第8章

WhenLockestartsbysayingthateverythingisexperienceandweabstractforourselvesfromthisexperiencegeneralconceptionsregardingobjectsandtheirqualities，hemakesadistinctioninrespectofexternalqualitieswhichwasbeforethismadebyAristotle(Deanima，II。6)，andwhichwelikewisemetwithinDescartes(supra，pp。245，246)。Thatistosay，Lockedistinguishesbetweenprimaryandsecondaryqualities；thefirstpertaintotheobjectsthemselvesintruth，theothersarenotrealqualities，butarefoundedonthenatureoftheorgansofsensation。Primaryqualitiesaremechanical，likeextension，solidity，figure，movement，rest；thesearequalitiesofthecorporeal，justasthoughtisthequalityofthespiritual。Butthedeterminationsofourindividualfeelingssuchascolours，sounds，smells，taste，etc。，arenotprimary。”(15)InDescartes\'casethisdistinctionhashoweveranotherform，forthesecondclassofthesedeterminationsisdefinedbyhiminsuchawayasthattheydonotconstitutetheessenceofbody，whileLockesaysthattheyexistforsensation，orfallwithinexistenceasitisforconsciousness。Locke，however，nodoubtreckonsfigure，etc。，asstillpertainingtoreality，butbysodoingnothingisascertainedastothenatureofbody。InLockeadifferencehereappearsbetweentheimplicitandbeing\'foranother，\'inwhichhedeclaresthemomentof\'foranother\'tobeunreal-andyetheseesalltruthintherelationof\'foranother\'only。

c。Sincetheuniversalassuch，theideaofspecies，is，according，toLocke，merelyaproductofourmind，whichisnotitselfobjective，butrelatesmerelytoobjectswhicharegermanetoit，andfromwhichtheparticularofqualities，conditions，time，place，etc。，areseparated，Lockedistinguishesessencesintorealessencesandnominalessences；theformeroftheseexpressthetrueessenceofthings，whilespeciesontheotherhandaremerenominalessenceswhichnodoubtexpresssomethingwhichispresentintheobjects，butwhichdonotexhausttheseobjects。Theyservetodistinguishspeciesforourknowledge，buttherealessenceofnaturewedonotknow。(16)Lockegivesgoodreasonsforspeciesbeingnothinginthemselves-fortheirnotbeinginnature，orabsolutelydetermined-instancinginexemplificationtheproductionofmonstrosities(Bk。III。chap。iii。§17):werespeciesabsolutenomonsterwouldbeborn。Butheoverlooksthefactthatsinceitpertainstospeciestoexist，ittherebylikewiseentersintorelationshipwithotherdeterminations；thusthatisthesphereinwhichindividualthingsoperateupononeanother，andmay，hencebedetrimentaltotheexistenceofthespecies。Lockethusarguesjustasonewouldwhowishedtoprovethatthegooddoesnotexistinitself，becausetherearelikewiseevilmen，thatthecircledoesnotexistabsolutelyinnature，becausethecircumferenceofatree，forexample，representsaveryirregularcircle，orbecauseIdrawacirclebadly。NaturejustsignifiesthelackofpowertobeperfectlyadequatetotheNotion；itisonlyinspiritthattheNotionhasitstrueexistence。Tosaythatspeciesarenothinginthemselves，thattheuniversalisnottheessentialrealityofnature，thatitsimplicitexistenceisnottheobjectofthought，istantamounttosayingthatwedonotknowrealexistence:itisthesamelitanywhichhassincebeensoconstantlyrepeatedthatwearetiredoflisteningtoit:

DasInnerederNaturkenntkeinerschaffenerGeist，andwhichgoesonuntilwehaveperceivedthatBeing-for-another，perception，isnotimplicit；apointofviewwhichhasnotmadeitswaytothepositivepositionthattheimplicitistheuniversal。

Lockeisfarbackinthenatureofknowledge，furtherbackthanPlato，becauseofhisinsistenceonBeing-for-another。

ItisfurthernoteworthythatfromthesoundunderstandingLockeargues(Vol。111。Bk。IV。chap。

vii。§8-11)againstuniversalpropositionsoraxiomssuchasthatA=A，i。e。，ifanythingisAitcannotbeB。Hesaystheyaresuperfluous，ofverylittleuseorofnouseatall，fornobodyyethasbuiltupascienceonapropositionwhichassertsacontradiction。Fromsuchthetruemaybeprovedaseasilyasthefalse；theyaretautological。WhatLockehasfurtherachievedinrespectofeducation，toleration，naturalrightsoruniversalstate-right，doesnotconcernushere，buthastodowithgeneralculture。

ThisisthephilosophyofLocke，inwhichthereisnotraceofspeculation。ThegreatendofPhilosophy，whichistoknowthetruth，isinitsoughttobeattainedinanempiricway；itthusindeedservestodrawattentiontogeneraldeterminations。Butsuchaphilosophynotonlyrepresentsthestandpointofordinaryconsciousness，towhichallthedeterminationsofitsthoughtappearasifgiven，humbleasitisintheoblivionofitsactivity，butinthismethodofderivationandpsychologicaloriginationthatwhichaloneconcernsPhilosophy，thequestionofwhetherthosethoughtsandrelationshipshavetruthinandforthemselves，isnotpresentatall，inasmuchastheonlyobjectaimedatistodescribethemannerinwhichthoughtacceptswhatisgiventoit。ItmaybeheldwithWolffthatitisarbitrarytobeginwithconcreteconceptions，aswhenourconceptionofidentityismadetotakeitsoriginfromsuchthingsasblueflowersandtheblueheavens。Onecanbetterbegindirectlyfromuniversalconceptionsandsaythatwefindinourconsciousnesstheconceptionsoftime，causeandeffectthesearethelaterfactsofconsciousness。ThismethodformsthebasisoftheWolffiansystemofreasoning，onlyherewemuststilldistinguishamongstthedifferentconceptionsthosethataretoberegardedasmostessential；inLocke\'sphilosophy，thisdistinctioncannotreallybesaidtocomeunderconsideration。Fromthistime，accordingtoLocke，orinthisparticularaspectofPhilosophy，thereisacompleteandentirechangeinthepointofviewadopted；thewholeinterestislimitedtotheforminwhichtheobjective，orindividualsensations，passintotheformofconceptions。InthecaseofSpinozaandMalebranche，weundoubtedlylikewisesawthatitwasmadeamatterofimportancetorecognizethisrelationofthoughttowhatissensuouslyperceived，andthustoknowitasfallingintorelation，aspassingintotherelative；themainquestionhencewas:Howarethetworelated？Butthequestionwasansweredtotheeffectthatitisonlythisrelationforitselfthatconstitutesthepointofinterest，andthisrelationitselfasabsolutesubstanceisthusidentity，thetrue，God，itisnottherelatedparts。Theinterestdoesnotlieintherelatedparts；therelatedpartsasone-sidedarenottheexistent，presupposedandpermanentlyestablished，theyareaccidentalmerely。Butheretherelatedsides，thethingsandthesubject，havetheirproperva1ue，andtheyarepresupposedashavingthisvalue。Locke\'sreasoningisquiteshallow；itkeepsentirelytothephenomenal，tothatwhichis，andnottothatwhichistrue。

Thereisanotherquestionhowever:Arethesegeneraldeterminationsabsolutelytrue？Andwhencecometheynotaloneintomyconsciousness，intomymindandunderstanding，butintothethingsthemselves？Space，cause，effect，etc。，arecategories。Howdothesecategoriescomeintotheparticular？Howdoesuniversalspacearriveatdeterminingitself？Thispointofview，thequestionwhetherthesedeterminationsoftheinfinite，ofsubstance，etc。，areinandforthemselvestrue，isquitelostsightof。Platoinvestigatedtheinfiniteandthefinite，Beingandthedeterminate，etc。，andpronouncedthatneitheroftheseoppositesisofitselftrue；theyaresoonlyastogetherconstitutinganidentity，whereverthetruthofthiscontentmaycomefrom。Butherethetruthasitisinandforitselfisentirelysetasideandthenatureofthecontentitselfismadethemainpoint。Itdoesnotmatterwhethertheunderstandingorexperienceisitssource，forthequestioniswhetherthiscontentisinitselftrue。WithLocke，thetruthmerelysignifiestheharmonyofourconceptionswiththings；hererelationisaloneinquestion，whetherthecontentisanobjectivethingoracontentoftheordinaryconception。Butitisquiteanothermattertoinvestigatethecontentitself，andtoask，“Isthiswhichiswithinustrue？Wemustnotdisputeaboutthesources，fortheWhence，theonlyimportantpointtoLocke，doesnotexhaustthewholequestion。Theinterestofthecontentinandforitselfwhollydisappearswhenthatpositionistakenup，andtherebythewholeofwhatisaimedatbyPhilosophyisgivenup。Ontheotherhand，whenthoughtisfromthebeginningconcrete，whenthoughtandtheuniversalaresynonymouswithwhatissetbeforeus，thequestionoftherelationofthetwowhichhavebeenseparatedbythoughtisdestituteofinterestandincomprehensible。Howdoesthoughtovercomethedifficultieswhichitselfhasbegotten？HerewithLockenoneatallhavebeenbegottenandawakened。Beforetheneedforreconciliationcanbesatisfied，thepainofdisunionmustbeexcited。

ThephilosophyofLockeiscertainlyverycomprehensible，butforthatveryreasonitislikewiseapopularphilosophytowhichthewholeoftheEnglishphilosophyasitexistsatthisdayisallied；itisthethinkingmethodofregardingthingswhichiscalledphilosophycarriedtoitsperfection，theformwhichwasintroducedintothesciencewhichthentookitsriseinEurope。Thisisanimportantmomentinculture；thesciencesingeneralandspeciallytheempiricscienceshavetoascribetheirorigintothismovement。TotheEnglish，Philosophyhaseversignifiedthedeductionofexperiencesfromobservations；thishasinaone-sidedwaybeenappliedtophysicalandeconomicsubjects。

Generalprinciplesofpoliticaleconomysuchasfree-tradeinthepresentday，andallmatterswhichrestonthinkingexperience，theknowledgeofwhateverrevealsitselfinthissphereasnecessaryanduseful，signifiesphilosophytotheEnglish(Vol。I。pp。57，58)。Thescholasticmethodofstartingfromprinciplesanddefinitionshasbeenrejected。Theuniversal，laws，forces，universalmatter，etc。，haveinnaturalsciencebeenderivedfromperceptions；thustotheEnglish，Newtonisheldtobethephilosopherparexcellence。Theothersideisthatinpracticalphilosophyregardingsocietyorthestate，thoughtappliesitselftoconcreteobjectssuchasthewilloftheprince，subjectsandtheirendsandpersonalwelfare。Inasmuchaswehaveanobjectsuchasthatbeforeus，theindwellingandessentialuniversalismadeevident；itmust，however，bemadeclearwhichconceptionistheonetowhichtheothersmustyield。ItisinthiswaythatrationalpoliticstooktheirriseinEngland，becausetheinstitutionsandgovernmentpeculiartotheEnglishledthemspeciallyandinthefirstplacetoreflectionupontheirinwardpoliticalandeconomicrelationships。Hobbesmustbementionedasanexemplificationofthisfact。Thismannerofreasoningstartsfromthepresentmind，fromwhatisourown，whetheritbewithinorwithoutus，sincethefeelingswhichwehave，theexperienceswhichfalldirectlywithinus，aretheprinciples。Thisphilosophyofreasoningthoughtisthatwhichhasnowbecomeuniversal，andthroughwhichthewholerevolutioninthepositiontakenupbymindhascometopass。

1。Buhle:GeschichtederneuernPhilosophie，Vol。IV。Sec。1，pp。238-241；QuarterlyReview，April，1817，pp。70，71；TheWorksofJohnLocke(London，1812)，Vol。I。:TheLifeoftheAuthor，pp。xix-xxxix。

2。Locke:AnEssayconcerninghumanUnderstanding(TheWorksofJohnLocke，Vol。I。)，BookI。chap。ii。§1；chap。iii。§15，§22。

3。Locke:AnEssayconcerninghumanUnderstanding(Vol。I。)BookI。chap……ii。§2-9；§27；

chap。iii。§1-15。

4。Locke:AnEssayconcerninghumanUnderstanding(Vol。I。)Bk。II。chap。i。§1，2。

5。Locke:AnEssayconcerninghumanUnderstanding(Vol。I。)，Bk。II。chap。i。§2-5。

6。v。Schiller\'sXenien。

7。Locke:AnEssayconcerninghumanUnderstanding(Vol。I。)，Bk。II。，chap。ii。§2，not。；chap。

xii。§1；chap。xxii。§2；chap。i。§10-14。

8。Locke:AnEssayconcerninghumanUnderstanding(Vol。I。)，Bk。II。chap。xiii。§2；chap。iv。§

2。

9。Ibidem(Vol。I。)，Bk。II。chap。xiv。§3。

10。Locke:AnEssayconcerninghumanUnderstanding(Vol。II。)，Bk。II。chap。xxiii。§1，2。

11。Ibidem(Vol。I。)，Bk。II。chap。xxi。§1。

12。Ibidem(Vol。II。)，Bk。II。chap。xxvi。§1。

13。Ibidem(Vol。I。)，Bk。II。chap。xxi。§7。

14。Ibidem(Vol。I。)，Bk。II。chap。xiii。§17，18。

15。Locke:AnEssayconcerninghumanUnderstanding(Vol。I。)，Bk。II。chap。viii。§9-26。

16。Locke:AnEssayconcerninghumanUnderstanding(Vol。II。)，Bk。III。chap。iii。§6；§13，15。

SectionTwo:PeriodoftheThinkingUnderstandingChapterI。—TheMetaphysicsoftheUnderstandingB2。HUGOGROTIUS。

HugoGrotiuswasstudyingthelawsofnationsatthesametimeasLocke；andinhimtheverysamemethodsmaybefoundasthosealreadymentioned，inasmuchashealsofallsintoaquiteempiricalsystemofassociatingnationswithoneanother，combiningwiththatanempiricalmodeofreasoning。HugovanGroot，born1583atDelft，wasalawyer，fiscalgeneral，andcouncilpensionary；in1619，however，hewasimplicatedintheBarneveldttrial，andwascompelledtoflythecountry。ForalongtimeheremainedinFrance，butin1634heenteredtheserviceofQueenChristinaofSweden。In1635hewasmadeSwedishambassadorinParis，andin1645hediedatRostock，whileonajourneyfromStockholmtoHolland。(1)Hisprincipalwork，Dejurebellietpacis，hecomposedin1625；nowitisnotread，butatonetimeitexercisedaverygreatandimportantinfluence。InitGrotiuspresentedacomparativehistoricalaccount，thematerialofwhichwaspartlyderivedfromtheOldTestament，ofthemannerinwhichnationsinthevariousrelationshipsofwarandpeacehaveactedtowardsoneanother，andwhatusagestheyheldtobebinding。Thefollowingmayserveasanexampleofhisempiricalmethodofreasoning:Prisonersoughtnottobekilled；fortheobjectistodisarmtheenemy，andifthisendbeattainednothingfurthershouldbedone。(2)Thisempiricalwayofconnectingfactshadtheeffectofbringinggeneralcomprehensibleandrationalprinciplesintoconsciousness，ofmakingthemrecognized，andofcausingthemtobemoreorlessacceptable。Thusweseeprinciplessetforth，respectingtherighteousnessofaking\'spowerforinstance；forthoughtapplieditselftoeverything。Weareunsatisfiedbysuchproofsanddeductions，butwemustnotoverlookwhatistherebyaccomplished；andthisistheestablishmentofprincipleswhichhavetheirultimateconfirmationintheobjectsthemselves，inmindandthought。

B3。THOMASHOBBES。

a。Hobbes，whowascelebratedanddistinguishedonaccountoftheoriginalityofhisviews，wastutortotheEarlofDevonshire；hewasbornin1588atMalmesbury，anddiedin1679。(3)AsacontemporaryofCromwell，hefoundintheeventsofthattime，intheRevolutionwhichthentookplaceinEngland，anoccasionforreflectingontheprinciplesofstateandlaw，andinfacthesucceededinmakinghiswaytoquiteoriginalconceptions。Hewrotemuch，includingatreatiseonPhilosophy，entitled“TheElementsofPhilosophy。”Thefirstsection(Sectio)ofthiswork，Decorpore，appearedinLondonin1655；inithefirstofalltreatsofLogic(ParsI。)，andsecondlyofphilosophiaprima(ParsIII。)；thislastisanontologyandmetaphysic。Thenextsubdivision(ParsIII。)，“Ontherelationbetweenmotionandmagnitude，”isasystemofmechanism，aquitepopularsystemofphysics；andastudyofthehumanorgans。Thesecondsectionwastotreatofthenatureofman(Dehomine)，andthethirdofthestate(Decive)，buttheintellectualsectionsoftheworkHobbesdidnotentirelyfinish。HesaysinhisprefacethatCopernicusfirstopenedupastronomy，andGalileophysics；beforethemtherewasnothingcertainineitherscience。Harveyworkedoutthescienceofthehumanbody，andphysicsgenerallyaswellasastronomywereperfectedbyKeppler。AllthiswastermedPhilosophy，inaccordancewiththepointofviewwhichhasbeenalreadygiven(p。313)，sinceinitthereflectiveunderstandingdesirestoknowtheuniversal。

Hobbesfurthersaysconcerningthephilosophyofthestate(philosophiacivilis)，thatitonlydatesfromthepublicationofhisbookDecive。(4)Thiswork，whichappearedatParisin1642，(5)is，likehisLeviathan，amuchdecriedbook；thesecondmentionedwritingwasforbiddentobecirculated，andishenceveryrare。Bothworkscontainsounderreflectionsonthenatureofsocietyandgovernmentthanmanynowincirculation。Society，thestate，istoHobbesabsolutelypreeminent，itisthedeterminingpowerwithoutappealasregardslawandpositivereligionandtheirexternalrelations；andbecauseheplacedtheseinsubjectiontothestate，hisdoctrineswereofcourseregardedwiththeutmosthorror。Butthereisnothingspeculativeorreallyphilosophicinthem，andthereisstilllessinHugoGrotius。

Beforethisidealsweresetbeforeus，orHolyScriptureorpositivelawwasquotedasauthoritative。Hobbes，onthecontrary，soughttoderivethebondwhichholdsthestatetogether，thatwhichgivesthestateitspower，fromprincipleswhichliewithinus，whichwerecognizeasourown。Inthiswaytwooppositeprinciplesarise。Thefirstisthepassiveobedienceofsubjects，thedivineauthorityofrulers，whosewillisabsolutelaw，andisitselfelevatedaboveallotherlaw。Allthisisrepresentedincloseconnectionwithreligion，andprovedbyexamplesfromtheOldTestament，bysuchstoriesasthoseofSaulandDavid。Criminalandmarriagelaws，too，forlongderivedtheircharacterfromtheMosaiclaws，or，speakinggenerally，fromthosetheprovisionsofwhichpossessedtheirvaluebythefactofbeingestablishedbyexpressdivinecommand。Ontheotherhandwehaveinthesecondplacethereasoningwhereinweourselvesarethedeterminingagents，andwhichwascalledsoundreason。InthemovementwhichCromwellmadeuseoftherewasalliedwiththisafanaticism，whichfromthewrittenletterdrewoppositeconclusionstotheabove，andthisweseeexemplifiedintheequalityofproperty，forinstance。Hobbes，itistrue，likewisemaintainedpassiveobedience，theabsolutefreedomoftheroyalwillandpower；butatthesametimehesoughttoderivetheprinciplesofmonarchicalpower，etc。，fromuniversaldeterminations。Theviewsthatheadoptsareshallowandempirical，butthereasonshegivesforthem，andthepropositionshemakesrespectingthem，areoriginalincharacter，inasmuchastheyarederivedfromnaturalnecessitiesandwants。

Hobbesmaintainedthat“Theoriginofallsocietyistobefoundinthemutualfearofallitsmembers；”itishenceaphenomenoninconsciousness。“Eachassociationisthusformedinitsowninterestorforitsownrenown，thatis，fromselfishmotives。”Allsuchmattersassecurityoflife，property，andenjoyment，arenottobefoundoutsideit。“Butmenhaveinalldissimilarityofstrengthanaturalsimilarityaswell。”ThisHobbesprovesbyacharacteristicreason，viz。that“eachindividualcanmakeawaywiththeother，”eachistheultimatepowerovertheothers。

“Eachcanbesupreme。”(6)Thustheirsimilarityisnotderivedfromthegreateststrength；itisnot，asinmoderntimes，foundedonthefreedomofthespirit，oronanequalityofmeritandindependence，butontheequalweaknessofmankind；eachmanisweakasregardsothers。

b。Hobbesfurthertakesupthepositionthatthisnaturalconditionisofsuchanaturethatallpossessthedesiretoruleoveroneanother。“Allintheirnaturalconditionarepossessedofthewilltoinjureothers，”totyrannizeoverothermen；eachhasthustofeartheother。Hobbeslooksatthisconditioninitstruelight，andwefindinhimnoidletalkaboutastateofnaturalgoodness；thenaturalconditionisreallyfarmorelikethatoftheanimals—aconditioninwhichthereisanunsubduedindividualwill。Allthuswishto“securethemselvesagainstthepretensionsofothers，toacquireforthemselvesadvantagesandsuperiorrights。Opinions，religions，desires，arousestrife；

thestrongerbearsawaythevictory。Thenaturalconditionisconsequentlyaconditionofmistrustonthepartofalltowardall；itisawarofallagainstall(bellumomniuminomnes)，”andtheendeavourofonetooverreachanother。Theexpressionnaturehasadoublesignificance:InthefirstplacethenatureofmansignifieshisspiritualandrationalBeing；buthisnaturalconditionindicatesquiteanothercondition，whereinmanconductshimselfaccordingtohisnaturalimpulses。

Inthiswayheconductshimselfinconformitywithhisdesiresandinclinations，whiletherational，onthecontrary，istheobtainingsupremacyovertheimmediatelynatural。“Intheconditionofnatureacertainirresistiblepowergrantstherighttoruleoverthosewhocannotresist；itisabsurdtoleavethosewhomwehaveinourpowertobecomefreeandstrongagain。”

FromthisHobbesdrawstheconclusionthat“manmustgoforthfromthenaturalcondition。”(7)

Thisistrue；thenaturalconditionisnotwhatitshouldbe，andmusthencebecastoff。

c。Hobbesfinallypassestothelawsofreasonwhichpreservetranquillity。Thisconditionoflawisthesubjectionofthenatural，particularwilloftheindividualtotheuniversalwill，which，however，isnotthatofallindividuals，butisthewilloftheruler；thisisconsequentlynotresponsibletoindividuals，butisdirectedagainstthisprivatewill，andtoitallmustbeobedient。(8)Thusthewholematterisnowplacedonquiteanotherfooting。Butbecausetheuniversalwillismadetoresideinthewillofonemonarch，thereneverthelessproceedsfromthispointofview，whichisreallycorrect，aconditionofabsoluterule，ofperfectdespotism。Theconditionoflawdoesnot，however，meanthatthearbitrarywillofonemanconstitutesabsolutelaw，fortheuniversalwillisnodespotism，beingrational，inasmuchasitisconsistentlyexpressedanddeterminedinlaws。

Rixner(HandbuchderGeschichtederPhilosophie，Vol。III。p。30)says:“Lawtohimisnothingbutthesumoftheconditionsofpeaceextortedbyironnecessityfromtheoriginalwickednessofmankind。”WemightaddthatinHobbesweatleastfindthis，thatthenatureandorganismoftheStateisestablishedontheprincipleofhumannature，humandesire，&c。TheEnglishconcernedthemselvesgreatlywiththatprincipleofpassiveobedience，inaccordancewithwhichitissaidthatkingsreceivetheirpowerfromGod。This，inoneaspect，isquitetrue，butinanotheritisfalselytakentomeanthattheyhavenoresponsibility，thattheirblinddesires，theirmerelysubjectivewill，iswhatmustbeobeyed。

B4。CUDWORTH。CLARKE。WOLLASTON。

CudworthwishedtorevivePlatoinEngland，buttodothisafterthemannerofthedemonstrationswhichwemetwithinDescartes，andthroughatrivialmetaphysicoftheunderstanding。Hewroteacelebratedwork:“ThetrueintellectualSystemoftheUniverse，”butthePlatonicideasexpressedareofteninaclumsyformandmingledwiththeChristianconceptionsofGodandangels—allregardedasparticularexistentthings。WhatinPlatoismythical，isheretakenasrealityintheformofexistence；thisisreasonedaboutjustaswereasonrespectingamatterofordinaryfact，suchaswhetheritisprobablethattheFrenchseektoeffectalandinginEngland，andifso，whethertheywillsuccessfullyaccomplishit。TheChristianintellectualworldisdraggeddowntotheformofordinaryactualityandconsequentlyitisruined。

ThenameofClarkeislikewisefamousinconnectionwithhisproofoftheexistenceofGod。TherewerequiteanumberofotherEnglishphilosophers，whomwedonot，however，requiretonotice；

forClarke，Wollaston，andotherscarryontheirspeculationswithinformssuchasbelongtoaverycommonplacemetaphysicoftheunderstanding。ThemanifoldsystemsofmoralphilosophywhichwefindtakingtheirriseinEnglandaredrawnupfromthissamementalstandpoint；inthemtheimplicitudeofmindappearsinaformofnaturalexistence，namely，ofdesiresandfeelings。Theirprinciplesarefoundinmoralsentiments，benevolentdesires，sympathy，&c。Thatformaloneisworthyofnoticewhich，ontheonehand，representsdutyassomethingwhichisnotforeign，given，commanded，butasclearlybelongingtoself-consciousness，evenwhile，ontheotherhand，itrepresentsthispropertyasanatural，unconscious，unspiritual，andirrationalexistence。Impulseisblind，asolidexistencewhichcannotgetbeyonditselflikethinkingself-consciousness。Itisindeedtrueofimpulsethatitspureactivityoritsprocess，andthecontent，are，asinthought，immediatelypositedasthesame；ithasitscontentinitself，andthisisnotdeadandpassive，butself-actingandimpelling。Butthatunityhastheformofimmediacyonlyasexistent；inthefirstplaceitisnotaknowledge，itisnotnecessary，foritisonlytakenfrominwardperception；inthesecondplace，itisadeterminatewhichdoesnotabrogateitself，beyondwhichwecannotget，andwhichthusisnotauniversal。Impulseisnomoreaninfinitethanisthefixedcategoryofforce。Suchreasoningtakestheimpulsesintheirdeterminatecharacterfromexperience，andexpressestheappearanceofnecessityinthesameasaninwardexistence，asaforce。Forinstance，thesocialinstinctisamomentwhichisfoundinexperience，becausemanderivesallmannerofutilityfromsociety。

WhereindoesthenecessityoftheState，ofsociety，finditsbasis？Inasocialdesire。Thisiscause，justasinthephysicalworldaformalinterpretationsuchasthisisalwaystobefound。Thenecessityofanyexistentfact，suchaswhatpertainstoelectricalphenomena，findsitsbasisinaforcewhichbringsitforth；itismerelytheformofreturningfromtheexternaltoaninward，ofpassingfromtheexistenttowhatisthought，whichisagaininturnrepresentedasanexistent。

Forceisnecessitatedbyreasonofthemanifestation，wemustarguefromthelattertotheformer。

Ontheotherhand，themanifestationtakesplacethroughtheforce，foritisthecauseofthemanifestation；wehencehaveforceinoneplaceasreason，andinanotherascause。ButinallthisthereisnorealizationofthefactthatinrespectofformthereisatransitionfromtheNotionintoBeingandtheotherway，whileinrespectofcontentthereisaperfectcontingencyofmanifestation；welookatelectricityinthesamewayaswelookatthefactthatmenhavesocialinstincts，sympatheticinclinations，andsoon。

B5。PUFFENDORF。

InthestruggletogivetojustandequitablerelationsintheStateanindependentbasisoftheirown，andtofoundajudicialsystemofgovernment，reflectivethoughtputforthitsefforts；andthisbecametoitarealinterestandconcern。And，asinthecaseofGrotius，itwasalsotrueofPuffendorf，thattheinstinctofmankind—thatis，thesocialinstinct，&c。—wasmadetheprinciple。

SamuelvonPuffendorfwasbornin1632inSaxony；hestudiedpubliclaw，philosophy，andmathematicsatLeipzigandJena；in1661，asaprofessoratHeidelberg，hemadenaturalandcivillawforthefirsttimeacademicstudies；in1668hebecametutorinaSwedishfamily，whichofficehelateronexchangedfortheserviceoftheHouseofBrandenburg，andin1694hediedatBerlinasaprivycouncillor。Hewroteseveralworksonpoliticallawandhistory；wemustspeciallymentionhiswork，Dejurenatur？etgentium，Libr。viii。，Londin。Scan。1672，4；andalsohiscompendiumDeofficiohominis，publishedatthesameplacein1673)8，andElementajurisprudenti？，universalis。(9)Whilethedivinerightofkingswasherestillrecognized—

wherebytheyrenderedaccounttoGodalone，or，atallevents，werestillboundtotakecounseloftheChurch—theimpulsesandnecessitiespresentinmankindwerenowconsideredaswell。

Thesewereregardedastheinwardprinciplesforprivateandpoliticallaw，andfromthemthedutiesbothofthegovernmentandofrulerswerededuced，sothatthefreedomofmankindmightnotbeinterferedwith。ThebasisofthestateinPuffendorf\'sviewisthesocialinstinct:thehighestendofthestateisthepeaceandsecurityofsociallifethroughthetransformationofinwarddutiesasprescribedby，conscienceintoexternaldutiesascompelledbylaw。(10)

B6。NEWTON。

Theothersideisthatthoughtlikewiseapplieditselftonature，andinthisconnectionIsaacNewtonisfamousbyreasonofhismathematicaldiscoveriesandhisworkinphysics。Hewasbornin1642

atCambridge，madeaspecialstudyofmathematics，andbecameprofessorofthesameatCambridge；lateronhewasmadepresidentoftheRoyalSocietyinLondon，andhediedin1727。(11)

NewtonwasindisputablythechiefcontributortothepopularityofthephilosophyofLocke，ortheEnglishmethodoftreatingofPhilosophy，andmoreespeciallydidhepromoteitsapplicationtoallthephysicalsciences。“Physics，bewareofmetaphysics，”washismaxim，(12)whichsignifies，Science，bewareofthought；andallthephysicalsciences，eventothepresentday，have，followinginhiswake，faithfullyobservedthisprecept，inasmuchastheyhavenotentereduponaninvestigationoftheirconceptions，orthoughtaboutthoughts。Physicscan，however，effectnothingwithoutthought；ithasitscategoriesandlawsthroughthoughtalone，andwithoutthoughtitdoesnoteffectanyprogress。Newtonwasmainlyinstrumentalinintroducingtophysicsthedeterminationsrespectingforces，whichpertaintoreflection；heraisedsciencetothestandpointofreflection，andsetthelawsofforcesintheplaceofthelawsofphenomena。Regardingmattersashedid，Newtonderivedhisconclusionsfromhisexperiences；andinphysicsandthetheoryofcolour-vision，hemadebadobservationsanddrewworseconclusions。Hepassedfromexperiencestogeneralpointsofview，againmadethemfundamental，andfromthemconstructedtheindividual；thisishowhistheoriesareconstructed。Theobservationofthings，thediscoveryofthelawimmanenttherein，andtheuniversalwhichisfoundwithinthem，hasbecometherealpointofinterest。Inthisway，Newtonissocompleteabarbarianasregardshisconceptionsthathiscaseislikethatofanotherofhiscountrymenwhowassurprisedandrejoicedtolearnthathehadtalkedproseallhislife，nothavinghadanyideathathewassoaccomplished。ThisNewton，likeallthePhysicists，indeed，neverlearned；hedidnotknowthathethoughtin，andhadtodealwithNotions，whileheimaginedhewasdealingwithphysicalfacts:andhepresentedtheextremestcontrasttoBoehme，whohandledsensuousthingsasNotions，and，bysheerforceofmind，obtainedentirepossessionoftheiractualityandsubjugatedthem。InsteadofthisNewtontreatedNotionslikesensuousthings，anddealtwiththemjustasmendealwithwoodandstone。Andthisisevennowthecase。Inthebeginningsofphysicalsciencewereadofthepowerofinertia，forinstance，oftheforceofacceleration，ofmolecules，ofcentripetalandcentrifugalforce，asoffactswhichdefinitelyexist；whatarereallythefinalresultsofreflectionarerepresentedastheirfirstgrounds。Ifweaskforthecauseoftherebeingnoadvancemadeinsuchsciences，wefindthatitisbecausemendonotunderstandthattheyshouldapplythemselvestoNotions，butmakeuptheirmindstoadoptthesedeterminationswithoutsenseorunderstanding。HenceinNewton\'sOptics，forinstance，thereareconclusionsderivedfromhisexperiencewhicharesountrueanddevoidofunderstanding，thatwhiletheyaresetforthasthefinestexampleofhowmencanlearntoknownaturebymeansofexperimentsandconclusionsderivedfromexperiments，theymayalsoserveasanexampleofhowweshouldneitherexperimentnordrawconclusions，ofhownothingatallcanbelearned。Amiserablekindofexperiencelikethisitselfcontradictsitselfthroughnature，fornatureismoreexcellentthanitappearsinthiswretchedexperience:bothnatureitselfandexperience，whencarriedalittlefurther，contradictit。Hence，ofallthesplendiddiscoveriesofNewtoninoptics，nonenowremainexceptingone—thedivisionoflightintosevencolours。Thisispartlybecausetheconceptionofwholeandpartcomeintoplay，andpartlyfromanobdurateclosingoftheeyestotheoppositeside。FromthisempiricalmethodinPhilosophy，weshallnowpassontoLeibnitz。

1。Brucker。Histor。critic。philos。T。IV。P。2，pp。731-736，743-745。

2。Hug。Grot。Dejurebelliacpacis，B。III。chap。xi。§13-16(Ed。Gronov。Lipsi？，1758，8vo)，pp。900-905；chap。iv。§10，pp。792，793。

3。Buhle:GeschichtederneuernPhilosophie，Vol。III。Sec。1，pp。223，224，227。

4。Hobbes。EpistoladedicatoriaanteElementor。philos。Sectionemprimam(Thom？HobbesiiOperaphilosophica，qu？latinescripsitomnia，Amstelod，1668，4to)，pp。1，2。

5。Cf。Brucker。Histor。crit。philos。T。IV。P。II。p。154。

6。Hobbes，Decive，chap。i。§2，3(Oper。phil。etc。Amstel。1668)，pp。3，4。

7。Hobbes，Decive，chap。i。§4-6，12-14，pp。4-8；Leviathan，chap。xiii。(Oper。)，pp。63-66。

8。Ibidem，chap。v。§6-12，pp。37-38；chap。vi。§12-14，pp。44-46。

9。Buhle:GeschichtederneuernPhilosophie，Vol。IV。Sec。2，pp。519-523；Rixner:HandbuchderGeschichtederPhilosophie，Vol。III。p。29。

10。Rixner:HandbuchderGeschichtederPhilosophie，Vol。III。p。31；cf。Puttendorf:Dejurenatur？etgent。II。2，§5-7(Francof。adMoenum，1706，4)，pp。157-161；VII。1，§3-7，pp。

900-909。

11。Buhle:GeschichtederneuernPhilosophie，Vol。IV。Sec。1，pp。107，108。

12。Buhle:GeschichtederneuernPhilosophie，Vol。IV。p。115；cf。NewtoniOptices，P。III。

(Londini，1706，4)p。314。

SectionTwo:PeriodoftheThinkingUnderstandingChapterI。—TheMetaphysicsoftheUnderstandingC1。LEIBNITZ。

AsinotherrespectsLeibnitzrepresentstheextremeantithesistoNewton，soinrespectofphilosophyhepresentsastrikingcontrasttoLockeandhisempiricism，andalsotoSpinoza。HeupholdsthoughtasagainsttheperceptionoftheEnglishschool，andinlieuofsensuousBeinghemaintainsBeingforthoughttobetheessenceoftruth，justasBoehmeatanearliertimeupheldimplicitBeing。WhileSpinozaassertedtheuniversality，theonenessofsubstancemerely，andwhilewithLockewesawinfinitedeterminationsmadethebasis，Leibnitz，bymeansofhisfundamentalprincipleofindividuality，bringsouttheessentialityoftheoppositeaspectofSpinoza\'sphilosophy，existenceforself，themonad，butthemonadregardedastheabsoluteNotion，thoughperhapsnotyetasthe"I。"Theopposedprinciples，whichwereforcedasunder，findtheircompletionineachother，sinceLeibnitz\'sprincipleofindividuationcompletedSpinoza\'ssystemasfarasoutwardaspectgoes。

GottfriedWilhelm，BaronvonLeibnitz，wasbornin1646atLeipzig，wherehisfatherwasprofessorofPhilosophy。Thesubjectthathestudiedinviewofaprofessionwasjurisprudence，butfirst，inaccordancewiththefashionoftheday，hemadeastudyofPhilosophy，andtoithedevotedparticularattention。Tobeginwith，hepickedupinLeipzigalargeandmiscellaneousstockofknowledge，thenhestudiedPhilosophyandmathematicsatJenaunderthemathematicianandtheosophistWeigel，andtookhisdegreeofMasterofPhilosophyinLeipzig。Therealso，ontheoccasionofhisgraduationasDoctorofPhilosophy，hedefendedcertainphilosophicaltheses，someofwhichdiscoursesarestillcontainedinhisworks(ed。Dutens，T。II。P。I。p。400)。Hisfirstdissertation，andthatforwhichheobtainedthedegreeofdoctorofphilosophy，was:Deprincipioindividui，—aprinciplewhichremainedtheabstractprincipleofhiswholephilosophy，asopposedtothatofSpinoza。Afterhehadacquiredathoroughknowledgeofthesubject，hewishedtograduatealsoasDoctorofLaws。Butthoughhediedanimperialcouncillor，itwashisillfortunetoreceivefromtheFacultyatLeipzigarefusaltoconferthedoctorateuponhim，hisyouthbeingtheallegedreason。Suchathingcouldscarcelyhappennowadays。Itmaybethatitwasdonebecauseofhisover-greatphilosophicalattainments，seeingthatlawyersarewonttoholdthesameinhorror。HenowquittedLeipzig，andbetookhimselftoAltdorf，wherehegraduatedwithdistinction。ShortlyafterwardshebecameacquaintedinNürnbergwithacompanyofalchemists，withwhoseongoingshebecameassociated。Herehemadeextractsfromalchemisticwritings，andstudiedthemysteriesofthisoccultscience。Hisactivityinthepursuitoflearningextendedalsotohistorical，diplomatic，mathematicalandphilosophicalsubjects。HesubsequentlyenteredtheserviceoftheElectorofMayence，becomingamemberofcouncil，and，in1672hewasappointedtutortoasonofVonBoineburg，ChancellorofStatetotheElector。WiththisyoungmanhetravelledtoParis，wherehelivedforfouryears。HeatthistimemadetheacquaintanceofthegreatmathematicianHuygens，andwasbyhimforthefirsttimeproperlyintroducedintothedomainofmathematics。Whentheeducationofhispupilwascompleted，andtheBaronVonBoineburgdied，LeibnitzwentonhisownaccounttoLondon，wherehebecameacquaintedwithNewtonandotherscholars，atwhoseheadwasOldenburg，whowasalsoonfriendlytermswithSpinoza。AfterthedeathoftheElectorofMayence，thesalaryofLeibnitzceasedtobepaid；hethereforeleftEnglandandreturnedtoFrance。TheDukeofBrunswick-Lüneburgthentookhimintohisservice，andgavehimtheappointmentofcouncillorandlibrarianatHanover，withpermissiontospendasmuchtimeashelikedinforeigncountries。HethereforeremainedforsometimelongerinFrance，England，andHolland。Intheyear1677hesettleddowninHanover，wherehebecamebusilyengagedinaffairsofstate，andwasspeciallyoccupiedwithhistoricalmatters。IntheHarzMountainshehadworksconstructedforcarryingoffthefloodswhichdiddamagetotheminesthere。Notwithstandingthesemanifoldoccupationsheinventedthedifferentialcalculusin1677，onoccasionofwhichtherearoseadisputebetweenhimandNewton，whichwascarriedonbythelatterandtheRoyalSocietyofLondoninamostungenerousmanner。ForitwasassertedbytheEnglish，whogavethemselvesthecreditofeverything，andwereveryunfairtoothers，thatthediscoverywasreallymadebyNewton。ButNewton\'sPrincipiaonlyappearedlater，andinthefirsteditionindeedLeibnitzwasmentionedwithcommendationinanotewhichwasafterwardsomitted。FromhisheadquartersinHanover，Leibnitz，commissionedbyhisprince，madeseveraljourneysthroughGermany，andalsowenttoItalyinordertocollecthistoricalevidencerelativetotheHouseofEste，andforthepurposeofprovingmoreclearlytherelationshipbetweenthisprincelyfamilyandthatofBrunswick-Lüneburg。Atothertimeshewaslikewisemuchoccupiedwithhistoricalquestions。OwingtohisacquaintancewiththeconsortofFrederickI。ofPrussia，SophiaCharlotte，aHanoverianprincess，hewasenabledtobringaboutthefoundationofanAcademyofScienceinBerlin，inwhichcityhelivedforaconsiderabletime。InViennahealsobecameacquaintedwithPrinceEugène，whichoccasionedhisbeingappointedfinallyanImperialCouncillor。Hepublishedseveralveryimportanthistoricalworksastheresultofthisjourney。HisdeathtookplaceatHanoverin1716，whenhewasseventyyearsofage。(1)

ItwasnotonlyonPhilosophy，butalsoonthemostvariedbranchesofsciencethatLeibnitzexpendedtoilandtroubleandenergy；itwastomathematics，however，thathespeciallydevotedhisattention，andheistheinventorofthemethodsoftheintegralanddifferentialcalculus。Hisgreatservicesinregardtomathematicsandphysicswehereleaveoutofconsideration，andpayattentiontohisphilosophyalone。Noneofhisbookscanbeexactlylookedonasgivingacompletesystematicaccountofhisphilosophy。Tothemoreimportantamongthembelongshisworkonthehumanunderstanding(Nouveauxessaissurl\'entendementhumain)inreplytoLocke；butthisisamererefutation。Hisphilosophyisthereforescatteredthroughvariouslittletreatiseswhichwerewritteninveryvariousconnections，inletters，andrepliestoobjectionswhichcausedhimtobringoutoneaspectofthequestionmorestronglythananother；weconsequentlyfindnoelaboratedsystematicwhole，superintendedorperfectedbyhim。Theworkwhichhassomeappearanceofbeingsuch，hisThéodicée，betterknowntothepublicthananythingelsehewrote，isapopulartreatisewhichhedrewupforQueenSophiaCharlotteinreplytoBayle，andinwhichhetookpainsnottopresentthematterinveryspeculativeform。AWürtembergtheologian，Pfaffbyname，andotherswhowerecorrespondentsofLeibnitzandwerethemselvesonlytoowellversedinphilosophy，broughtitasachargeagainstLeibnitz—achargewhichheneverdenied—thathisphilosophywaswritteninpopularform。(2)TheylaughedverymuchafterwardsatWolff，whohadtakenthemtobequiteinearnest；hisopinionwasthatifLeibnitzwerenotperfectlyseriousinthissensewithhisThéodicée，yethehadunconsciouslywrittenhisbesttherein。Leibnitz\'sThéodicéeisnotwhatwecanaltogetherappreciate；itisajustificationofGodinregardtotheevilintheworld。HisreallyphilosophicthoughtsaremostconnectedlyexpressedinatreatiseontheprinciplesofGrace(PrincipesdelaNatureetdelaGrace)，(3)andespeciallyinthepamphletaddressedtoPrinceEugéneofSavoy。(4)。Buhle(GeschichtederneuernPhilosophie，vol。iv。section1，p。131)says:“Hisphilosophyisnotsomuchtheproductoffree，independent，originalspeculation，astheresultofwell-testedearlier”andlater“systems，aneclecticismwhosedefectshetriedtoremedyinhisownway。ItisadesultorytreatmentofPhilosophyinletters。”

Leibnitzfollowedthesamegeneralplaninhisphilosophyasthephysicistsadoptwhentheyadvanceahypothesistoexplainexistingdata。HehasitthatgeneralconceptionsoftheIdeaaretobefound，fromwhichtheparticularmaybederived；here，onaccountofexistingdata，thegeneralconception，forexamplethedeterminationofforceormatterfurnishedbyreflection，musthaveitsdeterminationsdisposedinsuchawaythatitfitsinwiththedata。ThusthephilosophyofLeibnitzseemstobenotsomuchaphilosophicsystemasanhypothesisregardingtheexistenceoftheworld，namelyhowitistobedeterminedinaccordancewiththemetaphysicaldeterminationsandthedataandassumptionsoftheordinaryconception，whichareacceptedasvalid(5)—thoughtswhicharemoreoverpropoundedwithoutthesequencepertainingtotheNotionandmainlyinnarrativestyle，andwhichtakenbythemselvesshownonecessityintheirconnection。Leibnitz\'sphilosophythereforeappearslikeastringofarbitraryassertions，whichfollowoneonanotherlikeametaphysicalromance；itisonlywhenweseewhathewishedtherebytoavoidthatwelearntoappreciateitsvalue。Hereallymakesuseofexternalreasonsmainlyinordertoestablishrelations:

“Becausethevalidityofsuchrelationscannotbeallowed，nothingremainsbuttoestablishthematterinthisway。”Ifwearenotacquaintedwiththesereasons，thisprocedurestrikesusasarbitrary。

a。Leibnitz\'sphilosophyisanidealismoftheintellectualityoftheuniverse；andalthoughfromonepointofviewhestandsopposedtoLocke，asfromanotherpointofviewheisinoppositiontotheSubstanceofSpinoza，heyetbindsthembothtogetheragain。For，togointothemattermoreparticularly，ontheonehandheexpressesinthemanymonadstheabsolutenatureofthingsdistinguishedandofindividuality；ontheotherhand，incontrasttothisandapartfromit，heexpressestheidealityofSpinozaandthenon-absolutenatureofalldifference，astheidealismofthepopularconception。Leibnitz\'sphilosophyisametaphysics，andinsharpcontrasttothesimpleuniversalSubstanceofSpinoza，whereallthatisdeterminedismerelytransitory，itmakesfundamentaltheabsolutemultiplicityofindividualsubstances，whichaftertheexampleoftheancientshenamedmonads—anexpressionalreadyusedbythePythagoreans。Thesemonadshethenproceedstodetermineasfollows。

Firstly:“Substanceisathingthatiscapableofactivity；itiscompoundorsimple，thecompoundcannotexistwithoutthesimple。Themonadsaresimplesubstances。”Theproofthattheyconstitutethetruthinallthingsisverysimple；itisasuperficialreflection。Forinstance，oneofLeibnitz\'smaximsis:“Becausetherearecompoundthings，theprinciplesofthesamemustbesimple；forthecompoundconsistsofthesimple。”(6)Thisproofispoorenough；itisanexampleofthefavouritewayofstartingfromsomethingdefinite，saythecompound，andthendrawingconclusionstherefromastothesimple。Itisquiterightinaway，butreallyitistautology。Ofcourse，ifthecompoundexists，sodoesthesimple；forthecompoundmeanssomethinginitselfmanifoldwhoseconnectionorunityisexternal。Fromtheverytrivialcategoryofthecompounditiseasytodeducethesimple。Itisaconclusiondrawnfromacertainpremiss，butthequestioniswhetherthepremissistrue。Thesemonadsarenot，however，somethingabstractandsimpleinitself，liketheemptyEpicureanatoms，which，astheywereinthemselveslackingindetermination，drewalltheirdeterminationfromtheiraggregationalone。Themonadsare，onthecontrary，substantialforms，agoodexpression，borrowedfromtheScholastics(supra，p。71)，orthemetaphysicalpointsoftheAlexandrianSchool(Vol。II。p。439)；theyaretheentelechiesofAristotletakenaspureactivity，whichareformsinthemselves(Vol。II。pp。138，182，183)。

“Thesemonadsarenotmaterialorextended，nordotheyoriginateordecayinthenaturalfashion，fortheycanbeginonlybyacreativeactofGod，andtheycanendonlybyannihilation。”(7)

Therebytheyaredistinguishedfromtheatoms，whichareregardedsimplyasprinciples。Theexpressioncreationwearefamiliarwithfromreligion，butitisameaninglesswordderivedfromtheordinaryconception；inordertobeathoughtandtohavephilosophicsignificance，itmustbemuchmorecloselydefined。

Secondly:“Onaccountoftheirsimplicitythemonadsarenotsusceptibleofalterationbyanothermonadintheirinneressence；thereisnocausalconnectionbetweenthem。”Eachofthemissomethingindifferentandindependentasregardstherest，otherwiseitwouldnotbeanentelechy。

Eachofthemissomuchforitselfthatallitsdeterminationsandmodificationsgooninitselfalone，andnodeterminationfromwithouttakesplace。Leibnitzsays:“Therearethreewaysinwhichsubstancesareconnected:(1)Causality，influence；(2)Therelationofassistance；(3)Therelationofharmony。Therelationofinfluenceisarelationpertainingtoacommonplaceorpopularphilosophy。Butasitisimpossibletounderstandhowmaterialparticlesorimmaterialqualitiescanpassfromonesubstanceintoanother，suchaconceptionasthismustbeabandoned。”Ifweaccepttherealityofthemany，therecanbenotransitionatall；eachisanultimateandabsolutelyindependententity。“Thesystemofassistance，”accordingtoDescartes，“issomethingquitesuperfluous，aDeusexmachina，becausecontinualmiraclesinthethingsofnatureareassumed。”

Ifwe，likeDescartes，assumeindependentsubstances，nocausalnexusisconceivable；forthispresupposesaninfluence，abearingoftheoneupontheother，andinthiswaytheotherisnotasubstance。“Thereforethereremainsonlyharmony，aunitywhichisinitselforimplicit。Themonadisthereforesimplyshutupinitself，andcannotbedeterminedbyanother；thisothercannotbesetintoit。Itcanneithergetoutsideitself，norcanothersgetinsideit。”(8)ThatisalsoSpinoza\'swayofregardingmatters:eachattributeentirelyrepresentstheessenceofGodforitself，extensionandthoughthavenoinfluenceoneachother。

Inthethirdplace，“however，thesemonadsmustatthesametimehavecertainqualitiesordeterminationsinthemselves，inneractions，throughwhichtheyaredistinguishedfromothers。

Therecannotbetwothingsalike，forotherwisetheywouldnotbetwo，theywouldnotbedifferentbutoneandthesame。”(9)HerethenLeibnitz\'saxiomoftheundistinguishablecomesintowords。

Whatisnotinitselfdistinguishedisnotdistinguished。Thismaybetakeninatrivialsense，asthattherearenottwoindividualswhicharealike。Tosuchsensuousthingsthemaximhasnoapplication，itisprimafacieindifferentwhethertherearethingswhicharealikeornot；theremayalsobealwaysadifferenceofspace。Thisisthesuperficialsense，whichdoesnotconcernus。Themoreintimatesenseis，however，thateachthingisinitselfsomethingdetermined，distinguishingitselffromothersimplicitlyorinitself。Whethertwothingsarelikeorunlikeisonlyacomparisonwhichwemake，whichfallswithinourken。Butwhatwehavefurthertoconsideristhedetermineddifferenceinthemselves。Thedifferencemustbeadifferenceinthemselves，notforourcomparison，forthesubjectmusthavethedifferenceasitsownpeculiarcharacteristicordetermination，i。e。，thedeterminationmustbeimmanentintheindividual。Notonlydowedistinguishtheanimalbyitsclaws，butitdistinguishesitselfessentiallythereby，itdefendsitself，itpreservesitself。Iftwothingsaredifferentonlyinbeingtwo，theneachofthemisone；butthefactoftheirbeingtwodoesnotconstituteadistinctionbetweenthem；thedetermineddifferenceinitselfistheprincipalpoint。

Fourthly:“Thedeterminatenessandthevariationtherebyestablishedis，however，aninwardimplicitprinciple；itisamultiplicityofmodification，ofrelationstosurroundingexistences，butamultiplicitywhichremainslockedupinsimplicity。Determinatenessandvariationsuchasthis，whichremainsandgoesonintheexistenceitself，isaperception；”andthereforeLeibnitzsaysallmonadsperceiveorrepresent(forwemaytranslateperceptiobyrepresentation[Vorstellung])。Inotherwords，theyareinthemselvesuniversal，foruniversalityisjustsimplicityinmultiplicity，andthereforeasimplicitywhichisatthesametimechangeandmotionofmultiplicity。Thisisaveryimportantdetermination；insubstanceitselfthereisnegativity，determinateness，withoutitssimplicityanditsimplicitudebeinggivenup。Further，initthereisthisidealism，thatthesimpleissomethinginitselfdistinguished，andinspiteofitsvariation，thatityetremainsone，andcontinuesinitssimplicity。Aninstanceofthisisfoundin“I，”myspirit。Ihavemanyconceptions，awealthofthoughtisinme，andyetIremainone，notwithstandingthisvarietyofstate。Thisidentitymaybefoundinthefactthatwhatisdifferentisatthesametimeabrogated，andisdeterminedasone；themonadsarethereforedistinguishedbymodificationsinthemselves，butnotbyexternaldeterminations。Thesedeterminationscontainedinthemonadsexistintheminidealfashion；thisidealityinthemonadisinitselfawhole，sothatthesedifferencesareonlyrepresentationsandideas。ThisabsolutedifferencewhatistermedtheNotion；whatfallsasunderinthemererepresentationisheldtogether。ThisiswhatpossessesinterestinLeibnitz\'sphilosophy。Suchidealityinthesamewaypertainstothematerial，whichisalsoamultiplicityofmonads；thereforethesystemofLeibnitzisanintellectualsystem，inaccordancewithwhichallthatismaterialhaspowersofrepresentationandperception。Asthusrepresenting，themonad，saysLeibnitz，possessesactivity；foractivityistobedifferent，andyettobeone，andthisistheonlytruedifference。Themonadnotonlyrepresents，italsochanges；butindoingso，ityetremainsinitselfabsolutelywhatitis。Thisvariationisbasedonactivity。“Theactivityoftheinnerprinciple，bymeansofwhichitpassesfromoneperceptiontoanother，isdesire(appetitus)。”Variationinrepresentationisdesire，andthatconstitutesthespontaneityofthemonad；allisnowcompleteinitself，andthecategoryofinfluencefallsaway。Indeed，thisintellectualityofallthingsisagreatthoughtonthepartofLeibnitz:“Allmultiplicityisincludedinunity；”(10)determinationisnotadifferenceinrespectofsomethingelse，butreflectedintoitself，andmaintainingitself。Thisisoneaspectofthings，butthematterisnotthereincomplete；itisequallythecasethatitisdifferentinrespectofotherthings。

Fifthly:Theserepresentationsandideasarenotnecessarilyconsciousrepresentationsandideas，anymorethanallmonadsasformingrepresentationsareconscious。Itistruethatconsciousnessisitselfperception，butahighergradeofthesame；perceptionsofconsciousnessLeibnitzcallsapperceptions。Thedifferencebetweenthemerelyrepresentingandtheself-consciousmonadsLeibnitzmakesoneofdegreesofclearness。Theexpressionrepresentationhas，however，certainlysomethingawkwardaboutit，sinceweareaccustomedtoassociateitonlywithconsciousness，andwithconsciousnessassuch；butLeibnitzadmitsalsoofunconsciousrepresentation。Whenhethenadducesexamplesofunconsciousrepresentations，heappealstotheconditionofaswoonorofsleep，inwhichwearemeremonads:andthatrepresentationswithoutconsciousnessarepresentinsuchstatesheshowsfromthefactofourhavingperceptionsimmediatelyafterawakeningoutofsleep，whichshowsthatothersmusthavebeenthere，foroneperceptionarisesonlyoutofothers。(11)Thatisatrivialandempiricaldemonstration。

Sixthly:Thesemonadsconstitutetheprinciplethatexists。Matterisnothingelsethantheirpassivecapability。Thispassivecapabilityitiswhichconstitutestheobscurityoftherepresentations，oraconfusionwhichneverarrivesatdistinction，ordesire，oractivity。(12)Thatisacorrectdefinitionoftheconception；itisBeing，matter，inaccordancewiththemomentofsimplicity。Thisisimplicitlyactivity；“mereimplicitnesswithoutactualization”wouldthereforebeabetterexpression。ThetransitionfromobscuritytodistinctnessLeibnitzexemplifiesbythestateofswooning。

Seventhly:Bodiesasbodiesareaggregatesofmonads:theyaremereheapswhichcannotbetermedsubstances，anymorethanaflockofsheepcanbearthisname。(13)Thecontinuityofthesameisanarrangementorextension，butspaceisnothinginitself；(14)itisonlyinanother，oraunitywhichourunderstandinggivestothataggregate。(15)

b。Leibnitzgoesontodetermineanddistinguishmoreclearlyastheprincipalmoments，inorganic，organic，andconsciousmonads，andhedoesitinthefollowingway。

Suchbodiesashavenoinnerunity，whoseelementsareconnectedmerelybyspace，orexternally，areinorganic；theyhavenotanentelechyoronemonadwhichrulesovertherest。(16)ThecontinuityofspaceasamerelyexternalrelationhasnottheNotioninitselfofthelikenessofthesemonadsinthemselves。Continuityisinfacttoberegardedinthemasanarrangement，asimilarityinthemselves。Leibnitzthereforedefinestheirmovementsaslikeoneanother，asaharmonyinthemselves；(17)butagain，thisisasmuchassayingthattheirsimilarityisnotinthemselves。Infactcontinuityformstheessentialdeterminationoftheinorganic；butitmustatthesametimenotbetakenassomethingexternaloraslikeness，butaspenetratingorpenetratedunity，whichhasdissolvedindividualityinitselflikeafluid。ButtothispointLeibnitzdoesnotattain，becauseforhimmonadsaretheabsoluteprinciple，andindividualitydoesnotannulitself。

AhigherdegreeofBeingisfoundinbodieswithlifeandsoul，inwhichonemonadhasdominionovertherest。Thebodywhichisboundupwiththemonad，ofwhichtheonemonadistheentelechyorsoul，iswiththissoulnamedalivingcreature，ananimal。Onesuchentelechyrulesovertherest，yetnotreally，butformally:thelimbsofthisanimal，however，areagainthemselvessuchlivingthings，eachofwhichhasinitsturnitsrulingentelechywithinit。(18)Butrulingishereaninappropriateexpression。Toruleinthiscaseisnottoruleoverothers，forallareindependent；itisthereforeonlyaformalexpression。IfLeibnitzhadnothelpedhimselfoutwiththewordrule，anddevelopedtheideafurther，thisdominantmonadwouldhaveabrogatedtheothers，andputtheminanegativeposition；theimplicitnessoftheothermonads，ortheprincipleoftheabsoluteBeingofthesepointsorindividualswouldhavedisappeared。Yetweshalllateroncomeacrossthisrelationoftheindividualstooneanother。

Theconsciousmonaddistinguishesitselffromthenaked(material)monadsbythedistinctnessoftherepresentation。Butthisisofcourseonlyanindefiniteword，aformaldistinction；itindicatesthatconsciousnessistheverythingthatconstitutesthedistinctionoftheundistinguished，andthatdistinctionconstitutesthedeterminationofconsciousness。Leibnitzmoreparticularlydefinedthedistinctionofmanasthat“heiscapableoftheknowledgeofnecessaryandeternaltruths，"—orthatheconceivestheuniversalontheonehand，andontheotherwhatisconnectedwithit；thenatureandessenceofself-consciousnessliesintheuniversalityoftheNotions。“Theseeternaltruthsrestontwomaxims；theoneisthatofcontradiction，theotheristhatofsufficientreason。”

Theformeroftheseisunityexpressedinuselessfashionasamaxim，thedistinctionoftheundistinguishable，A=A；itisthedefinitionofthinking，butnotamaximwhichcouldcontainatruthascontent，oritdoesnotexpresstheNotionofdistinctionassuch。Theotherimportantprinciplewas，ontheotherhand:Whatisnotdistinguishedinthoughtisnotdistinguished(p。333)。“Themaximofthereasonisthateverythinghasitsreason，”(19)—theparticularhastheuniversalasitsessentialreality。Necessarytruthmusthaveitsreasoninitselfinsuchamannerthatitisfoundbyanalysis，i。e。throughthatverymaximofidentity。Foranalysisistheveryfavouriteplanofresolvingintosimpleideasandprinciples:aresolutionwhichannihilatestheirrelation，andwhichthereforeinfactformsatransitionintotheopposite，thoughitdoesnothavetheconsciousnessofthesame，andonthataccountalsoexcludestheNotion；foreveryoppositeitlaysholdofonlyinitsidentity。

Sufficientreasonseemstobeapleonasm；butLeibnitzunderstoodbythisaims，finalcauses(caus？finales)，thedifferencebetweenwhichandthecausalnexusortheefficientcauseheherebringsunderdiscussion。(20)

c。Theuniversalitself，absoluteessence，whichwithLeibnitzissomethingquitedifferentfromthemonads，separatesitselfalsointotwosides，namelyuniversalBeingandBeingastheunityofopposites。

ThatuniversalisGod，asthecauseoftheworld，totheconsciousnessofwhomtheaboveprincipleofsufficientreasoncertainlyformsthetransition。TheexistenceofGodisonlyaninferencefrometernaltruths；forthesemustasthelawsofnaturehaveauniversalsufficientreasonwhichdeterminesitselfasnoneotherthanGod。Eternaltruthisthereforetheconsciousnessoftheuniversalandabsoluteinandforitself；andthisuniversalandabsoluteisGod，who，asonewithHimself，themonadofmonads，istheabsoluteMonad。HereweagainhavethewearisomeproofofHisexistence:HeisthefountainofeternaltruthsandNotions，andwithoutHimnopotentialitywouldhaveactuality；HehastheprerogativeofexistingimmediatelyinHispotentiality。(21)Godisherealsotheunityofpotentialityandactuality，butinanuncomprehendingmanner；whatisnecessary，butnotcomprehended，istransferredtoHim。ThusGodisatfirstcomprehendedchieflyasuniversal，butalreadyintheaspectoftherelationofopposites。

Asregardsthissecondaspect，theabsoluterelationofopposites，itoccursinthefirstplaceintheformofabsoluteoppositesofthought，thegoodandtheevil。“GodistheAuthoroftheworld，”

saysLeibnitz；thatrefersdirectlytoevil。Itisroundthisrelationthatphilosophyspeciallyrevolves，buttotheunityofwhichitdidnotthenattain；theevilintheworldwasnotcomprehended，becausenoadvancewasmadebeyondthefixedopposition。TheresultofLeibnitz\'sThéodicéeisanoptimismsupportedonthelameandwearisomethoughtthatGod，sinceaworldhadtobebroughtintoexistence，choseoutofinfinitelymanypossibleworldsthebestpossible—themostperfect，sofarasitcouldbeperfect，consideringthefiniteelementwhichitwastocontain。(22)

Thismayverywellbesaidinageneralway，butthisperfectionisnodeterminedthought，butaloosepopularexpression，asortofbabblerespectinganimaginaryorfancifulpotentiality；Voltairemademerryoverit。Noristhenatureofthefinitethereindefined。Becausetheworld，itissaid，hastobetheepitomeoffiniteBeings，evilcouldnotbeseparatedfromit，sinceevilisnegation，finitude。(23)Realityandnegationremainstandinginoppositiontooneanotherexactlyinthesamewayasbefore。ThatistheprincipalconceptionintheThéodicée。Butsomethingverylikethiscanbesaidineverydaylife。IfIhavesomegoodsbroughttomeinthemarketatsometown，andsaythattheyarecertainlynotperfect，butthebestthataretobegot，thisisquiteagoodreasonwhyI

shouldcontentmyselfwiththem。Butcomprehensionisaverydifferentthingfromthis。Leibnitzsaysnothingfurtherthanthattheworldisgood，butthereisalsoevilinit；thematterremainsjustthesameasitwasbefore。“Becauseithadtobefinite”isthenamerearbitrarychoiceonthepartofGod。Thenextquestionwouldbe:WhyandhowistherefinitudeintheAbsoluteandHisdecrees？Andonlythenshouldtherebededucedfromthedeterminationoffinitudetheevilwhichnodoubtexiststherein。

ItistruethatLeibnitzhasareplytotheabovequestion:"Goddoesnotwillwhatisevil；evilcomesonlyindirectlyintotheresults”(blind)，“becauseoftentimesthegreatergoodcouldnotbeachievedifevilswerenotpresent。Thereforetheyaremeanstoagoodend。"ButwhydoesnotGodemployothermeans？Theyarealwaysexternal，notinandforthemselves。“Amoralevilmaynotberegardedasameans，normustwe，astheapostlesays，doevilthatgoodmaycome；yetithasoftentherelationofaconditiosinequanonofthegood。EvilisinGodonlytheobjectofapermissivewill(voluntatispermissiv？)；”buteverythingthatiswrongwouldbesuch。“GodhasthereforeamongtheobjectsofHiswillthebestpossibleastheultimateobject，butthegoodasamatterofchoice(qualemcunque)，alsoassubordinate；andthingsindifferentandevilsoftenasmeans。Evilis，however，anobjectofHiswillonlyastheconditionofsomethingotherwisenecessary(reialioquidebit？)，whichwithoutitcouldnotexist；inwhichsenseChristsaiditmustneedsbethatoffencescome。”(24)

Inageneralsensewearesatisfiedwiththeanswer:“InaccordancewiththewisdomofGodwemustacceptitasafactthatthelawsofnaturearethebestpossible，”butthisanswerdoesnotsufficeforadefinitequestion。Whatonewishestoknowisthegoodnessofthisorthatparticularlaw；andtothatnoanswerisgiven。If，forexample，itissaidthat“Thelawoffallingbodies，inwhichtherelationoftimeandspaceisthesquare，isthebestpossible，”onemightemploy，asfarasmathematicsareconcerned，anyotherpowerwhatever。WhenLeibnitzanswers:“Godmadeitso，”thisisnoansweratall。Wewishtoknowthedefinitereasonofthislaw；suchgeneraldeterminationssoundpious，butarenotsatisfying。

Hegoesontosaythatthesufficientreasonhasreferencetotherepresentationofthemonads。Theprinciplesofthingsaremonads，ofwhicheachisforitself，withouthavinginfluenceontheothers。IfnowtheMonadofmonads，God，istheabsolutesubstance，andindividualmonadsarecreatedthroughHiswill，theirsubstantialitycomestoanend。Thereisthereforeacontradictionpresent，whichremainsunsolvedinitself—thatisbetweentheonesubstantialmonadandthemanymonadsforwhichindependenceisclaimed，becausetheiressenceconsistsintheirstandinginnorelationtooneanother。Yetatthesametime，inordertoshowtheharmonythatexistsintheworld，Leibnitzunderstandstherelationofmonadstomonadsmoregenerallyastheunityofcontrastedexistences，namelyofsoulandbody。Thisunityherepresentsasarelationwithoutdifference，andnotionless，i。e。asapre-establishedharmony。(25)Leibnitzusesheretheillustrationoftwoclocks，whicharesettothesamehour，andkeepthesametime；(26)inthesamewaythemovementofthekingdomofthoughtgoeson，determinedinaccordancewithends，andthemovementonwardofthecorporealkingdomwhichcorrespondswithit，proceedsaccordingtoageneralcasualconnection。(27)ThecaseisthesameaswithSpinoza，thatthesetwosidesoftheuniversehavenoconnectionwitheachother，theonedoesnotinfluencetheother，butbothareentirelyindifferenttooneanother；itisreallythedifferentiatingrelationoftheNotionthatislacking。

InabstractthoughtthatiswithoutNotion，thatdeterminationnowreceivestheformofsimplicity，ofimplicitude，ofindifferencewithregardtowhatisother，ofaself-reflectionthathasnomovement:inthiswayredintheabstractisinapositionofindifferenceasregardsblue，&c。Here，asbefore，Leibnitzforsakeshisprincipleofindividuation；ithasonlythesenseofbeingexclusivelyone，andofnotreachingtoandincludingwhatisother；oritisonlyaunityofthepopularconception，nottheNotionofunity。Thesoulhasthusaseriesofconceptionsandideaswhicharedevelopedfromwithinit，andthisseriesisfromtheveryfirstplacedwithinthesoulatitscreation，i。e。，thesoulisinallimmediacythisimplicitdetermination；determinationis，however，notimplicit，butthereflectedunfoldingofthisdeterminationintheordinaryconceptionisitsoutwardexistence。

Parallelwiththisseriesofdifferentiatedconceptions，therenowrunsaseriesofmotionsofthebody，orofwhatisexternaltothesoul。(28)Bothareessentialmomentsofreality；theyaremutuallyindifferent，buttheyhavealsoanessentialrelationofdifference。

Sincenoweverymonad，asshutupwithinitself，hasnoinfluenceuponthebodyanditsmovements，andyettheinfinitemultitudeoftheiratomscorrespondwithoneanother，LeibnitzplacesthisharmonyinGod；abetterdefinitionoftherelationandtheactivityoftheMonadofmonadsisthereforethatitiswhatpre-establishesharmonyinthechangesofthemonads。(29)Godisthesufficientreason，thecauseofthiscorrespondence；Hehassoarrangedthemultitudeofatomsthattheoriginalchangeswhicharedevelopedwithinonemonadcorrespondwiththechangesoftheothers。Thepre-establishedharmonyistobethoughtofsomewhatinthisstyle；

whenadoggetsabeating，thepaindevelopsitselfinhim，inlikefashionthebeatingdevelopsitselfinitself，andsodoesthepersonwhoadministersthebeating；theirdeterminationsallcorrespondwithoneanother，andthatnotbymeansoftheirobjectiveconnection，sinceeachisindependent。(30)Theprincipleoftheharmonyamongthemonadsdoesnotconsequentlybelongtothem，butitisinGod，whoforthatveryreasonistheMonadofmonads，theirabsoluteunity。

WesawfromthebeginninghowLeibnitzarrivedatthisconception。Eachmonadisreallypossessedofthepowerofrepresentation，andisassucharepresentationoftheuniverse，thereforeimplicitlythetotalityofthewholeworld。Butatthesametimethisrepresentationisnotinconsciousness；thenakedmonadisimplicitlytheuniverse，anddifferenceisthedevelopmentofthistotalityinit。(31)Whatdevelopsitselfthereinisatthesametimeinharmonywithallotherdevelopments；allisoneharmony。“Intheuniverseallthingsarecloselyknittogether，theyareinonepiece，likeanocean:theslightestmovementtransmitsitsinfluencefarandwideallaround。”(32)Fromasinglegrainofsand，Leibnitzholds，thewholeuniversemightbecomprehendedinitsentiredevelopmentifweonlyknewthesandgrainthoroughly。Thereisnotreallymuchinallthis，thoughitsoundsveryfine；fortherestoftheuniverseisconsiderablymorethanagrainofsand，wellthoughweknewit，andconsiderablydifferenttherefrom。Tosaythatitsessenceistheuniverseismereemptytalk:forthefactisthattheuniverseasessenceisnottheuniverse。Tothesandgrainmuchmustbeaddedwhichisnotpresent；andsincethoughtaddsmorethanallthegrainsofsandthatexist，theuniverseanditsdevelopmentmayinthiswaycertainlybecomprehended。ThusaccordingtoLeibnitzeverymonadhasoristherepresentationoftheentireuniverse，whichisthesameassayingthatitisreallyrepresentationingeneral；butatthesametimeitisadeterminaterepresentation，bymeansofwhichitcomestobethisparticularmonad，thereforeitisrepresentationaccordingtoitsparticularsituationandcircumstances。(33)

Therepresentationsofthemonadinitself，whichconstituteitsuniverse，developthemselvesfromthemselves，asthespiritualelementinit，accordingtothelawsoftheirownactivityanddesire，justasthemovementsoftheirouterworlddoaccordingtolawsofbodies；hencelibertyisnothingotherthanthisspontaneityofimmanentdevelopment，butasinconsciousness。Themagneticneedle，onthecontrary，hasonlyspontaneitywithoutconsciousness，andconsequentlywithoutfreedom。For，saysLeibnitz，thenatureofthemagneticneedleistoturntothenorth；ifithadconsciousnessitwouldimaginethatthiswasitsself-determination；itwouldthushavethewilltomoveroundinaccordancewithitsnature。(34)Butitisclearthatinthecourseofconsciousrepresentationsthereisinvolvednonecessaryconnection，butcontingencyandwantofsequencearetobefound，thereasonofthisaccordingtoLeibnitz(Oper。T。II。P。I。p。75)being“becausethenatureofacreatedsubstanceimpliesthatitchangesincessantlyaccordingtoacertainorder，whichorderguidesitspontaneously(spontanément)inallthecircumstanceswhichbefallit；sothatonewhoseesallthingsrecognizesinthepresentconditionofsubstancethepastalsoandthefuture。Thelawoforder，whichdeterminestheindividualityoftheparticularsubstance，hasanexactreferencetowhattakesplaceineveryothersubstanceandinthewholeuniverse。”Themeaningofthisisthatthemonadisnotathingapart，orthattherearetwoviewsofit，theonemakingitoutasspontaneouslygeneratingitsrepresentations，sofarasformisconcerned，andtheothermakingitouttobeamomentofthewholeofnecessity；Spinozawouldcallthisregardingitfrombothsides。Anorganicwhole，ahumanbeing，isthusforinstancetheassertionofhisaimfromoutofhimself:atthesametimethebeingdirectedonsomethingelseisinvolvedinhisNotion。

Herepresentsthisandthattohimself，hewillsthisandthat；hisactivityemploysitselfandbringsaboutchanges。Hisinwarddeterminationthusbecomescorporealdetermination，andthenchangegoingbeyondhimself；heappearsascause，influencingothermonads。ButthisBeing-for-anotherisonlyanappearance。Fortheother，i。e。，theactual，insofarasthemonaddeterminesitormakesitnegative，isthepassiveelementwhichthemonadhasinitself:allmomentsareindeedcontainedtherein，andforthatveryreasonithasnoneedofothermonads，butonlyofthelawsofthemonadsinitself。ButiftheBeing-for-anotherismereappearance，thesamemaybesaidofBeing-for-self；forthishassignificanceonlyinreferencetoBeing-for-another。

TheimportantpointinLeibnitz\'sphilosophyisthisintellectualityofrepresentationwhichLeibnitz，however，didnotsucceedincarryingout；andforthesamereasonthisintellectualityisatthesametimeinfinitemultiplicity，whichhasremainedabsolutelyindependent，becausethisintellectualityhasnotbeenabletoobtainmasteryovertheOne。TheseparationintheNotion，whichproceedsasfarasreleasefromitself，orappearanceindistinctindependence，Leibnitzdidnotsucceedinbringingtogetherintounity。Theharmonyofthesetwomoments，thecourseofmentalrepresentationsandthecourseofthingsexternal，appearingmutuallyascauseandeffect，isnotbroughtbyLeibnitzintorelationinandforthemselves；hethereforeletsthemfallasunder，althougheachispassiveasregardstheother。Hemoreoverconsidersbothoftheminoneunity，tobesure，buttheiractivityisatthesametimenotforthemselves。Everyforwardadvancebecomesthereforeincomprehensiblewhentakenbyitself，becausethecourseoftherepresentationasthroughaimsinitself，requiresthismomentofOther-Beingorofpassivity；andagaintheconnectionofcauseandeffectrequirestheuniversal:eachhoweverlacksthisitsothermoment。TheunitywhichaccordingtoLeibnitzistobebroughtaboutbythepre-establishedharmony，namelythatthedeterminationofthewillofmanandtheoutwardchangeharmonize，isthereforebroughtaboutbymeansofanother，ifnotindeedfromwithout，forthisotherisGod。BeforeGodthemonadsarenottobeindependent，butidealandabsorbedinHim。

AtthispointthedemandwouldcomeinthatinGodHimselfthereshouldbecomprehendedtherequiredunityofthatwhichbeforefellasunder；andGodhasthespecialprivilegeofhavinglaidonHimtheburdenofwhatcannotbecomprehended。ThewordofGodisthusthemakeshiftwhichleadstoaunitywhichitselfisonlyhypothetical；fortheprocessofthemanyoutofthisunityisnotdemonstrated。Godplaysthereforeinthelaterphilosophyafargreaterpartthanintheearly，becausenowthecomprehensionoftheabsoluteoppositionofthoughtandBeingisthechiefdemand。WithLeibnitztheextenttowhichthoughtsadvanceistheextentoftheuniverse；wherecomprehensionceases，theuniverseceases，andGodbegins:sothatlateritwasevenmaintainedthattobecomprehendedwasderogatorytoGod，becausehewasthusdegradedintofinitude。Inthatprocedureabeginningismadefromthedeterminate，thisandthatarestatedtobenecessary；

butsinceinthenextplacetheunityofthesemomentsisnotcomprehended，itistransferredtoGod。Godistherefore，asitwere，thewastechannelintowhichallcontradictionsflow:Leibnitz\'sThéodicéeisjustapopularsummingupsuchasthis。Thereare，nevertheless，allmannerofevasionstobesearchedout—intheoppositionofGod\'sjusticeandmercy，thattheonetemperstheother；howthefore-knowledgeofGodandhumanfreedomarecompatible—allmannerofsyntheseswhichnevercometotherootofthematternorshowbothsidestobemoments。

ThesearethemainmomentsofLeibnitz\'sphilosophy。Itisametaphysicwhichstartsfromanarrowdeterminationoftheunderstanding，namely，fromabsolutemultiplicity，sothatconnectioncanonlybegraspedascontinuity。Therebyabsoluteunityiscertainlysetaside，butallthesameitispresupposed；andtheassociationofindividualswithoneanotheristobeexplainedonlyinthisway，thatitisGodwhodeterminestheharmonyinthechangesofindividuals。Thisisanartificialsystem，whichisfoundedonacategoryoftheunderstanding，thatoftheabsolutenessofabstractindividuality。WhatisofimportanceinLeibnitzliesinthemaxims，intheprincipleofindividualityandthemaximofindistinguishability。