第6章

OtherpropositionshavebeensetagainstthatofDescartes。Gassendi，(8)forexample，asksifwemightnotjustaswellsayLudificor，ergosum:Iammadeafoolofbymyconsciousness，thereforeIexist—orproperlyspeaking，thereforeIammadeafoolof。Descarteshimselfrecognizedthatthisobjectionmeritedconsideration，buthehererepelsit，inasmuchasitisthe‘I”

aloneandnottheothercontentwhichhastobemaintained。Beingaloneisidenticalwithpurethought，andnotitscontent，beitwhatitmay。Descartesfurthersays:“BythoughtI，however，understandallthattakesplaceinuswithinourconsciousness，inasfarasweareconsciousofit；

thuswill，conception，andevenfeelingareidenticalwiththought。ForifIsay”Isee，”or‘Iwalkout，”and‘thereforeIam，”andunderstandbythistheseeingandwalkingwhichisaccomplishedbythebody，theconclusionisnotabsolutelycertain，because，asoftenhappensinadream，ImayimaginethatIcanseeorwalkevenifIdonotopenmyeyesnormovefrommyplace，andImightalsopossiblydososupposingIhadnobody。ButifIunderstanditofthesubjectivefeelingortheconsciousnessofseeingorwalkingitself，becauseitisthenrelatedtothemindthatalonefeelsorthinksthatitseesorwalks，thisconclusionisperfectlycertain。”(9)“Inadream”isanempiricalmodeofreasoning，butthereisnootherobjectiontoit。Inwilling，seeing，hearing，&c。，thoughtislikewisecontained；itisabsurdtosupposethatthesoulhasthinkinginonespecialpocket，andseeing，willing，&c。，inothers。ButifIsay‘Isee，”‘Iwalkout，”thereispresentontheonehandmyconsciousness‘I，”andconsequentlythought；ontheotherhand，however，thereispresentwilling，seeing，hearing，walking，andthusastillfurthermodificationofthecontent。NowbecauseofthismodificationIcannotsay‘Iwalk，andthereforeIam，”forI

canundoubtedlyabstractfromthemodification，sinceitisnolongeruniversalThought。Thuswemustmerelylookatthepureconsciousnesscontainedintheconcrete‘I。”OnlywhenI

accentuatethefactthatIampresentthereasthinking，ispureBeingimplied；foronlywiththeuniversalisBeingunited。

“Inthisitisimplied，”saysDescartes，“thatthoughtismorecertaintomethanbody。IffromthefactthatItouchorseetheearthIjudgethatitexists，Imustmorecertainlyjudgefromthisthatmythoughtexists。ForitmayverywellhappenthatIjudgetheearthtoexist，evenifitdoesnotexist，butitcannotbethatIjudgethis，andthatmymindwhichjudgesthisdoesnotexist。”(10)Thatistosay，everythingwhichisformeImayasserttobenon-existent；butwhenIassertmyselftobenon-existent，Imyselfassert，oritismyjudgment。ForIcannotsetasidethefactthatIjudge，evenifIcanabstractfromthatrespectingwhichIjudge。InthisPhilosophyhasregaineditsowngroundthatthoughtstartsfromthoughtaswhatiscertaininitself，andnotfromsomethingexternal，notfromsomethinggiven，notfromanauthority，butdirectlyfromthefreedomthatiscontainedinthe‘Ithink。”OfallelseImaydoubt，oftheexistenceofbodilythings，ofmybodyitself；orthiscertaintydoesnotpossessimmediacyinitself。For‘I”isjustcertaintyitself，butinallelsethiscertaintyisonlypredicate；mybodyiscertaintome，itisnotthiscertaintyitself。(11)Asagainstthecertaintywefeelofhavingabody，Descartesadducestheempiricalphenomenonthatweoftenhearofpersonsimaginingtheyfeelpaininalimbwhichtheyhavelostlongago。(12)Whatisactual，hesaysisasubstance，thesoulisathinkingsubstance；itisthusforitself，separatefromallexternalmaterialthingsandindependent。Thatitisthinkingisevidentfromitsnature:itwouldthinkandexistevenifnomaterialthingswerepresent；thesoulcanhenceknowitselfmoreeasilythanitsbody:(13)

Allelsethatwecanholdastruerestsonthiscertainty；forinorderthatanythingshouldbeheldastrue，evidenceisrequisite，butnothingistruewhichhasnotthisinwardevidenceinconsciousness。

“Nowtheevidenceofeverythingrestsuponourperceivingitasclearlyandvividlyasthatcertaintyitself，andonitssoentirelydependingfrom，andharmonizingwiththisprinciple，thatifwewishedtodoubtitweshouldalsohavetodoubtthisprinciplelikewise”(ourego)。(14)Thisknowledgeisindeedonitsownaccountperfectevidence，butitisnotyetthetruth；orifwetakethatBeingastruth，itisanemptycontent，anditiswiththecontentthatwehavetodo。

c。Whatcomesthirdisthusthetransitionofthiscertaintyintotruth，intothedeterminate；

Descartesagainmakesthistransitioninana？veway，andwithitweforthefirsttimebegintoconsiderhismetaphysics。WhatheretakesplaceisthataninterestarisesinfurtherrepresentationsandconceptionsoftheabstractunityofBeingandThought；thereDescartessetstoworkinanexternallyreflectivemanner。“Theconsciousnesswhichmerelyknowsitselftobecertainnowhoweverseekstoextenditsknowledge，andfindsthatithasconceptionsofmanythings—inwhichconceptionsitdoesnotdeceiveitself，solongasitdoesnotassertordenythatsomethingsimilaroutsidecorrespondstothem。”Deceptionintheconceptionshasmeaningonlyinrelationtoexternalexistence。“Consciousnessalsodiscoversuniversalconceptions，andobtainsfromthemproofswhichareevident，e。g。thegeometricpropositionthatthethreeanglesofatrianglearetogetherequaltotworightanglesisaconceptionwhichfollowsincontrovertiblyfromothers。Butinreflectingwhethersuchthingsreallyexistdoubtsarise。”(15)Thatthereissuchathingasatriangleisindeedinthiscasebynomeanscertain，sinceextensionisnotcontainedintheimmediatecertaintyofmyself。Thesoulmayexistwithoutthebodilyelement，andthislastwithoutit；theyareinrealitydifferent；oneisconceivablewithouttheother。Thesoulthusdoesnotthinkandknowtheotherasclearlyasthecertaintyofitself。(16)

NowthetruthofallknowledgerestsontheproofoftheexistenceofGod。Thesoulisanimperfectsubstance，butithastheIdeaofanabsoluteperfectexistencewithinitself；thisperfectionisnotbegotteninitself，justbecauseitisanimperfectsubstance；thisIdeaisthusinnate。InDescartestheconsciousnessofthisfactisexpressedbyhissayingthataslongastheexistenceofGodisnotprovedandperceivedthepossibilityofourdeceivingourselvesremains，becausewecannotknowwhetherwedonotpossessanatureorderedanddisposedtoerr(supra，p。226)。

(17)Theformisratheramistakenone，anditonlygenerallyexpressestheoppositioninwhichself-consciousnessstandstotheconsciousnessofwhatisdifferent，oftheobjective；andwehavetodealwiththeunityofboth—thequestionbeingwhetherwhatisinthoughtlikewisepossessesobjectivity。ThisunityrestsinGodorisGodHimself。IshallputtheseassertionsinthemannerofDescartes:“Amongstthesevariousconceptionspossessedbyustherelikewiseistheconceptionofasupremelyintelligent，powerful，andabsolutelyperfectBeing；andthisisthemostexcellentofallconceptions。”Thisall-embracinguniversalconceptionhasthereforethisdistinguishingfeature，thatinitscasetheuncertaintyrespectingBeingwhichappearsintheotherconceptions，findsnoplace。Ithasthecharacteristicthat“Initwedonotrecognizeexistenceassomethingmerelypossibleandaccidental，aswedotheconceptionsofotherthingswhichweperceiveclearly，butasareallyessentialandeternaldetermination。Forinstance，asmindperceivesthatintheconceptionofatriangleitisimpliedthatthethreeanglesareequaltotworightangles，thetrianglehasthem；andinthesamewayfromthefactthatmindperceivesexistencetobenecessarilyandeternallyimpliedintheNotionofthemostperfectreality，itisforcedtoconcludethatthemostperfectrealityexists。”(18)Fortoperfectiontherelikewisepertainsthedeterminationofexistence，sincetheconceptionofanon-existentislessperfect。ThuswetherehavetheunityofthoughtandBeing，andtheontologicalproofoftheexistenceofGod；thiswemetwithearlier(p。

63，seq。)indealingwithAnselm。

TheproofoftheexistenceofGodfromtheIdeaofHimisinthiswise:InthisNotionexistenceisimplied；andthereforeitistrue。Descartesproceedsfurtherinthesamedirection，insofarasafterthemannerofempiricalaxiomshesetsforth:“Therearedifferentdegreesofrealityorentity，forthesubstancehasmorerealitythantheaccidentorthemode，andinfinitesubstancehasmorethanfinite。”“IntheNotionofathingexistenceisimplied，eitherthemerelypotentialorthenecessary，”i。e。，inthe‘I”thereisBeingastheimmediatecertaintyofanother-being，ofthenot-IopposedtotheI。“NothingornoperfectionofathingwhichreallyexistsactucanhavetheNothingasoriginalcauseofitsexistence。Forifanythingcouldbepredicatedofnothing，thoughtcouldequallywellbepredicatedofit，andIwouldthussaythatIamnothingbecauseIthink。”

Descartesherearrivesatadividingline，atanunknownrelationship；theNotionofcauseisreached，andthisisathoughtindeed，butadeterminatethought。Spinozasaysinhisexplanation，“Thattheconceptionscontainmoreorlessreality，andthosemomentshavejustasmuchevidenceasthoughtitself，becausetheynotonly，saythatwethink，buthowwethink。”Thesedeterminatemodesasdifferencesinthesimplicityofthought，had，however，tobedemonstrated。Spinozaaddstothisstepinadvancethat“Thedegreesofrealitywhichweperceiveinideasarenotintheideasinasfarastheyareconsideredmerelyaskindsofthought，butinsofarastheonerepresentsasubstanceandtheotherameremodeofsubstance，or，inaword，insofarastheyareconsideredasconceptionsofthings。”“TheobjectiverealityofNotions(i。e。，theentityofwhatisrepresentedinsofarasitisintheNotion)，"demandsafirstcauseinwhichthesamerealityiscontainednotmerelyobjectively”(thatistosayintheNotion)，“butlikewiseformallyoreveneminenter—

formally，thatisperfectlylikewise:eminenter，moreperfectly。Fortheremustatleastbeasmuchinthecauseasintheeffect。”“TheexistenceofGod，isknownimmediately”—apriori—

“fromthecontemplationofHisnature。TosaythatanythingiscontainedinthenatureorintheNotionofathingistantamounttosayingthatitistrue:existenceisdirectlycontainedintheNotionofGod。HenceitisquitetruetosayofHimthatexistencepertainsofnecessitytoHim。ThereisimpliedintheNotionofeveryparticularthingeitherapossibleoranecessaryexistence—anecessaryexistenceintheNotionofGod，i。e。oftheabsolutelyperfectBeing，forelseHewouldbeconceivedasimperfect。”(19)

Descarteslikewisearguesafterthismanner:“Problem:toproveaposteriorifromthemereNotionwithinustheexistenceofGod。TheobjectiverealityofaNotiondemandsacauseinwhichthesamerealityisnotmerelycontainedobjectively”(asinthefinite)，“butformally”(freely，purelyforitself，outsideofus)“oreminenter”(asoriginal)。(Axiom。)“WenowhaveaNotionofGod，butHisobjectiverealityisneitherformallynoreminentercontainedwithinus，anditcanthusbeonlyinGodHimself。”(20)ConsequentlyweseethatwithDescartesthisIdeaisanhypothesis。NowweshouldsaywefindthishighestIdeainus。IfwethenaskwhetherthisIdeaexists，why，thisistheIdea，thatexistenceisassertedwithit。Tosaythatitisonlyaconceptionistocontradictthemeaningofthisconception。Buthereitisunsatisfactorytofindthattheconceptionisintroducedthus:‘Wehavethisconception，”andtofindthatitconsequentlyappearslikeanhypothesis。InsuchacaseitisnotprovedofthiscontentinitselfthatitdeterminesitselfintothisunityofthoughtandBeing。IntheformofGodnootherconceptionisthusheregiventhanthatcontainedinCogito，ergosum，whereinBeingandthoughtareinseparablyboundup—thoughnowintheformofaconceptionwhichIpossesswithinme。Thewholecontentofthisconception，theAlmighty，All-wise，&c。，arepredicateswhichdonotmaketheirappearanceuntillater；thecontentissimplythecontentoftheIdeaboundupwithexistence。Henceweseethesedeterminationsfollowingoneanotherinanempiricalmanner，andnotphilosophicallyproved—

thusgivingusanexampleofhowinapriorimetaphysicsgenerallyhypothesesofconceptionsarebroughtin，andthesebecomeobjectsofthought，justashappensinempiricismwithinvestigations，observations，andexperiences。

Descartesthenproceeds:“Mindisthemoreconvincedofthiswhenitnoticesthatitdiscoverswithinitselftheconceptionofnootherthingwhereinexistenceisnecessarilyimplied。Fromthisitwillperceivethatthatideaofhighestrealityisnotimaginedbyit；itisnotchimerical，butatrueandunalterablefactwhichcannotdootherwisethanexist，seeingthatexistenceisnecessarilyinvolvedinit。Ourprejudiceshinderusfromapprehendingthiswithease，forweareaccustomedtodistinguishinallotherthingstheessence”(theNotion)“fromtheexistence。”Respectingtheassertionthatthoughtisnotinseparablefromexistence，thecommonwayoftalkingisasfollows:

‘Ifwhatmenthinkreallyexisted，thingswouldbedifferent。”Butinsayingthismendonottakeintoaccountthatwhatisspokenofinthiswayisalwaysaparticularcontent，andthatinittheessentialnatureofthefinalityofthingssimplysignifiesthefactthatNotionandBeingareseparable。

Buthowcanonearguefromfinitethingstotheinfinite？“ThisNotion，”Descartescontinues，“isfurthermorenotmadebyus。”Itisnowdeclaredtobeaneternaltruthwhichisrevealedinus。

“Wedonotfindinourselvestheperfectionswhicharecontainedinthisconception。Thuswearecertainthatafirstcauseinwhichisallperfection，i。e。，Godasreallyexistent，hasgiventhemtous；

foritiscertaintousthatfromnothing，nothingarises”(accordingtoBoehmeGodderivedthematerialoftheworldfromHimself)，“andwhatisperfectcannotbetheeffectofanythingimperfect。FromHimwemustthusintruesciencededuceallcreatedthings。”(21)WiththeproofoftheexistenceofGodthevalidityofandevidenceforalltruthinitsoriginisimmediatelyestablished。GodasFirstCauseisBeing-for-self，therealitywhichisnotmerelyentityorexistenceinthought。Anexistencesuchasthisfirstcause(whichisnotwhatweknowasathing)restsintheNotionofthenot-I，notofeachdeterminatething—sincetheseasdeterminatearenegations—

butonlyintheNotionofpureexistenceortheperfectcause。Itisthecauseofthetruthofideas，fortheaspectthatitrepresentsisthatoftheirBeing。

d。Fourthly，Descartesgoesontoassert:“WemustbelievewhatisrevealedtousbyGod，thoughwecannotunderstandit。Itisnottobewonderedat，sincewearefinite，thatthereisinGod”snatureasinconceivablyinfinite，whatpassesourcomprehension。”Thisrepresentstheentranceofaveryordinaryconception。Boehmeontheotherhandsays(supra，p。212):‘ThemysteryoftheTrinityiseverbornwithinus。”Descartes，however，concludes:“Hencewemustnottroubleourselveswithinvestigationsrespectingtheinfinite；forseeingthatwearefinite，itisabsurdforustosayanythingaboutit。”(22)Thismatterweshallnot，however，enteruponatpresent。

“NowthefirstattributeofGodisthatHeistrueandtheGiverofalllight；itishencequitecontrarytoHisnaturetodeceiveus。HencethelightofnatureorthepowerofacquiringknowledgegivenusbyGodcanaffectnoobjectwhichisnotreallytrueinasfarasitisaffectedbyit”(thepowerofacquiringknowledge)“i。e。，asitisperceivedclearlyanddistinctly。”WeascribetruthtoGod。

FromthisDescartesgoesontoinfertheuniversalbondwhichexistsbetweenabsoluteknowledgeandtheobjectivityofwhatwethusknow。Knowledgehasobjects，hasacontentwhichisknown；

wecallthisconnectiontruth。ThetruthofGodisjustthisunityofwhatisthoughtbythesubjectorclearlyperceived，andexternalrealityorexistence。“Therebyanendisputtodoubt，asifitcouldbethecasethatwhatappearsquiteevidenttousshouldnotbereallytrue。Wecanthusnolongerhaveanysuspicionofmathematicaltruths。Likewiseifwegiveheedtowhatwedistinguishbyoursensesinwakingorinsleeping，clearlyanddistinctly，itiseasytorecognizeineachthingwhatinitistrue。”Bysayingthatwhatisrightlyandclearlythoughtlikewiseis，Descartesmaintainsthatmancomestoknowbymeansofthoughtwhatinfactisinthings；thesourcesoferrorslieontheotherhandinthefinitudeofournature。“Itiscertain，becauseofGod”struth，thatthefacultyofperceivingandthatofassentingthroughthewill，ifitextendsnofurtherthantothatwhichisclearlyperceived，cannotleadtoerror。Evenifthiscannotbeinanywayproved，itisbynaturesoestablishedinallthings，thatasoftenasweclearlyperceiveanything，weassenttoitfromourselvesandcaninnowisedoubtthatitistrue。”(23)

Allthisissetforthveryplausibly，butitisstillindeterminate，formal，andshallow；weonlyhavetheassertionmadetousthatthisisso。Descartes”methodisthemethodoftheclearunderstandingmerely。Certaintywithhimtakesthefirstplace；fromitnocontentisdeducedofnecessity，nocontentgenerally，andstilllessitsobjectivityasdistinguishedfromtheinwardsubjectivityofthe‘I。”Atonetimewehavetheoppositionofsubjectiveknowledgeandactuality，andatanothertheirinseparableunion。Inthefirstcasethenecessityofmediatingthementersin，andthetruthofGodisassertedtobethismediatingpower。Itconsistsinthis，thatHisNotioncontainsrealityimmediatelyinitself。Theproofofthisunitythenrestssolelyuponthefactofitsbeingsaidthatwefindwithinustheideaofcompleteperfection；thusthisconceptionhereappearssimplyasonefoundreadytohand。WiththisiscomparedthemereconceptionofGodwhichcontainsnoexistencewithinit，anditisfoundthatwithoutexistenceitwouldbeimperfect。ThisunityofGodHimself，ofHisIdea，withHisexistence，isundoubtedlytheTruth；inthiswefindthegroundforholdingastruewhatisforusjustascertainasthetruthofourselves。AsDescartesproceedsfurtherwethusfindthatinrealityeverythinghastruthforhimonlyinsofarasitisreallyanobjectofthought，auniversal。ThistruthofGodhasbeen，asweshallsee，expressedevenmoreclearlyandinamoreconcisewaybyadiscipleofDescartes，ifonemayventuretocallhimso—ImeanMalebranche(whomightreallybedealtwithhere)，(24)inhisRecherchedelavérité。

ThefirstofthefundamentaldeterminationsoftheCartesianmetaphysicsisfromthecertaintyofoneselftoarriveatthetruth，torecognizeBeingintheNotionofthought。Butbecauseinthethought“Ithink，”Iamanindividual，thoughtcomesbeforemymindassubjective；BeingishencenotdemonstratedintheNotionofthoughtitself，forwhatadvancehasbeenmadeismerelyinthedirectionofseparationgenerally。InthesecondplacethenegativeofBeinglikewisecomesbeforeself-consciousness，andthisnegative，unitedwiththepositiveI，issotospeakimplicitlyunitedinathird，inGod。God，whobeforethiswasanon-contradictorypotentiality，nowtakesobjectiveformtoself-consciousness，Heisallrealityinsofarasitispositive，i。e。，asitisBeing，unityofthoughtandBeing，thehighestperfectionofexistence；itisjustinthenegative，intheNotionofthis，initsbeinganobjectofthought，thatBeingiscontained。Anobjectiontothisidentityisnowold—

Kanturgeditlikewise—thatfromtheNotionofthemostperfectexistencemoredoesnotfollowthanthatinthoughtexistencehereandnowandthemostperfectessenceareconjoined，butnotoutsideofthought。ButtheveryNotionofpresentexistenceisthisnegativeofself-consciousness，notoutofthought，—butthethoughtofthe‘outofthought。”

2。DescartesacceptsBeingintheentirelypositivesense，andhasnottheconceptionofitsbeingthenegativeofself-consciousness:butsimpleBeing，setforthasthenegativeofself-consciousness，isextension。DescartesthusseparatesextensionfromGod，remainsconstanttothisseparation，unitestheuniverse，matter，withGodinsuchawayastomakeHimitscreatorandfirstcause:andhehasthetrueperceptionthatconservationisacontinuouscreation，insofarascreationasactivityisassertedtobeseparated。Descartesdoesnot，however，traceextensioninatruemethodbacktothought；matter，extendedsubstances，standoveragainstthethinkingsubstanceswhicharesimple；inasfarastheuniverseiscreatedbyGod，itcouldnotbeasperfectasitscause。Asamatteroffacttheeffectislessperfectthanthecause，sinceitisthatwhichisposited，ifwearetoremainattheconceptionofcausepertainingtotheunderstanding。HenceaccordingtoDescartesextensionisthelessperfect。ButasimperfecttheextendedsubstancescannotexistandsubsistthroughthemselvesortheirNotion；theythusrequireeverymomenttheassistanceofGodfortheirmaintenance，andwithoutthistheywouldinamomentsinkbackintonothing。Preservationis，however，unceasingre-production。(25)

Descartesnowproceedstofurtherparticulars，andexpresseshimselfasfollows:“Weconsiderwhatcomesunderconsciousnesseitherasthingsortheirqualities，oraseternaltruthswhichhavenoexistenceoutsideourthought"—whichdonotbelongtothisorthattime，tothisorthatplace。

Hecallstheselastsomethinginbornwithinus，somethingnotmadebyusormerelyfelt，(26)buttheeternalNotionofminditselfandtheeternaldeterminationsofitsfreedom，ofitselfasitself。

Fromthispointtheconceptionthatideasareinborn(innat？ide？)henceproceeds；thisisthequestionoverwhichLockeandLeibnitzdispute。Theexpression“eternaltruths”iscurrenteveninthesemoderntimes，anditsignifiestheuniversaldeterminationsandrelationswhichexistentirelyontheirownaccount。Theword‘Inborn”ishoweveraclumsyandstupidexpression，becausetheconceptionofphysicalbirththerebyindicated，doesnotapplytomind。ToDescartesinbornideasarenotuniversal，astheyaretoPlatoandhissuccessors，butthatwhichhasevidence，immediatecertainty，animmediatemultiplicityfoundedinthoughtitself—manifoldconceptionsintheformofaBeing，resemblingwhatCicerocallsnaturalfeelingsimplantedintheheart。Wewouldrathersaythatsuchisimpliedinthenatureandessenceofourmindandspirit。Mindisactiveandconductsitselfinitsactivityinadeterminatemanner；butthisactivityhasnoothergroundthanitsfreedom。Yetifthisisthecasemoreisrequiredthanmerelytosayso；itmustbededucedasanecessaryproductofourmind。Wehavesuchideas，forinstance，inthelogicallaws:“Fromnothingcomesnothing，”“Athingcannotbothbeandnotbe，”(27)asalsoinmoralprinciples。

ThesearefactsofconsciousnesswhichDescarteshoweversoonpassesfromagain；theyareonlypresentinthoughtassubjective，andhehasthusnotyetinquiredrespectingtheircontent。

Asregardsthings，onwhichDescartesnowdirectshisattention，theothersidetotheseeternalverities，theuniversaldeterminationsofthingsaresubstance，permanence，order，&c。(28)Hethengivesdefinitionsofthesethoughts，justasAristotledrawsupalistofthecategories。ButalthoughDescarteslaiditdownformerlyasessentialthatnohypothesesmustbemade，yetnowhetakestheconceptions，andpassesontothemassomethingfoundwithinourconsciousness。Hedefinessubstancethus:“BysubstanceIunderstandnoneotherthanathing(rem)whichrequiresnoothersomethingforexistence；andthereisonlyonething，namelyGod，whichcanberegardedassuchasubstancerequiringnootherthing。”ThisiswhatSpinozasays；wemaysaythatitislikewisethetruedefinition，theunityofNotionandreality:“Allother”(things)“canonlyexistbymeansofaconcurrence(concursus)ofGod；”whatwestillcallsubstanceoutsideofGodthusdoesnotexistforitself，doesnothaveitsexistenceintheNotionitself。Thatisthencalledthesystemofassistance(systemaassistenti？)whichis，however，transcendental。GodistheabsoluteuniterofNotionandactuality；otherthings，finitethingswhichhavealimitand，standindependence，requiresomethingelse。“Henceifwelikewisecallotherthingssubstances，thisexpressionisnotapplicablebothtothemandtoGodunivoce，asissaidintheschools；thatistosaynodefinitesignificancecanbegiventothiswordwhichwouldequallyapplybothtoGodandtothecreatures。”(29)

“ButIdonotrecognizemorethantwosortsofthings；theoneisthatofthinkingthings，andtheotherthatofthingswhichrelatetowhatisextended。”Thought，theNotion，thespiritual，theself-conscious，iswhatisathomewithitself，anditsoppositeiscontainedinwhatisextended，spatial，separated，notathomewithitselfnorfree。Thisistherealdistinction(distinctiorealis)ofsubstances:“Theonesubstancecanbeclearlyanddefinitelycomprehendedwithouttheother。Butthecorporealandthethinkingandcreatingsubstancecanbecomprehendedunderthiscommonnotion，forthereasonthattheyarethingswhichrequireGod”ssupportaloneinordertoexist。”

Theyareuniversal；otherfinitethingsrequireotherthingsasconditionsessentialtotheirexistence。

Butextendedsubstance，thekingdomofnature，andspiritualsubstance，donotrequireoneanother。Theymaybecalledsubstances，becauseeachofthemconstitutesanentirerangeorsphere，anindependenttotality。Butbecause，Spinozaconcluded，eachside，thekingdomofthoughtaswellasnature，isonecompletesystemwithinitself，theyarelikewiseinthemselves，thatisabsolutely，identicalasGod，theabsolutesubstance；forthinkingspiritthisimplicitisthusGod，ortheirdifferencesareideal。

DescartesproceedsfromtheNotionofGodtowhatiscreated，tothoughtandextension，andfromthistotheparticular。“Nowsubstanceshaveseveralattributeswithoutwhichtheycannotbethought"—thatsignifiestheirdeterminateness—"buteachhassomethingpeculiartoitselfwhichconstitutesitsnatureandessence"—asimpleuniversaldeterminateness—"andtowhichtheothersallrelate。Thusthought，constitutestheabsoluteattributeofmind，”thoughtisitsquality；

“extensionis"theessentialdeterminationofcorporeality，andthisaloneis“thetruenatureofbody。Whatremainsaremerelysecondaryqualities，modes，likefigureandmovementinwhatisextended，imagination，feelingandwillinthinking；theymaybetakenawayorthoughtaway。Godistheuncreated，thinkingsubstance。”(30)

Descartesherepassestowhatisindividual，andbecausehefollowsupextensionhearrivesatmatter，rest，movement。OneofDescartes”mainpointsisthatmatter，extension，corporeality，arequitethesamethingforthought；accordingtohimthenatureofbodyisfulfilledinitsextension，andthisshouldbeacceptedastheonlyessentialfactrespectingthecorporealworld。Wesaythatbodyoffersresistance，hassmell，taste，colour，transparency，hardness，&c。，sincewithoutthesewecanhavenobody。Allthesefurtherdeterminationsrespectingwhatisextended，suchassize，rest，movement，andinertia，are，however，merelysensuous，andthisDescartesshowed，asithadlongbeforethisbeenshownbytheSceptics。UndoubtedlythatistheabstractNotionorpureessence，buttobodyortopureexistence，therelikewiseofnecessitypertainsnegativityordiversity。BymeansofthefollowingillustrationDescartesshowedthatwiththeexceptionofextension，allcorporealdeterminationsmaybeannihilated，andthatnonecanbeabsolutelypredicated。Wedrawconclusionsrespectingthesolidityandhardnessofmatterfromtheresistancewhichabodyofferstoourdisturbance，andbymeansofwhichitseekstoholditsplace。Nowifweadmitthatmatteraswetouchitalwaysgiveswaytoaslikespace，weshouldhavenoreasonforascribingtoitsolidity。Smell，colour，taste，areinthesamewaysensuousqualitiesmerely；butwhatweclearlyperceiveisalonetrue。Ifabodyisgroundintosmallparts，itgivesway，andyetitdoesnotloseitsnature；resistanceisthusnotessential。(31)Thisnot-being-for-itselfishoweveraquantitativelyslighterresistanceonly；theresistancealwaysremains。ButDescartesdesiresonlytothink；nowhedoesnotthinkresistance，colour，&c。，butapprehendsthembythesensesonly。Hencehesaysthatallthismustbeledbacktoextensionasbeingspecialmodificationsofthesame。ItisundoubtedlytothecreditofDescartesthatheonlyacceptsastruewhatisthought；buttheabrogationofthesesensuousqualitiessimplyrepresentsthenegativemovementofthought:theessenceofbodyisconditionedthroughthisthought，thatis，itisnottrueessence。

DescartesnowmakeshiswayfromtheNotionofextensiontothelawsofmotion，astheuniversalknowledgeofthecorporealinitsimplicitude；heshowsthatthereisnovacuum，forthatwouldbeanextensionwithoutbodilysubstance，i。e。abodywithoutbody；thattherearenoatoms(noindivisibleindependentexistence)，forthesamereason，viz。，becausetheessenceofbodyisextension。Hefurthershowsthatabodyissetinmotionbysomethingoutsideofit，butofitselfitcontinuesinaconditionofrest，andlikewiseitmust，wheninaconditionofmovement，bebroughttorestbyanotheroutsideofit—thisisthepropertyofinertia。(32)Theseareunmeaningpropositions，foranabstractionisinvolvedforinstanceinassertingsimplerestandmovementintheiropposition。

Extensionandmotionarethefundamentalconceptionsinmechanicalphysics；theyrepresentthetruthofthecorporealworld。ItisthusthatidealitycomesbeforethemindofDescartes，andheisfarelevatedabovetherealityofthesensuousqualities，althoughhedoesnotreachsofarastotheseparationofthisideality。Hethusremainsatthepointofviewofmechanismpureandsimple。

Givemematter(extension)andmotionandIwillbuildworldsforyou，iswhatDescartesvirtuallysays。(33)Spaceandtimewerehencetohimtheonlydeterminationsofthematerialuniverse。Inthis，then，liesthemechanicalfashionofviewingnature，orthenaturalphilosophyofDescartesisseentobepurelymechanical。(34)Hencechangesinmatterareduemerelytomotion，sothatDescartestraceseveryrelationshiptotherestandmovementofparticles，andallmaterialdiversitysuchascolour，andtaste—inshort，allbodilyqualitiesandanimalphenomena—tomechanism。Inlivingbeingsprocessessuchasthatofdigestionaremechanicaleffectswhichhaveasprinciples，restandmovement。Wehereseethegroundandoriginofthemechanicalphilosophy；butfurtheronwefindthatthisisunsatisfactory，formatterandmotiondonotsufficetoexplainlife。Yetthegreatmatterinallthisisthatthoughtgoesforwardinitsdeterminations，andthatitconstitutesfromthesethought-determinationsthetruthofnature。

Inhisconsiderationofthesystemoftheworldandthemovementoftheheavenlybodies，Descarteshasworkedoutthemechanicalviewmorefully。Hethuscomestospeakoftheearth，thesun，&c。，andofhisconceptionofthecirclingmotionoftheheavenlybodiesintheformofvortices:ofmetaphysicalhypothesesastohowsmallparticlespassinto，outof，andthroughporesandactononeanother；andfinallytosaltpetreandgunpowder。(35)

Universalreflectionsshouldhavethefirstclaimonourattention；butontheotherhandthetransitiontothedeterminateisaccomplishedinasystemofPhysicswhichistheresultofobservationsandexperiences，andthisisdoneentirelybymeansoftheunderstanding。Descartesthusminglesmanyobservationswithametaphysicofthisnature，andtoustheresultishenceobscure。Inthisphilosophythethinkingtreatmentofempiricismisthuspredominant，andasimilarmethodhasbeenadoptedbyphilosophersfromthistimeon。ToDescartesandothers，Philosophyhadstillthemoreindefinitesignificanceofarrivingatknowledgethroughthought，reflection，andreasoning。Speculativecognition，thederivationfromtheNotion，thefreeindependentdevelopmentofthematteritself，wasfirstintroducedbyFichte，andconsequentlywhatisnowcalledphilosophicknowledgeisnotyetseparatedinDescartesfromtherestofscientificknowledge。Inthosetimesalltheknowledgeofmankindwascalledphilosophy；inDescartes”

metaphysicswethussawquiteempiricalreflectionandreasoningfromparticulargrounds，fromexperiences，facts，phenomena，beingbroughtintoplayinthena？vestmanner，andonehasnosenseofspeculationinthematter。Thestrictlyscientificelementherereallyconsistedmainlyinthemethodofproofasithaslongbeenmadeuseofingeometry，andintheordinarymethodoftheformallogicalsyllogism。HenceitlikewisehappensthatPhilosophy，whichoughttoformatotalityofthesciences，beginswithlogicandmetaphysics；thesecondpartiscomposedofordinaryphysicsandmathematics，minglednodoubtwithmetaphysicalspeculations，andthethirdpart，ethics，dealswiththenatureofman，hisduties，thestate，thecitizen。AndthisisthecasewithDescartes。ThefirstpartofthePrincipiaphilosophi？treatsDeprincipiiscognitionishuman？，thesecondDeprincipiisrerummaterialium。Thisnaturalphilosophy，asaphilosophyofextension，is，however，noneotherthanwhataquiteordinaryphysicsormechanicsmightatthattimebe，anditisstillquitehypothetical；we，ontheotherhand，accuratelydistinguishempiricalphysicsandnaturalphilosophy，firstlikewisepertainstothought。

3。Descartesneverreachedthethirdpart，thephilosophyofMind，for，whilehemadeaspecialstudyofphysics，intheregionofethicshepublishedonetractonly，Depassionibus。InthisreferenceDescartestreatsofthoughtandhumanfreedom。Heprovesfreedomfromthefactofthesoulthinkingthatthewillisunrestrained，andofthatconstitutingtheperfectionofmankind。Andthisisquitetrue。Inrespecttothefreedomofthewillhecomesacrossthedifficultyofhowtoreconcileitwiththedivineprescience。Asfree，manmightdowhatisnotordainedofGodbeforehand—thiswouldconflictwiththeomnipotenceandomniscienceofGod；andifeverythingisordainedofGod，humanfreedomwouldtherebybedoneawaywith。Yethedoesnotsolvethecontradictioncontainedinthesetwodifferentaspectswithoutfallingintodifficulty。Butconformablytothemethodwhichheadopts，andwhichwepointedoutabove(pp。238，239)，hesays:"Thehumanmindisfinite，God”spowerandpredeterminationareinfinite；wearethusnotcapableofjudgingoftherelationshipinwhichthefreedomofthehumansoulstandstotheomnipotenceandomniscienceofGod—butinself-consciousnesswehavethecertaintyofitgivenusasafact。Andwemustholdonlytowhatiscertain。"(36)Whenheproceedsfurthermuchappearstohimstillincapableofexplanation；butweseeobstinacyandcapricelikewiseexhibitedinhisstoppingshortattheassertionastothebestofhisknowledge。ThemethodofknowledgeassetforthbyDescartes，takestheformofareasoningoftheunderstanding，andisthuswithoutspecialinterest。

These，then，aretheprincipalpointsintheCartesiansystem。SomeparticularassertionsmadebyDescartes，whichhavebeenspeciallyinstrumentalingivinghimfame，havestilltobementioned—

particularformswhichhavebeenformerlyconsideredinmetaphysics，andlikewisebyWolff。Forexample，inthefirstplacewegatherthatDescartesregardedanimalsandotherorganismsasmachinesmovedbyanother，andnotpossessingtheprincipleofthespontaneityofthoughtwithinthem(37)—amechanicalphysiology，acutanddrythoughtpertainingtotheunderstanding，whichisofnofurtherimportance。Inthesharpoppositionbetweenthoughtandextension，theformerisnotconsideredassensation，sothatthelattercanisolateitself。Theorganicmustasbodyreduceitselftoextension；anyfurtherdevelopmentofthislastthusonlyprovesitsdependenceonthefirstdeterminations。

Inthesecondplace，therelationbetweensoulandbodynowbecomesanimportantquestion，thatis，thereturnoftheobjectwithinitselfinsuchawaythatthoughtpositsitselfinanother，inmatter。

Astothis，manysystemsareofferedtousinmetaphysics。Oneoftheseistheinfluxusphysicus，thattherelationofspiritisofacorporealnature，thattheobjectisrelatedtomindasbodiesaretooneanother—aconceptionlikethisisverycrude。HowdoesDescartesunderstandtheunityofsoulandbody？Theformerbelongstothought，thelattertoextension；andthusbecausebotharesubstance，neitherrequirestheNotionoftheother，andhencesoulandbodyareindependentofoneanotherandcanexercisenodirectinfluenceupononeanother。Soulcouldonlyinfluencebodyinsofarasitrequiredthesame，andconversely—thatis，insofarastheyhaveactualrelationtooneanother。Butsinceeachisatotality，neithercanbeararealrelationtotheother。Descartesconsistentlydeniedthephysicalinfluenceofoneontheother；thatwouldhavesignifiedamechanicalrelationbetweenthetwo。Descartesthusestablishedtheintellectualsphereincontradistinctiontomatter，andonitbasedtheindependentsubsistenceofmind；forinhiscogito‘I”isatfirstonlycertainofitself，sinceIcanabstractfromall。Nowwefindthenecessityofamediatortobringaboutaunionoftheabstractandtheexternalandindividual。Descartessettlesthisbyplacingbetweenthetwowhatconstitutesthemetaphysicalgroundoftheirmutualchanges，God。Heistheintermediatebondofunion，inasfarasHeaffordsassistancetothesoulinwhatitcannotthroughitsownfreedomaccomplish，sothatthechangesinbodyandsoulmaycorrespondwithoneanother。(38)IfIhavedesires，anintention，thesereceivecorporealrealization；thisassociationofsoulandbodyis，accordingtoDescartes，effectedthroughGod。Forabove(p。

239)wesawthatDescartessaysofGodthatHeistheTruthoftheconception:aslongasIthinkrightlyandconsistently，somethingrealcorrespondstomythought，andtheconnectinglinkisGod。

Godisherebytheperfectidentityofthetwoopposites，sinceHeis，asIdea，theunityofNotionandreality。IntheIdeaofSpinozathisisworkedoutanddevelopedinitsfurthermoments。

Descartes”conclusionisquitecorrect；infinitethingsthisidentityisimperfect。OnlytheformemployedbyDescartesisinadequate；foritimpliesthatinthebeginningtherearetwothings，thoughtorsoulandbody，andthatthenGodappearsasathirdthing，outsideboth—thatHeisnottheNotionofunity，norarethetwoelementsthemselvesNotion。WemustnothoweverforgetthatDescartessaysthatboththoseoriginalelementsarecreatedsubstances。Butthisexpression‘created”pertainstotheordinaryconceptiononlyandisnotadeterminatethought；itwasSpinoza，therefore，whofirstaccomplishedthisreturntothought。

1。Brucker。Hist。crit。phil。T。IV。P。II。pp。203-217；Cartes。DeMethodo，I-II(Amstelod。1672，4)，pp。2-7(EuvrescomplètesdeDescartespubliéesparVictorCousin，T。I。pp。125-133；

Notessurl\'élogedeDescartesparThomas(EuvresdeDescartespubliéesparCousin，T。I)，p。

83，etsuiv。；Tennemann，Vol。X。pp。210-216。

2。Spinoza:Principiaphilosophi？Cartesian？(BendictideSpinozaOpera，ed。Paulus。Jen？，1802，T。I。)，p。2。

3。Cartes。Principiaphilosophi？，P。I。§1-6(Amstelod。1672，4)，pp。1，2(Euvres，T。III。pp。

63-66)；cf。Meditationesdeprimaphilosophia，I。(Amstelod。1685，4)，pp。5-8(Euvres，T。I。pp。

235-245)；DeMethodo，IV。p。20(pp。156-158)。

4。Cares。Principiaphilosophi？，P。I。§7，8，p。2(pp。66，67)。

5。Cartes。DeMethodo。IV。pp。20，21(p。158)；Spinoza:Principiaphilosophi？Cartes，p。14。

6。Cartes。DeMethodo，IV。p。21(p。159)；Epistol。T。I。ep。118(Amstelod。1682，4)，p。379

(Euvres，T。IX。pp。442，443)。

7。Cartes。Responsionesadsec。objectiones，adjunct？Meditationibusdeprimaphilosophia，p。

74(p。427)；Spinoza:Principiaphilosophi？Cartes。，pp。4，5。

8。AppendixadCartes。Meditationes，continensobjectionesquint。p。4(Euvres，T。II。pp。92，93)。

9。Cartes。Principiaphilosophi？，P。I。§9，pp。2，3(pp。67，68)。

10。Ibid。P。I。§11，p。3(pp。69，70)。

11。Cartes。Respons。adsec。object。:Rationesmoregeometr。dispos。，Postulata，p。86(pp。454，455)；Spinoza:Principaiphilosophi？，Cartes。，p。13。

12。Cartes。Princip。philos。，P。IV。§196，pp。215，216(pp。507-509)；Meditation。VI。p。38

(pp。329，330)；Spinoza:Principaphilos。Cartes。，pp。2，3。

13。Cartes。Respons。adsec。object。:Rat。moregeom。dispos。，AxiomataV。，VI。p。86(p。453)，etPropositioIV。p。91(pp。464，465)；Meditationes，II。pp。9-14(pp。246-262)。

14。Cartes。DeMethodo，IV。p。21(pp。158，159)；Spinoza:Principiaphilosoph。Cartes。，p。14。

15。Cartes。Principiaphilosophi？，P。I。§13，pp。3，4(pp。71，72)。

16。Cartes。Respons。adsec。object:Rationesmoregeom。dispos。，Def。I。p。85(pp。451，452)，etProposit。IV。p。91(pp。464，465)；Meditationes，III。pp。15-17(pp。263-268)。

17。Cartes。Principiaphilos。，P。I。§20，p。6(pp。76，77)；Meditationes，III。pp。17-25(pp。

268-292)；DeMethodo，IV。pp。21，22(pp。159-162)；Spinoza:Principiaphilos。Cartes。，p。10。

18。Cartes。Principiaphilos。P。I。，§14，p。4(pp。72，73)。

19。Cartes。Resp。adsec。obj。:Rat。moregeom。disp。，Ax。III-VI。，X。，Prop。I。pp。88，89(pp。

458-461)；Spinoza:Princ。phil。Cart。，pp。14-17。

20。Spinoza:Princip。philos。Cart。，p。20；CartesiiResp。adsec。obj。:Rat。moregeom。dispos。，Propos。II。p。89)pp。461，462)。

21。Cartes。Principiaphilosophi？，P。I。§15，16，18，24，pp。4，5，7(pp。73-75，78，79)。

22。Cartes。Principiaphilosophi？，P。I。§24-26，p。7(pp。79，80)。

23。Ibid。P。I。§29，30，35，36，38，43，pp。8-11(pp。81-86，89)；Meditationes，IV。pp。25，26

(pp。293-297)。

24。IntheLecturesof1829-1830thephilosophyofMalebrancheisinsertedhere。(Editor\'snote)。

25。Cartes。Principiaphilos。P。I。§22，23，pp。6，7(pp。77，78)；Responsionesquart？，p。133

(p。70)；Spinoza:Princip。philos。Cart。pp。30，31，36，38；Buhle:GeschichtederneuernPhilosophie，Vol。III。Sec。I。pp。17，18。

26。Cartes。Principiaphilos。P。I。§48，p。12(p。92)；Meditationes，III。p。17(pp。268，269)。

27。Cartes。Principiaphilosophi？。P。I。§49，p。13(p。93)。

28。Ibid。P。I。§48，p。12(p。92)。

29。Cartes。Princip。philosophi？，P。I。§51，p。14(p。95)。

30。Cartes。Principiaphilosophi？，P。I。§53，54，p。14(pp。96，97)。

31。Cartes。Princip。philos。，P。I。§66-74，pp。19-22(pp。107-117)；P。II§4，p。25(pp。

123，124)。

32。Cartes。Prineipiaphilos。P。II。§16，20，37，38，pp。29-31，38，39(pp。133，134，137，138，152-154)。

33。Cartes。Princip。philos。，P。I。§66-74，pp。19-22(pp。107-117)；P。II§4，p。25(pp。

123，124)。

34。Cf。Cartes。Principiaphilos。，P。II。§64，p。49(pp。178，179)。

35。Cartes。Principiaphilos。，P。III。§5-42，46sqq。pp。51-63，65sqq。(pp。183-208，p。210etsuiv。)；P。IV。§1sqq。，69，109-115，p。137sqq。，116，178-180(p。330etsuiv。，388，420-425)。

36。Cartes。Principiaphilosoph。，P。I。§37，39-41，pp。10，11(pp。85-88)。

37。Cartes。DeMethodo。V。pp。35，36(pp。185-189)。

38。Cartes。DeMethodo。V。p。29(173，174)。

SectionTwo:PeriodoftheThinkingUnderstandingChapterI。—TheMetaphysicsoftheUnderstandingA2。SPINOZA

ThephilosophyofDescartesunderwentagreatvarietyofunspeculativedevelopments，butinBenedictSpinozaadirectsuccessortothisphilosophermaybefound，andonewhocarriedontheCartesianprincipletoitsfurthestlogicalconclusions。Forhimsoulandbody，thoughtandBeing，ceasetohaveseparateindependentexistence。ThedualismoftheCartesiansystemSpinoza，asaJew，altogethersetaside。FortheprofoundunityofhisphilosophyasitfoundexpressioninEurope，hismanifestationofSpiritastheidentityofthefiniteandtheinfiniteinGod，insteadofGod\'sappearingrelatedtotheseasaThird—allthisisanechofromEasternlands。TheOrientaltheoryofabsoluteidentitywasbroughtbySpinozamuchmoredirectlyintoline，firstlywiththecurrentofEuropeanthought，andthenwiththeEuropeanandCartesianphilosophy，inwhichitsoonfoundaplace。

Firstofallwemust，however，glanceatthecircumstancesofSpinoza\'slife。HewasbydescentaPortugueseJew，andwasbornatAmsterdamintheyear1632；thenamehereceivedwasBaruch，buthealteredittoBenedict。InhisyouthhewasinstructedbytheRabbisofthesynagoguetowhichhebelonged，buthesoonfelloutwiththem，theirwrathhavingbeenkindledbythecriticismswhichhepassedonthefantasticdoctrinesoftheTalmud。Hewasnot，therefore，longinabsentinghimselffromthesynagogue，andastheRabbiswereindreadlesthisexampleshouldhaveevilconsequences，theyofferedhimayearlyallowanceofathousandguldenifhewouldkeepawayfromtheplaceandholdhistongue。Thisofferhedeclined；andtheRabbisthereaftercarriedtheirpersecutionofhimtosuchapitchthattheywereevenmindedtoridthemselvesofhimbyassassination。Afterhavingmadeanarrowescapefromthedagger，heformallywithdrewfromtheJewishcommunion，without，however，goingovertotheChristianChurch。HenowappliedhimselfparticularlytotheLatinlanguage，andmadeaspecialstudyoftheCartesianphilosophy。LateronhewenttoRhynsburg，nearLeyden，andfromtheyear1664helivedinretirement，firstatVoorburg，avillageneartheHague，andthenattheHagueitself，highlyrespectedbynumerousfriends:hegainedalivelihoodforhimselfbygrindingopticalglasses。Itwasnoarbitrarychoicethatledhimtooccupyhimselfwithlight，foritrepresentsinthematerialspheretheabsoluteidentitywhichformsthefoundationoftheOrientalviewofthings。Althoughhehadrichfriendsandmightyprotectors，amongwhomevengeneralswerenumbered，helivedinhumblepoverty，decliningthehandsomegiftsofferedtohimtimeaftertime。NorwouldhepermitSimonvonVriestomakehimhisheir；heonlyacceptedfromhimanannualpensionofthreehundredflorins；inthesamewayhegaveuptohissistershisshareoftheirfather\'sestate。FromtheElectorPalatine，CarlLudwig，amanofmostnoblecharacterandraisedabovetheprejudicesofhistime，hereceivedtheofferofaprofessor\'schairatHeidelberg，withtheassurancethathewouldhavelibertytoteachandtowrite，because“thePrincebelievedhewouldnotputthatlibertytoabadusebyinterferingwiththereligionpubliclyestablished。”Spinoza(inhispublishedletters)verywiselydeclinedthisoffer，however，because“hedidnotknowwithinwhatlimitsthatphilosophiclibertywouldhavetobeconfined，inorderthathemightnotappeartobeinterferingwiththepubliclyestablishedreligion。”HeremainedinHolland，acountryhighlyinterestinginthehistoryofgeneralculture，asitwasthefirstinEuropetoshowthe，exampleofuniversaltoleration，andaffordedtomanyaplaceofrefugewheretheymightenjoylibertyofthought；forfierceaswastherageofthetheologiansthereagainstBekker，forexample(Bruck。Hist。crit。phil。T。IV。P。2，pp。719，720)，andfuriousasweretheattacksofVoetiusontheCartesianphilosophy，thesehadnottheconsequenceswhichtheywouldhavehadinanotherland。Spinozadiedonthe21stofFebruary，1677，intheforty-fourthyearofhisage。Thecauseofhisdeathwasconsumption，fromwhichhehadlongbeenasufferer；thiswasinharmonywithhissystemofphilosophy，accordingtowhichallparticularityandindividualitypassawayintheonesubstance。AProtestantdivine，Colerusbyname，whopublishedabiographyofSpinoza，inveighsstronglyagainsthim，itistrue，butgivesneverthelessamostminuteandkindlydescriptionofhiscircumstancesandsurroundings—tellinghowheleftonlyabouttwohundredthalers，whatdebtshehad，andsoon。Abillincludedintheinventory，inwhichthebarberrequestspaymentduehimbyM。Spinozaofblessedmemory，scandalizestheparsonverymuch，andregardingithemakestheobservation:“HadthebarberbutknownwhatsortofacreatureSpinozawas，hecertainlywouldnothavespokenofhisblessedmemory。”TheGermantranslatorofthisbiographywritesundertheportraitofSpinoza:

characteremreprobationisinvultugerens，applyingthisdescriptiontoacountenancewhichdoubtlessexpressesthemelancholyofaprofoundthinker，butisotherwisewildandbenevolent。

Thereprobatioiscertainlycorrect；butitisnotareprobationinthepassivesense；itisanactivedisapprobationonSpinoza\'spartoftheopinions，errorsandthoughtlesspassionsofmankind。(1)

SpinozausedtheterminologyofDescartes，andalsopublishedanaccountofhissystem。ForwefindthefirstofSpinoza\'sworksentitled“AnExpositionaccordingtothegeometricalmethodoftheprinciplesoftheCartesianphilosophy。”SometimeafterthishewrotehisTractatustheologico-politicus，andbyitgainedconsiderablereputation。GreataswasthehatredwhichSpinozarousedamongsthisRabbis，itwasmorethanequalledbytheodiumwhichhebroughtuponhimselfamongstChristian，andespeciallyamongstProtestanttheologians—chieflythroughthemediumofthisessay。Itcontainshisviewsoninspiration，acriticaltreatmentofthebooksofMosesandthelikechieflyfromthepointofviewthatthelawsthereincontainedarelimitedintheirapplicationtotheJews。LaterChristiantheologianshavewrittencriticallyonthissubject，usuallymakingittheirobjecttoshowthatthesebookswerecompiledatalatertime，andthattheydateinpartfromaperiodsubsequenttotheBabyloniancaptivity；thishasbecomeacrucialpointwithProtestanttheologians，andonebywhichthemodernschooldistinguishesitselffromtheolder，greatlyplumingitselfthereon。Allthis，however，isalreadytobefoundintheabove-mentionedworkofSpinoza。ButSpinozadrewthegreatestodiumuponhimselfbyhisphilosophyproper，whichwemustnowconsiderasitisgiventousinhisEthics。WhileDescartespublishednowritingsonthissubject，theEthicsofSpinozaisundoubtedlyhisgreatestwork；itwaspublishedafterhisdeathbyLudwigMayer，aphysician，whohadbeenSpinoza\'smostintimatefriend。Itconsistsoffiveparts；thefirstdealswithGod(DeDeo)。Generalmetaphysicalideasarecontainedinit，whichincludetheknowledgeofGodandnature。Thesecondpartdealswiththenatureandoriginofmind(Denaturaetoriginementis)。WeseethusthatSpinozadoesnottreatofthesubjectofnaturalphilosophy，extensionandmotionatall，forhepassesimmediatelyfromGodtothephilosophyofmind，totheethicalpointofview；andwhatreferstoknowledge，intelligentmind，isbroughtforwardinthefirstpart，undertheheadoftheprinciplesofhumanknowledge。ThethirdbookoftheEthicsdealswiththeoriginandnatureofthepassions(Deoriqineetnaturaaffectuum)；thefourthwiththepowersofthesame，orhumanslavery(Deservitutehumanaseudeaffectuumviribus)；thefifth，lastly，withthepoweroftheunderstanding，withthought，orwithhumanliberty(Depotentiaintellectusseudelibertatehumana)。(2)KirchenrathProfessorPauluspublishedSpinoza\'sworksinJena；Ihadashareinthebringingoutofthisedition，havingbeenentrustedwiththecollationofFrenchtranslations。

AsregardsthephilosophyofSpinoza，itisverysimple，andonthewholeeasytocomprehend；thedifficultywhichitpresentsisduepartlytothelimitationsofthemethodinwhichSpinozapresentshisthoughts，andpartlytohisnarrowrangeofideas，whichcauseshiminanunsatisfactorywaytopassoverimportantpointsofviewandcardinalquestions。Spinoza\'ssystemisthatofDescartesmadeobjectiveintheformofabsolutetruth。ThesimplethoughtofSpinoza\'sidealismisthis:Thetrueissimplyandsolelytheonesubstance，whoseattributesarethoughtandextensionornature:

andonlythisabsoluteunityisreality，italoneisGod。Itis，aswithDescartes，theunityofthoughtandBeing，orthatwhichcontainstheNotionofitsexistenceinitself。TheCartesiansubstance，asIdea，hascertainlyBeingincludedinitsNotion；butitisonlyBeingasabstract，notasrealBeingorasextension(supra，p。241)。WithDescartescorporealityandthethinking\'I\'arealtogetherindependentBeings；thisindependenceofthetwoextremesisdoneawaywithinSpinozismbytheirbecomingmomentsoftheoneabsoluteBeing。ThisexpressionsignifiesthatBeingmustbegraspedastheunityofopposites；thechiefconsiderationisnottoletsliptheoppositionandsetitaside，buttoreconcileandresolveit。SincethenitisthoughtandBeing，andnolongertheabstractionsofthefiniteandinfinite，oroflimitandtheunlimited，thatformtheopposition(supra，p。161)，Beingisheremoredefinitelyregardedasextension；forinitsabstractionitwouldbereallyonlythatreturnintoitself，thatsimpleequalitywithitself，whichconstitutesthought(supra，p。229)。

ThepurethoughtofSpinozaisthereforenotthesimpleuniversalofPlato，forithaslikewisecometoknowtheabsoluteoppositionofNotionandBeing。

Takenasawhole，thisconstitutestheIdeaofSpinoza，anditisjustwhatpurebeingwastotheEleatics(Vol。1。pp。244，252)。ThisIdeaofSpinoza\'swemustallowtobeinthemaintrueandwell-grounded；absolutesubstanceisthetruth，butitisnotthewholetruth；inordertobethisitmustalsobethoughtofasinitselfactiveandliving，andbythatverymeansitmustdetermineitselfasmind。ButsubstancewithSpinozaisonlytheuniversalandconsequentlytheabstractdeterminationofmind；itmayundoubtedlybesaidthatthisthoughtisthefoundationofalltrueviews—not，however，astheirabsolutelyfixedandpermanentbasis，butastheabstractunitywhichmindisinitself。ItisthereforeworthyofnotethatthoughtmustbeginbyplacingitselfatthestandpointofSpinozism；tobeafollowerofSpinozaistheessentialcommencementofallPhilosophy。Foraswesawabove(Vol。I。p。144)，whenmanbeginstophilosophize，thesoulmustcommencebybathinginthisetheroftheOneSubstance，inwhichallthatmanhasheldastruehasdisappeared；thisnegationofallthatisparticular，towhicheveryphilosophermusthavecome，istheliberationofthemindanditsabsolutefoundation。ThedifferencebetweenourstandpointandthatoftheEleaticphilosophyisonlythis，thatthroughtheagencyofChristianityconcreteindividualityisinthemodernworldpresentthroughoutinspirit。Butinspiteoftheinfinitedemandsonthepartoftheconcrete，substancewithSpinozaisnotyetdeterminedasinitselfconcrete。Astheconcreteisthusnotpresentinthecontentofsubstance，itisthereforetobefoundwithinreflectingthoughtalone，anditisonlyfromtheendlessoppositionsofthislastthattherequiredunityemerges。Ofsubstanceassuchthereisnothingmoretobesaid；allthatwecandoistospeakofthedifferentwaysinwhichPhilosophyhasdealtwithit，andtheoppositeswhichinitareabrogated。Thedifferencedependsonthenatureoftheoppositeswhichareheldtobeabrogatedinsubstance。Spinozaisfarfromhavingprovedthisunityasconvincinglyaswasdonebytheancients；butwhatconstitutesthegrandeurofSpinoza\'smannerofthoughtisthatheisabletorenounceallthatisdeterminateandparticular，andrestricthimselftotheOne，givingheedtothisalone。

1。Spinozabegins(Eth。P。Ipp。35，36)withaseriesofdefinitions，fromwhichwetakethefollowing。

a。Spinoza\'sfirstdefinitionisoftheCauseofitself。Hesays:“Bythatwhichiscausasui，itsowncause，Iunderstandthatwhoseessence”(orNotion)“involvesexistence，orwhichcannotbeconceivedexceptasexistent。”Theunityofexistenceanduniversalthoughtisassertedfromtheveryfirst，andthisunitywilleverbethequestionatissue。“Thecauseofitself”isanoteworthyexpression，forwhilewepicturetoourselvesthattheeffectstandsinoppositiontothecause，thecauseofitselfisthecausewhich，whileitoperatesandseparatesan“other，”atthesametimeproducesonlyitself，andintheproductionthereforedoesawaywiththisdistinction。Theestablishingofitselfasanotherislossordegeneration，andatthesametimethenegationofthisloss；thisisapurelyspeculativeNotion，indeedafundamentalNotioninallspeculation。Thecauseinwhichthecauseisidenticalwiththeeffect，istheinfinitecause(infra，p。263)；ifSpinozahadfurtherdevelopedwhatliesincausasui，substancewithhimwouldnothavebeenrigidandunworkable。

b。Theseconddefinitionisthatofthefinite。“Thatthingissaidtobefiniteinitskindwhichcanbelimitedbyanotherofthesamenature。”Foritcomesthentoanend，itisnotthere；whatisthereissomethingelse。Thissomethingelsemust，however，beofalikenature；forthosethingswhicharetolimiteachothermust，inordertobeabletolimiteachother，toucheachother，andconsequentlyhavearelationtoeachother，thatistosaytheymustbeofonenature，standonalikebasis，andhaveacommonsphere。Thatistheaffirmativesideofthelimit。“Thusathoughtis”only“limitedbyanotherthought，abodybyanotherbody，butthoughtsarenotlimitedbybodiesnor"

conversely"bodiesbythoughts。”Wesawthis(p。244)withDescartes:thoughtisanindependent；

totalityandsoisextension，theyhavenothingtodowithoneanother；theydonotlimiteachother，eachisincludedinitself。

c。Thethirddefinitionisthatofsubstance。“BysubstanceIunderstandthatwhichexistsinitselfandisconceivedbyitself，i。e。theconceptionofwhichdoesnotrequiretheaidoftheconceptionofanyotherthingforitsformation(aquoformaridebeat)；”otherwiseitwouldbefinite，accidental。Whatcannothaveaconceptionformedofitwithouttheaidofsomethingelse，isnotindependent，butisdependentuponthatsomethingelse。

d。InthefourthplaceSpinozadefinesattributes，which，asthemomentcoming，secondtosubstance，belongtoit。“ByattributeIunderstandthatwhichthemindperceivesasconstitutingtheessenceofsubstance；”andtoSpinozathisaloneistrue。Thisisanimportantdetermination；theattributeisundoubtedlyadeterminateness，butatthesametimeitremainsatotality。Spinoza，likeDescartes，acceptsonlytwoattributes，thoughtandextension。Theunderstandinggraspsthemastherealityofsubstance，buttherealityisnothigherthanthesubstance，foritisonlyrealityintheviewoftheunderstanding，whichfallsoutsidesubstance。Eachofthetwowaysofregardingsubstance—extensionandthought—containsnodoubtthewholecontentofsubstance，butonlyinoneform，whichtheunderstandingbringswithit；andforthisveryreasonbothsidesareinthemselvesidenticalandinfinite。Thisisthetruecompletion；butwheresubstancepassesoverintoattributeisnotstated。

e。Thefifthdefinitionhastodowithwhatcomesthirdinrelationtosubstance，themode。“BymodeIunderstandtheaffectionsofsubstance，orthatwhichisinsomethingelse，throughtheaidofwhichalsoitisconceived。”Thussubstanceisconceivedthroughitself；attributeisnotconceivedthroughitself，buthasarelationtotheconceivingunderstanding，insofarasthislastconceivesreality；mode，finally，iswhatisnotconceivedasreality，butthroughandinsomethingelse。

TheselastthreemomentsSpinozaoughtnotmerelytohaveestablishedinthiswayasconceptions，heoughttohavededucedthem；theyareespeciallyimportant，andcorrespondwithwhatwemoredefinitelydistinguishasuniversal，particularandindividual。Theymustnot，however，betakenasformal，butintheirtrueconcretesense；theconcreteuniversalissubstance，theconcreteparticularistheconcretespecies；theFatherandSonintheChristiandogmaaresimilarlyparticular，buteachofthemcontainsthewholenatureofGod，onlyunderadifferentform。Themodeistheindividual，thefiniteassuch，whichentersintoexternalconnectionwithwhatis“other。”InthisSpinozaonlydescendstoalowerstage，themodeisonlytheforegoingwarpedandstunted。Spinoza\'sdefectisthereforethis，thathetakesthethirdmomentasmodealone，asafalseindividuality。Trueindividualityandsubjectivityisnotamereretreatfromtheuniversal，notmerelysomethingclearlydeterminate；for，asclearlydeterminate，itisatthesametimeBeing-for-itself，determinedbyitselfalone。Theindividual，thesubjective，iseveninbeingsothereturntotheuniversal；andinthatitisathomewithitself，itisitselftheuniversal。Thereturnconsistssimplyandsolelyinthefactoftheparticularbeinginitselftheuniversal；tothisreturnSpinozadidnotattain。Rigidsubstantialityisthelastpointhereached，notinfiniteform；thisheknewnot，andthusdeterminatenesscontinuallyvanishesfromhisthought。

f。Inthesixthplace，thedefinitionoftheinfiniteisalsoofimportance，forintheinfiniteSpinozadefinesmorestrictlythananywhereelsetheNotionoftheNotion。Theinfinitehasadoublesignificance，accordingasitistakenastheinfinitelymanyorastheabsolutelyinfinite(infra，p。

263)。“Theinfiniteinitskindisnotsuchinrespectofallpossibleattributes；buttheabsolutelyinfiniteisthattowhoseessenceallbelongsthatexpressesanessenceandcontainsnonegation。”

InthesamesenseSpinozadistinguishesinthenine-and-twentiethLetter(Oper。T。I。pp。526-532)

theinfiniteofimaginationfromtheinfiniteofthought(intellectus)，theactual(actu)infinite。Mostmen，whentheywishtostriveafterthesublime，getnofartherthanthefirstofthese；thisisthefalseinfinite，justaswhenonesays“andsoonintoinfinity，”meaningperhapstheinfinityofspacefromstartostar，orelsetheinfinityoftime。Aninfinitenumericalseriesinmathematicsisexactlythesamething。Ifacertainfractionisrepresentedasadecimalfraction，itisincomplete；1/7is，onthecontrary，thetrueinfinite，andthereforenotanincompleteexpression，althoughthecontenthereisofcourselimited。Itisinfinityintheincorrectsensethatoneusuallyhasinviewwheninfinityisspokenof；andevenifitislookedonassublime，ityetisnothingpresent，andonlygoeseveroutintothenegative，withoutbeingactual(actu)。ButforSpinozatheinfiniteisnotthefixingofalimitandthenpassingbeyondthelimitfixed—thesensuousinfinity—butabsoluteinfinity，thepositive，whichhascompleteandpresentinitselfanabsolutemultiplicitywhichhasnoBeyond。Philosophicinfinity，thatwhichisinfiniteactu，Spinozathereforecallstheabsoluteaffirmationofitself。Thisisquitecorrect，onlyitmighthavebeenbetterexpressedas:“Itisthenegationofnegation。”

SpinozaherealsoemploysgeometricalfiguresasillustrationsoftheNotionofinfinity。InhisOperapostuma，precedinghisEthics，andalsointheletterquotedabove，hehastwocircles，oneofwhichlieswithintheother，whichhavenot，however，acommoncentre。

“TheinequalitiesofthespacebetweenABandCDexceedeverynumber；andyetthespacewhichliesbetweenisnotsoverygreat。”Thatistosay，ifIwishtodeterminethemall，Imustenteruponaninfiniteseries。This“beyond”

always，however，remainsdefective，isalwaysaffectedwithnegation；andyetthisfalseinfiniteistheretohand，circumscribed，affirmative，actualandpresentinthatplaneasacompletespacebetweenthetwocircles。Orafinitelineconsistsofaninfinitenumberofpoints；andyetthelineispresenthereanddetermined；the“beyond”oftheinfinitenumberofpoints，whicharenotcomplete，isinitcompleteandcalledbackintounity。Theinfiniteshouldberepresentedasactuallypresent，andthiscomestopassintheNotionofthecauseofitself，whichisthereforethetrueinfinity。Assoonasthecausehassomethingelseopposedtoit—theeffect—finitudeispresent；butherethissomethingelseisatthesametimeabrogatedanditbecomesoncemorethecauseitself。Theaffirmativeisthusnegationofnegation，since，accordingtothewell-knowngrammaticalrule，duplexnegatioaffirmat。InthesamewaySpinoza\'searlierdefinitionshavealsotheinfinitealreadyimpliedinthem，forinstanceinthecaseofthejustmentionedcauseofitself，inasmuchashedefinesitasthatwhoseessenceinvolvesexistence(supra，p。258)。NotionandexistenceareeachtheBeyondoftheother；butcauseofitself，asthusincludingthem，isreallythecarryingbackofthis“beyond”

intounity。Or(supra，p。259)“Substanceisthatwhichisinitselfandisconceivedfromitself；”

thatisthesameunityofNotionandexistence。TheinfiniteisinthesamewayinitselfandhasalsoitsNotioninitself；itsNotionisitsBeing，anditsBeingitsNotion；trueinfinityisthereforetobefoundinSpinoza。Buthehasnoconsciousnessofthis；hehasnotrecognizedthisNotionasabsoluteNotion，andthereforehasnotexpresseditasamomentoftrueexistence；forwithhimtheNotionfallsoutsideofexistence，intothethoughtofexistence。

g。FinallySpinozasaysintheseventhplace:“GodisaBeingabsolutelyinfinite，i。e。asubstanceconsistingofinfiniteattributes，eachofwhichexpressesaneternalandinfiniteessence。”Doessubstance，onemighthereask，possessaninfinitenumberofattributes？ButaswithSpinozathereareonlytwoattributes，thoughtandextension，withwhichheinvestsGod，“infinite”isnottobetakenhereinthesenseoftheindeterminatebutpositively，asacircleisperfectinfinityinitself。

ThewholeofSpinoza\'sphilosophyiscontainedinthesedefinitions，which，however，takenasawholeareformal；itisreallyaweakpointinSpinozathathebeginsthuswithdefinitions。Inmathematicsthismethodispermitted，becauseattheoutsetwetheremakeassumptions，suchasthatofthepointandline；butinPhilosophythecontentshouldbeknownastheabsolutelytrue。Itisallverywelltograntthecorrectnessofthename-definition，andacknowledgethattheword“substance”correspondswiththeconceptionwhichthedefinitionindicates，butitisquiteanotherquestiontodeterminewhetherthiscontentisabsolutelytrue。Suchaquestionisnotaskedinthecaseofgeometricalpropositions，butinphilosophicinvestigationitistheverythingtobefirstconsidered，andthisSpinozahasnotdone。Insteadofonlyexplainingthesesimplethoughtsandrepresentingthemasconcreteinthedefinitionswhichhemakes，whatheoughttohavedonewastoexaminewhetherthiscontentistrue。Toallappearanceitisonlytheexplanationofthewordsthatisgiven，butthecontentofthewordsisheldtobeestablished。Allfurthercontentismerelyderivedfromthat，andprovedthereby；foronthefirstcontentalltherestdepends，andifitisestablishedasabasis，theothernecessarilyfollows。“TheattributeisthatwhichtheunderstandingthinksofGod。”Butherethequestionis:HowdoesitcomethatbesidestheDeitytherenowappearstheunderstanding，whichappliestoabsolutesubstancethetwoformsofthoughtandextension？andwhencecomethesetwoformsthemselves？Thuseverythingproceedsinwards，andnotoutwards；thedeterminationsarenotdevelopedfromsubstance，itdoesnotresolveitselfintotheseattributes。

2。ThesedefinitionsarefollowedbyaxiomsandpropositionsinwhichSpinozaprovesagreatvarietyofpoints。Hedescendsfromtheuniversalofsubstancethroughtheparticular，thoughtandextension，totheindividual。HehasthusallthreemomentsoftheNotion，ortheyareessentialtohim。Butthemode，underwhichheadfallsindividuality，hedoesnotrecognizeasessential，orasconstitutingamomentoftrueexistenceinthatexistence；foritdisappearsinexistence，oritisnotraisedintotheNotion。

a。ThemainpointthenisthatSpinozaprovesfromtheseNotionsthatthereisonlyOneSubstance，God。Itisasimplechainofreasoning，averyformalproof。“FifthProposition:Therecannotbetwoormoresubstancesofthesamenatureorofthesameattribute。”Thisisimpliedalreadyinthedefinitions；theproofisthereforeauselessand，wearisometoil，whichonlyservestorenderSpinozamoredifficulttounderstand。“Iftherewereseveral”(substancesofthesameattribute)“theymustbedistinguishedfromoneanothereitherbythediversityoftheirattributesorbythediversityoftheiraffections”(modes)。“Iftheyaredistinguishedbytheirattributes，itwouldbedirectlyconcededthatthereisonlyonesubstancehavingthesameattribute。”Fortheattributesaresimplywhattheunderstandinggraspsastheessenceoftheonesubstance，whichisdeterminedinitself，andnotthroughanythingelse。“Butifthesesubstancesweredistinguishedbytheiraffections，sincesubstanceisbynaturepriortoitsaffectionsitwouldfollowthatiffromsubstanceitsaffectionswereabstractedanditwereregardedinitself，i。e。，initstruth，itcouldhenceforthnotberegardedasdistinctfromothersubstances。”“EighthProposition:Allsubstanceisnecessarilyinfinite。Proof:Forotherwiseitmustbelimitedbyanothersubstanceofthesamenature，inwhichcasetherewouldbetwosubstancesofthesameattribute，whichiscontrarytothefifthproposition。”“Everyattributemustbeconceivedforitself，”asdeterminationreflectedonitself。“Forattributeiswhatthemindconceivesofsubstanceasconstitutingitsessence，fromwhichitfollowsthatitmustbeconceivedthroughitself，”i。e。，substanceiswhatisconceivedthroughitself(seethefourthandthirddefinitions)。“Thereforewemaynotarguefromthepluralityofattributestoapluralityofsubstances，foreachisconceivedbyitself，andtheyhaveallbeen，alwaysandatthesametime，insubstance，withoutthepossibilityoftheonebeingproducedbytheother。”“Substanceisindivisible。Forifthepartsretainedthenatureofthesubstance，therewouldbeseveralsubstancesofthesamenature，whichiscontrarytothefifthproposition。Ifnot，infinitesubstancewouldceasetoexist，whichisabsurd。”(3)

“FourteenthProposition:NoothersubstancethanGodcaneitherexistorbeconceived。Proof:

Godistheabsolutelyinfinitesubstance，towhomcanbedeniednoattributewhichexpressestheessenceofsubstance，andHeexistsnecessarily；thereforeiftherewereasubstanceotherthanGod，itmustbeexplainedbymeansofanattributeofGod。”Consequentlythesubstancewouldnothaveitsownbeing，butthatofGod，andthereforewouldnotbeasubstance。Orifitwerestilltobesubstance，“thentherewouldnecessarilyfollowthepossibilityoftherebeingtwosubstanceswiththesameattribute，whichaccordingtothefifthpropositionisabsurd。Fromthisitthenfollowsthatthethingextendedandthethingthatthinks”arenotsubstances，but“areeitherattributesofGod，oraffectionsofHisattributes。”Bytheseproofsandotherslikethemnotmuchistobegained。“Fifteenthproposition:Whatis，isinGod，andcannotexistorbeconceivedwithoutGod。”“Sixteenthproposition:Bythenecessityofthedivinenatureinfinitethingsmustfollowininfinitemodes，i。e。，allthatcanfallundertheinfiniteunderstanding。GodisthereforetheabsoluteFirstCause。”

SpinozathenascribesfreedomandnecessitytoGod:“Godistheabsolutefreecause，whoisdeterminedbynothingoutsideofHimself，forHeexistssolelybythenecessityofHisnature。ThereisnocausewhichinwardlyoroutwardlymovesHimtoact，excepttheperfectionofHisnature。

HisactivityisbythelawsofHisBeingnecessaryandeternal；whatthereforefollowsfromHisabsolutenature，fromHisattributes，iseternalasitfollowsfromthenatureofthetrianglefrometernityandtoeternitythatit，threeanglesareequaltotworightangles。"Thatistosay，HisBeingisHisabsolutepower；actusandpotentia，ThoughtandBeing，areinHimone。GodhasnotthereforeanyotherthoughtswhichHecouldnothaveactualized。“Godistheimmanentcauseofallthings，notthetransient(transiens)，”i。e。，externalcause。“HisessenceandHisexistencearethesame，namely，thetruth。Athingwhichisdeterminedtoperformsomeaction，is，sinceGodiscause，necessarilydeterminedtheretobyGod；andathingwhichisthusdeterminedcannotrenderitselfundetermined。Innaturenothingiscontingent。Willisnotafreecause，butonlyanecessarycause，onlyamode；itisthereforedeterminedbyanother。Godactsinaccordancewithnofinalcauses(subrationeboni)。ThosewhoassertthatHedoesso，appeartoestablishsomethingapartfromGod，whichdoesnotdependonGod，andwhichGodinHisworkingkeepsinview，asthoughitwereanend。Ifthisviewistaken，Godisnotafreecause，butissubjecttofate。ItisequallyinadmissibletosubjectallthingstothearbitrarypleasureofGod，i。e。，toHisindifferentwill。”(4)HeisdeterminedsolelybyHisownnature，theactivityofGodisthusHispower，andthatisnecessity。Heisthenabsolutepowerincontrasttowisdom，whichsetsupdefiniteaims，andconsequentlylimitations；particularaims，thoughtsofwhatisabouttocometopass，andthelikearethereforeputoutofthequestion。Butbeyondthisuniversal，noadvanceismade；foritmustbenoticedanegation。Moreover，ifGodisthecauseoftheworld，itisimpliedthatHeisfinite；fortheworldishereputbesideGodassomethingdifferentfromHim。

b。ThegreatestdifficultyinSpinozais，inthedistinctionstowhichhecomes，tograsptherelationofthisdeterminatetoGod，atthesametimepreservingthedetermination。“GodisathinkingBeing，becauseallindividualthoughtsaremodeswhichexpressGod\'snatureinacertainanddeterminatemanner；therepertainsthereforetoGodanattributetheconceptionofwhichallindividualthoughtsinvolve，andbymeansofthistheyalsoareconceived。GodisanextendedBeingforthesamereason。”Thismeansthatthesamesubstance，undertheattributeofthought，istheintelligibleworld，andundertheattributeofextension，isnature；natureandthoughtthusbothexpressthesameEssenceofGod。Or，asSpinozasays，“Theorderandsystemofnaturalthingsisthesameastheorderofthethoughts。Thus，forinstance，thecirclewhichexistsinnature，andtheideaoftheexistingcircle，whichisalsoinGod，areoneandthesamething”(theyareoneandthesamecontent)，“whichis”merely“expressedbymeansofdifferentattributes。Ifwethereforeregardnatureeitherundertheattributeofextensionorofthought，orunderanyotherattributewhatever，weshallfindoneandthesameconnectionofcauses，i。e。，thesamesequenceofthings。