForFichte\'segoisnotmerelytheegooftheempiricconsciousness，sincegeneraldeterminationsofthoughtsuchasdonotfallwithintheordinaryconsciousnesshavelikewisetobeknownandbroughttoconsciousness；inthiswaysinceFichte\'stimefewmenhaveoccupiedthemselveswithspeculation。Fichte，itistrue，inhislaterworksespecially，wrotewithaviewtomeetingthepopularearaswemayseeinthe“Attempttoforcethereaderintocomprehension，”butthisendwasnotaccomplished。ThepublicwasthroughthephilosophyofKantandJacobistrengthenedinitsopinion—onewhichitacceptedutiliter-thattheknowledgeofGodisimmediate，andthatweknowitfromthebeginningandwithoutrequiringtostudy，andhencethatPhilosophyisquitesuperfluous。

2。Fichte\'sSysteminaReconstitutedForm。

Thetimescalledforlife，forspirit。Nowsincemindhasthusretreatedwithinself-consciousness，butwithinself-consciousnessasabarrenego，whichmerelygivesitselfacontentorarealizationthroughfinitenessesandindividualitieswhichinandforthemselvesarenothing，thenextstageisfoundinknowingthisrealizationofself-consciousnessinitself，inknowingthecontentinitselfasacontentwhich，penetratedthroughoutbyspirit，isself-consciousandspiritual，oraspiritfullofcontent。InhislaterpopularworksFichtethussetforthfaith，love，hope，religion，treatingthemwithoutphilosophicinterest，andasforageneralpublic:itwasaphilosophycalculatedtosuitenlightenedJewsandJewesses，councillorsandKotzebues。Heplacesthematterinapopularform:“Itisnotthefiniteegothatis，butthedivineIdeaisthefoundationofallPhilosophy；

everythingthatmandoesofhimselfisnullandvoid。Allexistenceislivingandactiveinitself，andthereisnootherlifethanBeing，andnootherBeingthanGod；GodisthusabsoluteBeingandLife。Thedivineessencelikewisecomesforth，revealingandmanifestingitself-theworld。”(32)

Thisimmediateunityoftheself-consciousegoanditscontent，orspirit，whichmerelyhasanintuitionofitsself-consciouslifeandknowsitasthetruthimmediately，manifesteditselfsubsequentlyinpoeticandprophetictendencies，invehementaspirations，inexcrescenceswhichgrewoutoftheFichtianphilosophy。

3。TheMoreImportantoftheFollowersofFichte。

Ontheonehand，inrespectofthecontentwhichtheegoreachesinthephilosophyofFichte，thecompleteabsenceofspirituality，thewoodenness，and，toputitplainly，theutterfoolishnessthereinevidenced，strikeustooforciblytoallowustoremainathisstandpoint；ourphilosophicperceptionlikewisetellsusoftheone-sidednessanddeficienciesoftheprinciple，asalsooftheevidentnecessitythatthecontentshouldprovetobewhatitis。Butontheotherhandself-consciousnesswasthereinpositedasrealityoressence—notasaforeign，alienself-consciousness，butasego—asignificationwhichallpossess，andwhichfindsananswerintheactualityofall。TheFichtianstandpointofsubjectivityhasthusretaineditscharacterofbeingunphilosophicallyworkedout，andarrivedatitscompletioninformspertainingtosensationwhichinpartremainedwithintheFichtianprinciple，whiletheywereinparttheeffort—futilethoughitwas—togotbeyondthesubjectivityoftheego。

a。FriedrichVonSchlegel。

InFichte\'scasethelimitationiscontinuallyreappearing；butbecausetheegofeelsconstrainedtobreakthroughthisbarrier，itreactsagainstit，andgivesitselfarestingplacewithinitself；thislastoughttobeconcrete，butitisanegativeresting-placealone。Thisfirstform，Irony，hasFriedrichvonSchlegelasitsleadingexponent。ThesubjecthereknowsitselftobewithinitselftheAbsolute，andallelsetoitisvain；alltheconclusionswhichitdrawsforitselfrespectingtherightandgood，itlikewiseknowshowtodestroyagain。Itcanmakeapretenceofknowingallthings，butitonlydemonstratesvanity，hypocrisy，andeffrontery。Ironyknowsitselftobethemasterofeverypossiblecontent；itisseriousaboutnothing，butplayswithallforms。Theothersideisthis，thatsubjectivityhascastitselfintoreligioussubjectivity。Theutterdespairinrespectofthought，oftruth，andabsoluteobjectivity，asalsotheincapacitytogiveoneselfanysettledbasisorspontaneityofaction，inducedthenoblesoultoabandonitselftofeelingandtoseekinReligionsomethingfixedandsteadfast；thissteadfastbasis，thisinwardsatisfaction，istobefoundinreligioussentimentsandfeelings。Thisinstinctimpellingustowardssomethingfixedhasforcedmanyintopositiveformsofreligion，intoCatholicism，superstitionandmiracleworking，inorderthattheymayfindsomethingonwhichtheycanrest，becausetoinwardsubjectivityeverythingfluctuatesandwavers。Withthewholeforceofitsmindsubjectivitytriestoapplyitselftowhatispositivelygiven，tobenditsheadbeneaththepositive，tocastitself，sotospeak，intothearmsofexternality，anditfindsaninwardpowerimpellingitsotodo。

b。Schleiermacher。

Ontheotherhandtheegofindsinthesubjectivityandindividualityofthepersonalviewofthingstheheightofallitsvanity—itsReligion。AllthevariousindividualitieshaveGodwithinthemselves。

Dialecticisthelastthingtoariseandtomaintainitsplace。Asthisisexpressedforphilosophicself-consciousness，theforeignintellectualworldhaslostallsignificanceandtruthforordinaryculture；itiscomposedofthreeelements，adeitypertainingtoatimegoneby，andindividualizedinspaceandexistence，aworldwhichisoutsidetheactualityofself-consciousness，andaworldwhichhadyettoappear，andinwhichself-consciousnesswouldfirstattaintoitsreality。Thespiritofculturehasdesertedit，andnolongerrecognizesanythingthatisforeigntoself-consciousness。

Inaccordancewiththisprinciple，thespirituallivingessencehasthentransformeditselfintoself-consciousness，anditthinkstoknowtheunityofspiritimmediatelyfromitself，andinthisimmediacytobepossessedofknowledgeinapoetic，oratleastapropheticmanner。Asregardsthepoeticmanner，ithasaknowledgeofthelifeandpersonoftheAbsoluteimmediately，byanintuition，andnotintheNotion，anditthinksitwouldlosethewholeaswhole，asaself-penetratingunity，wereitnottoexpressthesameinpoeticform；andwhatitthusexpressespoeticallyistheintuitionofthepersonallifeofself-consciousness。Butthetruthisabsolutemotion，andsinceitisamotionofformsandfigures[Gestalten]，andtheuniverseisakingdomofspirits，theNotionistheessenceofthismovement，andlikewiseoreachindividualform；itisitsidealform[Form]andnottherealone，orthatoffigure[Gestalt]。Inthelattercasenecessityislostsightof；individualaction，lifeandheart，remainwithinthemselves，andundeveloped；andthispoetryvacillatesbetwixttheuniversalityoftheNotionandthedeterminatenessandindifferenceofthefigure；itisneitherfleshnorfish，neitherpoetrynorphilosophy。Thepropheticutteranceoftruthswhichclaimtobephilosophical，thusbelongstofaith，toself-consciousness，whichindeedperceivestheabsolutespiritinitself，butdoesnotcomprehenditselfasself-consciousness，sinceitplacesabsoluterealityaboveKnowledge，beyondself-consciousreason，aswasdonebyEschenmayerandJacobi。Thisuncomprehending，propheticmannerofspeechaffirmsthisorthatrespectingabsoluteexistenceasfromanoracle，andrequiresthateachmanshouldfindthesameimmediatelyinhisownheart。Theknowledgeofabsoluterealitybecomesamatterpertainingtotheheart；thereareanumberofwould-beinspiredspeakers，eachofwhomholdsamonologueandreallydoesnotunderstandtheothers，exceptingbyapressureofthehandsandbetrayalofdumbfeeling。Whattheysayismainlycomposedoftrivialities，ifthesearetakeninthesenseinwhichtheyareuttered；itisthefeeling，thegesture，thefulnessoftheheart，whichfirstgivesthemtheirsignificance；tonothingofmoreimportanceisdirectexpressiongiven。Theyoutbidoneanotherinconceitsoffancy，inardentpoetry。ButbeforetheTruthvanityturnspale，spitefullysneeringitsneaksbackintoitself。Asknotafteracriterionofthetruth，butaftertheNotionofthetruthinandforitself；onthatfixyourgaze。

ThegloryofPhilosophyisdeparted，foritpresupposesacommongroundofthoughtsandprinciples—whichiswhatsciencedemands—oratleastofopinions。Butnowparticularsubjectivitywaseverything，eachindividualwasproudanddisdainfulasregardsallothers。Theconceptionofindependentthought—asthoughtherecouldbeathoughtwhichwasnotsuch(Vol。

I。p。60)—isverymuchthesame；menhave，itissaid，tobringforthaparticularityoftheirown，orelsetheyhavenotthoughtforthemselves。Butthebadpictureisthatinwhichtheartistshowshimself；originalityistheproductionofwhatisinitsentiretyuniversal。Thefollyofindependentthoughtisthatitresultsineachbringingforthsomethingmorepreposterousthananother。

c。Novalis。

Subjectivitysignifiesthelackofafirmandsteadybasis，butlikewisethedesireforsuch，andthusitevermoreremainsayearning。TheseyearningsofaloftysoularesetforthinthewritingsofNovalis。Thissubjectivitydoesnotreachsubstantiality，itdiesawaywithinitself，andthestandpointitadoptsisoneofinwardworkingsandfinedistinctions；itsignifiesaninwardlifeanddealswiththeminuti？ofthetruth。Theextravagancesofsubjectivityconstantlypassintomadness；iftheyremaininthoughttheyarewhirledroundandroundinthevortexofreflectingunderstanding，whichisevernegativeinreferencetoitself。

d。Fries，Bouterweck，Krug。

Yetalastformofsubjectivityisthesubjectivityofarbitrarywillandignorance。Itmaintainedthis，thatthehighestmodeofcognitionisanimmediateknowledgeasafactofconsciousness；andthatissofarright。TheFichtianabstractionanditshardunderstandinghasarepellenteffectonthought；

slothfulreasonalloweditselftobetoldtheresultofthephilosophyofKantandJacobi，andrenouncedallconsistentthought，allconstruction。Thisarbitrarinessgaveitselfentireliberty—thelibertyoftheTabagie-butindoingsoitregardeditselffromapoeticorpropheticpointofview，aswehavejustseen(pp。508，509)。Thenitwasbothmoresoberandmoreprosaic，andthusbroughttheoldlogicandmetaphysiconcemoreintoevidence，thoughwiththismodificationthattheyaremadefactsofconsciousness。ThusFriesturnsbacktothefaithofJacobiintheformofimmediatejudgmentsderivedfromreason，anddarkconceptionsincapableofutterance。(33)Hewishedtoimprovethecritiqueofpurereasonbyapprehendingthecategoriesasfactsofconsciousness；anythingonechoosescaninsuchacasebeintroduced。Bouterweckspeaksof“Thevirtue，thelivingnatureofpower，thefactthatsubjectandobjectareregardedasone，thatisasabsolutevirtue。WiththisabsolutevirtuewehaveallBeingandaction，namelytheeternal，absoluteandpureunity；inonewordwehavegraspedtheworldwithinusandwehavegraspedourselvesintheworld，andthatindeednotthroughconceptionsandconclusions，butdirectlythroughthepowerwhichitselfconstitutesourexistenceandourrationalnature。ToknowtheAll，orindeedtoknowGodinanyway，ishowever，impossibleforanymortal。”(34)Krugwrotea“GroundworkofPhilosophy，”settingfortha“TranscendentalSynthesis—thatisatranscendentalrealismandatranscendentalidealisminseparablyboundtogether。”Itisan“original，transcendentalsynthesisoftherealandtheideal，thethinkingsubjectandthecorrespondingouterworld；”thistranscendentalsynthesismust“berecognizedandassertedwithoutanyattemptbeingmadeatexplainingit。”(35)

1。Fichte:GrundlagedergesammtenWissenschaftslehre(Leipzig，1794)，Preface，p。xii。

2。Fichte\'sLebenundBriefwechsel，editedbyhisson，Pt。I。pp。3，6，24seq。；38seq。；142，189；

337，338，348，349，353，354，358-364；Pt。II。pp。140-142；Pt。I。pp。370-372，442-448，455；

518，540；578。

3。Fichte\'sposthumousworks，whichwerenotpublisheduntilafterHegel\'sdeath，neverthelessshowthatthewriterinhislecturesattheBerlinUniversitylikewiseworkedoutscientificallythisnewlydevelopedpointofviewinhisphilosophy；Fichtemadeabeginninginthisregardbrochevenintheurewhichappearedin1810:“DieWissenschaftslehreinihremallgemeinenUmrisse”(v。

Michelet:GeschichtederletztenSystemederPhilosophie，Pt。I。pp。441，442)。[Editor\'snote。]

4。Fichte:GrundlagedergesammtenWissenschaftslehre，pp。10-12。

5。Fichte:GrundlagedergesammtenWissenschaftslehre，pp。13，14。

6。Fichte:UeberdenBegriffderWissenschaftslehre(Weimar，1794)，p。12。

7。Fichte:Grundlagederges。Wissenschaftsl。，Preface，pp。x。，xi。

8。Fichte:GrundlagedergesammtenWissenschaftslehre，pp。184，185。

9。Fichte:GrundlagedergesammtenWissenschaftslehre，p。3。

10。Cf。Fichte:UeberdenBegriffderWissenschaftslehre，pp。13-17，19-39，50-52。

11。Fichte:GrundlagedergesammtenWissenschaftslehre，pp。4，5。

12。GrundlagedergesammtenWissenschaftslehre，pp。23，5，15，17，8。

13。Fichte:Grundlagederges。Wissenschaftslehre，pp。17，19-22。

14。Fichte:GrundlagedergesammtenWissenschaftslehre，pp。34，31，23，27-30(52)，14，18。

15。Ibidem，pp。52-56，74。

16。Fichte\'sAnweisungzumseligenLeben，pp。80-82。

17。Fichte:GrundlagedergesammtenWissenschaftslehre，p。57。

18。Fichte:GrundlagedergesammtenWissenschaftslehre，pp。78，79。

19。Fichte:GrundlagedergesammtenWissenschaftslehre，pp。60，67，59，76。

20。Ibidem，pp。121，122。

21。Fichte:GrundlagedergesammtenWissenschaftslehre，pp。194-197，204，221，222。

22。Ibidem，p。228。

23。Fichte:GrundlagedergesammtenWissenschaftslehre，pp。225，229，232。

24。Fichte:GrundlagedergesammtenWissenschaftslehre，pp。233，238，239。

25。Fichte:GrundlagedergesammtenWissenschaftslehre，pp。302，246，247。

26。Ibidem，p。273。

27。Fichte:UeberdenGrundunseresGlaubensaneineg？ttlicheWeltregierung(Fichte\'sLeben，PartII。)，p。111。

28。Fichte:VerantwortungsschreibengegendieAnklagedesAtheismus，pp。51，53。

29。Fichte:GrundlagedesNaturrechts(JenaundLeipzig，1796)，PartI。pp。55-71。

30。Ibidem，pp。78-82。

31。Fichte:GrundlagedesNaturrechts，PartII。p。21。

32。Rixner:Handbuchd。Gesch。d。Phil。Vol。III。，§192，p。416；Fichte:UeberdasWesendesGelehrten(Berlin，1806)，pp。4，5，15，25-27。

33。Rixner:Handbuchd。Gesch。d。Phil。Vol。III。§158，pp。350，351；Fries:NeueKritikd。

Vernunft(Firstedition，Heidelberg，1807)，Vol。I。pp。75，281，284，343；206。

34。Rixner:Handbuchd。Gesch。d。Phil。Vol。III。§156，pp。347，348；cf。Bouterweck\'sApodiktik(1799)，PartII。pp。206-212。

35。Krug:EntwurfeinesneuenOrganonderPhilosophie(Meissen，1801)，pp。75，76；Rixner:

Handbuchd。Geschichted。Philosophie，Vol。III。§157，p。349。

SectionThree:RecentGermanPhilosophyD。Schelling。

ItwasSchelling，finally，whomadethemostimportant，or，fromaphilosophicpointofview，theonlyimportantadvanceuponthephilosophyofFichte；hisphilosophyrosehigherthanthatofFichte，thoughundoubtedlyitstoodincloseconnectionwithit；indeed，hehimselfprofessestobeaFichtian。NowthephilosophyofSchellingfromthefirstadmittedthepossibilityofaknowledgeofGod，althoughitlikewisestartedfromthephilosophyofKant，whichdeniessuchknowledge。

AtthesametimeSchellingmakesJacobi\'sprincipleoftheunityofthoughtandBeingfundamental，althoughhebeginstodetermineitmoreclosely。(1)Tohimconcreteunityisthis，thatthefiniteisnomoretruethantheinfinite，thesubjectiveideanomorethanobjectivity，andthatcombinationsinwhichbothuntruthsarebroughttogetherintheirindependenceinrelationtooneanother，arelikewisecombinationsofuntruthsmerely。Concreteunitycanonlybecomprehendedasprocessandasthelivingmovementinaproposition。ThisinseparabilityisinGodalone；thefinite，ontheotherhand，isthatwhichhasthisseparabilitywithinit。Insofarasitisatruthitislikewisethisunity，butinalimitedsphere，andforthatreasonintheseparabilityofbothmoments。

FrederickWilhelmJosephSchelling，bornonthe27thJanuary，1775，atSchorndorf(2)inWürtemberg，studiedinLeipzigandJena，wherehecametobeontermsofgreatintimacywithFichte。Intheyear1807hebecamesecretaryoftheAcademyofScienceinMunich。Wecannotwithproprietydealfullywithhislife，forheisstillliving。(3)

Schellingworkedouthisphilosophyinviewofthepublic。TheseriesofhisphilosophicwritingsalsorepresentsthehistoryofhisphilosophicdevelopmentandthegradualprocessbywhichheraisedhimselfabovetheFichtianprincipleandtheKantiancontentwithwhichhebegan。ItdoesnotthuscontainasequenceofseparatelyworkedoutdivisionsofPhilosophy，butonlysuccessivestagesinhisowndevelopment。Ifweaskforafinalworkinwhichweshallfindhisphilosophyrepresentedwithcompletedefinitenessnonesuchcanbenamed。Schelling\'sfirstwritingsarestillquiteFichtian，anditisonlybyslowdegreesthatheworkedhimselffreeofFichte\'sform。TheformoftheegohastheambiguityofbeingcapableofsignifyingeithertheabsoluteEgoorGod，oregoinmyparticularity；(4)thissuppliedthefirststimulustoSchelling。Hisfirstandquiteshortworkoffoursheetswhichhewrotein1795atTübingen，whilestillattheuniversity，wascalled，“OnthePossibilityofanyFormofPhilosophy”；itcontainspropositionsrespectingtheFichtianphilosophyonly。Thenextwork，“OftheEgoasprincipleofPhilosophy，orontheUnconditionedinHumanKnowledge”(Tübingen，1795)，islikewisequiteFichtian；inthiscase，however，itisfromawiderandmoreuniversalpointofview，sincetheegoisthereingraspedasanoriginalidentity。(5)Wefind，however，asummaryoftheFichtianprincipleandtheKantianmodeofpresentation:“Itisonlybysomethingbeingoriginallysetinoppositiontotheego，andbytheegobeingitselfpositedasthemanifold(intime)，thatitispossiblefortheegotogetbeyondtheunitywhichbelongstoitofmerelybeingposited，andthat，forexample，itpositsthesamecontentonmorethanoneoccasion。”(6)Schellingthenpassedontonaturalphilosophy，adoptedKantianformsandreflectivedeterminations，suchasthoseofrepulsionandattraction，fromKant\'s“MetaphysicsofNature，”andlikewisedealtwithquiteempiricalphenomenainexpressionstakenfromKant。Allhisfirstworksonthissubjectcomeunderthiscategory，viz。”“IdeastowardsaPhilosophyofNature，”1797；“OntheWorld-Soul，”1798，thesecondeditionofwhichpossessesappendiceswhichareentirelyinconsistentwithwhatgoesbefore。InthewritingsofHerderandKielmeyer(7)wefindsensibility，irritability，andreproductiondealtwith，asalsotheirlaws，suchasthatthegreaterthesensibilitythelesstheirritability，&c。—justasthepowersorpotenciesweredealtwithbyEschenmayer。ItwasonlylateroninrelationtothesethatSchellingfirstapprehendednatureinthecategoriesofthought，andmadegeneralattemptsofamoredefinitecharacterinthedirectionofgreaterscientificdevelopment。Itwasonlythroughwhathadbeenaccomplishedbythesementhathewasenabledtocomeintopublicnoticesoyoung。Thespiritualandintellectualside，moralityandthestate，herepresentedontheotherhandpurelyinaccordancewithKantianprinciples:thusinhis“TranscendentalIdealism，”althoughitwaswrittenfromaFichtianpointofview，hegoesnofurtherthanKantdidinhis“PhilosophyofRights”andhiswork“OnEternalPeace。”Schelling，indeed，lateronpublishedaseparatetreatiseonFreedom，deeplyspeculativeincharacter；this，however，remainsisolatedandindependent，anddealswiththisonepointalone；inPhilosophy，however，nothingisolatedcanbeworkedoutordeveloped。InthevariouspresentationsofhisviewsSchellingoneachoccasionbeganagainfromthebeginning，because，aswemaysee，whatwentbeforedidnotsatisfyhim；hehaseverpressedontoseekanewform，andthushehadtriedvariousformsandterminologiesinsuccessionwithouteversettingforthonecompleteandconsistentwhole。Hisprincipalworksinthisconnectionarethe“FirstSketchofaSystemofNaturalPhilosophy，”1799；the“SystemofTranscendentalIdealism，”

1800，oneofhismostcarefullythroughoutworks；“Bruno，aDialogueontheDivineandNaturalPrincipleofThings，”1802；“JournalofSpeculativePhysics，”1801；“NewJournalofSpeculativePhysics，”1802etseq。Inthesecondnumberofthesecondvolumeofhis“JournalofSpeculativePhysics，”Schellingmadethecommencementofadetailedtreatmentofthewholeofhisphilosophy。Herehelikewisestartstoacertainmeasure，thoughunconsciously，fromtheFichtianformofconstruction；buttheideaisalreadypresentthatnatureequallywithknowledgeisasystemofreason。

ItisnotfeasibleheretogointodetailsrespectingwhatiscalledthephilosophyofSchelling，eveniftimepermitted。Foritisnotyetascientificwholeorganizedinallitsbranches，sinceitratherconsistsincertaingeneralelementswhichdonotfluctuatewiththerestofhisopinions。Schelling\'sphilosophymuststillberegardedasinprocessofevolution，andithasnotyetripenedintofruit；(8)

wecanhencegiveageneralideaofitonly。

WhenSchellingmadehisfirstappearancethedemandsputforwardbyPhilosophywereasfollows。WithDescartesthoughtandextensionwereinsomeincomprehensiblewayunitedinGod，withSpinozaitwasasmotionlesssubstance；andbeyondthispointofviewneitherofthemeverpassed。Lateronwesawtheformdevelop，partlyinthesciencesandpartlyintheKantianphilosophy。Finally，intheFichtianphilosophy，theformwassubjectivityonitsownaccount，fromwhichalldeterminationswereheldtodevelop。Whatisthusdemandedisthatthissubjectivityofinfiniteformwhichwesawdyingintoironyorarbitrariness(pp。507-510)shouldbedeliveredfromitsone-sidednessinordertobeunitedwithobjectivityandsubstantiality。Toputitotherwise，thesubstanceofSpinozashouldnotbeapprehendedastheunmoved，butastheintelligent，asaformwhichpossessesactivitywithinitselfofnecessity，sothatitistheformingpowerofnature，butatthesametimeknowledgeandcomprehension。ThisthenistheobjectofPhilosophy；itisnottheformalunionofSpinozathatisdemanded，northesubjectivetotalityofFichte，buttotalitywiththeinfiniteform。WeseethisdevelopinginthephilosophyofSchelling。