第9章

1。LaviedeMr。LeibnitzparMr。leChevalierdeJaucourt(EssaisdeThéodicée，parLeibnitz，Amsterdam，1747，T。I。)，pp。1-28，45，59-62，66-74，77-80，87-92，110-116，148-151；

Brucker。Hist。crit。phil。，T。IV。P。II。pp。335-368；LeibnitziiOperaomnia(ed。Dutens)，T。II。，P

I。pp。45，46。

2。ViedeMr。Leibnitz，pp。134-143；Brucker。Hist。crit。philos。T。IV。P。II。pp。385，389；

Tennemann，vol。xi。pp。181，182。

3。LeibnitziiOpera，T。II。P。I。pp。32-39。

4。Ibidem，Principiaphilosophi？，pp。20-31。

5。cf。Leibnitz:EssaisdeThéodicée，T。I。P。I。§10，p。86。

6。Leibnitz:Principesdelanatureetlagrace，§1，p。32(RecueildediversespiècesparDes-Maiseaux，T。II。p。485)；Principiaphilosophi？，§1，2，p。20。

7。LeibnitziiDeipsanaturasivedeviinsitaactionibusquecreaturarum(Oper。T。II。P。II。)，§11，p。55，Principiaphilosophi？，§3-6，18，pp。20-22；Principesdelanatureetdelagrace，§2，p。

32。

8。LeibnitziiPrincipaphilosophi？，§7，p。21；Troisièmeéclaircissementdusystèmedelacommunicationdessubstances(Oper。T。II。P。I。)，p。73(Recueil，T。II，p。402)。

9。LeibnitziiPrincipiaphilosophi？，§8，9，p。21；Oper。T。II。P。I。pp。128，129，§4，5:Iln\'yapointdeuxindividusindiscrenables。Ungentilhommed\'espritdemesamis，enparlantavecmoienprésencedeMad。l\'ElectricedanslejardindeHerrenhausen，crutqu\'iltrouveraitbiendeuxfeuillesentièrementsemblables。Mad。l\'Electricel\'endéfia，etilcourtlongtempsenvainpourenchercher。Deuxgouttesd\'eauoudelaitregardéesparlemicroscopesetrouverontdiscernables。

C\'estunargumentcontrelesAtomes(Recueil，T。I。p。50)-Cf。Hegel\'sWerke，Vol。IV。p。45。

10。LeibnitziiPrincipiaphilosophi？，§10-16，pp。21，22；Principesdelanatureetdelagrace，§

2，p。32。

11。LeibnitziiPrincipiaphilosophi？，§19-23，pp。22，23；Principesdelanatureetdelagrace，§

4，pp。33，34；Nouveauxessaissurl\'entendementhumain(？uvresphilosophiquesdeLeibnitzparRaspe)，Bk。II。chap。ix。§4，p。90。

12。LeibnitziiDeaminabrutorum(Op。T。II。P。I。)，§2-4，pp。230，231。

13。LeibnitziiOper。T。II。P。I。pp。214，215，§3；Deipsanaturasivedeviinsita，§11，p。55；

Systèmenouveaudelanatureetdelacommunicationdessubstances(Op。T。II。P。I)，pp。50，53。

14。LeibnitziiOper。T。II。P。I。pp。79，121，234-237，280，295；Nouveauxessaissurl\'entendementhumain，Bk。II。chap。xiii。§15，17，pp。106，107。

15。Leibnitz:Nouveauxessaissurl\'entendementhumain，Bk。II。chap。xii。§7，pp。102，103；

chap。xxi。§72，p。170；chap。xxiv。§1，p。185。

16。LeibnitziiOper。T。II。P。I。p。39；Nouveauxessaissurl\'entendementhumain，Bk。III。chap。vi。

§24，p。278；§39，p。290。

17。LeibnitziiOper。T。II。P。II。p。60；Nouveauxessaissurl\'entendementhumain，Bk。II。chap。

xxiii。§23，p。181。

18。LeibnitziiPrincipiaphilosophim，§65-71，p。28；Principesdelanatureetdelagrace，§3，4，pp。32，33。

19。LeibnitziiPrincipiaphilosophim，§29-31，p。24；Principesdelanatureetdelagrace，§5，p。

34；EssaisdeTh6odic6e，T。I。P。1。§44，p。115。

20。Leibnitz:Priucipesdelanatureetdelagrace，§7，p。36。

21。Leibnitz:Principesdelanatureetdelagrace，§8，p。35；Principiaphilosophi？，§43-46，p。

25。

22。Leibnitz:EssaisdeThéodicée，T。I。P。I。§6-8，pp。83-85；Principesdelanatureetdelagrace，§10，p。36。

23。Leibnitz:EssaisdeThéodicée，T。I。P。I。§20，pp。96，97；§32，33，pp。106，107；T。II。P。

II。§153，pp。57，58；§378，pp。256，257。

24。LeibnitziiCausaDeiassertaperjustitiamejus(EssaisdeThéodicée，T。II。)，§34-39，pp。

385，386。

25。Leibnitz:Principesdelanatureetdelagrace，§3，p。33；Premieréclaircissementdusystèmedelacommunicationdessubstances，p。70。

26。Leibnitz:Secondettroisièmeéclaircissemensdusystèmedelacommunicationdessubstances，pp。71-73。

27。LeibnitziiPrincipiaphilosophi？，§82，p。30；Principesdelanatureetdelagrace，§11，p。

36。

28。Leibnitz:Systèmenouveaudelanatureetdelacommunicationdessubstances，pp。54，55。

29。LeibnitziiPrincipiaphilosophi？，§90，p。31；Principesdelanatureetdelagrace，§12，13，pp。36，37；§15，pp。37，38。

30。LeibnitziiOper。T。II。P。I。pp。75，76。

31。LeibnitziiPrincipiaphilosoph。，§58-62，p。27；Oper。T。II。P。I。pp。46，47。

32。Leibnitz:EssaisdeThéodicée，T。I。P。I。§9，pp。85，86。

33。Leibnitz:Principesdelanatureetdelagrace，§12，13，pp。36，37；Oper。T。II。P。I。p。337。

34。Leibnitz:EssaisdeThéodicée，T。II。P。III。§291，pp。184，185；T。I。P。I。§50，p。119。

SectionTwo:PeriodoftheThinkingUnderstandingChapterI。—TheMetaphysicsoftheUnderstandingC2。WOLFF

ThephilosophyofWolffisdirectlyconnectedwiththatofLeibnitz，forreallyitisapedanticsystematizationofthelatter，forwhichreasonitislikewisecalledtheLeibnitz-Wolffiansystemofphilosophy。Wolffattainedtogreatdistinctioninmathematicsandmadehimselffamousbyhisphilosophyaswell；thelatterwasforlongpredominantinGermany。InWolff，asateacherdealingwiththeunderstanding，wefindasystematicexpositionofthephilosophicelementpresentinhumanconceptionsasawhole。AsregardshisconnectionwithGermanculturegenerally，greatandimmortalpraiseismoreespeciallyduetohim；beforeallothershemaybetermedtheteacheroftheGermans。WemayindeedsaythatWolffwasthefirsttonaturalizephilosophyinGermany。

TschirnhausenandThomasiuslikewiseparticipatedinthishonour，forthespecialreasonthattheywroteuponPhilosophyintheGermanlanguage。InregardtothematterofthephilosophyofTschirnhausenandThomasiuswehavenotmuchtosay；itisso-calledhealthyreason-thereisinitthesuperficialcharacterandtheemptyuniversalityalwaystobefoundwhereabeginningismadewiththought。Inthiscasetheuniversalityofthoughtsatisfiesusbecauseeverythingispresentthere，justasitispresentinamoralmaximwhichhas，however，nodeterminatecontentinitsuniversality。Wolff，then，wasthefirsttomake，notexactlyPhilosophy，butthoughtsintheformofthought，intoageneralpossession，andhesubstitutedthisinGermanyformeretalkoriginatingfromfeeling，fromsensuousperception，andfromtheordinaryconception。Thisismostimportantfromthepointofviewofculture，andyetitdoesnotreallyconcernushere，exceptinginsofarasthecontentinthisformofthoughthascauseditselftoberecognizedasPhilosophy。Thisphilosophy，asaphilosophyoftheunderstanding，becametheordinarycultureoftheday；init，determinate，intelligentthoughtisthefundamentalprinciple，anditextendsoverthewholecircleofobjectswhichfallwithintheregionofknowledge。WolffdefinedtheworldofconsciousnessforGermany，andfortheworldingeneral，inthesamewidesenseinwhichwemaysaythatthiswasdonebyAristotle。WhatdistinguisheshimfromAristotleisthatinsodoingthepointofviewthatheadoptedwasthatoftheunderstandingmerely，whileAristotletreatedthesubjectspeculatively。

ThephilosophyofWolffishencenodoubtbuiltonfoundationslaidbyLeibnitz，butyetinsuchamannerthatthespeculativeinterestisquiteeliminatedfromit。Thespiritualphilosophy，substantialinahighersense，whichwefoundemergingfirstinBoehme，thoughstillinapeculiarandbarbarousform，hasbeenquitelostsightof，andhasdisappearedwithoutleavinganytracesoreffectsinGermany；hisverylanguagewasforgotten。

TheprincipaleventsinChristianWolff\'slifearethese:Hewasthesonofabaker，andwasbornatBreslauin1679。HefirststudiedTheologyandthenPhilosophy，andin1707hebecameProfessorofMathematicsandPhilosophyatHalle。Herethepietistictheologians，andmoreespeciallyLange，treatedhiminthebasestmanner。Pietydidnottrustthisunderstanding；forpiety，ifitistrue，embodiesacontentwhichisspeculativeinnature，andwhichpassesbeyondtheunderstanding。Ashisopponentscouldmakenoheadwaybytheirwritings，theyresortedtointrigues。TheycausedittobeconveyedtoKingFrederickWilliamI。，thefatherofFrederickII。，aroughmanwhotookaninterestinnothingbutsoldiers，thataccordingtothedeterminismofWolff，freewillwasimpossible，andthatsoldierscouldnothencedesertoftheirownfreewill，butbyaspecialdispositionofGod(pre-establishedharmony)adoctrinewhich，ifdisseminatedamongstthemilitary，wouldbeextremelydangerous。Theking，muchenragedbythis，immediatelyissuedadecreethatwithinforty-eighthoursWolffshouldleaveHalleandthePrussianStates，underpenaltyofthehalter。WolffthusleftHalleonthe23rdofNovember，1723。ThetheologiansaddedtoallthisthescandalofpreachingagainstWolffandhisphilosophy，andthepiousFrankethankedGodonhiskneesinchurchfortheremovalofWolff。Buttherejoicingsdidnotlastlong。

WolffwenttoCassel，wasthereimmediatelyinstalledfirstprofessorinthephilosophicfacultyatMarburg，andatthesametimemadeamemberoftheAcademiesofScienceofLondon，Paris，andStockholm。ByPetertheFirstofRussiahewasmadeVice-PresidentofthenewlyinstitutedAcademyinSt。Petersburg。WolffwasalsosummonedtoRussia，butthisinvitationhedeclined；hereceived，however，anhonorarypost，hewasmadeaBaronbytheElectorofBavaria，and，inshort，loadedwithpublichonourswhich，moreespeciallyatthattime，thoughevennowitisthecase，wereverymuchthoughtofbythegeneralpublic，andwhichweretoogreatnottomakeaprofoundsensationinBerlin。InBerlinacommissionwasappointedtopassjudgmentontheWolffianphilosophy-forthisithadnotbeenpossibletoeradicate-anditdeclaredthesametobeharmless，thatistosay，freefromalldangertostateandreligion；italsoforbadethetheologianstomakeitasubjectofdispute，andaltogetherputanendtotheirclamour。FrederickWilliamnowissuedarecallinveryrespectfultermstoWolff，who，however，hesitatedtocomplywithitowingtohislackofconfidenceinitssincerity。OntheaccessionofFrederickII。in1740hewasagainrecalledintermsofthehighesthonour(Langehadmeanwhiledied)，andonlythendidbecomply。

WolffbecameVice-ChancelloroftheUniversity，butheoutlivedhisrepute，andhislecturesattheendwereverypoorlyattended。Hediedin1754。(1)

LikeTschirnhausenandThomasius，Wolffwroteagreatpartofhisworksinhismothertongue，whileLeibnitzforthemostpartwroteonlyinLatinorFrench。Thisisanimportantmatter，for，aswehavealreadynoticed(pp。114and150)，itisonlywhenanationpossessesascienceinitsownlanguagethatitcanreallybesaidtobelongtoit；andinPhilosophymostofallthisisrequisite。Forthoughthasinitthisverymomentofpertainingtoself-consciousnessorofbeingabsolutelyitsown；whenone\'sownlanguageisthevehicleofexpression，aswhenwetalkof"Bestimmtheit"

insteadof"Determination，"and"Wesen"insteadof"Essenz，"itisimmediatelypresenttoourconsciousnessthattheconceptionsareabsolutelyitsown；ithastodealwiththeseatalltimes，andtheyareinnowayforeigntoit。TheLatinlanguagehasaphraseology，adefinitesphereandrangeofconception；itisatoncetakenforgrantedthatwhenmenwriteinLatintheyareatlibertytobedull；itisimpossibletoreadorwritewhatmenpermitthemselvestosayinLatin。ThetitlesofWolff\'sphilosophicworksareperpetuallyofthisnature:"Rationalthoughtsonthepowersofthehumanunderstandingandtheirrightusesintheknowledgeofthetruth，"Halle，1712，8vo；

"RationalthoughtsonGod，theworld，andthesoulofman，likewiseonallthingsgenerally，"

FrankfortandLeipzig，1719；"Ontheactionandconductofmen，"Halle，1720；"OnSocialLife，"

Halle，1720；"OntheoperationsofNature，"Halle，1723，andsoon。WolffwroteGermanandLatinquartosoneverydepartmentofPhilosophy，evenoneconomics-twenty-threethickvolumesofLatin，oraboutfortyquartosaltogether。Hismathematicalworksmakeagoodmanymorequartos。HebroughtintogeneralusethedifferentialandintegralcalculusofLeibnitz。

ItisonlyinitsgeneralcontentandtakenasawholethatWolff\'sphilosophyisthephilosophyofLeibnitz，thatistosay，onlyinrelationtothefundamentaldeterminationsofmonadsandtothetheodicy-totheseheremainedfaithful；anyothercontentisempiric，derivedfromourfeelingsanddesires。WolfflikewiseacceptedintheirentiretyalltheCartesianandotherdefinitionsofgeneralideas。Hencewefindinhimabstractpropositionsandtheirproofsmingledwithexperiences，ontheindubitabletruthofwhichhebuildsalargepartofhispropositions；andhemustsobuildandderivehisfoundationsifacontentistoresultatall。WithSpinoza，onthecontrary，nocontentistobefoundexceptingabsolutesubstanceandaperpetualreturnintothesame。ThegreatnessofWolff\'sservicestothecultureofGermany，whichnow，appearedquiteindependentlyandwithoutanyconnectionwithanearlierandprofoundermetaphysicalstandpoint(supra，p。350)，areinproportiontothebarrennessandinwardcontentlessconditionintowhichPhilosophyhadsunk。

Thishedividedintoitsformaldisciplines，spinningitout，intodeterminationsoftheunderstandingwithapedanticapplicationofgeometricmethods；and，contemporaneouslywiththeEnglishphilosophers，hemadethedogmatismofthemetaphysicsoftheunderstandingfashionable，thatisa，philosophizingwhichdeterminestheabsoluteandrationalbymeansofself-exclusivethought-determinationsandrelationships(suchasoneandmany，simpleandcompound，finiteandinfinite，causalconnection，&c。)。WolffentirelydisplacedtheAristotelianphilosophyoftheschools，andmadePhilosophyintoanordinarysciencepertainingtotheGermannation。ButbesidesthishegavePhilosophythatsystematicandrequisitedivisionintosectionswhichhasdowntothepresentdayservedasasortofstandard。

IntheoreticphilosophyWolfffirsttreatsofLogicpurifiedfromscholasticinterpretationsordeductions；itisthelogicoftheunderstandingwhichhehassystematized。ThesecondstageisMetaphysics，whichcontainsfourparts:firstthereisOntology，thetreatmentofabstractandquitegeneralphilosophiccategories，suchasBeinganditsbeingtheOneandGood；inthisabstractmetaphysictherefurthercomesaccident，substance，causeandeffect，thephenomenon，&c。NextinorderisCosmology，ageneraldoctrineofbody，thedoctrineoftheworld；herewehaveabstractmetaphysicalpropositionsrespectingtheworld，thatthereisnochance，noleapsorboundsinnature-thelawofcontinuity。Wolffexcludesnaturalscienceandnaturalhistory。Thethirdpartofthemetaphysicisrationalpsychologyorpneumatology，thephilosophyofthesoul，whichdealswiththesimplicity，immortality，immaterialityofthesoul。Finally，thefourthisnaturaltheology，whichsetsforththeproofsoftheexistenceofGod。(2)Wolffalsoinserts(chap。iii。)anempiricalpsychology。PracticalphilosophyhedividesintotheRightsofNature，Morality，theRightsofNationsorPolitics，andEconomics。

Thewholeispropoundedingeometricformssuchasdefinitions，axioms，theorems，scholia，corollaries，&c。Inmathematicstheunderstandingisinitsproperplace，forthetrianglemustremainthetriangle。Wolffontheonehandstarteduponalargerangeofinvestigation，andonequiteindefiniteincharacter，andontheother，heldtoastrictlymethodicalmannerwithregardtopropositionsandtheirproofs。ThemethodisreallysimilartothatofSpinoza，onlyitismorewoodenandlifelessthanhis。Wolffappliedthesamemethodstoeverysortofcontent-eventothatwhichisaltogetherempirical，suchashisso-calledappliedmathematics，intowhichheintroducesmanyusefularts，bringingthemostordinaryreflectionsanddirectionsintothegeometricform。Inmanycasesthisundoubtedlygiveshisworkamostpedanticaspect，especiallywhenthecontentdirectlyjustifiesitselftoourconceptionwithoutthisformatall。ForWolffproceedsbyfirstlayingdowncertaindefinitions，whichreallyrestuponourordinaryconceptions，sincethesehetranslatedintotheemptyformofdeterminationsoftheunderstanding。Hencethedefinitionsaremerelynominaldefinitions，andweknowwhethertheyarecorrectonlybyseeingwhethertheycorrespondtoconceptionswhicharereferredtotheirsimplethoughts。Thesyllogismistheformofrealimportanceinthismodeofreasoning，andwithWolffitoftenattainstoitsextremeofrigidityandformalism。

Undermathematics，whichisthesubjectoffoursmallvolumes，Wolffalsotreatsofarchitectureandmilitaryscience。OneofthepropositionsinArchitectureisthis:"Windowsmustbewideenoughfortwopersons。"Themakingofadoorisalsopropoundedasatask，andthesolutionthereofgiven。Thenextbestexamplecomesfromtheartofwarfare。The"Fourthproposition。Theapproachtothefortressmustalwaysbeharderfortheenemythenearerhecomestoit。"Insteadofsayingbecausethedangerisgreater，whichwouldbetrivial，therefollowsthe"Proof。Thenearertheenemycomestothefortress，thegreaterthedanger。Butthegreaterthedangerthegreatertheresistancethatmustbeofferedinordertodefytheattacks，and，sofarasmaybe，avertthedanger。Hencethenearertheenemyistothefortthehardermusttheapproachbemadeforhim。Q。E。D。"(3)Sincetheincreaseofthedangerisgivenasthereason，thewholeisfalse，andthecontrarymaybesaidwithequaltruth。Forifatthebeginningallpossibleresistanceisofferedtotheenemy，hecannotgetnearerthefortressatall，andthusthedangercannotbecomegreater。

Thegreaterresistancehasarealcause，andnotthisfoolishone-namely，thatbecausethegarrisonisnowatcloserquarters，andconsequentlyoperatesinanarrowfield，itcanofferagreaterresistance。InthismosttrivialwayWolffproceedswitheverysortofcontent。Thisbarbarismofpedantry，orthispedantryofbarbarism，representedasitisinitswholebreadthandextent，necessarilybroughtitselfintodisrepute；andwithouttherebeingadefiniteconsciousnessofthereasonwhythegeometricmethodisnottheonlyandultimatemethodofknowledge，instinctandanimmediateconsciousnessofthefoolishnessofitsapplicationscausedthismethodtobesetaside。

C3。THEPOPULARPHILOSOPHYOF

GERMANY。

Popularphilosophyflattersourordinaryconsciousness，makesittheultimatestandard。AlthoughwithSpinozawebeginwithpre-supposeddefinitions，thecontentisstillprofoundlyspeculativeinnature，anditisnotderivedfromtheordinaryconsciousness。InSpinozathinkingisnotmerelytheform，forthecontentbelongstothinkingitself；itisthecontentofthoughtinitself。Inthespeculativecontenttheinstinctofreasonsatisfiesitselfonitsownaccount，becausethiscontent，asatotalitywhichintegratesitselfwithinitself，atonceinitselfjustifiesitselftothought。ThecontentinSpinozaisonlywithoutgroundinsofarasithasnoexternalground，butisagroundinitself。Butifthecontentisfinite，ademandforanexternalgroundisindicated，sinceinsuchacasewedesiretohaveagroundotherthanthisfinite。InitsmatterthephilosophyofWolffisindeedapopularphilosophy，evenifinformitstillmakesthoughtauthoritative。UntilthetimeofKantthephilosophyofWolffwasthuspre-eminent，Baumgarten，Crusius，andMosesMendelssohnworkedeachofthemindependentlyonthesamelinesasWolff；thephilosophyofthelast-mentionedwaspopularandgracefulinform。TheWolffianphilosophywasthuscarriedon，althoughithadcastoffitspedanticmethods:nofurtherprogresswashowevermade。Thequestiondealtwithwashowperfectioncouldbeattained-whatitispossibletothinkandwhatnot；metaphysicwasreducedtoitsslightestconsistencyandtoitscompletestvacuity，sothatinitstexturenotasinglethreadremainedsecure。Mendelssohnconsideredhimself，andwasconsidered，thegreatestofphilosophers，andwaslaudedassuchbyhisfriends。Inhis"Morgenstunden"wereallyfindadryWolffianphilosophy，howevermuchthesegentlemenendeavouredtogivetheirdullabstractionsabrightPlatonicform。

TheformsofPhilosophywhichwehaveconsideredbearthecharacterwhichpertainsspeciallytometaphysics，ofproceedingfromgeneraldeterminationsoftheunderstanding，butofcombiningtherewithexperienceandobservation，ortheempiricmethodingeneral。Onesideofthismetaphysicisthattheoppositesofthoughtarebroughtintoconsciousness，andthatattentionisdirecteduponthesolutionofthiscontradiction。ThoughtandBeingorextension，Godandtheworld，goodandevil，thepowerandprescienceofGodontheoneside，andtheevilintheworldandhumanfreedomontheother:thesecontradictions，theoppositesofsoulandspirit，thingsconceivedandthingsmaterial，andtheirmutualrelation，haveoccupiedallmen\'sattention。Thesolutionoftheseoppositesandcontradictionshasstilltobegiven，andGodissetforthastheOneinwhomallthesecontradictionsaresolved。Thisiswhatiscommontoallthesephilosophiesasfarastheirmainelementsareconcerned。Yetwemustlikewiseremarkthatthesecontradictionsarenotsolvedinthemselves，i。e。thatthenullityofthesuppositionisnotdemonstratedinitself，andtherebyatrueconcretesolutionhasnotcometopass。EvenifGodisrecognisedassolvingallcontradictions，Godasthesolutionofthesecontradictionsisamatterofwordsratherthansomethingconceivedandcomprehended。IfGodiscomprehendedinHisqualities，andprescience，omnipresence，omniscience，power，wisdom，goodness，justice，&c。，areconsideredasqualitiesofGodHimself，theysimplyleadtocontradictions；andthesecontradictions，Leibnitz(supra，p。348)soughttoremovebysayingthatthequalitiestemperoneanother，i。e。thattheyarecombinedinsuchawaythatoneannulstheother。This，however，isnorealcomprehensionofsuchcontradiction。

ThismetaphysiccontrastsgreatlywiththeoldphilosophyofaPlatooranAristotle。Totheoldphilosophywecanalwaysturnagainandadmititstruth；itissatisfyinginthestageofdevelopmentithasreached-aconcretecentre-pointwhichmeetsalltheproblemssetbythoughtasthesearecomprehended。Inthismodernmetaphysic，however，theoppositesaremerelydevelopedintoabsolutecontradictions。Godisindeedgivenastheirabsolutesolution，butonlyasanabstractsolution，asaBeyond；onthissideallcontradictionsare，asregardstheircontent，unsolvedandunexplained。GodisnotcomprehendedastheOneinwhomthesecontradictionsareeternallyresolved；HeisnotcomprehendedasSpirit，astheTrinity。ItisinHimaloneasSpirit，andasSpiritwhichisThreeinOne，thatthisoppositionofHimselfandHisOther，theSon，iscontained，andwithittheresolutionofthesame；thisconcreteIdeaofGodasreason，hasnotasyetfoundanentranceintoPhilosophy。

Inorderthatwemaynowcastaretrospectiveglanceoverthephilosophiceffortsofothernations，weshallapplyourselvestothefurtherprogressofPhilosophy。OncemoreweseeScepticismmakingitswayintothisandphilosophyoftheunderstanding。Butthistimeitis，properlyspeaking，intheformofIdealism，orthedeterminationsaresubjectivedeterminationsofself-consciousness。

IntheplaceofthoughtweconsequentlyfindtheNotionnowmakingitsappearance。JustaswiththeStoicsdeterminatenessisheldtobeanobjectofthought，wehaveinmoderntimesthissamemanifestationofthoughtastheunmovedformofsimplicity。Onlyheretheimageorinnerconsciousnessoftotalityispresent，theabsolutespiritwhichtheworldhasbeforeitasitstruthandtowhoseNotionitmakesitsway-thisisanotherinwardprinciple，anotherimplicitudeofmindwhich，itendeavourstobringforthfromitselfandforitself，sothatreasonisacomprehensionofthesame，orhasthecertitudeofbeingallreality。Withtheancientsreason，astheimplicitandexplicitBeingofconsciousness，hadonlyanetherealandformalexistenceaslanguage，buthereithascertaintyasexistentsubstance。HencewithDescartesthereistheunityoftheNotionandBeing，andwithSpinozatheuniversalreality。ThefirstcommencementoftheNotionofthemovementoffixedthoughtsinthemselvesisfoundinthis，thatthemovementwhich，asmethod，simplyfallsoutsideitsobject，comeswithinit，orthatself-consciousnesscomeswithinthought。

Thoughtisimplicitudewithoutexplicitude，anobjectivemodebearingnoresemblancetoasensuousthing；andyetitisquitedifferentfromtheactualityofself-consciousness。ThisNotionwhichwenowfindenteringintothought，hasthethreekindsofformwhichwestillhavetoconsider；inthefirstplaceithasthatofindividualself-consciousnessortheformalconceptiongenerally；secondly，thatofuniversalself-consciousness，whichappliesitselftoallobjectswhethertheybeobjectsofthought，determinateconceptions，orhavetheformofactuality-thatistosayitappliesitselftowhatisestablishedinthought，totheintellectualworldwiththerichesofitsdeterminationsandlookedonasaBeyond，ortotheintellectualworldinasfarasitisitsrealisation，theworldhereandaroundus。Itisinthosetwoways，andinthosewaysalone，thattheactualNotionispresentinthesucceedingchapter；fornotasyetisitinthethirdplacetobefoundastakenbackintothought，orastheself-thinkingorthoughtofNotion。Whilethatuniversalself-consciousnessis，onthewhole，athoughtwhichgraspsandcomprehends，thisthirdkindofthoughtistheNotionitselfrecognisedasconstitutingrealityinitsessence，thatistosayasIdealism。Thesethreeaspectsagaindividethemselvesasbeforeintothethreenationswhichalonecountinthecivilisedworld。TheempiricalandperfectlyfiniteformofNotionpertainstotheEnglish；totheFrenchbelongsitsformasmakinganattemptateverything，asestablishingitselfinitsreality，abolishingalldetermination，andthereforebeinguniversal，unlimited，pureself-consciousness；and，lastly，totheGermanpertainstheenteringintoitselfofthisimplicitude，thethoughtoftheabsoluteNotion。

1。Buhle:GeschichtederneuernPhilosoph。，Vol。IV。Sec。II。，pp。571-582；Tiedemann；GeistderspeculativenPhilos。，Vol。VI。pp。511-518；Rixner:HandbuchderGeschichtederPhilosophie，Vol。III。§79，pp。195，196。

2。Wolf\'sVernünftigeGedankenvonGott，derWeltundderSeeledesMenschen(Halle，1741)，Pt。I。chap。ii。§114，120，pp。59，60，62，63；chap。vi。§575-581，686，pp。352-359，425；

chap。v。§742，p。463；§926，p。573；chap。vi。§928，p。574，seq。

3。Wolff\'sAnfangsgründeallermathematischenWissenschaften，Pt。I。:AnfangsgründederBaukunst，Pt。II。Prop。8，p。414；Problem22，pp。452，453；Pt。II。:AnfangsgründederFortification，Pt。I。p。570。

SectionTwo:PeriodoftheThinkingUnderstandingChapterII。—TransitionPeriod，AIdealism&Scepticism1。BERKELEY。

Thisidealism，inwhichallexternalrealitydisappears，hasbeforeitthestandpointofLocke，anditproceedsdirectlyfromhim。ForwesawthattoLockethesourceoftruthisexperience，orBeingasperceived。NowsincethissensuousBeing，asBeing，hasinitthequalityofbeingforconsciousness，wesawthatitnecessarilycametopassthatinLocke\'scasesomequalities，atleast，weresodeterminedthattheywerenotinthemselves，butonlyforanother；andthatcolour，figure，&c。，hadtheirgroundonlyinthesubject，inhisparticularorganization。ThisBeing-for-another，however，wasnotbyhimacceptedastheNotion，butasfallingwithinself-consciousness—i。e。，self-consciousnessnotlookedonasuniversal，—notwithinmind，butwithinwhatisopposedtotheimplicit。

GeorgeBerkeleywasbornin1684atKilcrin，nearThomastown，inthecountyofKilkenny，Ireland:in1754hediedasanEnglishBishop。(1)Hewrotethe“TheoryofVision，”1709；“A

Treatiseconcerningtheprinciplesofhumanknowledge，”1710；“ThreeDialoguesbetweenHylasandPhilonous，”1713。In1784hiscollectedworkswerepublishedinLondonintwoquartovolumes。

BerkeleyadvocatedanidealismwhichcameveryneartothatofMalebranche。Asagainstthemetaphysicoftheunderstanding，wehavethepointofviewthatallexistenceanditsdeterminationsarisefromfeeling，andareconstitutedbyself-consciousness。Berkeley\'sfirstandfundamentalthoughtisconsequentlythis:“TheBeingofwhateveriscalledbyusathingconsistsaloneinitsbeingperceived，”i。e。，ourdeterminationsaretheobjectsofourknowledge。“Allobjectsofhumanknowledgeareideas”(socalledbyBerkeleyasbyLocke)，“whichariseeitherfromtheimpressionsoftheoutwardsenses，orfromperceptionsoftheinwardstatesandactivitiesofthemind，orfinally，theyaresuchasareconstitutedbymeansofmemoryandimaginationthroughtheirseparationandrearrangement。Aunionofdifferentsensuousfeelingsappearstoustobeaparticularthing，e。g。，thefeelingofcolour，taste，smell，figure，&c。；forbycolours，smells，sounds，somethingofwhichwehaveasensationisalwaysunderstood。”(2)Thisisthematterandtheobjectofknowledge；theknoweristhepercipient“I，”whichrevealsitselfinrelationtothosefeelingsinvariousactivities，suchasimagination，remembrance，andwill。

BerkeleythusindeedacknowledgesthedistinctionbetweenBeing-for-selfandOther-Being，whichinhiscase，however，itselffallswithinthe“I。”Ofthematteronwhichactivityisdirected，itisnodoubtinregardtooneportionallowedthatitdoesnotexistoutsideofmind—thatistosay，sofarasourthoughts，inwardfeelingsandstates，ortheoperationsofourimaginarypowersareconcerned。Butinlikemannerthemanifoldsensuousconceptionsandfeelingscanonlyexistinamind。Lockecertainlydistinguishedextensionandmovement，forexample，asfundamentalqualities，i。e。，asqualitieswhichpertaintotheobjectsinthemselves。ButBerkeleyverypertinentlypointsoutinconsistencyherefromthepointofviewthatgreatandsmall，quickandslow，holdgoodassomethingrelative；thuswereextensionandmovementtobeinherentorimplicit，theycouldnotbeeitherlargeorsmall，quickorslow；thatis，theycouldnotbe，forthesedeterminationsrestintheconception(3)ofsuchqualities。InBerkeleytherelationofthingstoconsciousnessisalonedealtwith，andbeyondthisrelationshiptheydonotinhisviewcome。Fromthisitfollowsthatitisonlyself-consciousnessthatpossessesthem；foraperceptionwhichisnotinaconceivingmindisnothing:itisadirectcontradiction。Therecanbenosubstance，hesays，whichneitherconceivesnorperceives，andwhichisyetthesubstratumofperceptionsandconceptions。

Ifitisrepresentedthatthereissomethingoutsideofconsciousnesswhichissimilartotheconceptions，thisislikewisecontradictory；aconceptioncanalonebesimilartoaconception，theideatotheideaalone。(4)

Thus，whileLocke\'sultimatepointisabstractsubstance，Beinggenerallywiththerealdeterminationofasubstratumofaccidents，Berkeleydeclaresthissubstancetobethemostincomprehensibleassumptionofall；buttheincomprehensibilitydoesnotmakethisBeingintoanabsolutenullity，nordoesitmakeitinitselfincomprehensible。(5)ForBerkeleybringsforwardagainstthepresentexistenceofexternalobjectsonlytheinconceivabilityoftherelationofaBeingtomind。Thisinconceivability，however，isdestroyedintheNotion，fortheNotionisthenegativeofthings；andthismovedBerkeleyandLeibnitztoshutupthetwosidesinthemselves。Thereneverthelessremainsarelationshipofwhatis“other”tous；thesefeelingsdonotdevelopfromusasLeibnitzrepresents，butaredeterminedthroughsomewhatelse。WhenLeibnitzspeaksofdevelopmentwithinthemonads，itisnothingbutemptytalk；forthemonadsastheyfollowinsuccessionhavenoinwardconnection。Eachindividualisthusdeterminedthroughanother，andnotthroughus；anditdoesnotmatterwhatthisexternalis，sinceitremainsacontingent。NowinrelationtothetwosidesofLeibnitzwhichareindifferenttooneanother，Berkeleysaysthatsuchan“other”isquitesuperfluous。Berkeleycallstheothertheobjects；butthese，hesays，cannotbewhatwecallmatter，forspiritandmattercannotcometogether。(6)ButthenecessityofconceptionsdirectlycontradictsthisBeing-within-selfoftheconceiver；fortheBeing-within-selfisthefreedomoftheconceiver；thelatterdoesnot，however，producetheconceptionswithfreedom；theyhaveforhimtheformanddeterminatenessofanindependent“other。”Berkeleylikewisedoesnotacceptidealisminthesubjectivesense，butonlyinrespectthattherearespiritswhichimpartthemselves(intheothercasethesubjectformshisownconceptions)，andconsequently，thatitisGodalonewhobringstopasssuchconceptions；thustheimaginationsorconceptionswhichareproducedbyuswithourindividualactivityremainseparatefromtheseothers，(7)i。e。fromtheimplicit。

Thisconceptiongivesaninstanceofthedifficultieswhichappearinregardtothesequestions，andwhichBerkeleywishedtoescapefrominaquiteoriginalway。TheinconsistencyinthissystemGodhasagaintomakegood；Hehastobearitallaway；toHimthesolutionofthecontradictionisleft。Inthisidealism，inshort，thecommonsensuousviewoftheuniverseandtheseparationofactuality，asalsothesystemofthought，ofjudgmentsdevoidofNotion，remainexactlyasbefore；

plainlynothinginthecontentisalteredbuttheabstractformthatallthingsareperceptionsonly。(8)

Suchidealismdealswiththeoppositionbetweenconsciousnessanditsobjectmerely，andleavestheextensionoftheconceptionsandtheantagonismsoftheempiricalandmanifoldcontentquiteuntouched；andifweaskwhatthenisthetruthoftheseperceptionsandconceptions，asweaskedformerlyofthings，noanswerisforthcoming。Itisprettymuchamatterofindifferencewhetherwebelieveinthingsorinperceptions，ifself-consciousnessremainspossessedentirelybyfinalities；itreceivesthecontentintheordinaryway，andthatcontentisoftheordinarykind。Initsindividualityitstumblesaboutamidtheconceptionsofanentirelyempiricalexistence，withoutknowingandunderstandinganythingelseaboutthecontent:thatistosayinthisformalidealismreasonhasnocontentofitsown。

AstowhatBerkeleyfurtherstatesinrespectoftheempiricalcontent，wheretheobjectofhisinvestigationbecomesentirelypsychological，itrelatesinthemaintofindingoutthedifferencebetweenthesensationsofsightandfeeling，andtodiscoveringwhichkindofsensationsbelongtotheoneandwhichtotheother。Thiskindofinvestigationkeepsentirelytothephenomenal，andonlythereindistinguishesthevarioussortsofphenomena；orcomprehensiononlyreachesasfarastodistinctions。Theonlypointofinterestisthattheseinvestigationshaveintheircoursechieflylightedonspace，andadisputeiscarriedonastowhetherweobtaintheconceptionofdistanceandsoon，inshortalltheconceptionsrelatingtospace，throughsightorfeeling。Spaceisjustthissensuousuniversal，theuniversalinindividualityitself，whichintheempiricalconsiderationofempiricalmultiplicityinvitesandleadsusontothought(forititselfisthought)，andbyitthisverysensuousperceptionandreasoningrespectingperceptionisinitsactionconfused。Andsincehereperceptionfindsanobjectivethought，itreallywouldbeledontothoughtortothepossessionofathought，butatthesametimeitcannotarriveatthoughtinitscompletion，sincethoughtortheNotionarenotinquestion，anditclearlycannotcometotheconsciousnessoftruereality。Nothingisthoughtintheformofthought，butonlyasanexternal，assomethingforeigntothought。

DavidHume(nextsection)—Contents1。NachrichtenvondemLebenunddenSchriftendesBischofsBerkeley(inBerkeley\'sphilosph。

Werk。Pt。I。Leipzig，1781)，pp。1，45；Buhle:GeschichtederneuernPhilosophie，Vol。V。Sect。1，pp。86-90。

2。Buhle:GeschichtederneuernPhilosophie，Vol。V。pp。90，91；TheWorksofGeorgeBerkeley，Prof。Fraser\'sedition(DialoguesbetweenHylasandPhilonous)，Vol。I。p。264，seq。etpassim。

3。Buhle，GeschichtederneuernPhilosophie，Vol。V。Sect。1，pp。92，93；TheWorksofGeorgeBerkeley，Vol。I。p。279seq。

4。Buhle，ibidem，pp。91，92；Berkeley，ibidem，pp。288seq。，300seq。etpassim。

5。Buhle，ibidem，pp。93，94；Berkeley，ibidem，pp。289，308。seq。

6。Buhle:GeschichtederneuernPhilosophie，Vol。V。Sect。1，pp。94，95；TheWorksofGeorgeBerkeley，Vol。I。pp。308，335。

7。Buhle，ibidem，pp。96-99；Berkeley，ibidem，p。325，seq。etpassim。

8。Cf。Berkeley，ibidem，passim。

SectionTwo:PeriodoftheThinkingUnderstandingChapterII。—TransitionPeriod，AIdealism&Scepticism2。HUME。

WemustaddtowhathasprecededanaccountoftheScepticismofHume，whichhasbeengivenamoreimportantplaceinhistorythanitdeservesfromitsintrinsicnature；itshistoricimportanceisduetothefactthatKantreallyderivesthestartingpointofhisphilosophyfromHume。

DavidHumewasbornin1711atEdinburghanddiedtherein1776。Heheldalibrarian\'spostinthattownforsometime，thenhebecamesecretarytotheEmbassyinParis；forquitealongperiod，indeed，hemovedindiplomaticcircles。InParishecametoknowJeanJacquesRousseauandinvitedhimtoEngland，butRousseau\'sterriblydistrustfulandsuspiciousnatureverysoonestrangedthetwo。(1)Humeismorecelebratedasawriterofhistorythanthroughhisphilosophicworks。Hewrote:“ATreatiseofhumannature，”3vols。，1739，translatedintoGermanbyJacob，Halle，1790，8vo；likewise“EssaysandTreatisesonseveralsubjects，”2vols。(Vol。1。containing“Essaysmoral，politicalandliterary，”printedforthefirsttimeinEdinburgh，1742；Vol。II。

containingan“Inquiryconcerninghumanunderstanding”afurtherdevelopmentoftheTreatise，andfirstprintedseparatelyinLondon，1748，8vo)。Inhis“Essays，”whichcontributedmosttohisfameasfarasthephilosophicsideisconcerned，hetreatedphilosophicsubjectsasaneducated，thoughtfulmanoftheworldwoulddo—notinasystematicconnection，norshowingthewiderangewhichhisthoughtsshouldproperlyhavebeenabletoattain；infactinsomeofhistreatiseshemerelydealtwithparticularpointsofview。

WemustshortlydealwiththemainaspectsofHume\'sphilosophy。HestartsdirectlyfromthephilosophicstandpointofLockeandBacon，whichderivesourconceptionsfromexperience，andhisscepticismhastheidealismofBerkeleyasitsobject。Thesequenceofthoughtisthis:Berkeleyallowsallideastoholdgoodastheyare；inHumetheantithesisofthesensuousanduniversalhasclearedandmoresharplydefineditself，sensebeingpronouncedbyhimtobedevoidofuniversality。Berkeleydoesnotmakeanydistinctionastowhetherinhissensationsthereisanecessaryconnectionornot。Formerlyexperiencewasamixtureofthetwoelements。Humetellsusthatallperceptionsofthemindmaybedividedintotwoclassesorspecies，thatofimpressions，i。e。sensuousperceptions，andthoughtsorideas；thelatteraresimilarincontenttotheformer，butlessforcibleandlively。Allobjectsofreasonareconsequentlyeitherrelationsofthoughtssuchasmathematicalaxioms，orfactsofexperience。(2)SinceHumemakestheseintothecontenthenaturallyrejectsinnateideas。(3)

NowwhenHumegoesontoconsidermorecloselywhatissubsumedunderexperience，hefindscategoriesoftheunderstandingpresentthere，andmoreespeciallythedeterminationoftheuniversalandofuniversalnecessity；hetookunderhisconsiderationmoreparticularlythecategoryofcauseandeffect，andinitsetforththerationalelement，inasmuchasinthiscausalrelationshipnecessityisespeciallycontained。HereHumereallycompletedthesystemofLocke，sinceheconsistentlydrewattentiontothefactthatifthispointofviewbeadheredto，experienceisindeedtheprincipleofwhateveroneknows，orperceptionitselfcontainseverythingthathappens，butneverthelessthedeterminationofuniversalityandnecessityarenotcontainedin，norweretheygivenusbyexperience。Humehasthusdestroyedtheobjectivityorabsolutenatureofthought-determinations。“Ourconvictionofthetruthofafactrestsonfeeling，memory，andthereasoningsfoundedonthecausalconnection，i。e。ontherelationofcauseandeffect。Theknowledgeofthisrelationisnotattainedbyreasoningsapriori，butarisesentirelyfromexperience；andwedrawinferences，sinceweexpectsimilarresultstofollowfromsimilarcauses，byreasonoftheprincipleofthecustomorhabitofconjoiningdifferentmanifestations，i。e。byreasonoftheprincipleoftheassociationofideas。Hencethereisnoknowledgeandnometaphysicsbeyondexperience。”(4)

ThesimplethoughtwehavehereisexactlywhatLockesays，thatwemustreceivetheconceptionofcauseandeffect，andthusofanecessaryconnection，fromexperience；butexperience，assensuousperception，containsnonecessity，hasnocausalconnection。Forinwhatwetermsuch，thatwhichweproperlyspeakingperceiveismerelythefactthatsomethingfirstofallhappensandthatthensomethingelsefollows。Immediateperceptionrelatesonlytoacontentofconditionsorthingswhicharepresentalongsideofandinsuccessiontooneanother，butnottowhatwecallcauseandeffect；intime-successionthereisthusnorelationofcauseandeffect，andconsequentlynonecessityeither。(5)Whenwesaythepressureofthewateristhecauseofthedestructionofthishouse，thatisnopureexperience。Wehavemerelyseenthewaterpressingormovingalonginthisdirection，andsubsequentlythehousefallingdown；andsowithotherexamples。Necessityisthusnotjustifiedbyexperience，butwecarryitintoexperience；itisaccidentallyarrivedatbyusandissubjectivemerely。Thiskindofuniversalitywhichweconnectwithnecessity，Humecallscustom。Becausewehaveoftenseenresultstofollowweareaccustomedtoregardtheconnectionasanecessaryone；thenecessitytohimisthusaquitecontingentassociationofideas，whichiscustom。

Itisthesamethinginrespectoftheuniversal。Whatweperceiveareindividualphenomenaandsensationsinwhichweseethatthisisnowonethingandnowanother。Itmaylikewisebethatweperceivethesamedeterminationfrequentlyrepeatedandinmanifoldways。Butthisisstillfarremovedfromuniversality；universalityisadeterminationwhichisnotgiventousthroughexperience。ItmaybesaidthatthisisquiteacorrectremarkonHume\'spart，ifbyexperienceweunderstandoutwardexperience。Experienceissensiblethatsomethingexists，butneverthelesstheuniversalisnotasyetpresentinit。Indeed，sensuousexistenceassuchissomethingwhichissetforthasindifferent，notdifferentiatedfromanythingelse；butsensuousexistenceislikewiseuniversalinitself，ortheindifferenceofitsdeterminatenessisnotitsonlydeterminateness。ButsinceHumeregardsnecessity，theunityofopposites，asrestingquitesubjectivelyoncustom，wecannotgetanydeeperinthought。Customisindeedsofaranecessityinconsciousness，andtothisextentwereallyseetheprincipleofthisidealisminit；butinthesecondplacethisnecessityisrepresentedassomethingquitedevoidofthoughtorNotion。

Thiscustomobtainsbothinourperceptionwhichrelatestosensuousnature，andinrelationtolawandmorality。Theideasofjusticeandmoralityrestuponaninstinct，onasubjective，butveryoftendeceptivemoralfeeling。(6)Fromascepticalpointofviewtheoppositemaylikewisebedemonstrated。FromthissideHumeconsidersjustice，morality，religiousdeterminations，anddisputestheirabsolutevalidity。Thatistosaywhenitisassumedthatourknowledgearisesfromexperience，andthatwemustconsideronlywhatweobtaintherebytobethetruth，wefindindeedinourfeeling，thesentimente。g。thatthemurderer，thethief，&c。，mustbepunished；andbecausethisislikewisefeltbyothersitisuniversallyallowed。ButHume，likethescepticsofformerdays，appealstothevariousopinionsofvariousnations:amongstdifferentnationsandindifferenttimesvariousstandardsofrighthavebeenheld。(7)Therearethosewhointhiscasedonothavethefeelingofwrongdoinginrespectofstealing，e。g。theLaced？moniansortheso-calledinnocentinhabitantsoftheSouthSeaIslands。Whatisbyonenationcalledimmoral，shamefulandirreligious，isbyanothernotconsideredsoatall。Thusbecausesuchmattersrestuponexperience，onesubjecthassuchandsuchanexperience，finds，forinstance，inhisreligiousfeelingsthisdeterminationwhichinclineshimtoGod，whileanothersubjecthasdifferentexperiencesaltogether。Weareinthehabitofallowingonethingtobejustandmoral，othershaveanothermodeofregardingit。Henceifthetruthdependsuponexperience，theelementofuniversality，ofobjectivity，&c。，comesfromelsewhere，orisnotjustifiedbyexperience。Humethusdeclaredthissortofuniversality，ashedeclarednecessity，toberathersubjectivelythanobjectivelyexistent；forcustomisjustasubjectiveuniversalityofthiskind。Thisisanimportantandacuteobservationinrelationtoexperiencelookedatasthesourceofknowledge；anditisfromthispointthattheKantianreflectionnowbegins。

Hume(EssaysandTreatisesonseveralsubjects，Vol。111。Sect。8，11)thenextendedhisscepticismtotheconceptionsanddoctrinesoffreedomandnecessity，andtotheproofsoftheexistenceofGod；andinfactscepticismherepossessesawidefield。Tosuchasystemofreasoningfromthoughtsandpossibilitiesanothermethodofreasoningmayagainbeopposed，andthisreasoningisnobetterthantheother。Whatissaidtobemetaphysicallyestablishedregardingimmortality，God，nature，&c。，lacksarealgroundforrestingupon，suchasisprofessedtobegiven；fortheinferencesonwhichmengroundtheirproofsaresubjectivelyformedconceptions。

Butwhereauniversalityisfound，itdoesnotrestinthematterinitself，butissimplyasubjectivenecessitywhichisreallymerecustom。HencetheresultwhichHumearrivesatisnecessarilyastonishmentregardingtheconditionofhumanknowledge，ageneralstateofmistrust，andascepticalindecision—whichindeeddoesnotamounttomuch。TheconditionofhumanknowledgeregardingwhichHumesomuchwonders，hefurtherdescribesascontaininganantagonismbetweenreasonandinstinct；thisinstinct，itissaid，whichembracesmanysortsofpowers，inclinations，&c。，deceivesusinmanydifferentways，andreasondemonstratesthis。Butontheothersideitisempty，withoutcontentorprinciplesofitsown；andifacontentisinquestionatall，itmustkeeptothoseinclinations。Initselfreasonthushasnocriterionwherebytheantagonismbetweenindividualdesires，andbetweenitselfandthedesires，maybesettled。(8)Thuseverythingappearsintheformofanirrationalexistencedevoidofthought；theimplicitlytrueandrightisnotinthought，butintheformofaninstinct，adesire。

1。Buhle:GeschichtederneuernPhilosophie，Vol。V。Sect。1，pp。193-200。

2。Tennemann\'sGrundrissderGeschichtederPhilosophievonWendt(Leipzig，1829)，§370，pp。439，440；Hume:EssaysandTreatisesonseveralsubjects，Vol。III。containinganInquiryConcerningHumanUnderstanding(London，1770)，Sect。2。pp。21，22；Sect。4，P。I。p。42；

Tennemann，Vol。XI。pp。433，434。

3。Hume:op。cit。，Vol。III。Not。A。pp。283，284。

4。Tennemannop。cit。，§370，p。440；Hume:op。cit。，Vol。III。Sect。4，Pt。I。pp。43-45；Sect。5，pp。66，67；Buhle:GeschichtederneuernPhilosophie，Vol。V。Sect。1，pp。204，205；Tennemann，Vol。XI。pp。435，436。

5。Hume:op。cit。，Vol。III。Sect。vii。Pt。1，pp。102，103；Pt。2，pp。108，109；Sect。viii。pp。118，119。

6。Hume:op。cit。，Vol。IV。containinganInquiryconcerningtheprinciplesofmorals，Sect。1，p。4；

AppendixI。p。170。

7。Buhle:op。cit。，Vol。V。Sect。1，pp。230，231；cf。Hume，ibidem，Vol。III。Sect。12，P。II。p。

221；Vol。IV。；AnInquiry，&c。，Sect。4，pp。62-65；Adialogue，pp。235，236，&c。，&c。

8。Hume:op。cit……Vol。III。Sect。12，Pt。I。pp。217，218；Not。N。pp。296，297；Buhle:

GeschichtederneuernPhilosophie，Vol。V。Sect。1，p。210。

SectionTwo:PeriodoftheThinkingUnderstandingChapterII。—TransitionPeriodB。ScottishPhilosophy1。THOMASREID。

ThomasReid，bornin1710，diedasaprofessorinGlasgowin1796。(1)Hemaintainedtheprincipleofcommon-sense。Hisendeavourwastodiscovertheprinciplesofknowledge，andthefollowingarehisconclusions:"(a)Therearecertainundemonstratedandundemonstrablefundamentaltruthswhichcommon-sensebegetsandrecognizesasimmediatelyconclusiveandabsolute。"Thishenceconstitutesanimmediateknowledge；initaninwardindependentsourceissetforthwhichisherebyopposedtoreligionasrevealed。"(b)Theseimmediatetruthsrequirenosupportfromanyelaboratedscience，nordotheysubmittoitscriticism；"theycannotbecriticizedbyphilosophy。"(c)Philosophyitselfhasnoroototherthanthatofanimmediate，self-enlighteningtruth；whatevercontradictssuchtruthisinitselffalse，contradictory，andabsurd。"Thisistrueforknowledgeand"(d)Morality；theindividualismoralifheactsinaccordancewiththeperfectprinciplesoftheperfectionofthewholeandwithhisowndutyasitisknowntohim。"(2)

2。JAMESBEATTIE。

JamesBeattie，born1735，wasaprofessorofmoralphilosophyinEdinburghandAberdeen，anddiedin1803。Helikewisemadecommon-sensethesourceofallknowledge。"Thecommon-senseoftheplainhumanunderstandingisthesourceofallmorality，ofallreligion，andallcertainty。Theconfirmationofcommon-sensemustbeaddedtothetestimonyofoursenses。Thetruthiswhatthenecessitiesofmynaturecalluponmetobelieve。Beliefsignifiesconvictioninthecaseoftruthswhicharecertain，inthatofthosewhichareprobable，approbation。Thetruthwhichiscertainisknownbymeansofintuition，theprobabletruthbymeansofproofs。"(3)Suchconvictionsasarequitecertainformthebasisofactions。

3。JAMESOSWALD。

JamesOswald，aScottishclergyman，madeuseofanexpressionwhichindicatesthatwehavetheprinciplesjustmentionedasfactsexistingwithinus。(4)"TheexistenceoftheDivineBeingis(accordingtohim)afactabsolutelyraisedaboveallreasoningandalldoubt，andimmediatelycertainforthecommon-senseofmorality。"(5)ThesameprinciplewaslikewiseestablishedinGermanyatthistime-aninwardrevelation，aknowledgeoftheconscience，andspeciallyofGodandHisBeing。

4。DUGALDSTEWART。

TothisschoolalsobelongDugaldStewart，EdwardSearch，(9)Ferguson，andHutcheson，mostofwhomhavewrittenonmorals。ThepoliticaleconomistAdamSmithfromthispointofviewislikewiseaphilosopher，andthebestknownofthemall。ThisScottishphilosophyisnowgivenforthinGermanyassomethingnew。Itisapopularphilosophy，which，ontheonehand，hasthegreatmeritofseekinginman，andinhisconsciousness，forthesourceofallthatshouldbeheldbyhimastrue，theimmanenceofwhatshouldbebyhimesteemed。Thecontentisatthesametimeaconcretecontent；inacertaindegree，itistheantithesisofmetaphysicsproper，ofthewanderingaboutinabstractdeterminationsoftheunderstanding。OftheseScots，DugaldStewart，whoislivingstill，(10)appearstobethelastandleastsignificant；inthemallthereisthesameground-worktobefound，thesamecircleofreflection，namely，anaprioriphilosophy，thoughnotonewhichistobepursuedinaspeculativeway。Thegeneralideawhichpervadestheirprincipleisthatofthehealthyhumanunderstanding；tothistheyhaveaddedbenevolentdesires，sympathy，amoralsense，andfromsuchgroundscomposedveryexcellentmoralwritings。Thatiscertainlyallverywellinordertounderstandapproximately，uptoacertaindegreeofculture，whatuniversalthoughtsare，inordertonarratetheirhistory，toappealtoexamples，andtoexplainthem；butfurtheritdoesnotextend。

InmorerecenttimesthisScottishphilosophyhaspassedtoFrance，andProfessorRoyer-Collard，nowpresidentoftheSecondChamber，(11)asalsohisdisciple，Jouffroy，inconformitywithit，passfromthefactsofconsciousnessthroughculturedreasoningandexperience，toafurtherstageindevelopment。WhatbytheFrenchiscalledIdéologie(supra，p。308)hasalsoitsplacehere；itisabstractmetaphysics，insofarasitisanenumerationandanalysisofthemostsimplethought-determinations。Theyarenottreateddialectically，butfromourreflection，fromourthoughts，thematerialisderived，andinthisthedeterminationsthereincontainedaredemonstrated。

1。Tennemann\'sGrundrissderGeschichtederPhilosophievonWendt，§371，p。442。

2。Rixner:HandbuchderGeschictederPhilosophie，Vol。III。§119，p。259；ct。ThomasReid；AnInquiryintothehumanmindontheprinciplesofcommonsense(Edinburgh，1810)，chap。i。Sect。

4，pp。19，20(translatedintoGerman，Leipzig，1782，pp。17，18)；chap。vi。Sect。20，pp。

372-375(pp。310，311)，&c。

3。Rixner:HandbuchderGeschichtederPhilosophie，Vol。III。§120，pp。261，262；cf。JamesBeattie:EssaysonthenatureandimmutabilityofTruth，&c。(Edinburh，1772)，Pt。I。，chap。i。，pp。

18-31(translatedintoGerman，CopenhagenandLeipzig，1772，pp。24-42)；chap。ii。Sect。2，pp。

37-42(pp。49-55)，&c。

4。Cf。JamesOswald:AnAppealofcommon-senseinbehalfofreligion(Edinburgh，1772)，Vol。I。

BookI。Introduction，p。12(translatedbyWilmsen，Leipzig，1774，p。11)。

5。Rixner，ibidem，§121，p。262；cf。JamesOswald，ibidem，Vol。II。BookII。chap。i。pp。50，51

(pp。54，55)。

6。ThenameassumedbyAbrahamTucker-[Translator\'snote。]

7。Lecturesof1825-1826。

8。Lecturesof1829-1830。

9。ThenameassumedbyAbrahamTucker-[Translator\'snote。]

10。Lecturesof1825-1826。

11。Lecturesof1829-1830。

SectionTwo:PeriodoftheThinkingUnderstandingChapterII。—TransitionPeriodC。FrenchPhilosophyWepassontotheFrenchphilosophy；therelationitbearstometaphysicsisthis，thatwhilemanasametaphysicianstandstohimselfintheattitudeofalaymanoroutsider，Frenchphilosophydoesawaywiththelayoroutsidepositioninregardaliketopolitics，religion，andphilosophy。Twoformshavetobementionedwhichareofthegreatestimportanceinrespecttoculture—FrenchphilosophyandtheAufkl？rung。WiththeEnglishwesawacertainidealismonly:thiswaseitherformal，asthemeregeneraltranslationofBeingintoBeing-for-another，i。e。，intoperceptibility，orelsewhatisimplicitinthisperceptibility，instincts，impulses，habits，&c。—blinddeterminateforces；

areturnintoself-consciousness，whichitselfappearsasaphysicalthing。Inthatfirstidealismthewholefinitudeandextensionofappearances，ofsensations，andlikewiseofthoughtsanddeterminatefixedconceptions，remainjustwhattheyareintheunphilosophicconsciousness。ThescepticismofHumemakesallthatisuniversalsinkintohabitsandinstincts，i。e。，itconsistsinamoresimplesynthesisofthephenomenalworld；butthesesimplerelements，theseinstincts，impulses，andforces，arejustasmuchafixedpresentexistenceinself-consciousness，unspiritual，andwithoutmovement。TheFrenchphilosophyhasmorelife，moremovement，morespirit；itwouldperhapsbemorecorrecttodescribeitasfulloflifeandspirit。ItistheabsoluteNotion，whichrevoltsagainstthewholereigningsystemofprevalentconceptionsandestablishedideas，whichoverthrowsallthathassettledintofixity，andacquirestheconsciousnessofperfectliberty。

Attherootofthisidealisticactivityliesthecertaintythatwhateveris，whatevercountsforanythinginitself，isallamatterofself-consciousness；andastoNotions(individualandisolatedexistencesrulingactualself-consciousness)，suchastheNotionsofgoodandevil，ofpowerandriches，andthefixedconceptionsregardingfaithinGodandHisrelationtotheworld，Hismodeofgovernmentand，further，thedutiesofself-consciousnesstowardsHim—thatallthesearenottruthsinthemselves，havingvaliditybeyondtheboundsofself-consciousness。Alltheseforms，therealimplicitudeoftheactualworldandalsoofthesupersensuousworld，arethereforesetasideinthisspiritconsciousofitself。Itdoesnottroubleitselfseriouslyaboutthosewhoadmitthevalidityoftheseconceptionsjustastheyare，andacceptthemastrue，respectingthemasindependentandfreeapartfromself-consciousness，butitspeaksofsuchconceptionswithintelligenceandspirit，thatistosay，itassertsthatself-consciousnessbyitsactivityisthefirsttomakeanythingofthem，andtomakethatasomethingverydifferentfromwhattheyprofesstobe；fortheself-consciousspiritonlyintellectualrelations，theseprocessesofformationandmovementbymeansofitsself-consciousness，possessvalidityandinterest。ThisisthecharacteroftheNotioninitsactuality；

whathasrealityforthisall-perceivingandall-comprehendingconsciousnessisheldtobevalid。

Wemustnowconsiderwhatformexistencetakesforthisabsolutelycomprehendingself-

consciousness。InthefirstplacethisNotionisfixedasthenegativemovementoftheNotiononly；

thepositiveandsimple，orexistence，fallsoutsideofthismovement。ThereremainstotheNotionnodistinction，nocontent；foralldeterminatecontentislostinthatnegativity。Thisemptyexistenceisforuspurethoughtgenerally，whattheFrenchcallêtresuprême，orifrepresentedobjectivelyasexistent，andasinoppositiontoconsciousness，itismatter。AbsoluteBeingisthereforedeterminedasmatter，asemptyobjectivity，throughaNotionwhichdestroysallcontentanddetermination，andhasasitsobjectthisuniversalalone。ItisaNotionwhichactsonlydestructively，anddoesnotagainconstructitselfoutofthismatterorpurethoughtorpuresubstantiality。Wehereseeso-calledmaterialismandatheismfreelyemerge，asthenecessaryresultofthepurecomprehendingself-consciousness。Fromonepointofviewthereperishesinthisnegativemovementalldeterminationwhichrepresentsspiritassomethingbeyondself-consciousness，andmoreespeciallyalldeterminationswithinthespirit，andalsothosewhichexpressitasspirit，indeedalltheconceptionsformedofitbyfaith，forwhichithasvalidityasanexistentself-consciousnessbeyondself-consciousness—inshort，allthatistraditionalorimposedbyauthority。Thereremainsonlyapresent，actualBeing，forself-consciousnessrecognizesimplicitexistenceonlyintheformwhichithasforself-consciousness，andinwhichitisactuallyknowntoitself；inmatter，andmatterasactivelyextendingandrealizingitselfinmultiplicity，i。e。，asnature。InthepresentIamconscioustomyselfofmyreality，andconsequentlyself-consciousnessfindsitselfasmatter，findsthesoultobematerial，andconceptionstobemovementsandchangesintheinnerorganofthebrain，whichresultfromexternalimpressionsonthesenses。Thoughtisthereforeamodeoftheexistenceofmatter。TheOneSubstanceofSpinoza，towhichFrenchmaterialismasnaturalismisparallel，reallyfindsitsaccomplishmenthereinthisobjectasinallrespectstheultimate；butwhileinSpinozathiscategoryisapossessionwhichwefindreadytohand，hereitappearsastheresultoftheabstractionoftheunderstandingproceedingfromempiricism。

TheotherformoftheAufkl？rungis，onthecontrary，whenabsoluteBeingissetforthassomethingbeyondself-consciousness，sothatofitself，ofitsimplicitBeing，nothingwhatevercanbeknown。ItbearstheemptynameofGod。ForthoughGodmaybedeterminedinanywaywhatever，allthesedeterminationsfallaway；Heis，likex，thealtogetherunknownquantity。Thisviewisnotthereforetobetermedatheism，inthefirstplacebecauseitstillemploystheempty，meaninglessname，andinthesecondplacebecauseitexpressesthenecessaryrelationsofself-consciousness，duties，&c。，notasnecessaryinanabsolutesense，butasnecessarythroughrelationtoanother，namelytotheunknown—althoughtherecanbenopositiverelationtoanunknownexceptbyabrogatingtheselfasparticular。Yetitisnotmatter，becausethissimpleandemptysomethingisnegativelydefinedasnon-existentforself-consciousness。Thisallcomestothesamething，however，formatteristheuniversal，andisBeing-for-selfrepresentedasabrogated。

Butthetruereflectiononthatunknownisthis，thatitexistsforself-consciousnesssimplyasanegativeofthesame，i。e。，asmatter，reality，thepresent；itisthisnegativeforme，thisisitsNotion。

Thedifferencedistinguishingthisfromwhatappearstobeinitsentiretysomething“other，”andinwhichanyonesideisnotpermittedtosaythatwhatitthinksissuchisthatparticularthing，isthedifferencewhichrestsonthislastabstraction。

SincethentheNotionispresentonlyinitsnegativeform，positiveextensionremainswithoutaNotion；ithastheformofnature，ofanexistent，bothinthephysicalandinthemoralsphere。Theknowledgeofnatureremainstheordinary，scientificallyunspeculativeknowledge，andastoitsessence，insofarasitclaimstobephilosophy，itisageneralwayofspeakingthatplayswiththewords，“forces，relations，manifoldconnections，”butarrivesatnothingdefinite。Similarly，inthespiritualsphere，itissofartruethatthemetaphysicofthespiritisofsuchanaturethatitisnothingmorenorlessthanaparticularorganizationbymeansofwhichthepowerswhicharetermedsensation，perception，&c。，comeintoexistence；butthisisawearisomewayoftalking，whichcanmakenothingintelligible，whichacceptsappearancesandperceptionsandreasonsaboutthem，butnonethelessreducestheirimplicitexistencetocertaindeterminateforces，oftheinwardnatureofwhichweknownothingfurther。Thedeterminationandknowledgeofthemoralspherehassimilarlyforitsobjecttobringmanbacktohisso-callednaturalpromptings；itsessencehastheformofanaturalimpulse，andthisnaturalimpulseistermedself-love，selfishness，orbenevolence。

Itisrequiredthatmanshouldliveinconformitywithnature；butthisnaturedoesnotreachfurtherthangeneralexpressionsanddescriptions，suchasthestateofnaturewefinddepictedbyRousseau。WhatiscalledthemetaphysicofordinaryconceptionsistheempiricismofLocke，whichseekstoshowtheirorigin，tobeinconsciousness，inasfarasitisindividualconsciousness；

which，whenbornintotheworld，emergesoutofunconsciousnessinordertoacquireknowledgeassensuousconsciousness。ThisexternalorigintheyconfoundwiththeBecomingandNotionofthematterinpoint。Ifoneweretoaskvaguelywhatistheoriginandgenesisofwater，andtheanswerweretobegiventhatitcomesfromthemountainsorfromrain，thiswouldbeareplyinthespiritoftheabovephilosophy。Inshort，itisonlythenegativeaspectthatisinteresting，andasforthispositiveFrenchphilosophy，itisoutofthequestion。Buteventhenegativesideofitbelongsproperlytoculturemainly，withwhichwehaveherenothingtodo，andtheAufkl？runglikewisebelongstothesame。IntheFrenchphilosophicwritings，whichinthisrespectareofimportance，whatisworthyofadmirationistheastonishingenergyandforceoftheNotionasdirectedagainstexistence，againstfaith，againstallthepowerofauthoritythathadheldswayforthousandsofyears。Ontheonehandwecannothelpremarkingthefeelingofutterrebellionagainstthewholestateofaffairsatpresentprevailing，astatewhichisalientoself-consciousness，whichwouldfaindispensewithit，andinwhichself-consciousnessdoesnotfinditself；thereisacertaintyofthetruthofreason，whichchallengesthewholeintellectualworldasitstandsaloof，andisconfidentofdestroyingit。Frenchatheism，materialism，ornaturalismhasovercomeallprejudices，andhasbeenvictoriousoverthesenselesshypothesesandassumptionsofthepositiveelementinreligion，whichisassociatedwithhabits，manners，opinions，determinationsastolawandmoralityandcivilinstitutions。Withthehealthyhumanunderstandingandearnestnessofspirit，andnotwithfrivolousdeclamations，ithasrebelledagainsttheconditionoftheworldaslegallyestablished，againsttheconstitutionofthestate，theadministrationofjustice，themodeofgovernment，politicalauthority，andlikewiseagainstart。

Contrastingwiththisbarrencontentthereistheotherandfertileside。Thepositiveisinitsturnconstitutedbyso-calledimmediatelyenlighteningtruthsofthehealthyhumanunderstanding，whichcontainsnothingexceptthistruthandtheclaimtofinditself，andbeyondthisformdoesnotpass。

Butinsodoingtherearisestheendeavourtograsptheabsoluteassomethingpresent，andatthesametimeasanobjectofthoughtandasabsoluteunity:anendeavourwhich，asitimpliesdenialoftheconceptionofdesignbothinthenaturalandinthespiritualsphere—theformerinvolvingtheideaoflife，andthelatterthatofspiritandfreedom—onlyreachestotheabstractionofanatureundeterminedinitself，tosensation，mechanism，self-seeking，andutility。ItisthisthenthatweshallhavetomakeevidentinthepositivesideofFrenchphilosophy。IntheirpoliticalconstitutionstheFrenchhave，itistrue，startedfromabstractions，buttheyhavedonesoasfromuniversalthoughts，whicharethenegativeofreality；theEnglish，ontheotherhand，proceedfromconcretereality，fromtheunwieldystructureoftheirconstitution；justastheirwritersevenhavenotattainedtouniversalprinciples。WhatLutherbeganintheheartonlyandinthefeelings—thefreedomofspiritwhich，unconsciousofitssimpleroot，doesnotcomprehenditself，andyetistheveryuniversalitself，forwhichallcontentdisappearsinthethought，thatfillsitselfwithitself—theseuniversaldeterminationsandthoughtstheFrenchassertedandsteadfastlyadheredto:theyareuniversalprinciples，intheformoftheconvictionoftheindividualinhimself。Freedombecomestheconditionoftheworld，connectsitselfwiththeworld\'shistoryandformsepochsinthesame；itistheconcretefreedomofthespirit，aconcreteuniversality；fundamentalprinciplesasregardstheconcretenowtaketheplaceoftheabstractmetaphysicofDescartes。AmongtheGermanswefindmerechatter；theywouldhavelikedtoofferexplanationsalso，butalltheyhavetogiveisintheformofmiserablephenomenaandindividualism。TheFrench，fromtheirstarting-pointofthethoughtofuniversality，andtheGermanlibertyofconsciencestartingfromtheconsciencewhichteachesusto“Proveallthings，”to“holdfastthatwhichisgood，”have，however，joinedhandswithoneanother，ortheyfollowthesamepath。OnlytheFrench，asthoughtheywerewithoutconscience，havemadeshortworkofeverything，andhavesystematicallyadheredtoadefinitethought—thephysiocraticsystem；whiletheGermanswishtoleavethemselvesafreeretreat，andexaminefromthestandpointofconsciencewhetheracertaincourseispermissible。TheFrenchwarredagainstthespeculativeNotionwiththespirit，theGermansdidsowiththeunderstanding。

WefindintheFrenchadeepall-embracingphilosophicneed，differentfromanythingintheEnglishandScotchandevenintheGermans，andfullofvitality:itisauniversalconcreteviewofallthatexists，withentireindependencebothofallauthorityandofallabstractmetaphysics。Themethodemployedisthatofdevelopmentfromperception，fromtheheart；itisacomprehensiveviewoftheentirematter，whichkeepsthewholeeverinsight，andseekstoupholdandattaintoit。

Thishealthyhumanunderstanding，thissoundreason，withitscontenttakenfromthehumanbreast，fromnaturalfeeling，hasdirecteditselfagainstthereligioussideofthingsinvariousmoments:ontheonehandandfirstofall，asFrenchphilosophy，itdidsoagainsttheCatholicreligion，thefettersofsuperstitionandofthehierarchy；ontheotherhand，inlesspronouncedform，astheGerman“illumination，”againsttheProtestantreligion，inasfarasithasacontentwhichithasderivedfromrevelation，fromecclesiasticalauthorityingeneral。Ontheonehandtheformofauthorityingeneralwaschallenged，andontheotherhanditsmatter。Thecontentcanbeeasilyenoughdisposedofbythisformofthought，whichisnotwhatweunderstandbyreason，butwhichmustbetermedunderstanding；itiseasyfortheunderstandingtoshowobjectionstotheultimateprinciplesofwhatcanbecomprehendedonlybymeansofspeculation。Theunderstandinghasthustriedthecontentofreligionbyitsstandard，andhascondemnedit；theunderstandingproceedsinthesamewayagainstaconcretephilosophy。Whatofreligionhasinmanytheologiesbeenverycommonlyleftremainingiswhatistermedtheism，faithingeneral；thisisthesamecontentwhichisfoundalsoinMohammedanism。Butalongwiththisattackuponreligiononthepartofthereasoningunderstandingtherehasbeenalsoamovementtowardsmaterialism，atheismandnaturalism。Itistruethatweshouldnotmakethechargeofatheismlightly，foritisaverycommonoccurrencethatanindividualwhoseideasaboutGoddifferfromthoseofotherpeopleischargedwithlackofreligion，orevenwithatheism。Buthereitreallyisthecasethatthisphilosophyhasdevelopedintoatheism，andhasdefinedmatter，nature，&c。，asthatwhichistobetakenastheultimate，theactive，andtheefficient。SomeFrenchmen，Rousseauforinstance，arenot，however，tobeincludedwiththerest；oneofthisauthor\'sworks，“TheConfessionofFaithofaVicar，”(1)containstheverysametheismwhichisfoundinGermantheologians。ThusFrenchmetaphysicsfindsaparallelnotonlyinSpinoza(supra，p。382)butalsointheGermanmetaphysicsofWolff。OtherFrenchmenhaveconfessedlygoneovertonaturalism；amongthemisspeciallytobementionedMirabaud，towhomtheSystèmedelaNatureisattributed。

InwhathasbeentermedFrenchphilosophy，representedbyVoltaire，Montesquieu，Rousseau，d\'Alembert，Diderot，andinwhatsubsequentlyappearedinGermanyastheAufkl？rung，andhasbeenalsostigmatizedasatheism，wemaynowdistinguishthreeaspects，first，thenegativeside，towhichmostexceptionhasbeentaken；secondly，thepositiveside；thirdly，thephilosophical，metaphysicalside。

1。THENEGATIVEASPECT。

Justicemustbedoneeventothisnegativeside，astoeverythingelse；whatissubstantialinitistheattackofthereasoninginstinctagainstaconditionofdegeneracy，Imayevensayofutteranduniversalfalsehood；forinstance，againstthepositivesideofareligionthathasbecomewoodenandlifeless。Whatwecallreligionisfirmfaith，convictionthatthereisaGod；ifthisisfaithinthedoctrinesofChristianity，itismoreorlessabstractedfrom。Butinthisattackagainstreligionwehavetothinkofsomethingquitedifferentfromtheabove；inwhatwefindhere，thepositiveofreligionisthenegativeofreason。Ifwewouldunderstandthefeelingofindignationtowhichthesewritersgiveutterance，wemustkeepbeforeoureyesthestateofreligioninthosedays，withitsmightandmagnificence，thecorruptionofitsmanners，itsavarice，itsambition，itsluxury，forwhichneverthelessreverencewasclaimed—astateofcontradictionpresentandexistent。Weperceiveintowhatafrightfulconditionofformalismanddeadnesspositivereligionhadsunk，ashadthebondsofsocietyaswell，themeansemployedfortheadministrationofjustice，thepowerofthestate。ThisFrenchphilosophyalsoattackedthestate；itassailedprejudicesandsuperstition，especiallythedepravityofciviclife，ofcourtmannersandofGovernmentofficials；itlaidholdofandbroughttolighttheevil，theridiculous，thebase，andexposedthewholetissueofhypocrisyandunjustpowertothederision，thecontemptandthehatredoftheworldatlarge，andthusbroughtmen\'smindsandheartsintoastateofindifferencetotheidolsoftheworldandindignationagainstthem。Oldinstitutions，whichinthesenseofself-consciousfreedomandhumanitythathaddeveloped，nolongerfoundaplace，andwhichhadformerlybeenfoundedandupheldbymutualgoodfeelingandtheobtusenessofaconsciousnessunconsciousofself，institutionswhichwerenolongerinharmonywiththespiritthathadestablishedthem，andnow，inconsequenceoftheadvancethathadbeenmadeinscientificculture，wereboundtomakegoodtoreasontheirclaimtobesacredandjust，—thiswastheformalismthatthosephilosophersoverthrew。Inmakingtheirattacks，theywrotesometimeswithreasonedargument，sometimessatirically，sometimesinthelanguageofplaincommon-sense，andtheydidnotwagewaronwhatwecallreligion；that，wasleftquiteunharmed，anditsclaimswereurgedwithwordsofchoicesteloquence。Thosewhoenforcedtheseviewswerethereforeagentsofdestructionagainstthatalonewhichwasinitselfalreadydestroyed。WeplaceittoourcreditwhenwereproachtheFrenchfortheirattacksuponreligionandonthestate。Wemustrepresenttoourselvesthehorriblestateofsociety，themiseryanddegradationinFrance，inordertoappreciatetheservicesthatthesewritersrendered。