第7章

TheformalBeingoftheideaofthecirclecanbeconceivedonlybymeansofthemodeofthought，asitsproximatecause，andthismodeagainbymeansofanother，andsooninfinitely；sothatwemustexplaintheorderofthewholeofnature，ortheconnectionofcauses，bytheattributeofthoughtalone，andifthingsareconsideredbytheattributeofextension，theymustbeconsideredonlybytheattributeofextension，—andthesameholdsgood。ofothercauses。”(5)Itisoneandthesamesystem，whichatonetimeappearsasnature，andatanothertimeintheformofthought。

ButSpinozadoesnotdemonstratehowthesetwoareevolvedfromtheonesubstance，nordoesheprovewhytherecanonlybetwoofthem。Neitherareextensionandthoughtanythingtohiminthemselves，orintruth，butonlyexternally；fortheirdifferenceisamerematteroftheunderstanding，whichisrankedbySpinozaonlyamongaffections(Eth。P。I。Prop。XXXI。

Demonst。p。62)，andassuchhasnotruth。ThishasinrecenttimesbeenservedupagainbySchellinginthefollowingform:Inthemselves，theintelligentworldandthecorporealworldarethesame，onlyunderdifferentforms；sothattheintelligentuniverseisinitselfthewholeabsolutedivinetotality，andthecorporealuniverseisequallythissametotality。Thedifferencesarenotinthemselves；butthedifferentaspectsfromwhichtheAbsoluteisregardedaremattersexternaltoit。Wetakeahighertoneinsayingthatnatureandmindarerational；butreasonisforusnoemptyword，foritmeansthetotalitywhichdevelopsitselfwithinitself。Again，itisthestandpointofreflectiontoregardaspectsonly，andnothinginitself。ThisdefectappearsinSpinozaandSchellinginthefactthattheyseenonecessitywhytheNotion，astheimplicitnegativeofitsunity，shouldmakeaseparationofitselfintodifferentparts；sothatoutofthesimpleuniversalthereal，theopposed，itselfbecomesknown。Absolutesubstance，attributeandmode，Spinozaallowstofollowoneanotherasdefinitions，headoptsthemready-made，withouttheattributesbeingdevelopedfromthesubstance，orthemodesfromtheattributes。Andmoreespeciallyinregardtotheattributes，thereisnonecessityevident，whythesearethoughtandextensioninparticular。

c。WhenSpinozapassesontoindividualthings，especiallytoself-consciousness，tothefreedomofthe\'I，\'heexpresseshimselfinsuchawayasrathertoleadbackalllimitationstosubstancethantomaintainafirmgraspoftheindividual。Thuswealreadyfound，theattributesnottobeindependent，butonlytheformsinwhichtheunderstandinggraspssubstanceinitsdifferences；

whatcomesthird，themodes，isthatunderwhichforSpinozaalldifferenceofthingsalonefalls。Ofthemodeshesays(Ethic。P。I。Prop。XXXII。Demonst。etCoroll。11。p。63):Ineveryattributetherearetwomodes；inextension，thesearerestandmotion，inthoughttheyareunderstandingandwill(intellectusetvoluntas)。TheyaremeremodificationswhichonlyexistforusapartfromGod；thereforewhateverreferstothisdifferenceandisspeciallybroughtaboutbyit，isnotabsolute，butfinite。TheseaffectionsSpinozasumsup(Ethices，P。I。Prop。XXIX。Schol。pp。61，62)undertheheadofnaturanaturata:“NaturanaturansisGodregardedasfreecause，insofarasHeisinHimselfandisconceivedbyHimself:orsuchattributesofsubstanceasexpresstheeternalandinfiniteessence。Bynaturanaturata，Iunderstandallthatfollowsfromthenecessityofthedivinenature，orfromanyoftheattributesofGod，allmodesofthedivineattributes，insofarastheyareregardedasthingswhichareinGod，andwhichwithoutGodcanneitherexistnorbeconceived。”FromGodproceedsnothing，forallthingsmerelyreturntothepointwhencetheycame，iffromthemselvesthecommencementismade。

ThesethenareSpinoza\'sgeneralforms，thisishisprincipalidea。Somefurtherdeterminationshavestilltobementioned。Hegivesdefinitionsofthetermsmodes，understanding，will，andoftheaffections，suchasjoyandsadness。(6)Wefurtherfindconsciousnesstakenintoconsideration。Itsdevelopmentisextremelysimple，orratheritisnotdevelopedatall；Spinozabeginsdirectlywithmind。“TheessenceofmanconsistsofcertainmodificationsoftheattributesofGod”；thesemodificationsareonlysomethingrelatedtoourunderstanding。“Ifwe，therefore，saythatthehumanmindperceivesthisorthat，itmeansnothingelsethanthatGodhasthisorthatidea，notinsofarasHeisinfinite，butinsofarasHeisexpressedbytheideaofthehumanmind。AndifwesaythatGodhasthisorthatidea，notinsofarasHeconstitutestheideaofthehumanmind，butinsofarasHehas，alongwiththehumanmind，theideaofanotherthing，thenwesaythatthehumanmindperceivesthethingpartiallyorinadequately。”TruthisforSpinoza，ontheotherhand，theadequate。(7)Theideathatallparticularcontentisonly，amodificationofGodisridiculedbyBayle，(8)whoarguesfromitthatGodmodifiedasTurksandAustrians，iswagingwarwithHimself；butBaylehasnotatraceofthespeculativeelementinhim，althoughheisacuteenoughasadialectician，andhascontributedtotheintelligentdiscussionofdefinitesubjects。

TherelationofthoughtandextensioninthehumanconsciousnessisdealtwithbySpinozaasfollows:“Whathasaplaceintheobject”(orratherintheobjective)“oftheideawhichconstitutesthehumanmindmustbeperceivedbythehumanmind；ortheremustnecessarilybeinthemindanideaofthisobject。Theobjectoftheideawhichconstitutesthehumanmindisbody，oracertainmodeofextension。If，then，theobjectoftheideawhichconstitutesthehumanmind，isthebody，therecanhappennothinginthebodywhichisnotperceivedbythemind。OtherwisetheideasoftheaffectionsofthebodywouldnotbeinGod，insofarasHeconstitutesourmind，buttheideaofanotherthing:thatistosay，theideasoftheaffectionsofourbodywouldnotbelikewiseinourmind。”WhatisperplexingtounderstandinSpinoza\'ssystemis，ontheonehand，theabsoluteidentityofthoughtandBeing，and，ontheotherhand，theirabsoluteindifferencetooneanother，becauseeachofthemisamanifestationofthewholeessenceofGod。Theunityofthebodyandconsciousnessis，accordingtoSpinoza，this，thattheindividualisamodeoftheabsolutesubstance，which，asconsciousness，istherepresentationofthemannerinwhichthebodyisaffectedbyexternalthings；allthatisinconsciousnessisalsoinextension，andconversely。“Mindknowsitselfonlyinsofarasitperceivestheideasoftheaffectionsofbody，”ithasonlytheideaoftheaffectionsofitsbody；thisideaissyntheticcombination，asweshallimmediatelysee。“Theideas，whetheroftheattributesofGodorofindividualthings，donotrecognizeastheirefficientcausetheirobjectsthemselves，orthethingsperceived，butGodHimself，insofarasHeisthatwhichthinks。”(9)Buhle(GeschichtederneuernPhilos。Vol。III。SectionII。p。524)sumsupthesepropositionsofSpinozathus:“Thoughtisinseparablyboundupwithextension；thereforeallthattakesplaceinextensionmustalsotakeplaceinconsciousness。”Spinoza，however，alsoacceptsbothintheirseparationfromoneanother。Theideaofbody，hewrites(Epistol。LXVI。p。673)，includesonlythesetwoinitself，anddoesnotexpressanyotherattributes。Thebodywhichitrepresentsisregardedundertheattributeofextension；buttheideaitselfisamodeofthought。

Hereweseeadividingasunder；mereidentity，theundistinguishablenatureofallthingsintheAbsolute，isinsufficientevenforSpinoza。

Theindividuum，individualityitself，isthusdefinedbySpinoza(Ethic。P。11。Prop。XIII。Defin。p。

92):“Whenseveralbodiesofthesameorofdifferentmagnitudesaresopressedtogetherthattheyrestononeanother，orwhen，movingwithlikeordifferentdegreesofrapidity，theycommunicatetheirmovementtooneanotherinacertainmeasure，wesaythatsuchbodiesareunitedtooneanother，andthatalltogethertheyformonebodyorindividuum，whichbythisuniondistinguishesitselffromalltheotherbodies。"HereweareattheextremelimitofSpinoza\'ssystem，anditisherethathisweakpointappears。Individuation，theone，isameresynthesis；itisquiteadifferentthingfromtheIchtsorself-hoodofBoehme(supra，pp。205-207)，sinceSpinozahasonlyuniversality，thought，andnotself-consciousness。If，beforeconsideringthisinreferencetothewhole，wetakeitfromtheotherside，namelyfromtheunderstanding，thedistinctionreallyfallsunderthatheaditisnotdeduced，itisfound。Thus，aswehavealreadyseen(p。270)“theunderstandinginact(intellectusactu)，asalsowill，desire，love，mustbereferredtonaturanaturata，nottonaturanaturans。Forbytheunderstanding，asrecognizedforitself，wedonotmeanabsolutethought，butonlyacertainmodeofthought—amodewhichisdistinctfromothermodeslikedesire，love，etc。，andonthataccountmustbeconceivedbymeansofabsolutethought，i。e。，bymeansofanattributeofGodwhichexpressesaneternalandinfiniteessentialityofthought；withoutwhichtheunderstanding，asalsotherestofthemodesofthought，couldneitherbenorbeconceivedtobe。”

(Spinoza，Ethices，P。1。Propos。XXXI。pp。62，63)。Spinozaisunacquaintedwithaninfinityofform，whichwouldbesomethingquitedifferentfromthatofrigid，unyieldingsubstance。WhatisrequisiteistorecognizeGodastheessenceofessences，asuniversalsubstance，identity，andyettopreservedistinctions。

Spinozagoesontosay:“Whatconstitutesthereal(actuale)existenceofthehumanmindisnothingelsethantheideaofaparticular”(individual)“thing，thatactuallyexists，”notofaninfinitething。

“Theessenceofmaninvolvesnonecessaryexistence，i。e。，accordingtotheorderofnatureamanmayjustaswellbeasnotbe。”Forthehumanconsciousness，asitdoesnotbelongtoessenceasanattribute，isamode—amodeoftheattributeofthought。Butneitheristhebody，accordingtoSpinoza，thecauseofconsciousness，norisconsciousnessthecauseofthebody，butthefinitecauseishereonlytherelationofliketolike；bodyisdeterminedbybody，conceptionbyconception。“Thebodycanneitherdeterminethemindtothought，norcantheminddeterminethebodytomotion，orrest，oranythingelse。ForallmodesofthoughthaveGodasCause，insofarasHeisathinkingthing，andnotinsofarasHeisrevealedbymeansofanotherattribute。Whatthereforedeterminesthemindtothought，isamodeofthoughtandnotofextension；similarlymotionandrestofthebodymustbederivedfromanotherbody。”(10)ImightquotemanyothersuchparticularpropositionsfromSpinoza，buttheyareveryformal，andacontinualrepetitionofoneandthesamething。

Buhle(Gesch。d。neuernPhil。Vol。III。Section2，pp。525-528)，attributeslimitedconceptionstoSpinoza:“Thesoulexperiencesinthebodyallthe\'other\'ofwhichitbecomesawareasoutsideofthebody，anditbecomesawareofthis\'other\'onlybymeansoftheconceptionsofthequalitieswhichthebodyperceivestherein。If，therefore，thebodycanperceivenoqualitiesofathing，thesoulalsocancometonoknowledgeofit。Ontheotherhand，thesoulisequallyunabletoarriveattheperceptionofthebodywhichbelongstoit；thesoulknowsnotthatthebodyisthere，andknowsitselfeveninnootherwaythanbymeansofthequalitieswhichthebodyperceivesinthingswhichareoutsideofit，andbymeansoftheconceptionsofthesame。Forthebodyisanindividualthing，determinedinacertainmanner，whichcanonlygradually，inassociationwithandamidstotherindividualthings，attaintoexistence，andcanpreserveitselfinexistenceonlyasthusconnected，combinedandassociatedwithothers，”i。e。，ininfiniteprogress；thebodycanbynomeansbeconceivedfromitself。“Thesoul\'sconsciousnessexpressesacertaindeterminateformofaNotion，astheNotionitselfexpressesadeterminateformofanindividualthing。Buttheindividualthing，itsNotion，andtheNotionofthisNotionarealtogetherandentirelyoneandthesamething，onlyregardedunderdifferentattributes。AsthesoulisnothingelsethantheimmediateNotionofthebody，andisoneandthesamethingwiththis，theexcellenceofthesoulcanneverbeanythingelsethantheexcellenceofthebody。Thecapacitiesoftheunderstandingarenothingbutthecapacitiesofthebody，iftheyarelookedatfromthecorporealpointofview，andthedecisionsofthewillarelikewisedeterminationsofthebody。IndividualthingsarederivedfromGodinaneternalandinfinitemanner”(i。e。，onceandforall)，“andnotinatransitory，finiteandevanescentmanner；theyarederivedfromoneanothermerelyinasmuchastheymutuallyproduceanddestroyeachother，butintheireternalexistencetheyendureunchangeable。Allindividualthingsmutuallypresupposeeachother；onecannotbethoughtwithouttheother；thatistosaytheyconstitutetogetheraninseparablewhole；theyexistsidebysideinoneutterlyindivisible，infiniteThing，andinnootherwaywhatever。

3。WehavenowtospeakofSpinoza\'ssystemofmorals，andthatisasubjectofimportance。Itsgreatprincipleisnootherthanthis，thatthefinitespiritismoralinsofarasithasthetrueIdea，i。e。，insofarasitdirectsitsknowledgeandwillonGod，fortruthismerelytheknowledgeofGod。Itmaybesaidthatthereisnomoralityloftierthanthis，sinceitsonlyrequisiteistohaveaclearideaofGod。ThefirstthingSpinozaspeaksofinthisregardistheaffections:“Everythingstrivesafterself-preservation。Thisstrivingistheactualessenceofthething，andinvolvesonlyindefinitetime；

whenreferredexclusivelytomind，itistermedwill；whenreferredtobothmindandbodytogether，itiscalleddesire。Determinationofthewill(volitio)andIdeaareoneandthesamething。Thesenseoflibertyrestsonthis，thatmendonotknowthedeterminingcausesoftheiractions。TheaffectionisaconfusedIdea；themoreclearlyanddistinctly，therefore，weknowtheaffection，themoreitisunderourcontrol。”(11)Theinfluenceoftheaffections，asconfusedandlimited(inadequate)ideas，uponhumanaction，constitutestherefore，accordingtoSpinoza，humanslavery；ofthepassionateaffectionstheprincipalarejoyandsorrow；weareinsufferingandslaveryinsofaraswerelateourselvesasapart。(12)

“OurhappinessandlibertyconsistinanenduringandeternallovetoGod；thisintellectuallovefollowsfromthenatureofmindinsofarasitisregardedaseternaltruththroughthenatureofGod。ThemoreamanrecognizesGod\'sexistenceandlovesHim，thelessdoeshesufferfromevilaffectionsandthelessishisfearofdeath。”(13)Spinozarequiresinadditionthetruekindofknowledge。Thereare，accordingtohim，threekindsofknowledge；inthefirst，whichhecallsopinionandimagination，heincludestheknowledgewhichweobtainfromanindividualobjectthroughthesenses—aknowledgefragmentaryandill-arranged—alsoknowledgedrawnfromsigns，pictorialconceptionsandmemory。ThesecondkindofknowledgeisforSpinozathatwhichwederivefromgeneralconceptionsandadequateideasofthepropertiesofthings。Thethirdisintuitiveknowledge(scientiaintuitiva)whichrisesfromtheadequateideaoftheformalessenceofcertainattributesofGodtotheadequateknowledgeoftheessenceofthings。”(14)Regardingthislasthethensays:“Thenatureofreasonisnottocontemplatethingsascontingent，butasnecessary……tothinkofallthingsunderacertainformofeternity(subquadamspecie？ternitatis)；”i。e。，inabsolutelyadequateNotions，i。e。inGod。“ForthenecessityofthingsisthenecessityoftheeternalnatureofGodHimself。EveryideaofanindividualthingnecessarilyincludestheeternalandinfiniteessenceofGodinitself。ForindividualthingsaremodesofanattributeofGod；thereforetheymustincludeinthemselvesHiseternalessence。Ourmind，insofarasitknowsitselfandthebodyundertheformofeternity，hastothatextentnecessarilytheknowledgeofGod，andknowsthatitisitselfinGodandisconceivedthroughGod。AllIdeas，insofarastheyarereferabletoGod，aretrue。”(15)ManmusttracebackallthingstoGod，forGodistheOneinAll；theeternalessenceofGodistheonethingthatis，theeternaltruthistheonlythingformantoaimatinhisactions。WithSpinozathisisnotaknowledgearrivedatthroughphilosophy，butonlyknowledgeofatruth。“ThemindcansucceedintracingbackallaffectionsofthebodyorimagesofthingstoGod。Inproportionasthemindregardsallthingsasnecessary，ithasagreaterpoweroveritsaffections，”whicharearbitraryandcontingent。ThisisthereturnofthemindtoGod，andthisishumanfreedom；asmode，ontheotherhand，thespirithasnofreedom，butisdeterminedfromwithout。“Fromthethirdkindofknowledgetherearisesthereposeofthemind；thesupremegoodofthemindistoknowGod，andthisisthehighestvirtue。

ThisknowledgenecessarilyproducestheintellectualloveofGod；foritproducesajoyfulnessaccompaniedbytheIdeaofGodascause—i。e。theintellectualloveofGod。GodHimselflovesHimselfwithaninfiniteintellectuallove。”(16)ForGodcanhaveonlyHimselfasaimandcause；

andtheendofthesubjectivemindistobedirectedonHim。Thisisthereforethepurest，butalsoauniversalmorality。

Inthethirty-sixthLetter(pp。581-582)Spinoza，speaksofEvil。TheallegationismadethatGod，astheoriginatorofallthingsandeverything，isalsotheoriginatorofevil，isconsequentlyHimselfevil；inthisidentityallthingsareone，goodandevilareinthemselvesthesamething，inGod\'ssubstancethisdifferencehasdisappeared。Spinozasaysinanswertothis“IassertthefactthatGodabsolutelyandtruly”(ascauseofHimself)“isthecauseofeverythingthathasanessentialcontent”(i。e。，affirmativereality)“beitwhatitmay。Nowifyoucanprovetomethatevil，error，crime，etc。，aresomethingthatexpressesanessence，IwillfreelyadmittoyouthatGodistheoriginatorofcrimeandevilanderror。ButIhaveelsewhereabundantlydemonstratedthattheformofevilcannotsubsistinanythingthatexpressesanessence，andthereforeitcannotbesaidthatGodisthecauseofevil。”Evilismerelynegation，privation，limitation，finality，mode—nothinginitselftrulyreal。“Nero\'smurderofhismother，insofarasithadpositivecontent，wasnocrime。

ForOrestesdidthesameexternaldeed，andhadindoingitthesameendinview—tokillhismother；andyetheisnotblamed，”andsoon。Theaffirmativeisthewill，theintention，theactofNero。“WhereinthenconsistsNero\'scriminality？Innothingelsebutthatheprovedhimselfungrateful，merciless，anddisobedient。Butitiscertainthatallthisexpressesnoessence，andthereforeGodwasnotthecauseofit，thoughHewasthecauseofNero\'sactionandintention。”

Theselastaresomethingpositive，butyettheydonotconstitutethecrimeassuch；itisonlythenegativeelement，suchasmercilessness，etc。thatmakestheactionacrime。“Weknowthatwhateverexists，regardedinitselfandwithouttakinganythingelseintoconsideration，containsaperfectionwhichextendsaswidelyastheessenceofthethingitselfextends，fortheessenceisinnowaydifferenttherefrom。"—"Becausethen，”wefindinthethirty-secondletter(pp。541，543)，“Goddoesnotregardthingsabstractly，orformgeneraldefinitions，”(ofwhatthethingoughttobe)“andnomorerealityisrequiredofthingsthantheDivineunderstandingandpowerhasgivenandactuallymetedouttothem；thereforeitclearlyfollowsthatsuchprivationexistsonlyandsolelyinrespecttoourunderstanding，butnotinrespecttoGod；”forGodisabsolutelyreal。Itisallverywelltosaythis，butitdoesnotmeetthecase。ForinthiswayGodandtherespecttoourunderstandingaredifferent。Whereistheirunity？Howisthistobeconceived？Spinozacontinuesinthethirty-sixthletter:“Althoughtheworksoftherighteous(i。e。，ofthosewhohaveaclearideaofGod，towhichtheydirectalltheiractionsandeventheirthoughts)，and”alsotheworks“ofthewicked(i。e。，ofthosewhohavenoideaofGod，butonlyideasofearthlythings，"—individual，personalinterestsandopinions，—"bywhichtheiractionsandthoughtsaredirected)，andallwhatsoeverexists，necessarilyproceedfromGod\'seternallawsandcounsels，andperpetuallydependonGod，theyareyetnotdistinguishedfromoneanotherindegree，butinessence；foralthoughamouseaswellasanangeldependsonGod，andsorrowaswellasjoy，yetamousecannotbeakindofangel，andsorrowcannotbeakindofjoy，"—theyaredifferentinessence。

ThereisthereforenogroundfortheobjectionthatSpinoza\'sphilosophygivesthedeath-blowtomorality；weevengainfromitthegreatresultthatallthatissensuousismerelimitation，andthatthereisonlyonetruesubstance，andthathumanlibertyconsistsinkeepinginviewthisonesubstance，andinregulatingallourconductinaccordancewiththemindandwilloftheEternalOne。ButinthisphilosophyitmaywithjusticebeobjectedthatGodisconceivedonlyasSubstance，andnotasSpirit，asconcrete。Theindependenceofthehumansoulisthereinalsodenied，whileintheChristianreligioneveryindividualappearsasdeterminedtosalvation。Here，onthecontrary，theindividualspiritisonlyamode，anaccident，butnotanythingsubstantial。ThisbringsustoageneralcriticismofthephilosophyofSpinoza，inthecourseofwhichweshallconsideritfromthreedifferentpointsofview。

InthefirstplaceSpinozismisassertedtobeAtheism—byJacobi，forinstance(Werke，Vol。IV。

SectionI，p。216)—becauseinitnodistinctionisdrawnbetweenGodandtheworld；itmakesnaturetherealGod，orlowersGodtothelevelofnature，sothatGoddisappearsandonlynatureisestablished。ButitisnotsomuchGodandnaturethatSpinozasetsupinmutualopposition，asthoughtandextension；andGodisunity，notOnemadeupoftwo，butabsoluteSubstance，inwhichhasreallydisappearedthelimitationofthesubjectivityofthoughtandnature。ThosewhospeakagainstSpinozadosoasifitwereonGod\'saccountthattheywereinterested；butwhattheseopponentsarereallyconcernedaboutisnotGod，butthefinite—themselves。TherelationshipbetweenGodandthefinite，towhichwebelong，mayberepresentedinthreedifferentways:firstly，onlythefiniteexists，andinthiswaywealoneexist，butGoddoesnotexist—thisisatheism；thefiniteisheretakenabsolutely，andisaccordinglythesubstantial。Or，inthesecondplace，Godaloneexists；thefinitehasnoreality，itisonlyphenomena，appearance。Tosay，inthethirdplace，thatGodexistsandwealsoexistisafalsesyntheticunion，allamicablecompromise。Itisthepopularviewofthematter，thattheonesidehasasmuchsubstantialityastheother；Godishonouredandsupreme，butfinitethingsalsohaveBeingtoexactlythesameextent。Reasoncannotremainsatisfiedwiththis"also，”withindifferencelikethis。Thephilosophicrequisiteisthereforetoapprehendtheunityofthesedifferencesinsuchawaythatdifferenceisnotletslip，butproceedseternallyfromsubstance，withoutbeing，petrifiedintodualism。Spinozaisraisedabovethisdualism；religionissoalso，ifweturnitspopularconceptionsintothoughts。Theatheismofthefirstattitude—whenmensetupasultimatethearbitrarinessofthewill，theirownvanity，thefinitethingsofnature，andtheworlddwellsforeverinthemind—isnotthestandpointofSpinoza，forwhomGodistheoneandonlysubstance，theworldonthecontrarybeingmerelyanaffectionormodeofthissubstance。IntherespectthatSpinozadoesnotdistinguishGodfromtheworld，thefinite，itisthereforecorrecttotermhistheoryatheism，forhiswordsarethese:Nature，thehumanmind，theindividual，areGodrevealedunderparticularforms。Ithasbeenalreadyremarked(pp。

257，258，280)thatundoubtedlySubstancewithSpinozadoesnotperfectlyfulfilltheconceptionofGod，sinceitisasSpiritthatHeistobeconceived。ButifSpinozaiscalledanatheistforthesolereasonthathedoesnotdistinguishGodfromtheworld，itisamisuseoftheterm。SpinozismmightreallyjustaswellorevenbetterhavebeentermedAcosmism，sinceaccordingtoitsteachingitisnottotheworld，finiteexistence，theuniverse，thatrealityandpermanencyaretobeascribed，butrathertoGodaloneasthesubstantial。Spinozamaintainsthatthereisnosuchthingaswhatisknownastheworld；itismerelyaformofGod，andinandforitselfitisnothing。Theworldhasnotruereality，andallthisthatweknowastheworldhasbeencastintotheabyssoftheoneidentity。Thereisthereforenosuchthingasfinitereality，ithasnotruthwhatever；accordingtoSpinozawhatis，isGod，andGodalone。ThereforetheallegationsofthosewhoaccuseSpinozaofatheismarethedirectoppositeofthetruth；withhimthereistoomuchGod。Theysay:IfGodistheidentityofmindandnature，thennatureortheindividualmanisGod。Thisisquitecorrect，buttheyforgetthatnatureandtheindividualdisappearinthissameidentity:andtheycannotforgiveSpinozaforthusannihilatingthem。ThosewhodefamehiminsuchawayasthisarethereforenotaimingatmaintainingGod，butatmaintainingthefiniteandtheworldly；theydonotfancytheirownextinctionandthatoftheworld。Spinoza\'ssystemisabsolutepantheismandmonotheismelevatedintothought。Spinozismisthereforeveryfarremovedfrombeingatheismintheordinarysense；butinthesensethatGodisnotconceivedasspirit，itisatheism。However，inthesamewaymanytheologiansarealsoatheistswhospeakofGodonlyastheAlmightySupremeBeing，etc。，whorefusetoacknowledgeGod，andwhoadmitthevalidityandtruthofthefinite。TheyaremanydegreesworsethanSpinoza。

ThesecondpointtobeconsideredisthemethodadoptedbySpinozaforsettingforthhisphilosophy；itisthedemonstrativemethodofgeometryasemployedbyEuclid，inwhichwefinddefinitions，explanations，axioms，andtheorems。EvenDescartesmadeithisstarting-pointthatphilosophicpropositionsmustbemathematicallyhandledandproved，thattheymusthavetheverysameevidenceasmathematics。Themathematicalmethodisconsideredsuperiortoallothers，onaccountofthenatureofitsevidence；anditisnaturalthatindependentknowledgeinitsre-awakeninglightedfirstuponthisform，ofwhichitsawsobrilliantanexample。Themathematicalmethodis，however，ill-adaptedforspeculativecontent，andfindsitsproperplaceonlyinthefinitesciencesoftheunderstanding。InmoderntimesJacobihasasserted(Werke，Vol。IV。SectionI。

pp。217-223)thatalldemonstration，allscientificknowledgeleadsbacktoSpinozism，whichaloneisalogicalmethodofthought；andbecauseitmustleadthither，itisreallyofnoservicewhatever，butimmediateknowledgeiswhatwemustdependon。ItmaybeconcededtoJacobithatthemethodofdemonstrationleadstoSpinozism，ifweunderstandtherebymerelythemethodofknowledgebelongingtotheunderstanding。ButthefactisthatSpinozaismadeatesting-pointinmodernphilosophy，sothatitmayreallybesaid:YouareeitheraSpinozistornotaphilosopheratall。Thisbeingso，themathematicalanddemonstrativemethodofSpinozawouldseemtobeonlyadefectintheexternalform；butitisthefundamentaldefectofthewholeposition。Inthismethodthenatureofphilosophicknowledgeandtheobjectthereof，areentirelymisconceived，formathematicalknowledgeandmethodaremerelyformalincharacterandconsequentlyaltogetherunsuitedforphilosophy。Mathematicalknowledgeexhibitsitsproofontheexistentobjectassuch，notontheobjectasconceived；theNotionislackingthroughout；thecontentofPhilosophy，however，issimplytheNotionandthatwhichiscomprehendedbytheNotion。ThereforethisNotionastheknowledgeoftheessenceissimplyoneassumed，whichfallswithinthephilosophicsubject；andthisiswhatrepresentsitselftobethemethodpeculiartoSpinoza\'sphilosophy。Ofthisdemonstrativemannerwehavealreadyseentheseexamples:ThedefinitionsfromwhichSpinozatakeshisstart—asingeometryacommencementismadewiththeline，triangle，&c。—

concernuniversaldeterminations，suchascauseofitself，thefinite，substance，attribute，mode，andsoon，whicharesolelyandsimplyacceptedandassumed，notdeduced，norprovedtobenecessary；forSpinozaisnotawareofhowhearrivesattheseindividualdeterminations。Hefurtherspeaksofaxioms，forinstance(Ethic。P。I。Ax。I。p。36):“Whatis，iseitherinitselforinanother。”Thedeterminations“initself”and“inanother”arenotshownforthintheirnecessity:

neitheristhisdisjunctionproved，itismerelyassumed。Thepropositionshave，assuch，asubjectandpredicatewhicharenotsimilar。Whenthepredicateisprovedofthesubjectandnecessarilycombinedwithit，thediscrepancyremainsthattheoneasuniversalisrelatedtotheotherasparticular:thereforeevenalthoughtherelationisproved，thereispresentatthesametimeasecondaryrelation。Mathematicalscience，initstruepropositionsrespectingawhole，escapesfromthedifficultybyprovingalsotheconverseofthepropositions，inthiswayobtainingforthemaspecialdefinitenessbyprovingeachpropositioninbothways。Truepropositionsmay，therefore，belookedonasdefinitions，andtheconversionistheproofofthepropositionintheforminwhichitisexpressed。ButthismeansofescapingthedifficultyPhilosophycannotwellemploy，sincethesubjectofwhichsomethingisprovedisitselfonlytheNotionortheuniversal，andthepropositionformisthereforequitesuperfluousandoutofplace。Whathastheformofthesubjectisintheformofanexistentthing，ascontrastedwiththeuniversal，thecontentoftheproposition。Theexistentthingistakenassignifyingexistentintheordinarysense；itisthewordwhichweuseinevery-daylife，andofwhichwehaveaconceptionthathasnothingoftheNotioninit。Theconverseofapropositionwouldsimplyreadlikethis:TheNotionisthatwhichisthuspopularlyconceived。Thisprooffromtheusageoflanguage—thatwealsounderstandthistobethemeaninginevery-daylife，orinotherwordsthatthenameiscorrect—hasnophilosophicsignificance。Butifthepropositionisnotonelikethis，butanordinaryproposition，andifthepredicateisnottheNotion，butsomegeneraltermorother，apredicateofthesubject，suchpropositionsarereallynotphilosophic:wemightinstancethestatementthatsubstanceisoneandnotseveral，butonlythatinwhichsubstanceandunityarethesame。Or，inotherwords，thisunityofthetwomomentsistheverythingwhichtheproofhastodemonstrate，itistheNotionortheessence。Inthiscaseitlooksasifthepropositionwerethematterofchiefimportance，thetruth。Butifinthesereallyonlyso-calledpropositions，subjectandpredicateareintruthnotalike，becauseoneisindividualandtheotheruniversal，theirrelationisessential，i。e。，thereasonforwhichtheyareone。Theproofhashereafalsepositionindeed，asifthatsubjectwereimplicitorinitself，whereassubjectandpredicateare，fundamentallyeven，momentsinseparation；inthejudgment“GodisOne，”thesubjectitselfisuniversal，sinceitresolvesitselfintounity。Ontheothersideitisimpliedinthisfalsepositionthattheproofisbroughtinfromoutsidemerely，asinmathematicsfromaprecedingproposition，andthatthepropositionisnotthereforeconceivedthroughitself；thusweseetheordinarymethodofprooftakeitsmiddleterm，theprinciple，fromanywhereitcan，inthesamewayasinclassificationittakesitsprincipleofclassification。Thepropositionisthen，asitwere，asecondaryaffair；butwemustaskifthispropositionistrue。Theresultaspropositionoughttobetruth，butisonlyknowledge。Themovementofknowledge，asproof，fallstherefore，inthethirdplace，outsideoftheproposition，whichoughttobethetruth。Theessentialmomentsofthesystemarereallyalreadycompletelycontainedinthepre-suppositionsofthedefinitions，fromwhichallfurtherproofshavemerelytobededuced。Butwhencehavewethesecategorieswhichhereappearasdefinitions？Wefindthemdoubtlessinourselves，inscientificculture。Theexistenceoftheunderstanding，thewill，extension，isthereforenotdevelopedfrominfinitesubstance，butitisdirectlyexpressedinthesedeterminations，andthatquitenaturally；forofatruththereexiststheOneintowhicheverythingenters，inordertobeabsorbedtherein，butoutofwhichnothingcomes。

ForasSpinozahassetupthegreatproposition，alldeterminationimpliesnegation(supra，p。267)，andasofeverything，evenofthoughtincontrasttoextension，itmaybeshownthatitisdeterminedandfinite，whatisessentialinitrestsuponnegation。ThereforeGodaloneisthepositive，theaffirmative，andconsequentlytheonesubstance；allotherthings，onthecontrary，areonlymodificationsofthissubstance，andarenothinginandforthemselves。Simpledeterminationornegationbelongsonlytoform，butisquiteanotherthingfromabsolutedeterminatenessornegativity，whichisabsoluteform；inthiswayoflookingatitnegationisthenegationofnegation，andthereforetrueaffirmation。Thisnegativeself-consciousmoment，themovementofknowledge，whichpursuesitswayinthethoughtwhichispresentbeforeus，ishowevercertainlylackingtothecontentofSpinoza\'sphilosophy，oratleastitisonlyexternallyassociatedwithit，sinceitfallswithinself-consciousness。Thatistosay，thoughtsformthecontent，buttheyarenotself-consciousthoughtsorNotions:thecontentsignifiesthought，aspureabstractself-consciousness，butanunreasoningknowledge，intowhichtheindividualdoesnotenter:thecontenthasnotthesignificationof\'I。\'Thereforethecaseisasinmathematics；aproofiscertainlygiven，convictionmustfollow，butyetthematterfailstobeunderstood。Thereisarigidnecessityintheproof，towhichthemomentofself-consciousnessislacking；the\'I\'disappears，givesitselfaltogetherup，merelywithersaway。Spinoza\'sprocedureisthereforequitecorrect；yettheindividualpropositionisfalse，seeingthatitexpressesonlyonesideofthenegation。Theunderstandinghasdeterminationswhichdonotcontradictoneanother；contradictiontheunderstandingcannotsuffer。

Thenegationofnegationis，however，contradiction，forinthatitnegatesnegationassimpledetermination，itisontheonehandaffirmation，butontheotherhandalsoreallynegation；andthiscontradiction，whichisamatterpertainingtoreason，islackinginthecaseofSpinoza。Thereislackingtheinfiniteform，spiritualityandliberty。Ihavealreadymentionedbeforethis(pp。93，94；

129-137)thatLullusandBrunoattemptedtodrawupasystemofform，whichshouldembraceandcomprehendtheonesubstancewhichorganizesitselfintotheuniverse；thisattemptSpinozadidnotmake。

BecausenegationwasthusconceivedbySpinozainone-sidedfashionmerely，thereis，inthethirdplace，inhissystem，anutterblottingoutoftheprincipleofsubjectivity，individuality，personality，themomentofself-consciousnessinBeing。Thoughthasonlythesignificationoftheuniversal，notofself-consciousness。Itisthislackwhichhas，ontheoneside，broughttheconceptionofthelibertyofthesubjectintosuchvehementantagonismtothesystemofSpinoza，becauseitsetasidetheindependenceofthehumanconsciousness，theso-calledlibertywhichismerelytheemptyabstractionofindependence，andinsodoingsetasideGod，asdistinguishedfromnatureandthehumanconsciousness—thatisasimplicitconsciousnessoffreedom，ofthespiritual，whichisthenegativeofthecorporeal，andmanhasalsotheconsciousnessthathistrueBeingliesinwhatisopposedtothecorporeal。Thishasbeenfirmlymaintainedbyreligion，theology，andthesoundcommonsenseofthecommonconsciousness，andthisformofoppositiontoSpinozaappearsfirstofallintheassertionthatfreedomisreal，andthatevilexists。ButbecauseforSpinoza，ontheotherhand，thereexistsonlyabsoluteuniversalsubstanceasthenon-particularized，thetrulyreal—allthatisparticularandindividual，mysubjectivityandspirituality，has，ontheotherhand，asalimitedmodificationwhoseNotiondependsonanother，noabsoluteexistence。Thusthesoul，theSpirit，insofarasitisanindividualBeing，isforSpinozaamerenegation，likeeverythingingeneralthatisdetermined。AsalldifferencesanddeterminationsofthingsandofconsciousnesssimplygobackintotheOnesubstance，onemaysaythatinthesystemofSpinozaallthingsaremerelycastdownintothisabyssofannihilation。Butfromthisabyssnothingcomesout；andtheparticularofwhichSpinozaspeaksisonlyassumedandpresupposedfromtheordinaryconception，withoutbeingjustified。Wereittobejustified，SpinozawouldhavetodeduceitfromhisSubstance；butthatdoesnotopenitselfout，andthereforecomestonovitality，spiritualityoractivity。Hisphilosophyhasonlyarigidandunyieldingsubstance，andnotyetspirit；initwearenotathomewithourselves。ButthereasonthatGodisnotspiritisthatHeisnottheThreeinOne。Substanceremainsrigidandpetrified，withoutBoehme\'ssourcesorsprings；fortheindividualdeterminationsintheformofdeterminationsoftheunderstandingarenotBoehme\'soriginatingspirits，whichenergizeandexpandinoneanother(supra，pp。202，203)。Whatwefindregardingthisparticularthenisthatitisonlyamodificationofabsolutesubstance，which，however，isnotdeclaredtobesuch；forthemomentofnegativityiswhatislackingtothisrigidmotionlessness，whosesingleformofactivityisthis，todivestallthingsoftheirdeterminationandparticularityandcastthembackintotheoneabsolutesubstance，whereintheyaresimplyswallowedup，andalllifeinitselfisutterlydestroyed。ThisiswhatwefindphilosophicallyinadequatewithSpinoza；distinctionsareexternallypresent，itistrue，buttheyremainexternal，sinceeventhenegativeisnotknowninitself。Thoughtistheabsolutelyabstract，andforthatveryreasontheabsolutelynegative；itissointruth，butwithSpinozaitisnotassertedtobetheabsolutelynegative。ButifinoppositiontoSpinozismweholdfasttotheassertionthatSpirit，asdistinguishingitselffromthecorporeal，issubstantial，actual，true，andinthesamewaythatfreedomisnotsomethingmerelyprivative，thenthisactualityinformalthoughtisdoubtlesscorrect，yetitrestsonlyuponfeeling；butthefurtherstepisthattheIdeaessentiallyincludeswithinitselfmotionandvitality，andthatitconsequentlyhasinitselftheprincipleofspiritualfreedom。Ontheonehand，therefore，thedefectofSpinozismisconceivedasconsistinginitswantofcorrespondencewithactuality；butontheothersideitistobeapprehendedinahighersense，ImeaninthesensethatsubstancewithSpinozaisonlytheIdeatakenaltogetherabstractly，notinitsvitality。

If，inconclusion，wesumupthiscriticismthatwehaveoffered，wewouldsaythatontheonehandwithSpinozanegationorprivationisdistinctfromsubstance；forhemerelyassumesindividualdeterminations，anddoesnotdeducethemfromsubstance。OntheotherhandthenegationispresentonlyasNothing，forintheabsolutethereisnomode；thenegativeisnotthere，butonlyitsdissolution，itsreturn:wedonotfinditsmovement，itsBecomingandBeing。Thenegativeisconceivedaltogetherasavanishingmoment—notinitself，butonlyasindividualself-consciousness；itisnotliketheSeparatorwemetwithinBoehme\'ssystem(supra，p。206)。

Self-consciousnessisbornfromthisocean，drippingwiththewaterthereof，i。e。，nevercomingtoabsoluteself-hood；theheart，theindependenceistransfixed—thevitalfireiswanting。Thislackhastobesupplied，themomentofself-consciousnesshastobeadded。Ithasthefollowingtwospecialaspects，whichwenowperceiveemergingandgainingacceptance；inthefirstplacetheobjectiveaspect，thatabsoluteessenceobtainsinself-consciousnessthemodeofanobjectofconsciousnessforwhichthe“other”exists，ortheexistentassuch，andthatwhatSpinoza，understoodbythe“modes”iselevatedtoobjectiverealityitsanabsolutemomentoftheabsolute；

inthesecondplacewehavetheaspectofself-consciousness，individuality，independence。AswasformerlythecasewithrespecttoBaconandBoehme，theformeraspectisheretakenupbytheEnglishman，JohnLocke，thelatterbytheGermanLeibnitz；inthefirstcaseitdidnotappearasamoment，nordiditinthesecondappearasabsoluteNotion。NowwhileSpinozaonlytakesnoticeoftheseordinaryconceptions，and。thehighestpointofviewhereachesinregardtothemisthattheysinkanddisappearintheoneSubstance，Lockeonthecontraryexaminesthegenesisoftheseconceptions，whileLeibnitzopposestoSpinozatheinfinitemultiplicityofindividuals，althoughallthesemonadshaveonemonadasthebasisoftheirBeing。BothLockeandLeibnitzthereforecameforwardasopponentsoftheabovementionedone-sidednessofSpinoza。

1。CollectaneadevitaB。deSpinoza(additaOperibused。PaulusJenn？1802-1803，T。II。)，pp。

593-604，612-628(SpinozaEpist。LIII-LIV。inOper。ed。PaulT。I。pp。638-640)642-665；

Spinoz？Oper。ed。PaulT。II。Pr？f。p。XVI。

2。CollectaneadevitaB。deSpinoza，pp。629-641；Spinoz？Ethic。(Oper。T。II。)Pp。1，3etnot。，33。

3。Spinoz。Ethices，P。I。Prop。V。VIII。X。etSchol。，XIII。pp。37-39，41，42，45。

4。Spinoz。Ethices，P。I。Prop。XVII。，Coroll。I。，II。，etSchol。，Prop。XVIII。，Prop。XX。，etCoroll。

I。Prop。XXI。，XXVI。，XXVII。，XXIX。，XXXII。，XXXIII。Schol。II。pp。51-57，59，61，63，67，68。

5。Spinoz。Ethices，P。II。Prop。I。，II。，VII。etSchol。pp。78，79，82，83。

6。Spinoz。Ethic。P。I。Prop。XXX-XXXII。pp。62，63；P。III。Defin。III。p。132；Prop。XI。Schol。，p。141。

7。Spinoz。Ethices，P。II。Prop。XI。Demonst。etCoroll。pp。86，87；Defin。IV。pp。77，78。

8。Dictionnairehistoriqueetcritique(éditionde1740，T。IV。)，ArticleSpinosa，p。261，NoteN。

No。IV。

9。Spinoz。Ethices，P。II。Prop。XII。，XIII。etSchol。Prop。XIV。，XXIII。，V。pp。87-89，95，102，80，81。

10。Spinoz。Ethices，P。II。Prop。XI。(AxiomI。p。78)etDemonstr。Prop。X。pp。85-87；Prop。

VI。p。81；P。III。Prop。II。pp。133，134。

11。Spinoz。Ethices，P。III。Prop。VI-VIII。Prop。IX。Schol。pp。139，1140；P。II。Prop。XLIX。

Coroll。p。123；P。III。Prop。II。Schol。p。136；P。V。Prop。III。Demonst。etCoroll。pp。272，273。

12。Spinoz。Ethices，P。III。Prop。I。p。132；Prop。III。p。138；P。IV。Pr？f。p。199；P。III。Prop。

XI。Schol。pp。141，142；P。IV。Prop。II。p。205；P。III。Prop。III。etSchol。p。138。

13。Spinoz。Ethices，P。V。Prop。XXXVI。Schol。Prop。XXXVILDemonstr。，Prop。XXXVIII。etSchol。pp。293-295。

14。Spinoz。Ethices，P。II。Prop。XL。Schol。II。pp。113，114。

15。Spinoz。Ethices，P。II。Prop。XLIV。etCoroll。II。pp。117，118；Prop。XLV。p。119；P。V。

Prop。XXX。p。289:P。II。Prop。XXXII。p。107。

16。Spinoz。Ethices，P。V。Prop。XIV。p。280；Prop。VI。p。275；Prop。XXVII。pp。287，288；

Prop。XXXII。Coroll。；Prop。XXXV。pp。291，292。

SectionTwo:PeriodoftheThinkingUnderstandingChapterI。—TheMetaphysicsoftheUnderstandingA3。MALEBRANCHE

ThephilosophyofMalebrancheisinpointofmatterentirelyidenticalwiththatofSpinoza，butithasanother，amorereligiousandmoretheologicalform；onaccountofthisformitneverencounteredtheoppositionmetwithbySpinoza，andforthesamereasonMalebranchehasneverbeenreproachedwithAtheism。

NicholasMalebranchewasbornatParisin1638。Hewassicklyanddeformedinbody，andwashencebroughtupwithgreatcare。Hewasdiffidentandlovedsolitude；inhistwenty-secondyearheenteredthecongrégationdel”oratoire，asortofspiritualorder，anddevotedhimselftothesciences。Inpassingabookseller”sshophehappenedaccidentallytoseeDescartes”workDehomine；hereadit，anditinterestedhimgreatly—somuchsothatthereadingofitbroughtonseverepalpitationandhewasforcedtocease。Thisdecidedhisfuturelife；thereawokeinhimanirrepressibleinclinationforPhilosophy。Hewasamanofmostnobleandgentlecharacter，andofthemostgenuine，andunswerving，piety。HediedatParisin1715，andin，theseventy-seventhyearofhisage。(1)

Hisprincipalworkbearsthetitle:Delarecherchedelavérité。Onepartofitisentirelymetaphysical，butthegreaterpartisaltogetherempirical。Forinstance，Malebrancheinthefirstthreebookstreatslogicallyandpsychologicallyoftheerrorsinsightandhearing，intheimaginationandunderstanding。

a。Whatismostimportantinthisbookishisideaoftheoriginofourknowledge。Hesays:“Theessenceofthesoulisinthought，justasthatofmatterisinextension。Allelse，suchassensation，imaginationandwill，aremodificationsofthought。”Hethusbeginswithtwosides，betweenwhichhesetsanabsolutechasm，andthenhefollowsoutindetailtheCartesianideaoftheassistanceofGodinknowledge。Hismainpointisthat“thesoulcannotattaintoitsconceptionsandnotionsfromexternalthings。”ForwhenIandthethingareclearlyindependentofoneanotherandhavenothingincommon，thetwocancertainlynotenterintorelationwithoneanothernorbeforoneanother。“Bodiesareimpenetrable；theirimageswoulddestroyoneanotheronthewaytotheorgans。”Butfurther:“Thesoulcannotbegetideasfromitself，norcantheybeinborn，”foras“Augustinehassaid，‘Saynotthatyeyourselvesareyourownlight。””Buthowthencomesextension，themanifold，intothesimple，intothespirit，sinceitisthereverseofthesimple，namelythediverse？ThisquestionregardingtheassociationofthoughtandextensionisalwaysanimportantoneinPhilosophy。AccordingtoMalebranchetheansweris，“ThatweseeallthingsinGod。”GodHimselfistheconnectionbetweenusandthem，andthustheunitybetweenthethingandthought。“GodhasinHimtheideasofallthingsbecauseHehascreatedall；GodisthroughHisomnipresenceunitedinthemostintimatewaywithspirits。Godthusistheplaceofspirits，”theUniversalofspirit，“justasspace”istheuniversal，“theplaceofbodies。ConsequentlythesoulknowsinGodwhatisinHim，”bodies，“inasmuchasHesetsforth”(inwardlyconceives)

“createdexistence，becauseallthisisspiritual，intellectual，andpresenttothesoul。"(2)BecausethingsandGodareintellectualandwetooareintellectual，weperceivetheminGodastheyare，sotospeak，intellectualinHim。IfthisbefurtheranalyzeditinnowaydiffersfromSpinozism。

Malebrancheindeedinapopularwayallowssoulandthingstosubsistasindependent，butthisindependencevanishesawaylikesmokewhentheprincipleisfirmlygrasped。Thecatechismsays:

“Godisomnipresent，”andifthisomnipresencebedevelopedSpinozismisarrivedat；andyettheologiansthenproceedtospeakagainstthesystemofidentity，andcryoutaboutPantheism。

b。WemustfurtherremarkthatMalebranchealsomakestheuniversal，thought，theessential，byplacingitbeforetheparticular。“ThesoulhastheNotionoftheinfiniteanduniversal:itknowsnothingexceptingthroughtheIdeawhichithasoftheinfinite；thisIdeamusthencecomefirst。Theuniversalisnotamereconfusionofindividualideas，itisnotaunionofindividualthings。”

AccordingtoLocketheindividualfromwhichtheuniversalisformedprecedes(infra，p。299)；

accordingtoMalebranchetheuniversalIdeaiswhatcomesfirstinman。“Ifwewishtothinkofanythingparticularwethinkfirstoftheuniversal；”itistheprincipleoftheparticular，asspaceisofthings。Allessentialityprecedesourparticularconceptions，andthisessentialitycomesfirst。“Allessentialexistences(essences)comebeforeourordinaryconception；theycannotbesuchexceptingbyGod”spresenceinthemindandspirit。HeitiswhocontainsallthingsinthesimplicityofHisnature。ItseemsevidentthatmindwouldnotbecapableofrepresentingtoitselftheuniversalNotionsofspecies，kind，andsuchlike，ifitdidnotseeallthingscomprehendedinone。”Theuniversalisthusinandforitself，anditdoesnottakeitsrisethroughtheparticular。

“Sinceeachexistentthingisanindividual，wecannotsaythatweseesomethingactuallycreatedwhen，forexample，weseeatriangleingeneral，”forweseeitthroughGod。“Noaccountcanbegivenofhowspiritknowsabstractandcommontruths，exceptingthroughthepresenceofHimwhocanenlightenspiritinaninfiniteway，”becauseHeisinandforHimselftheuniversal。“WehaveaclearideaofGod，”oftheuniversal:“WecanhavesuchonlythroughunionwithHim，forthisideaisnotacreatedone，”butisinandforitself。AswithSpinoza，theoneuniversalisGod，andinsofarasitisdetermined，itistheparticular；weseethisparticularonlyintheuniversal，asweseebodiesinspace。“WealreadyhaveaconceptionofinfiniteBeing，inasmuchaswehaveaconceptionofBeingwithoutregardtowhetheritisfiniteorinfinite。Toknowafinitewemustlimittheinfinite；andthislastmustthusprecede。Thusspiritperceivesallintheinfinite；thisissofarfrombeingaconfusedconceptionofmanyparticularthingsthatallparticularconceptionsaremerelyparticipationsintheuniversalIdeaofinfinitude—inthesamewaythatGoddoesnotreceivethisBeingfrom"finite“creatures，but，”onthecontrary，“allcreaturesonlysubsistthroughHim。"(3)

c。AsregardstheturningofthesoultoGod，MalebranchesayswhatSpinozasaidfromhisethicalpointofview:“ItisimpossiblethatGodshouldhaveanendotherthanHimself(theHolyScripturesplacethisbeyonddoubt)；”thewillofGodcanonlyhavethegood，whatiswithoutdoubtuniversalasitsend。“Hencenotonlyisitessentialthatournaturallove，i。e。，theemotionwhichhebringsforthinourspirit，shouldstriveafterHim"—"thewillisreallylovetowardsGod"

—"butitislikewiseimpossiblethattheknowledgeandthelightHegivestoourspiritshouldmakeanythingelseknownthanwhatisinHim，”forthoughtonlyexistsinunitywithGod。“IfGodweretomakeaspiritandgiveitthesunasanideaorastheimmediateobjectofitsknowledge，GodwouldhavemadethisspiritandtheideaofthisspiritforthesunandnotforHimself。”Allnaturallove，andstillmoreknowledge，andthedesireaftertruth，haveGodastheirend。”Allmotionsofthewillasregardsthecreaturesareonlydeterminationsofmotionasregardsthecreator。”

MalebranchequotesfromAugustine“thatweseeGodevenfromthetimewefirstenteruponthislife(dèscettevie)，throughtheknowledgethatwehaveofeternaltruths。Thetruthisuncreated，unchangeable，immeasurable，eternalaboveallthings；itistruethroughitself，andhasitsperfectionfromnothing。Itmakesthecreatormoreperfect，andallspiritsnaturallyseektoknowit:nowthereisnothingthathastheseperfectionsbutGod，andthusthetruthisGod。Weperceivetheseunchangeableandeternaltruths，henceweseeGod。”“GodindeedseesbutHedoesnotfeelsensuousthings。Ifweseesomethingsensuous，sensationandpurethoughtaretobefoundinourconsciousness。Sensationisamodificationofourspirit；GodoccasionsthisbecauseHeknowsthatoursouliscapableofit。TheIdeawhichisboundupwiththesensationisinGod；weseeit，etc。Thisrelation，thisunionofourmindandspiritwiththeWord(Verbe)ofGod，andofourwillwithHislove，isthatweareformedaftertheimageofGodandinHislikeness。"(4)ThustheloveofGodconsistsinrelatingone”saffectionstotheIdeaofGod；whoeverknowshimselfandthinkshisaffectionsclearly，lovesGod。WefurtherfindsundryemptylitaniesconcerningGod，acatechismforchildrenofeightyearsofagerespectinggoodness，justice，omnipresence，themoralorderoftheworld；inalltheirlifetimetheologiansdonotgetanyfurther。

WehavegiventheprincipalofMalebranche”sideas；theremainderofhisphilosophyiscomposedpartlyofformallogic，andpartlyofempiricalpsychology。Hepassestothetreatmentoferrors，howtheyarise，howthesenses，theimagination，theunderstanding，deceiveus，andhowwemustconductourselvesinordertoeffectaremedy。ThenMalebranchegoeson(T。III。L。VI。

P。I。chap。i。pp。1-3)totherulesandlawsforrecognizingthetruth。ThusherethetermPhilosophywasevenappliedtothemannerinwhichreflectionsonparticularobjectsaredrawnfromformallogicandexternalfacts。

1。Buhle:Gesch。d。neuernPhilosophie，Vol。III。Sec。2，pp。430，431。

2。Malebranche:Delarecherchedelavérité(Paris，1736)，T。II。L。III。PartI。chap。i。pp。4-6；

T。I。L。I。chap。i。pp。6，7；P。IIchap。ii。pp。66-68；chap。iii。p。72；chap。iv。p。84；chap。v。p。

92；chap。vi。pp。95，96。

3。Malebranche:Delarecherchedelavérité，T。II。L。III。PartII。chap。vi。pp。100-102。

4。Malebranche:Delarecherchedelavérité，T。II。L。III。P。II。chap。vi。pp。103-107，109-111。

SectionTwo:PeriodoftheThinkingUnderstandingChapterI。—TheMetaphysicsoftheUnderstandingB1。LOCKE。

WhenexperiencemeansthattheNotionhasobjectiveactualityforconsciousness，itisindeedanecessaryelementinthetotality；butasthisreflectionappearsinLocke，signifyingasitdoesthatweobtaintruthbyabstractionfromexperienceandsensuousperception，itisutterlyfalse，since，insteadofbeingamoment，itismadetheessenceofthetruth。ItisnodoubttruethatagainstthehypothesisoftheinwardimmediacyoftheIdea，andagainstthemethodofsettingitforthindefinitionsandaxioms，asalsoagainstabsolutesubstance，thedemandthatideasshouldberepresentedasresults，andtheclaimsofindividualityandself-consciousness，asserttheirrightstorecognition。InthephilosophyofLockeandLeibnitz，however，thesenecessitiesmakethemselvesknowninanimperfectmanneronly；theonefactwhichiscommontobothphilosophersisthatthey，inoppositiontoSpinozaandMalebranche，takefortheirprincipletheparticular，finitedeterminatenessandtheindividual。AccordingtoSpinozaandMalebranchesubstanceortheuniversalisthetrue，thesoleexistent，theeternal，thatwhichisinandforitself，withoutorigin，andofwhichparticularthingsareonlymodificationswhichareconceivedthroughsubstance。ButherebySpinozahasdoneaninjurytothisnegative；hehencearrivedatnoimmanentdetermination，forallthatisdeterminedandindividualismerelyannihilatedinhissystem。Now，onthecontrary，thegeneralinclinationofconsciousnessistomaintainthedifference，partlyinorderto，markitselfoutasimplicitlyfreeinoppositiontoitsobject-Being，nature，andGod，andpartlyinordertorecognizetheunityinthisopposition，andfromtheoppositionitselftomaketheunityemerge。Butthosewhoweretheinstrumentsofthistendencycomprehendedthemselvesbutlittle，theyhadstillnoclearconsciousnessoftheirtask，norofthemannerinwhichtheirclaimscouldbesatisfied。

WithLocke，thisprinciplemakesitsfirstentranceintoPhilosophyinamannersocompletelyatvariancewiththeinflexibleundifferentiatedidentityofthesubstanceofSpinoza，thatthesensuousandlimited，theimmediatepresentandexistent，isthemainandfundamentalmatter。Lockedoesnotgetbeyondtheordinarypointofviewofconsciousness，viz。thatobjectsoutsideofusaretherealandthetrue。ThefiniteisthusnotgraspedbyLockeasabsolutenegativity，i。e。，initsinfinitude；thisweshallnotfinduntilwecometodealinthethirdplacewithLeibnitz。ItisinahighersensethatLeibnitzassertsindividuality，thedifferentiated，tobeself-existentandindeedobjectless，tobetrueBeing。Thatistosay，itisnotaccordingtohimfinite，butisyetdistinguished；

thus，eachmonadisitselfthetotality。LeibnitzandLockehencelikewisestandinapositionofmutualindependenceandantagonism。

JohnLockewasbornin1632，atWrington，inEngland。HestudiedforhimselftheCartesianphilosophyatOxford，settingasidethescholasticphilosophywhichwasstillinvogue。Hedevotedhimselftothestudyofmedicine，which，however，onaccountofhisdelicatehealth，heneverreallypractised。In1664hewentwithanEnglishambassadorforayeartoBerlin。AfterhisreturntoEngland，hebecameacquaintedwiththeintellectualEarlofShaftesburyofthattime，whoavailedhimselfofhismedicaladvice，andinwhosehousehelivedwithoutrequiringtogivehimselfuptopractice。WhenLordShaftesburybecameLordChancellorofEngland，Lockereceivedanofficefromhim，which，however，hesoonlostbyachangeofministry。Owingtohisdreadoffallingapreytoconsumption，hebetookhimselfin1675toMontpellierforthebenefitofhishealth。Whenhispatroncameintopoweragainheoncemorerecoveredtheplacehehadlost，onlytobeagaindeposedonafreshoverthrowofthisminister，andhewasnowcompelledtofleefromEngland。

“TheactbymeansofwhichLockewasdrivenfromOxford”(whatpostheheldtherewearenottold)“wasnotanenactmentoftheUniversity，butofJamesII。，bywhoseexpresscommand，andbytheperemptoryauthorityofawrittenwarrant，theexpulsionwascarriedout。Fromthecorrespondencethattookplace，itisevidentthatthecollegesubmitteditselfagainstitswilltoameasurewhichitcouldnotresistwithoutcompromisingthepeaceandquietofitsmembers。”

LockewenttoHolland，whichwasatthattimethelandwhereinallwhowereobligedtoeffecttheirescapefromanyoppression，whetherpoliticalorreligious，foundprotection，andinwhichthemostfamousandliberal-mindedmenweretobemetwith。TheCourtpartypersecutedhimevenhere，andbyroyalwarranthewasorderedtobetakenprisonerandsenttoEngland；consequentlyhehadtoremainhiddenwithhisfriends。WhenWilliamofOrangeascendedtheEnglishthrone，aftertheRevolutionof1688，LockereturnedwithhimtoEngland。HewastheremadeCommissionerofTradeandPlantation，gavetotheworldhisfamoustreatiseontheHumanUnderstanding，andfinally，havingwithdrawnfrompublicofficeoraccountofthedelicacyofhishealth，hespenthisremainingyearsinthecountryhousesofEnglishnobles；hediedonthe28thdayofOctober，1704，intheseventy-thirdyearofhislife。(1)

ThephilosophyofLockeismuchesteemed；itisstill，forthemostpart，thephilosophyoftheEnglishandtheFrench，andlikewiseinacertainsenseoftheGermans。Toputitinafewwords，itassertsontheonehandthattruthandknowledgerestuponexperienceandobservation；andontheothertheanalysisofandabstractionfromgeneraldeterminationsisprescribedasthemethodofknowledge；itis，sotospeak，ametaphysicalempiricism，andthisistheordinarymethodadoptedinthesciences。Inrespectofmethod，LockethusemploysanexactlyoppositesystemtothatofSpinoza。InthemethodsofSpinozaandDescartesanaccountoftheoriginofideasmaybedispensedwith；theyareacceptedatonceasdefinitions，suchasthoseofsubstance，theinfinite，mode，extension，etc。，allofwhichconstituteaquiteincoherentlist。Butwerequiretoshowwherethesethoughtscomein，onwhattheyarefounded，andhowtheyareverified。ThusLockehasstriventosatisfyatruenecessity。Forhehasthemeritofhavingdesertedthesystemofmeredefinitions，whichwerebeforethismadethestartingpoint，andofhavingattemptedtomakedeductionofgeneralconceptions，inasmuchashewas，forexample，atthepainstoshowhowsubstantialityarisessubjectivelyfromobjects。ThatisafurtherstepthananyreachedbySpinoza，whobeginsatoncewithdefinitionsandaxiomswhichareunverified。Nowtheyarederived，andnolongeroracularlylaiddown，evenifthemethodandmannerwherebythisauthenticationisestablishedisnottherightone。Thatistosay，herethematterinquestionismerelysubjective，andsomewhatpsychological，sinceLockemerelydescribesthemethodsofmindasitappearstoustobe。Forinhisphilosophywehavemoreespeciallytodealwiththederivationofthegeneralconceptions，orideas，ashecalledthem，thatarepresentinourknowledge，andwiththeiroriginastheyproceedfromwhatisoutwardlyandinwardlyperceptible。Malebranchenodoubtlikewiseaskshowwearriveatconceptions，andthusheapparentlyhasbeforehimthesamesubjectofinvestigationashasLocke。Butfirstly，thispsychologicalelementinMalebrancheismerelythelaterdevelopment，andthentohimtheuniversalorGodisplainlyfirst，whileLockecommencesatoncewithindividualperceptions，andonlyfromthemdoesheproceedtoNotions，toGod。TheuniversaltoLockeis，therefore，merelyalaterresult，theworkofourminds；itissimplysomethingpertainingtothought，assubjective。Everymanundoubtedlyknowsthatwhenhisconsciousnessdevelopsempirically，hecommencesfromfeelings，fromquiteconcreteconditions，andthatitisonlylateronthatgeneralconceptionscomein，whichareconnectedwiththeconcreteofsensationbybeingcontainedtherein。Space，forexample，comestoconsciousnesslaterthanthespacial，thespecieslaterthantheindividual；anditisonlythroughtheactivityofmyconsciousnessthattheuniversalisseparatedfromtheparticularofconception，feeling，etc。Feelingundoubtedlycomeslowest，itistheanimalmodeofspirit；butinitscapacityasthinking，spiritendeavourstotransformfeelingintoitsownform。ThusthecourseadoptedbyLockeisquiteacorrectone，butalldialecticconsiderationsareutterlyandentirelysetaside，sincetheuniversalismerelyanalyzedfromtheempiricalconcrete。AndinthismatterKantreproachesLockewithreason，theindividualisnotthesourceofuniversalconceptions，buttheunderstanding。

AstoLocke\'sfurtherreflections，theyareverysimple。Lockeconsidershowtheunderstandingisonlyconsciousness，andinbeingsoissomethinginconsciousness，andheonlyrecognizestheimplicitinasfarasitisinthesame。

a。Locke\'sphilosophyismoreespeciallydirectedagainstDescartes；who，likePlato，hadspokenofinnateideas。Lockelikewisemakesspecialexaminationofthe“inbornimpressions(notionescommunesinforointerioridescript？)”whichLordHerbertassumesinhisworkDeveritate。

InthefirstbookofhisworkLockecombatstheso-calledinnateideas，theoreticaswellaspractical，i。e。，theuniversal，absolutelyexistentideaswhichatthesametimearerepresentedaspertainingtomindinanaturalway。Lockesaidthatwearrivefirstatthatwhichwecallidea。Bythisheunderstandsnottheessentialdeterminationsofman，butconceptionswhichwehaveandwhicharepresentandexistinconsciousnessassuch:inthesamewayweallhavearmsandlegsaspartsofourbodies，andthedesiretoeatexistsineveryone。InLockewethushavetheconceptionofthesoulasofacontentlesstabularasawhichisby-and-byfilledwithwhatwecallexperience。(2)Theexpression“innateprinciples”wasatthattimecommon，andtheseinnateprincipleshavesometimesbeenfoolishlyspokenof。Buttheirtruesignificationisthattheyareimplicit，thattheyareessentialmomentsinthenatureofthought，qualitiesofagerm，whichdonotyetexist:onlyinrelationtothislastthereisanelementoftruthinLocke\'sconclusions。Asdiverseconceptionsessentiallydeterminedtheyareonlylegitimatizedbyitsbeingshownthattheyareimpliedintheessentialnatureofthought；butaspropositionswhichholdgoodasaxioms，andconceptionswhichareimmediatelyacceptedaslaiddownindefinitions，theyundoubtedlypossesstheformofthatwhichispresentandinborn。Astheyareregardedtheyareboundtohavevalueinandforthemselves；butthisisamereassertion。Fromtheotherpointofviewthequestionofwhencetheycomeisafutileone。Mindisundoubtedlydeterminedinitself，foritistheexplicitlyexistentNotion；itsdevelopmentsignifiesthecomingtoconsciousness。Butthedeterminationswhichitbringsforthfromitselfcannotbecalledinnate，forthisdevelopmentmustbeoccasionedbyanexternal，andonlyonthatdoestheactivityofmindreact，inorderthatitmayforthefirsttimebecomeconsciousofitsreality。

ThegroundsonwhichLockerefutesinnateideasareempirical。“Thereisnothingmorecommonlytakenforgrantedthanthattherearecertainprinciples，bothspeculativeandpractical，universallyagreeduponbyallmankind:whichtherefore，theyargue，mustneedsbeconstantimpressionswhichthesoulsofmenreceiveintheirfirstBeings。”Butthisuniversalconsentisnottobefound。

Wemayinstancetheproposition，“Whatsoeveris，is；andItisimpossibleforthesamethingtobeandnottobe；whichofallothersIthinkhavethemostallowedtitletoinnate。”ButthispropositiondoesnotholdgoodfortheNotion；thereisnothingeitherinheavenorearthwhichdoesnotcontainBeingandnon-Being。Manymen，“Allchildrenandidiots，”saysLocke，“havenottheleastapprehensionofthesepropositions。”“Nopropositioncanbesaidtobeinthemindwhichitneveryetknew，whichitwasneveryetconsciousof……\'Tisusuallyanswered，Thatallmenknowandassenttothem”(thepropositions)“whentheycometotheuseofreason……Ifitbemeantthattheuseofreasonassistsusintheknowledgeofthesemaxims，itwouldprovethemnottobeinnate。”Reasonissaidtobethederivingfromprinciplesalreadyknownunknowntruths。Howthenshouldtheapplicationofreasonberequiredtodiscoversupposedinnateprinciples？Thisisaweakobjection，foritassumesthatbyinnateideasweunderstandthosewhichmanpossessesinconsciousnessasimmediatelypresent。Butdevelopment，inconsciousnessissomethingaltogetherdifferentfromanyinherentdeterminationofreason，andthereforetheexpressioninnateideaisundoubtedlyquitewrong。Innateprinciplesmustbefound“clearestandmostperspicuousnearestthefountain，inchildrenandilliteratepeople，whohavereceivedleastimpressionfromforeignopinion。”Lockegivesfurtherreasonsofasimilarnature，moreespeciallyemployingthosewhichareofapracticalkind-thediversityinmoraljudgments，thecaseofthosewhoareutterlywickedanddepraved，devoidofsenseofrightorconscience。(3)

b。InthesecondbookLockegoesontothenextstage，totheoriginofideas，andseekstodemonstratethisprocessfromexperience-thisisthemainobjectofhisefforts。Thereasonthatthepositivepointofviewwhichheopposestoanyderivationfromwithin，issofalse，isthathederiveshisconceptionsonlyfromoutsideandthusmaintainsBeingfor-another，whilehequiteneglectstheimplicit。Hesays:“Everymanbeingconscioustohimself，thathethinks；andthatwhichhismindisappliedabout，whilethinking，beingtheideasthatarethere；\'tispastdoubt，thatmenhaveintheirmindsseveralideas，suchasthoseexpressedinthewords，whiteness，hardness，sweetness，thinking，motion，man，elephant，army，drunkenness，andothers。”Ideaheresignifiesboththeordinaryconceptionandthought；weunderstandsomethingquitedifferentbythewordidea。“Itisinthefirstplacethentobeinquired，howhecomesbythem”(theseideas)？Innateideashavealreadybeenrefuted。“Letusthensupposethemindtobe，aswesay，whitepaper，voidofallcharacters，withoutanyideas；howcomesittobefurnished？……TothisIanswerinaword，fromExperience:inthatallourknowledgeisfounded。”(4)

Astothequestioninpointwemustinthefirstplacesaythatitistruethatmancommenceswithexperienceifhedesirestoarriveatthought。Everythingisexperienced，notmerelywhatissensuous，butalsowhatexcitesandstimulatesmymind。ConsciousnessthusundoubtedlyobtainsallconceptionsandNotionsfromexperienceandinexperience；theonlyquestioniswhatweunderstandbyexperience。Inausualwaywhenthisisspokenoftheideaofnothingparticularisconveyed；wespeakofitasofsomethingquitewellknown。Butexperienceisnothingmorethantheformofobjectivity；tosaythatitissomethingwhichisinconsciousnessmeansthatithasobjectiveformforconsciousnessorthatconsciousnessexperiencesit，itseesitasanobjective。

Experiencethussignifiesimmediateknowledge，perception，i。e。，Imyselfmusthaveandbesomething，andtheconsciousnessofwhatIhaveandamisexperience。Nowthereisnoquestionastothis，thatwhateverweknow，ofwhateverkinditmaybe，mustbeexperienced，thatrestsintheconceptionofthething。Itisabsurdtosaythatoneknowsanythingwhichisnotinexperience。

Iundoubtedlyknowmen，forinstance，fromexperience，withoutrequiringtohaveseenthemall，forIhave，asman，activityandwill，aconsciousnessrespectingwhatIamandwhatothersare。

Therationalexists，i。e。，itisasanexistentforconsciousness，orthislastexperiencesit；itmustbeseenandheard，itmustbethereorhavebeenthereasaphenomenonintheworld。Thisconnectionofuniversalwithobjectiveishoweverinthesecondplacenottheonlyform，thatoftheimplicitislikewiseabsoluteandessential-thatis，theapprehensionofwhatisexperiencedortheabrogationofthisapparentother-beingandtheknowledgeofthenecessityofthethingthroughitself。Itisnowquiteamatterofindifferencewhetheranythingisacceptedassomethingexperienced，asasuccessionofempiricalideas，ifonemaysosay，orconceptions；orwhetherthesuccessionisasuccessionofthoughts，i。e。，implicitlyexistent。

Locketreatsofthevariouskindsoftheseideasimperfectlyandempiricallymerely。

AccordingtoLockesimpleideasarise，partlyfromoutward，andpartlyfrominwardexperience。

Forexperiences，hesays，areinthefirstplacesensations；theothersideisreflection，theinwarddeterminationsofconsciousness。(5)Fromsensation，fromtheorgansofsightforinstance，theconceptionsofcolour，light，etc。，arise；therefurtherarisesfromoutwardexperiencetheideaofimpenetrability，offigure，rest，motionandsuchlike。Fromreflectionscometheideasoffaith，doubt，judgment，reasoning，thinking，willing，etc。；frombothcombined，pleasure，pain，etc。Thisisaverycommonplaceaccountofthematter。

AfterLockehaspre-supposedexperience，hegoesontosaythatitistheunderstandingwhichnowdiscoversanddesirestheuniversal-thecomplexideas。TheBishopofWorcestermadetheobjectionthat“Iftheideaofsubstancebegroundeduponplainandevidentreason，thenwemustallowanideaofsubstancewhichcomesnotinbysensationorreflection。”Lockereplies:

“Generalideascomenotintothemindbysensationorreflection，butarethecreaturesorinventionsoftheunderstanding。Themindmakesthemfromideaswhichithasgotbysensationandreflection。”Theworkofthemindnowconsistsinbringingforthfromseveralsimpleso-calledideasanumberofnewones，bymeansofitsworkinguponthismaterialthroughcomparing，distinguishingandcontrastingit，andfinallythroughseparationorabstraction，wherebytheuniversalconceptions，suchasspace，time，existence，unityanddiversity，capacity，causeandeffect，freedom，necessity，taketheirrise。“Themindinrespectofitssimpleideasiswhollypassive，andreceivesthemallfromtheexistenceandoperationofthings，suchassensationorreflectionoffersthem，withoutbeingabletomakeanyoneidea。”But“themindoftenexercisesanactivepowerinmakingtheseseveralcombinations。Foritbeingoncefurnishedwithsimpleideasitcanputthemtogetherinseveralcombinations。”AccordingtoLockethereforethoughtitselfisnottheessenceofthesoul，butoneofitspowersandmanifestations。Hemaintainsthoughttobeexistentinconsciousnessasconsciousthought，andthusbringsitforwardasafactinhisexperience，thatwedonotalwaysthink。Experiencedemonstratesdreamlesssleepwhenthesleepisprofound。Lockequotestheexampleofamanwhorememberednodreamuntilhehadreachedhistwenty-fifthyear。ItisasintheXenien，-(6)

Oftschonwarich，undhab\'wirklichangarnichtsgedacht。

Thatistosay，myobjectisnotathought。Butsensuousperceptionandrecollectionarethought，andthoughtistruth。(7)Locke，however，placestherealityoftheunderstandingonlyintheformalactivityofconstitutingnewdeterminationsfromthesimpleconceptionsreceivedbymeansofperception，throughtheircomparisonandthecombinationofseveralintoone；itistheapprehensionoftheabstractsensationswhicharecontainedintheobjects。Lockelikewisedistinguishes(Bk。11。chap。xi。§15-17)betweenpureandmixedmodes。Puremodesaresimpledeterminationssuchaspower，number，infinitude；insuchexpressionsascausalitywereach，ontheotherhand，amixedmode。

Lockenowexplainsindetailthemannerinwhichthemind，fromthesimpleideasofexperience，reachesmorecomplexideas；butthisderivationofgeneraldeterminationsfromconcreteperceptionismostunmeaning，trivial，tiresomeanddiffuse；itisentirelyformal，anemptytautology。

Forinstanceweformthegeneralconceptionofspacefromtheperceptionofthedistanceofbodiesbymeansofsightandfeeling。(8)Orinotherwords，weperceiveadefinitespace，abstractfromit，andthenwehavetheconceptionofspacegenerally；theperceptionofdistancesgivesusconceptionsofspace。Thishoweverisnodeduction，butonlyasettingasideofotherdeterminations；sincedistanceitselfisreallyspace，mindthusdeterminesspacefromspace。

Similarlywereachthenotionoftimethroughtheunbrokensuccessionofconceptionsduringourwakingmoments，(9)i。e，。fromdeterminatetimeweperceivetimeingeneral。Conceptionsfollowoneanotherinacontinualsuccession；ifwesetasidetheparticularelementthatispresentwetherebyreceivetheconceptionoftime。Substance(whichLockedoesnotacceptinsoloftyasenseasSpinoza)，acomplexidea，hencearisesfromthefactthatweoftenperceivesimpleideassuchasblue，heavy，etc。，inassociationwithoneanother。Thisassociationwerepresenttoourselvesassomethingwhichsotospeaksupportsthesesimpleideas，orinwhichtheyexist。(10)

Lockelikewisededucesthegeneralconceptionofpower。(11)Thedeterminationsoffreedomandnecessity，causeandeffect，arethenderivedinasimilarway。“Inthenoticethatoursensestakeoftheconstantvicissitudeofthings，wecannotbutobserve，thatseveralparticulars，bothqualitiesandsubstance，begintoexist；andthattheyreceivethistheirexistencefromthedueapplicationandoperationofsomeotherbeing。Fromthisobservationwegetourideasofcauseandeffect，”

forinstancewhenwaxismeltedbythefire。(12)Lockegoesontosay:“Everyone，Ithink，findsinhimselfapowertobeginorforbear，continueorputanendtoseveralactionsinhimself。Fromtheconsiderationoftheextentofthispowerofthemindovertheactionsoftheman，whicheveryonefindsinhimself，arisetheideasoflibertyandnecessity。”(13)

Wemaysaythatnothingcanbemoresuperficialthanthisderivationofideas。Thematteritself，theessence，isnottoucheduponatall。Adeterminationisbroughtintonoticewhichiscontainedinaconcreterelationship；hencetheunderstandingontheonehandabstractsandontheotherestablishesconclusions。Thebasisofthisphilosophyismerelytobefoundinthetransferenceofthedeterminatetotheformofuniversality，butitwasjustthisfundamentalessencethatwehadtoexplain。AstothisLockeconfessesofspace，forexample，thathedoesnotknowwhatitreallyis。(14)Thisso-calledanalysisbyLockeofcomplexconceptions，andhisso-calledexplanationofthesame，has，onaccountofitsuncommonclearnessandlucidityofexpression，founduniversalacceptance。Forwhatcanbeclearerthantosaythatwehavethenotionoftimebecauseweperceivetime，ifwedonotactuallyseeit，andthatweconceiveofspacebecauseweseeit？TheFrenchhaveacceptedthismostreadilyandtheyhavecarrieditfurtherstill；theirIdéologiecontainsnothingmorenorless。