第10章

Hypocrisyandcant，imbecilityofmindandthetyrannywhichseesitselfrobbedofitsprey，maysaythatattacksweremadeonreligion，onthestate，andonmanners。Butwhatareligion！NotthereligionthatLutherpurified，butthemostwretchedsuperstition，priestlydomination，stupidity，degradationofmind，andmoreespeciallythesquanderingofrichesandtherevellingintemporalpossessionsinthemidstofpublicmisery。Andwhatastate！Theblindesttyrannyofministersandtheirmistresses，wivesandchamberlainssothatavastarmyofpettytyrantsandidlerslookeduponitasarightdivinelygiventhemtoplundertherevenuesofthestateandlayhandsupontheproductofthenation\'ssweat。Theshamelessness，thedishonestywerepastbelief，andmoralsweresimplyinkeepingwiththecorruptnessoftheinstitutions。Weseethelawdefiedbyindividualsinrespecttocivilandpoliticallife；weseeitlikewisesetatnoughtinrespecttoconscienceandthought。

Inregardtopracticalpolitics，thewritersinquestionnevereventhoughtofarevolution，butdesiredanddemandedreformsalone，andthattheseshouldbesubjectivemainly；theycalledontheGovernmenttosweepawayabuses，andappointhonourablemenasministers。Thepositiverecommendationsmadebythemastothecoursetobepursuedwere，forexample，thattheroyalchildrenshouldreceiveagoodupbringing，thatprincesshouldbeoffrugalhabits，&c。TheFrenchRevolutionwasforcedonbythestiff-neckedobstinacyofprejudices，byhaughtiness，utterwantofthought，andavarice。Thephilosophersofwhomwearespeakingwereabletogiveonlyageneralideaofwhatoughttobedone；theycouldnotindicatethemodeinwhichthereformsweretobecarriedout。ItwastheGovernment\'sbusinesstomakearrangementsandcarryoutreformsinconcreteshape；butitdidnotperceivethis。Whatthephilosophersbroughtforwardandmaintainedasaremedyforthishorriblestateofdisorderwas，speakinggenerally，thatmenshouldnolongerbeinthepositionoflaymen，eitherwithregardtoreligionortolaw；sothatinreligiousmattersthereshouldnotbeahierarchy，alimitedandselectednumberofpriests，andinthesamewaythatthereshouldnotbeinlegalmattersanexclusivecasteandsociety(notevenaclassofprofessionallawyers)，inwhomshouldreside，andtowhomshouldberestricted，theknowledgeofwhatiseternal，divine，true，andright，andbywhomothermenshouldbecommandedanddirected；butthathumanreasonshouldhavetherightofgivingitsassentanditsopinion。Totreatbarbariansaslaymenisquiteasitshouldbe—barbariansarenothingbutlaymen；buttotreatthinkingmenaslaymenisveryhard。Thisgreatclaimmadebymantosubjectivefreedom，perceptionandconviction，thephilosophersinquestioncontendedforheroicallyandwithsplendidgenius，withwarmthandfire，withspiritandcourage，maintainingthataman\'sownself，thehumanspirit，isthesourcefromwhichisderivedallthatistoberespectedbyhim。Therethusmanifestsitselfinthemthefanaticismofabstractthought。WeGermanswerepassiveatfirstwithregardtotheexistingstateofaffairs，weenduredit；inthesecondplace，whenthatstateofaffairswasoverthrown，wewerejustaspassive:itwasoverthrownbytheeffortsofothers，weletitbetakenawayfromus，wesuffereditalltohappen。

InGermany，FrederickII。alliedhimselfwiththisculture，arareexampleinthosedays。Frenchcourtmanners，operas，gardens，dresses，werewidelyadoptedinGermany，butnotFrenchphilosophy；yetintheformofwitandjestmuchofitfounditswayintothisupperworld，andmuchthatwasevilandbarbarouswasdrivenaway。FrederickII。，withouthavingbeenbroughtuponmelancholypsalms，withouthavinghadtolearnoneortwoofthemeverydaybyheart，withoutthebarbarousmetaphysicsandlogicofWolff(forwhatdidhefindtoadmireinGermanyexceptGellert？)，waswellacquaintedwiththegreat，althoughformalandabstractprinciplesofreligionandthestate，andgovernedinaccordancetherewith，asfarascircumstancesallowed。Nothingelsewasatthattimerequiredinhisnation；onecannotaskthatheshouldhavereformedandrevolutionisedit，sincenotasinglepersonyetdemandedrepresentativegovernmentandthepublicityofcourtsofjustice。Heintroducedwhattherewasneedof，religioustolerance，legislation，improvementsintheadministrationofjustice，economyintherevenuesofstate；ofthewretchedGermanlawthereremainednolongerinhisstateseventhemerestphantom。Heshowedwhatwastheobjectandpurposeofthestate，andatthesametimecastdownallprivileges，theprivaterightswhichpertainedtoGermans，andarbitrarystatutelaws。ItisfoolishwhencantandGermanpseudo-patriotismpouncedownuponhimnow，andtrytodisparagethegreatnessofamanwhoseinfluencewassoenormous，andwouldevendetractfromhisfamebyachargeofvanityandwickedness。WhatGermanpatriotismaimsatshouldbereasonable。

2。THEPOSITIVEASPECT。

Theaffirmativecontentofthisphilosophycertainlydoesnotsatisfytherequirementsofprofundity。

Aleadingcharacteristicofitsteaching，whichisfoundalsowiththeScottishphilosophersandwithourselves，istheassumptionofprimitivefeelingsofjusticewhichmanhasinhimself，asforexamplebenevolenceandsocialinstinctswhichshouldbecultivated。Thepositivesourceofknowledgeandofjusticeisplacedinhumanreasonandthecommonconsciousnessofmankind，inthehealthyhumanreason，andnotintheformoftheNotion。Itiscertainlywonderfultofindtruthsexpressedintheformofuniversalthoughts，respectingwhichitisofinfiniteimportancethattheyshouldbeassumptionspresentinthehumanmind:thatmanhasinhisheartthefeelingofright，oflovetohisfellow-creatures:thatreligionandfaitharenotmattersofcompulsion；thatmerit，talent，virtuearethetruenobility，&c。Animportantquestion，especiallyamongtheGermans，waswhatistheendandcharacterofman，bywhichwasmeantthenatureofhismindandspirit，andcertainly，asfarasthespiritualisconcerned，itistothispointthatwemustreturn。Butinordertofindthenatureofspirit，todiscoverwhatthisdeterminationis，areturnwasmadetoperception，observation，experience，totheexistenceofcertainimpulses。Thesearecertainlydeterminationsinourselves，butwehavenotknownthemintheirnecessity。Suchanimpulseisbesidestakenasnatural，andthusitishereindeterminateinitself，ithasitslimitationonlyasamomentofthewhole。Inregardtoknowledge，veryabstractthoughtsaretobefound—thoughofatruththeyarequiteasgoodasours，andmoreingenious—whichaccordingtotheircontentoughttobeconcrete，andalsowereso。Butsosuperficiallyweretheycomprehendedthattheysoonshowedthemselvesfarfromsufficientforwhathadtobederivedfromthem。Theysaid，forinstance，thatNatureisawhole，thatallisdeterminedbylaws，throughacombinationofdifferentmovements，throughachainofcausesandeffects，andsoon；thevariousproperties，materials，connectionsofthingsbringeverythingtopass。Thosearegeneralphrases，withwhichonecanfillwholebooks。

a。SYSTèMEDELANATURE。

TothisphilosophybelongstheSystèmedelaNature，theleadingworkonthesubject，writteninParisbyaGerman，BaronvonHollbach，whowasthecentralfigureofallthosephilosophers。

Montesquieu，d\'Alembert，Rousseau，wereforatimeinhiscircle；howevermuchthesemenweremovedtoindignationattheexistingstateofthings，theywereyetinotherrespectsverydifferentfromoneanother。TheSystèmedelaNaturemayveryeasilybefoundtiresometoread，becauseittreatsdiscursivelyofgeneralconceptions，whichareoftenrepeated；itisnotaFrenchbook，forvivacityislackingandthemodeofpresentationisdull。

ThegreatWholeofNature(legrandtoutdelanature)istheultimate:“Theuniversedisplaysnothingbutanimmensecollectionofmatterandmotion”(aswithDescartes)，“anunbrokenchainofcausesandeffects，ofwhichcausessomedirectlyaffectoursenses，whileothersareunknowntous，becausetheireffects，whichweperceive，aretooremotefromtheircauses。Thedifferentqualitiesofthesematerials，theirmanifoldconnections，andtheeffectswhichresulttherefrom，constituteessencesforus。Fromthediversityoftheseessencesarisethedifferentorders，species，systems，underwhichthingsfall，andwhosesumtotal，thegreatwhole，iswhatwecallNature。”(2)

ItislikewhatAristotle(videVol。I。p。241)saysofXenophanes，thathegazedintotheblue，i。e。

intoBeing。AccordingtoHollbachallismovement，mattermovesitself:beerferments，thesoulismovedbyitspassions。(3)“Themanifoldvarietyofnaturalphenomena，andtheirincessantriseanddisappearance，havetheirsolegroundinthevarietyofmotionsandoftheirmaterial。”Throughdifferentcombinationsandmodifications，throughadifferentarrangement，anotherthingisoriginated。“Materialsubstanceshaveeitheratendencytocombinewithoneanother，orelsetheyareincapableofsocombining。Uponthisarebasedbyphysicalscientiststheforcesofattractionandrepulsion，sympathyandantipathy，affinityandrelation；andthemoralistsbasethereonhatredandlove，friendshipandenmity。”Spirit，theincorporeal，contradictsoropposesitselftomotion，toachangeoftherelationsofabodyinspace。(4)

b。ROBINET。

Anotherworkofimportanceisthestillmore“dangerous”treatise，DelaNature，byRobinet。Inittherereignsquiteadifferentandadeeperspirit；oneisfrequentlystruckbythedepthofearnestnesswhichthewriterdisplays。Hebeginsthus:“ThereisaGod，i。e。，acauseofthephenomenaofthatWholewhichwecallNature。WhoisGod？Weknownot，andwearesoconstitutedthatwecanneverknowinwhatorderofthingswehavebeenplaced。WecannotknowGodperfectly，becausethemeansofdoingsowillalwaysbelackingtous。WetoomightwriteoverthedoorsofourtemplesthewordswhichweretobereaduponthealtarwhichtheAreopagiteraised，\'TotheunknownGod。\'”Theverysamethingissaidnowadays:therecanbenotransitionfromthefinitetotheinfinite。“TheorderwhichreignsintheuniverseisjustaslittlethevisibletypeofHiswisdom，asourweakmindistheimageofHisintelligence。”ButthisFirstCause，God，isaccordingtoRobinetacreativeGod，HehasbroughtNatureintoexistence；sothatforhimtheonlypossibleknowledgeisthatofNature。“ThereisonlyOneCause。TheeternalCause，whosotospeakhadsown(engrainé)eventsoneintheother，inorderthattheymightwithoutfailfollowoneuponanotherasHechose，inthebeginningsetinmotiontheendlesschainofthings。ThroughthispermanentimpressiontheUniversegoesonliving，movingandperpetuatingitself。Fromtheunityofcausetherefollowstheunityofactivity，forevenitdoesnotappearassomethingtobemoreorlessadmitted。Byvirtueofthissingleactallthingscometopass。SincemanhasmadeNaturehisstudy，hehasfoundnoisolatedphenomenon，andnoindependenttruth，becausetherearenotandcannotbesuch。Thewholesustainsitselfthroughthemutualcorrespondenceofitsparts。”(5)TheactivityofNatureisone，asGodisOne。

Thisactivity，moreparticularlyregarded，signifiesthatgermsunfoldthemselvesineverything:

everywherethereareorganicBeingswhichproducethemselves；nothingisisolated，everythingiscombinedandconnectedandinharmony。Robinetheregoesthroughtheplants，theanimals，andalsothemetals，theelements，air，fire，water，&c。；andseeksfromthemtodemonstratetheexistenceofthegerminwhateverhaslife，andalsohowmetalsareorganisedinthemselves。“Theexampleofthepolypusisconvincingastotheanimalnature(animalité)ofthesmallestportionsoforganisedmatter；forthepolypusisagroupofassociatedpolypi，eachofwhichisasmuchatruepolypusasthefirst。Itstandsprovedthatfromthesamepointofviewthelivingconsistsonlyoftheliving，theanimalsofminuteanimals，everyanimalinparticularofminuteanimalsofthesamekind，adogofdog-germs，manofhumangerms。”InproofofthisRobinetstatesina“Recapitulation”

that“animalspermswarmswithspermaticanimalcules。”Sincehethenconnectseverypropagationproperlyso-calledwiththeco-operationofbothsexes，heallegesthateveryindividualisinwardlyoralsointheexternalorgansahermaphrodite。Ofthemineralshesays:“Arewenotcompelledtoregardasorganicbodiesallthoseinwhichwemeetwithaninwardstructuresuchasthis？Itpresupposesthroughoutaseed，seed-granules，germs，ofwhichtheyarethedevelopment。”Inthesamewaytheairmusthaveitsgerm，whichdoesnotcometorealityuntilitisnourishedbywater，fire，&c。“Theair，asprinciple，isonlythegermoftheair；asitimpregnatesorsaturatesitselfinvaryingdegreeswithwaterandfire，itwillgraduallypassthroughdifferentstagesofgrowth:itwillbecomefirstembryo，thenperfectair。”(6)Robinetgivesthenameofgermtothesimpleforminitself，thesubstantialform，theNotion。Althoughheseekstoprovethistoomuchfromthesensuousside，heyetproceedsfromprinciplesinthemselvesconcrete，fromtheforminitself。

Hespeaksalsooftheevilandgoodintheworld。Theresultofhisobservationisthatgoodandevilbalanceeachother；thisequilibriumconstitutesthebeautyoftheworld。Inordertorefutetheassertionthatthereismoregoodthanevilintheworld，hesaysthateverythingtowhichwereducethegoodconsistsonlyinanenjoyment，apleasure，asatisfaction；butthismustbeprecededbyawant，alack，apain，theremovalofwhichconstitutessatisfaction。(7)Thisisnotonlyacorrectthoughtempirically，butitalsohintsatthedeeperideathatthereisnoactivityexceptthroughcontradiction。

3。IDEAOFACONCRETEUNIVERSALUNITY。

TheresultoftheFrenchphilosophyisthatitinsistedonmaintainingageneralunity，notabstract，butconcrete。ThusRobinetnowpropoundedthetheoryofauniversalorganiclife，andauniformmodeoforigination；thisconcretesystemhecalledNature，overwhichGodwasset，butastheunknowable；allpredicateswhichcouldbeexpressedofHimcontainedsomethinginapplicable。

Wemustadmitthatgrandconceptionsofconcreteunityaretobefoundhere，asopposedtotheabstractmetaphysicaldeterminationsoftheunderstanding，e。g。，thefruitfulnessofNature。But，ontheotherhand，thepointofmostimportancewiththesephilosophersisthatwhatistobeacceptedasvalidmusthavepresence，andthatmaninallknowledgemustbehimselftheknower；for，aswemaysee，thosephilosophersmadewaronallexternalauthorityofstateandchurch，andinparticularonabstractthoughtwhichhasnopresentmeaninginus。TwodeterminationsfoundinallphilosophyaretheconcretionoftheIdeaandthepresenceofthespiritinthesame；mycontentmustatthesametimebesomethingconcrete，present。ThisconcretewastermedReason，andforitthemorenobleofthosemencontendedwiththegreatestenthusiasmandwarmth。Thoughtwasraisedlikeastandardamongthenations，libertyofconvictionandofconscienceinme。Theysaidtomankind，“Inthissignthoushaltconquer，”fortheyhadbeforetheireyeswhathadbeendoneinthenameofthecrossalone，whathadbeenmadeamatteroffaithandlawandreligion—theysawhowthesignofthecrosshadbeendegraded。Forinthesignofthecrosslyinganddeceithadbeenvictorious，underthissealinstitutionshadbecomefossilised，andhadsunkintoallmannerofdegradation，sothatthissigncametoberepresentedastheepitomeandrootofallevil。ThusinanotherformtheycompletedtheReformationthatLutherbegan。Thisconcretehadmanifoldforms；socialinstinctsinthepracticalsphere，lawsofnatureinthetheoretical。Thereispresenttheabsoluteimpulsetofindacompassimmanentinthemselves，i。e。inthehumanmind。Forthehumanminditisimperativetohaveafixedpointsuchasthis，if，indeed，itistobewithinitself，ifitistobefreeinitsownworldatleast。Butthisstrivingafterreallypresentvitalitytookformswhichasby-pathswerethemselvesone-sided。Inthisstrivingafterunity，whichwas，however，concreteunity，thefurthervarietiesofthecontentlikewiselie。

Onthetheoreticsideoftheirphilosophy，therefore，theFrenchproceededtomaterialismornaturalism，becausetherequirementsoftheunderstanding，asabstractthought，whichfromafirmlyfixedprincipleallowsthemostmonstrousconsequencestobedrawn，drovethemtosetuponeprincipleasultimate，andthataprinciplewhichhadatthesametimetobepresentandtoliequiteclosetoexperience。Hencetheyacceptsensationandmatterastheonlytruth，towhichmustbereducedallthought，allmorality，asameremodificationofsensation。TheunitieswhichtheFrenchpropoundedwereinthiswayone-sided。

a。OPPOSITIONOFSENSATIONANDTHOUGHT。

Tothisone-sidednessbelongstheoppositionbetweensentirandpenser，orelse，ifyoulike，theiridentity，makingthelatteronlyaresultoftheformer；thereisnot，however，anyspeculativereconciliationofthisoppositioninGod，suchaswefindinSpinozaandMalebranche。Thisreductionofallthoughttosensation，whichincertainrespectstookplacewithLocke，becomesawidelyextendedtheory。Robinet(DelaNature，T。I。P。IV。chap。iii。pp。257-259)lightsalsoonthisopposition，beyondwhichhedoesnotget，thatmindandbodyarenotseparate，butthatthemannerinwhichtheyareunitedisinexplicable。TheSystèmedelaNature(T。I。chap。x。p。177)

ismarkedbyanespeciallyplainreductionofthoughttosensation。Theleadingthoughtisthis:

“Abstractthoughtsareonlymodesinwhichourinmostorganviewsitsownmodifications。Thewordsgoodness，beauty，order，intelligence，virtue，&c。，havenomeaningforusifwedonotreferandapplythemtoobjectswhichoursenseshaveshowntobecapableofthesequalities，ortomodesofbeingandactingwhichareknowntous。”Thusevenpsychologypassedintomaterialism，asforinstancewemayfindinLaMettrie\'sworkL\'hommeMachine:Allthoughtandallconceptionhavemeaningonlyiftheyareapprehendedasmaterial；matteraloneexists。

b。MONTESQUIEU。

Othergreatwritershaveopposedtotheabovethefeelinginthebreast，theinstinctofself-preservation，benevolentdispositionstowardsothers，theimpulsetofellowship，whichlastPuffendorfalsomadethefoundationofhissystemoflaw(supra，p。321)。Fromthispointofviewmuchthatisexcellenthasbeensaid。ThusMontesquieu，inhischarmingbook，L\'EspritdesLois，ofwhichVoltairesaiditwasanespritsurleslois，regardedthenationsfromthisimportantpointofview，thattheirconstitution，theirreligion，inshort，everythingthatistobefoundinastate，constitutesatotality。

c。HELVETIUS。

ThisreductionofthoughttofeelinginthecaseofHelvetiustakestheformthatifinmanasamoralbeingasingleprincipleissought，thisoughttobecalledself-love，andheendeavouredtodemonstratebyingeniousanalysisthatwhateverwetermvirtue，allactivityandlawandright，hasasitsfoundationnothingbutself-loveorselfishness，andisresolvablethereinto。(8)Thisprincipleisone-sided，althoughthe“Imyself”isanessentialmoment。WhatIwill，thenoblest，theholiest，ismyaim；Imusttakepartinit，Imustagreetoit，Imustapproveofit。Withallself-sacrificethereisalwaysconjoinedsomesatisfaction，somefindingofself；thiselementofself，subjectiveliberty，mustalwaysbepresent。Ifthisistakeninaone-sidedsense，theremaybeconsequencesdrawnfromitwhichoverthrowallthatissacred；butitisfoundinequaldegreeinamoralityasnobleasanypossiblycanbe。

d。ROUSSEAU。

Inconnectionwiththepracticalsideofthingsthisparticularmustalsobenoted，thatwhenthefeelingofright，theconcretepracticalmind，and，speakinggenerally，humanityandhappinessweremadetheprinciple，thisprinciple，universallyconceived，hadcertainlytheformofthought；butinthecaseofsuchconcretecontentderivedfromourimpulseorinwardintuition，eventhoughthatcontentwerereligious，thethoughtitselfwasnotthecontent。Butnowthisfurtherphaseappeared，thatpurethoughtwassetupastheprincipleandcontent，evenifagaintherewaslackingtothiscontentthetrueconsciousnessofitspeculiarformforitwasnotrecognisedthatthisprinciplewasthought。Weseeitemergeinthesphereofwill，ofthepractical，ofthejust，andsoapprehendedthattheinner-mostprincipleofman，hisunitywithhimself，issetforthasfundamentalandbroughtintoconsciousness，sothatmaninhimselfacquiredaninfinitestrength。ItisthisthatRousseaufromonepointofviewsaidaboutthestate。Heinvestigateditsabsolutejustification，andinquiredastoitsfoundation。Therightofrulingandassociating，oftherelationoforder，ofgoverningandbeinggoverned，heapprehendsfromhisownpointofview，sothatitismadetoresthistoricallyonpower，compulsion，conquest，privateproperty，&c。(9)

Rousseaumakesfree-willtheprincipleofthisjustification，andwithoutreferencetothepositiverightofstateshemadeanswertotheabovequestion(chap。iv。p。12)，thatmanhasfree-will，because“libertyisthedistinguishingfeatureofman。Torenouncehislibertysignifiestorenouncehismanhood。Nottobefreeisthereforearenunciationofaman\'srightsasahumanbeing，andevenofhisduties。”Theslavehasneitherrightsnorduties。Rousseauthereforesays(chap。vi。p。

21):“Thefundamentaltaskistofindaformofassociationwhichwillshieldandprotectwiththepowerofthewholecommonwealthcombinedthepersonandpropertyofeveryoneofitsmembers，andinwhicheachindividual，whilejoiningthisassociation，obeyshimselfonly，andthusremainsasfreeasbefore。ThesolutionisgivenbytheSocialContract；”thisistheassociationofwhicheachisamemberbyhisownwill。Theseprinciples，thusabstractlystated，wemustallowtobecorrect，yettheambiguityinthemsoonbeginstobefelt。Manisfree，thisiscertainlythesubstantialnatureofman；andnotonlyisthislibertynotrelinquishedinthestate，butitisactuallyinthestatethatitisfirstrealised。Thefreedomofnature，thegiftoffreedom，isnotanythingreal；forthestateisthefirstrealisationoffreedom。

Themisunderstandingastotheuniversalwillproceedsfromthis，thattheNotionoffreedommustnotbetakeninthesenseofthearbitrarycapriceofanindividual，butinthesenseoftherationalwill，ofthewillinandforitself。Theuniversalwillisnottobelookedonascompoundedofdefinitivelyindividualwills，sothattheseremainabsolute；otherwisethesayingwouldbecorrect:

“Wheretheminoritymustobeythemajority，thereisnofreedom。”Theuniversalwillmustreallybetherationalwill，evenifwearenotconsciousofthefact；thestateisthereforenotanassociationwhichisdecreedbythearbitrarywillofindividuals。Thewrongapprehensionoftheseprinciplesdoesnotconcernus。Whatdoesconcernusisthis，thattherebythereshouldcomeintoconsciousnessascontentthesensethatmanhaslibertyinhisspiritasthealtogetherabsolute，thatfree-willistheNotionofman。Freedomisjustthoughtitself；hewhocaststhoughtasideandspeaksoffreedomknowsnotwhatheistalkingof。Theunityofthoughtwithitselfisfreedom，thefreewill。Thought，asvolitionmerely，istheimpulsetoabrogateone\'ssubjectivity，therelationtopresentexistence，therealisingofoneself，sinceinthatIamendeavouringtoplacemyselfasexistentonanequalitywithmyselfasthinking。Itisonlyashavingthepowerofthinkingthatthewillisfree。TheprincipleoffreedomemergedinRousseau，andgavetoman，whoapprehendshimselfasinfinite，thisinfinitestrength。ThisfurnishesthetransitiontotheKantianphilosophy，which，theoreticallyconsidered，madethisprincipleitsfoundation；knowledgeaimedatfreedom，andataconcretecontentwhichitpossessesinconsciousness。

1。Emileoudel\'éducation，T。II。(Paris，1813，él。stéréotype)，BookIV。，Professiondefoiduvicairesavoyard，p。215seq。

2。Buhle:LehrbuchderGeschichtederPhilosophie，Pt。VIII。pp。62，63:SystèmedelaNatureparMirabaud(Londres，1770)，T。I。chap。i。p。10；chap。ii。p28。

3。Buhle:LehrbuchderGeschichtederPhilosophie，Pt。VIII。pp。63，64。SystèmedelaNature，T。

I。chap。ii。pp。18，16，21，et15。

4。Buhle，ibidem，pp。64，65，70；SystèmedelaNature，T。I。chap。ii，pp。30，31；chap。iii，pp。39，40；chap。iv。pp。45，46；chap。vii，pp。90，91。

5。Robinet:DelaNature(Troisièmeédition，Amsterdam，1766)，T。I。P。I。chap。iii。iv。pp。16，17。

6。Robinet:DelaNature，T。I。P。II。chap。ii。pp。156，157；chap。vii。pp。166，168；chap。ix-xi。；

chap。xv。pp。202，203；chap。xix。p。217。

7。Robinet:DelaNature，T。I。P。I。chap。xxviii。p。138；chap。xiii。p。70。

8。Helvetius:Del\'esprit(Oeuvrescomplètes，T。II。Deux-Ponts，1784)，T。I。DiscoursII。chap。i。

pp。62-64；chap。ii。pp。65，68，69；chap。iv。p。90；chap。v。p。91；chap。viii。p。114；chap。xxiv。

pp。256，257。

9。Rousseau:Ducontratsocial(Lyon，1790)，BookI。chap。iii。pp。8，9；chap。iv。pp。10，11，13-16。

SectionTwo:PeriodoftheThinkingUnderstandingChapterII。—TransitionPeriodD。THEGERMANILLUMINATION。

TheGermanswereatthistimequietlydriftingalongintheirLeibnitzo-Wolffianphilosophy，initsdefinitions，axiomsandproofs。Thentheyweregraduallybreatheduponbythespiritofforeignlands，theymadeacquaintancewithallthedevelopmentswhichtherecametopass，andtookverykindlytotheempiricismofLocke；ontheotherhandtheyatthesametimelaidasidemetaphysicalinvestigations，turnedtheirattentiontothequestionofhowtruthscanbegraspedbythehealthyhumanunderstanding，andplungedintotheAufkl？rungandintotheconsiderationoftheutilityofallthings-apointofviewwhichtheyadoptedfromtheFrench。Utilityastheessenceofexistentthingssignifiesthattheyaredeterminedasnotbeinginthemselves，butforanother:thisisanecessarymoment，butnottheonlyone。TheGermanAufkl？rungwarredagainstideas，withtheprincipleofutilityasitsweapon。Philosophicinvestigationsonthissubjecthaddegeneratedintoafeeblepopulartreatmentofitwhichwasincapableofgoingdeeper；theydisplayedarigidpedantryandanearnestnessoftheunderstanding，butwereunspiritual。TheGermansarebusybeeswhodojusticetoallnations，theyareold-clothesmenforwhomanythingisgoodenough，andwhocarryontheirhagglingwitheveryone。Pickedupasitwasfromforeignnations，allthishadlostthewitandlife，theenergyandoriginalitywhichwiththeFrenchhadmadethecontenttobelostsightofintheform。TheGermans，whohonestlysiftamattertoitsroot，andwhowouldputrationalargumentsintheplaceofwitandvivacity，sincewitandvivacityreallyprovenothing，inthiswayreachedacontentwhichwasutterlyempty，somuchsothatnothingcouldbemorewearisomethanthisprofoundmodeoftreatment；suchwasthecasewithEberhard，Tetens，andthoselikethem。

Others，likeNicolai，Sulzerandtheirfellows，wereexcellentintheirspeculationsonquestionsoftasteandtheliberalsciences；forliteratureandartwerealsotoflourishamongtheGermans。Butwithallthistheyonlyarrivedatamosttrivialtreatmentof？sthetics-Lessing(1)calleditshallowchatter。Asamatteroffact，indeed，thepoemsofGellert，WeisseandLessingsankalmost，ifnotquiteasmuchintothesamepoeticfeebleness。Moreover，previoustothephilosophyofKant，thegeneralprinciplewasreallythetheoryofhappiness，whichwehavealreadymetwithinthephilosophyoftheCyrenaics(Vol。I。p。477)，andthepointofviewofpleasantorunpleasantsensationsheldgoodamongthephilosophersofthattimeasanultimateandessentialdetermination。OfthismannerofphilosophizingIwillquoteanexamplewhichNicolaigivesintheaccountofaconversationwhichhehadwithMendelssohn:whatisinquestionisthepleasureintragicsubjectswhichisheldtobeawakenedevenbymeansoftheunpleasantemotionsdepictedinatragedy:

HERRMOSES。"Thepowerofhavinganinclinationforperfectionsandofshunningimperfectionsisareality。Thereforetheexerciseofthispowerbringsapleasurewithit，which，however，isinnaturecomparativelylessthanthedispleasurewhicharisesfromthecontemplationoftheobject。

I。Yeteventhen，whentheviolenceofpassioncausesusunpleasantsensations，themovement(whatelseisthismovementthanthepoweroflovingperfections，&c。？)whichitbringswithithasstilldelightsforus。Itisthestrengthofthemovementwhichweenjoy，eveninspiteofthepainfulsensationswhichopposewhatispleasantinthepassion，andinashorttimeobtainthevictory。

HERRMOSES。Inastageplay，onthecontrary，astheimperfectobjectisabsent，pleasuremustgaintheupperhandandeclipsethesmalldegreeofdispleasure。

I。Apassionthereforewhichisnotfollowedbytheseresultsmustbealtogetherpleasant。Ofthissortaretheimitationsofthepassionswhichthetragedyaffords。"(2)

Withsuchvapidandmeaninglessdriveltheyrambledon。Inadditiontothese，theeternityofpunishmentinhell，thesalvationoftheheathen，thedifferencebetweenuprightnessandgodliness，werephilosophicmattersonwhichmuchlabourwasexpendedamongtheGermans，whiletheFrenchtroubledthemselveslittleaboutthem。Finitedeterminationsweremadetoholdgoodagainsttheinfinite；againsttheTrinityitwasassertedthatOnecannotbeThree；againstoriginalsin，thateachmustbearhisownguilt，musthavedonehisowndeedsofhimself，andmustanswerforthem；inthesamewayagainstredemption，thatanothercannottakeuponhimselfpunishmentthatisdue；againstforgivenessofsin，thatwhatisdonecannotberenderedundone；tosumupgenerally，theincommensurabilityofthehumannaturewiththedivine。Ontheonesideweseehealthyhumanunderstanding，experience，factsofconsciousness，butontheothersidetherewasstillinvoguetheWolffianmetaphysicsofthedry，deadunderstanding；thusweseeMendelssohntakehisstandbythehealthyhumanunderstanding，andmakeithisrule。

Somemovementwasbroughtintothisauthority，whichhadsettledintoperfectpeaceandsecurityandletnodreamsofothermatterscrossitspath，bythechancedisputeofMendelssohnwithJacobi，firstastowhetherLessinghadbeenadiscipleofSpinoza，andthenregardingthedoctrinesofSpinozahimself。OnthisoccasionitcametolighthowmuchSpinozawasreallyforgotten，andinwhathorrorSpinozismwasheld。ButwhileJacobiinthiswayoncemoreunexpectedlybroughttoremembranceinconnectionwithSpinozismaquitedifferentcontentofphilosophy，faith，i。e。，thesimplyimmediatecertaintyofexternal，finitethings，aswellasofthedivine(whichfaithinthedivinehecalledreason)wascertainlyplacedbyhim，asanindependentthinker，inoppositiontomediatingknowledge，whichheapprehendedasmereunderstanding。ThiscontinueduntilKantgaveanewimpulseinGermanytophilosophy，whichhaddiedoutintherestofEurope。

AsfarasthetransitiontomodernGermanphilosophyisconcerned，itisfromHumeandRousseau，aswehavesaid(pp。369，374，402)，thatittookitsstart。Descartesopposesextensiontothought，aswhatissimplyonewithitself。Heischargedwithdualism，but，likeSpinozaandLeibnitz，hedidawaywiththeindependenceofthetwosides，andmadesupremetheirunity，God。

But，asthisunity，GodisfirstofallonlytheThird；andHeisfurtherdeterminedinsuchawaythatnodeterminationpertainstoHim。Wolff\'sunderstandingofthefinite，hisschoolmetaphysicsgenerally，hisscienceoftheunderstanding，andhisdivergenceintotheobservationofnature，afterithasgrownstronginitsconformitywithlawandinitsfiniteknowledge，turnsagainsttheinfiniteandtheconcretedeterminationsofreligion，andcomestoastandstillwithabstractionsinhistheologianaturalis；forthedeterminateishisdomain。Butfromthistimeanutterlydifferentpointofviewisintroduced。Theinfiniteistransportedintoabstractionorincomprehensibility。Thisisanincomprehensiblepositiontoadopt。Nowadaysitislookedonasmostpious，mostjustifiable。Butasweseethethird，theunityofdifference，definedassomethingwhichcannotbethoughtorknown，thisunityisnotoneofthought，foritisaboveallthought，andGodisnotsimplythought。

Neverthelessthisunityisdefinedastheabsolutelyconcrete，i。e。，astheunityofthoughtandBeing。

Nowwehavecomesofarthatthisunityisaunitysimplyinthought，andpertainingtoconsciousness，sothattheobjectivityofthought-reason-comesforthasOneandAll。ThisisdimlyconceivedbytheFrench。WhetherthehighestBeing，thisBeingdivestedofalldetermination，iselevatedabovenature，orwhethernatureormatteristhehighestunity，thereisalwayspresenttheestablishingofsomethingconcrete，whichatthesametimebelongstothought。

Sincethelibertyofmanhasbeensetupasanabsolutelyultimateprinciple，thoughtitselfhasbeensetupasaprinciple。Theprincipleoflibertyisnotonlyinthoughtbuttherootofthought；thisprincipleoflibertyisalsosomethinginitselfconcrete，atleastinprincipleitisimplicitlyconcrete。

Thusfarhavegeneralcultureandphilosophiccultureadvanced。Sincewhatisknowablehasnowbeenplacedentirelywithinthesphereofconsciousness，andsincethelibertyofthespirithasbeenapprehendedasabsolute，thismaybeunderstoodtomeanthatknowledgehasenteredaltogetherintotherealmofthefinite。Thestandpointofthefinitewasatthesametimetakenasultimate，andGodasaBeyondoutsideconsciousness；duties，rights，knowledgeofnature，arefinite。Manhastherebyformedforhimselfakingdomoftruth，fromwhichGodisexcluded；itisthekingdomoffinitetruth。Theformoffinitudemayherebetermedthesubjectiveform；liberty，self-consciousness[Ichheit]ofthemind，knownastheabsolute，isessentiallysubjective-infactitisthesubjectivityofthought。Themorethehumanreasonhasgraspeditselfinitself，themorehasitcomedownfromGodandthemorehasitincreasedthefieldofthefinite。ReasonisOneandAll，whichisatthesametimethetotalityofthefinite；reasonundertheseconditionsisfiniteknowledgeandknowledgeofthefinite。Thequestionis，sinceitisthisconcretethatisestablished(andnotmetaphysicalabstractions)，howitconstitutesitselfinitself；andthen，howitreturnstoobjectivity，orabrogatesitssubjectivity，i。e。，howbymeansofthoughtGodistobeagainbroughtabout，whoatanearliertimeandatthebeginningofthisperiodwasrecognizedasalonethetrue。Thisiswhatwehavetoconsiderinthelastperiod，indealingwithKant，Fichte，andSchelling。

1。S？mmtlicheSchriften，Vol。XXXIX。(Berlinu。Stettin，1828)，pp。111，112。

2。Lessing\'sS？mmtlicheSchriften，Vol。XXIX。pp。122，123。

SectionThree:RecentGermanPhilosophyA。Jacobi。

InconnectionwithKantwemustherebeginbyspeakingofJacobi，whosephilosophyiscontemporaneouswiththatofKant；inbothofthesetheadvancebeyondtheprecedingperiodisveryevident。Theresultinthetwocasesismuchthesame，althoughboththestartingpointandthemethodofprogressionaresomewhatdifferent。InJacobi\'scasethestimuluswasgivenmainlybyFrenchphilosophy，withwhichhewasveryconversant，andalsobyGermanmetaphysics，whileKantbeganratherfromtheEnglishside，thatis，fromthescepticismofHume。Jacobi，inthatnegativeattitudewhichhepreservedaswellasKant，keptbeforehimtheobjectiveaspectofthemethodofknowledge，andspeciallyconsideredit，forhedeclaredknowledgetobeinitscontentincapableofrecognizingtheAbsolute:thetruthmustbeconcrete，present，butnotfinite。Kantdoesnotconsiderthecontent，buttooktheviewofknowledgebeingsubjective；andforthisreasonhedeclaredittobeincapableofrecognizingabsoluteexistence。ToKantknowledgeisthusaknowledgeofphenomenaonly，notbecausethecategoriesaremerelylimitedandfinite，butbecausetheyaresubjective。ToJacobi，ontheotherhand，thechiefpointisthatthecategoriesarenotmerelysubjective，butthattheythemselvesareconditioned。Thisisanessentialdifferencebetweenthetwopointsofview，eveniftheybotharriveatthesameresult。

FriedrichHeinrichJacobi，bornatDüsseldorfin1743，heldofficefirstintheDuchyofBerg，andtheninBavaria。HestudiedinGenevaandParis，associatingintheformerplacewithBonnetandinthelatterwithDiderot。Jacobiwasamanofthehighestcharacterandculture。HewaslongoccupiedwithStateaffairs，andinDüsseldorfheheldapublicofficewhichwasconnectedwiththeadministrationofthefinancedepartmentintheState。AtthetimeoftheFrenchRevolutionhewasobligedtoretire。AsaBavarianofficialhewenttoMunich，therebecamePresidentoftheAcademyofSciencesin1804，whichofficehe，however，resignedin1812；forintheNapoleonicperiodProtestantsweredecriedasdemagogues。HelivedatMunichtilltheendofhislife，anddiedatthesameplaceonthe10thofMarch，1819。(1)

Intheyear1785，JacobipublishedLettersonSpinoza，whichwerewrittenin1783，ontheoccasionofthedisputewithMendelssohnabove-mentioned(p。406)；forinnoneofhiswritingsdidJacobidevelophisphilosophysystematically，hesetitforthinlettersonly。WhenMendelssohnwishedtowritealifeofLessing，Jacobisenttoaskhimifheknewthat“LessingwasaSpinozist”

(Jacobi\'sWerke，Vol。IV。Sec。1，pp。39，40)。Mendelssohnwasdispleasedatthis，anditwastheoccasionofthecorrespondence。InthecourseofthedisputeitwasmadeevidentthatthosewhoheldthemselvestobeprofessedphilosophersandpossessedofamonopolyofLessing\'sfriendship，suchasNicolai，Mendelssohn，&c。，knewnothingaboutSpinozism；notonlywastheremanifestedinthemthesuperficialcharacteroftheirphilosophicinsight，butignoranceaswell；withMendelssohn，forinstance，thiswasshownrespectingeventheoutwardhistoryoftheSpinozisticphilosophy，andmuchmoreregardingtheinward(Jacobi\'sWerke，Vol。IV。Sec。1，p。91)。ThatJacobiassertedLessingtobeaSpinozist，andgaveahighplacetotheFrench—thisseriousstatementcametothesegoodmenasathunderboltfromtheblue。They—theself-satisfied，self-possessed，superiorpersons—werequitesurprisedthathealsomadepretensionstoknowledge，andofsucha“deaddog”asSpinoza(ibidem，p。68)。Explanationsfolloweduponthis，inwhichJacobifurtherdevelopedhisphilosophicviews。

MendelssohnisdirectlyopposedtoJacobi，forMendelssohntookhisstandoncognition，placedtrueexistenceimmediatelyinthoughtandconception，andmaintained:“WhatIcannotthinkastruedoesnottroublemeasdoubt。AquestionwhichIdonotunderstand，Icannotanswer，itisformeasgoodasnoquestionatall。"(2)Hecontinuedtoargueonthesesamelines。HisproofoftheexistenceofGodthuscarrieswithitthisnecessityofthought，viz。thatactualitymustplainlybeinthought，andathinkermustbepre-supposed，orthepossibilityoftheactualisinthethinker。“WhatnothinkingBeingconceivesaspossibleisnotpossible，andwhatisthoughtbynothinkingcreatureasactualcannotbeactualinfact。IfwetakeawayfromanythingwhatsoevertheconceptionformedbyathinkingBeingthatthatthingispossibleoractual，thethingitselfisdoneawaywith。”

TheNotionofthethingisthustomantheessenceofthesame。“NofiniteBeingcanthinktheactualityofathinginitsperfectionasactual，andstilllesscanheperceivethepossibilityandactualityofallpresentthings。TheremustthusbeathinkingBeingoranunderstandingwhichinthemostperfectwaythinksthecontentofallpossibilitiesaspossible，andthecontentofallactualitiesasactual；i。e。theremustbeaninfiniteunderstanding，andthisisGod。"(3)HereontheonehandweseeaunityofthoughtandBeing，ontheothertheabsoluteunityasinfiniteunderstanding—theformeristheself-consciousnesswhichisapprehendedasfinitemerely。Actuality，Being，hasitspossibilityinthought，oritspossibilityisthought；itisnotaprocessfrompossibilitytoactuality，forthepossibilityremainsathomeintheactuality。

Jacobimaintainsagainstthesedemandsofthought—andthisinoneviewisthechiefthoughtinhisphilosophy—thateverymethodoftheirdemonstrationleadstofatalism，atheism，andSpinozism，(4)andpresentsGodasderivedandfoundeduponsomethingelse；forcomprehendingHimsignifiesdemonstratingHisdependence。Jacobithusassertsthatmediateknowledgeconsistsingivingacauseofsomethingwhichhasinitsturnafiniteeffect，andsoon；sothataknowledgesuchasthiscanallthroughrelatetothefiniteonly。

Jacobifurtherstatesuponthissubject，inthefirstplace，that"Reason"—lateronwhenhedistinguishedreasonandunderstanding(ofwhichmorehereafter(5))，healteredittounderstanding(6)-"canneverbringtolightmorethantheconditionsofwhatisconditioned，naturallawsandmechanism。Wecomprehendathingwhenwecandeduceitfromitsproximatecauses，”andnotfromtheremotercauses；themostremoteandquiteuniversalcauseisalwaysGod。“Or”weknowthethingifwe“perceiveitsimmediateconditionsastheycomeinduesuccession。Thus，forinstance，wecomprehendacirclewhenwecanclearlyrepresenttoourselvesthemechanismofitsoriginationoritsphysicalconditions；weknowthesyllogisticformul？whenwehaveactuallycometoknowthelawstowhichthehumanunderstandingissubjectinjudgmentandconclusion，itsphysicalnatureanditsmechanism。Forthisreasonwehavenoconceptionsofqualitiesassuch，butonlyintuitions。Evenofourpresentexistencewehaveafeelingonly，butnoconceptions。Genuineconceptionswehavemerelyoffigure，number，position，movementandtheformsofthought；qualitiesareknownandunderstood，iftheyaretracedbacktotheseandobjectivelyannulled。”Thisisundoubtedlyreallyfiniteknowledge，whichistogivethedeterminateconditionsofanythingdeterminate，todemonstrateitasresultingfromanothercause，insuchawaythateachconditionisagainconditionedandfinite。Jacobicontinues:“Thebusinessofreasonisreallyprogressiveunionandconnection，anditsspeculativebusinessisunionandconnectioninaccordancewiththeknownlawsofnecessity，i。e。ofidentity。Everythingthatreasoncanbringforthbymeansofanalysis，combination，judgment，conclusion，andre-conception，consistsinnothingbutthingsofnature”(i。e。finitethings)，“andreasonitself，asalimitedexistence，belongstothesethings。Butthewholeofnature，thesumofallconditionedexistence，cannotrevealmoretotheinvestigatingunderstandingthanwhatiscontainedinit，namely，manifoldexistence，changes，asuccessionofforms”(theconditioned)，“andnotanactualbeginning”(oftheworld)，“norarealprincipleofanyobjectiveexistence。"(7)

ButJacobiinthesecondplacehereacceptsreasoninawidersenseandsays:“Ifweunderstandbyreasontheprincipleofknowledgegenerally，itisthemindfromwhichthewholelivingnatureofmanisconstituted；throughitmanarises；heisaformwhichithasadopted。”WiththisJacobi\'sviewoftheattempttoknowtheunconditionedisconnected。“Itakethewholehumanbeingandfindthathisconsciousnessiscomposedoftwooriginalconceptions，theconceptionsoftheconditionedandtheunconditioned。Bothareinseparablyboundupwithoneanother，andyetinsuchawaythattheconceptionoftheconditionedpresupposestheconceptionoftheunconditioned，andcanbegiveninthisalone。Wearejustascertainofitsexistenceasweareofourownconditionedexistence，orevenmoreso。Sinceourconditionedexistencerestsonaninfinitudeofmediations，thereisopeneduptoourinvestigationavastfieldwhich，forthesakeofourpreservationeven，weareforcedtoworkupon。”Itwould，however，bequiteanotherthingtowishtoknowtheunconditionedapartfromthispracticalend。HoweverJacobihereremarks，“Totrytodiscovertheconditionsoftheunconditioned，tofindapossibilityforabsolutenecessity，andtoconstructthislastinordertobeabletocomprehendit，iswhatweundertakewhenweendeavourtomakenatureanexistencecomprehensibletous，i。e。amerelynaturalexistence，andtobringthemechanismoftheprincipleofmechanismintothelightofday。Forifeverythingwhichcanbesaidtoariseandbepresentinawaycomprehensibletous，mustariseandbepresentinaconditionedway，weremain，solongaswecontinuetocomprehend，inachainofconditionedconditions。Wherethischainbreaksoff，weceasetocomprehend，andtheretheconnectionwhichwecallnaturelikewiseceases。Theconceptionofthepossibilityoftheoutwardexistenceofnaturewouldthusbetheconceptionofanabsolutebeginningororiginofnature；itwouldbetheconceptionoftheunconditioneditselfinsofarasitisaconditioningofnaturenotnaturallyconnected，i。e。aconditioningofnatureunconnectedandunconditionedforus。Nowshouldaconceptionofwhatisthusunconditionedandunconnected，andconsequentlysupernatural，bepossible，theunconditionedmustceasetobeunconditioned，itmustitselfreceiveconditions；andabsolutenecessitymustcommencetobepossibilityinorderthatitmayallowitselftobeconstructed。"(8)Thisiscontradictory。

Jacobithenpassesonfromthispointtothesecondofhismainpropositions，“Theunconditionediscalledthesupernatural。Nowsinceeverythingwhichliesoutsidetheconnectionofwhatisconditioned，ofwhatisnaturallymediated，alsoliesoutsidethesphereofourclearandcertainknowledge，andcannotbeunderstoodthroughconceptions，thesupernaturalcannotbeacceptedinanyotherwaybyusthanthatinwhichitisgiventous—namelyasafact。Itis！Thissupernatural，thisessenceofallessence，alltonguesjoininproclaimingtobeGod。"(9)Godastheuniversal，thetrue，isheretakeninthesenseofaspiritualgenerally，inthesenseofpower，wisdom，&c。ThatGodis，however，istoJacobinotabsolutelytrue；fortoknowledgepertainsHisobjectiveabsoluteexistence，butHecannotbesaidtobeknown。ItisthusmerelyafactofmyconsciousnessthatGodexistsindependentlyapartfrommyconsciousness；this，however，isitselfmaintainedthroughmyconsciousness；thesubjectiveattitudeofthoughtisthustoJacobitheelementofmostimportance。TheconsciousnessofGod，whichisinourconsciousness，is，however，ofsuchanaturethatalongwiththethoughtofGodwehaveimmediatelyassociatedthefactthatHeis。Theexistenceofthesupernaturalandsuper-sensuous，towhichthethoughtofmanregardingthenaturalandfinitepasseson，isjustascertaintoJacobiasheishimself。Thiscertaintyisidenticalwithhisself-consciousness；ascertainlyasIam，socertainlyisGod(Jacobi\'sWerke，Vol。III。p。35)。Sincehethuspassesbackintoself-consciousness，theunconditionedisonlyforusinanimmediateway；thisimmediateknowledgeJacobicallsFaith，inwardrevelation(Werke，Vol。

II。pp。3，4)；tothisappealcanbemadeinman。God，theabsolute，theunconditioned，cannot，according，toJacobi，beproved。Forproof，comprehension，meanstodiscoverconditionsforsomething，toderiveitfromconditions；butaderivedabsolute，God，&c。，wouldthusnotbeabsoluteatall，wouldnotbeunconditioned，wouldnotbeGod(Jacobi\'sWerke，Vol。III。p。7)。

ThisimmediateknowledgeofGodisthenthepointwhichismaintainedinthephilosophyofJacobi。ThefaithofKantandofJacobiare，however，different。ToKantitisapostulateofreason，itisthedemandforthesolutionofthecontradictionbetweentheworldandgoodness；toJacobiitisrepresentedonitsimmediateknowledge。

EverythingwhichhasbeenwrittenuponGodsinceJacobi\'stime，byphilosopherssuchasFriesandbytheologians，restsonthisconceptionofimmediateintellectualknowledge，andmenevencallthisrevelation，thoughinanothersensethantherevelationoftheology。Revelationasimmediateknowledgeisinourselves，whiletheChurchholdsrevelationtobesomethingimpartedfromwithout。(10)Inthetheologicalsense，faithisfaithinsomethingwhichisgiventousthroughteaching。Itisasortofdeceptionwhenfaithandrevelationarespokenofandrepresentedasiffaithandrevelationinthetheologicalsensewerehereinquestion；forthesenseinwhichtheyareused，andwhichmaybetermedphilosophic，isquiteadifferentone，howeverpiousanairmaybeassumedinusingtheterms。ThisisJacobi\'sstandpoint，andwhateverisbyphilosophersandtheologianssaidagainstit，thisteachingiseagerlyacceptedanddisseminated。AndnowhereisthereanythingtobefoundbutreflectionsoriginatingfromJacobi，wherebyimmediateknowledgeisopposedtophilosophicknowledgeandtoreason；andpeoplespeakofreason，philosophy，&c。，asablindmanspeaksofcolours。Itis，indeed，allowedthatamancannotmakeshoesunlessheisashoemaker，evenalthoughhehavethemeasureandfoot，andalsothehands。ButwhenPhilosophyisconcerned，immediateknowledgesignifiesthateverymanashewalksandstandisaphilosopher，thathecandogmatizeashechooses，andthatheiscompletelyacquaintedwithPhilosophy。

Byreason，however，mediateknowledgemerelyisontheonehandunderstood，andontheothertheintellectualperceptionwhichspeaksoffacts(supra，pp。413-415)。Inthisrespectitistruethatreasonistheknowledgeandrevelationofabsolutetruth，sincetheunderstandingistherevelationofthefinite(Jacobi\'sWerke，Vol。II。pp。8-14，101)。“Wemaintainedthattwodifferentpowersofperceptioninmanhavetobeaccepted:apowerofperceptionthroughvisibleandtangibleandconsequentlycorporealorgansofperception，andanotherkindofpower，viz。throughaninvisibleorganwhichinnowayrepresentsitselftotheoutwardsenses，andwhoseexistenceismadeknowntousthroughfeelingalone。Thisorgan，aspiritualeyeforspiritualobjects，hasbeencalledbymen—generallyspeaking—reason。Hewhomthepurefeelingsofthebeautifulandgood，ofadmirationandlove，ofrespectandawe，donotconvincethatinandwiththesefeelingsheperceivessomethingtobepresentwhichisindependentofthem，andwhichisunattainablebytheoutwardsensesorbyanunderstandingdirectedupontheirperceptionsalone—suchanonecannotbearguedwith”(Jacobi\'sWerke，Vol。II。pp。74，76)。ButbyfaithJacobilikewiseunderstandsallthathasimmediacyofBeingforme:“Throughfaithweknowthatwehaveabody，webecomeawareofotheractualthings，andthatindeedwiththesamecertaintywithwhichweareawareofourselves。Weobtainallconceptionsthroughthequalitieswhichwereceiveandaccept，andthereisnootherwayofattainingrealknowledge；forreason，whenitbegetsobjects，begetsphantomsofthebrain。Thuswehavearevelationofnature。"(11)Hencetheexpressionfaith，whichhadadeepsignificanceinreligion，ismadeuseoffordifferentcontentsofeverykind；

thisinourowntimeisthepointofviewmostcommonlyadopted。

Jacobiherebringsfaithintooppositionwiththought。Letuscomparethetwo，anddiscoverwhethertheyareseparatedbysogreatachasmasthosewhothusopposethemthink。Ontheonehandabsoluteexistenceistofaithimmediate；believingconsciousnessfeelsitselfpenetratedbythisasbyitsessence:thatexistenceisitslife，believingconsciousnessassertsitselftobeindirectunitywithit。Thoughtthinkstheabsoluteexistence；suchexistenceistoitabsolutethought，absoluteunderstanding，purethought；butthatsignifiesthatitislikewiseimmediateitself。OntheotherhandtofaiththeimmediacyofabsoluteexistencehasalsothesignificanceofaBeing:itis，andisanotherthan\'I。\'Andthesameistrueofthethinker；tohimitisabsoluteBeing，actualinitself，anddifferentfromself-consciousnessorthoughtasfiniteunderstanding，tousethecommonterm。Nowwhatisthereasonthatfaithandthoughtdonotunderstandoneanother，andeachrecognizeitselfintheother？Inthefirstplacefaithhasnoconsciousnessofbeingathought，inasmuchasitassertsabsoluteconsciousnesstobeidenticalwithitasself-consciousness，andhasdirectinwardknowledgeofthesame。Butitexpressesthissimpleunity；initsconsciousnessitisonlyimmediacysotospeakinthesignificationofBeing，aunityofitsunconscioussubstance。InthesecondplaceBeing-for-selfiscontainedinthought；tothisfaithopposestheimmediacyofBeing。Thought，onthecontrary，hastheimmediateasabsolutepotentiality，asabsolutelyathingofthought:andtheimmediacybelongingtothisthingofthoughtiswithoutthedeterminationofBeing，oflife。Ontheheightsofthisabstractionthetwostandopposedtoeachother，astheAufkl？rungwhichassertsabsoluteexistencetobeaBeyondofself-consciousness，andasthematerialismwhichmakesitsotospeakpresentmatter(supra，pp。382，383)。Intheonecaseitisinfaithandthoughtaspositiveexistenceorthought，andintheotheritisthenegativeofself-consciousness，whichisthuseitheronlydeterminedasnegative，asaBeyond，orlikewiseasexistentforself-consciousness。Hencefaithandthoughtarebothofthemknowledge。Wecalluniversalknowledgethought，particularknowledgewecallsensuousperception；andwetermtheintroductionofexternaldeterminationsunderstanding。Theuniversalelementinmanisthought，buttoitlikewiseappertainsreligiousfeelingforinstance；theanimaldoesnotpossessit，forithasnohumanfeeling；andinsofarasthisfeelingisreligious，itisthefeelingofathinker，andwhatdeterminesthisfeelingisnotthedeterminationofnaturaldesire，&c。，butauniversaldetermination。ThusGod，eventhoughHeisonlyfeltandbelievedin，isyettheuniversaltakenquiteabstractly—eveninHispersonalityHeistheabsolutelyuniversalpersonality。

Asthoughtandfaitharethusone，thesameistrueoftheantithesisbetweenmediatedandimmediateknowledge。Wemust，itistrue，keepbeforeoureyesthefactthatwhatisrevealedinimmediateknowledgeistheuniversal。Butabstractimmediateknowledgeisnatural，sensuousknowledge；theimmediatemaninhisnaturalcondition，inhisdesires，doesnotknowthisuniversal。

Children，theEsquimaux，&c。，knownothingofGod；orwhatthenaturalmanknowsofHimisnotarealknowledgeofHim。ThustheintuitiveknowledgeoftheEgyptianstoldthemthatGodwasanoxoracat，andtheIndiansstillpossesssimilarsortsofknowledge。OntheotherhandwhenmanhascomesofarastoknowGodasmerelyanobjectofthemind，i。e。asspiritual，itiseasytoperceivethatthisknowledgewhichisassertedtobeimmediateisreallyaresultmediatedthroughinstruction，throughalongcontinuedculture。Itisonlybymeansofbeingelevatedabovenaturethatmanarrivesataconsciousnessofwhatishigher，andataknowledgeoftheuniversal；thereindeedhisknowledgeisimmediate，buthehasonlyarrivedatthisthroughmediation。Ithink，andthusIknowtheuniversalimmediately，butthisverythoughtisjustprocessinitself，movementandlife。Alllifeisprocesswithinitself，ismediated，andthisisallthemoretrueofspirituallife；foritisthepassingfromonetotheother，thatis，fromthemerelynaturalandsensuoustothespiritual。Itthusindicatesadeficiencyinthemostsimplereflectionnottoknowthattheuniversalisnotinimmediateknowledge，butisaresultoftheculture，theeducation，andtheself-revelationofthehumanrace。Ifimmediateknowledgeistobeallowed，everyonewillberesponsiblemerelytohimself:thismanknowsthis，anotherthat，andconsequentlyeverythingisjustifiedandapproved，howevercontrarytorightandreligion。Thisoppositionbetweenimmediacyandmediacyisthusaverybarrenandquiteemptydetermination；itisaplatitudeoftheextremesttypetoconsideranythinglikethistobeatrueopposition；itproceedsfromamostwoodenunderstanding，whichthinksthatanimmediacycanbesomethingonitsownaccount，withoutamediationwithinitself。IfPhilosophyweretoresultinthisitwouldbeapooraffair；thesedeterminationsaremerelyforms，noneofwhichhasintrinsictruth。TheformintowhichPhilosophyhasinJacobi\'scasefinallyfallen，whichisthatimmediacyisgraspedasabsolute，manifestsalackofallcriticalfaculty，ofalllogic。

TheKantianphilosophyiscriticalphilosophy，butfromitthefacthasbeenomittedthatwecannotconstitutetheinfinitewithfinitecategories—andimmediacyissuchanone。Whenweregardthisoppositionmorecloselyallknowledgemaybetermedimmediate，butallimmediateknowledgeislikewisemediatedinitself。Thisweknowwithinourconsciousness，andwemayseeitinthemostgeneralphenomena。Iknow，forexample，ofAmericaimmediately，andyetthisknowledgeisverymuchmediated。IfIstandinAmericaandseeitssoil，Imustfirstofallhavejourneyedtoit，Columbusmustfirsthavediscoveredit，shipsmusthavebeenbuilt，&c。；allthesediscoveriesandinventionspertaintoit。Thatwhichwenowknowimmediatelyisconsequentlyaresultofinfinitelymanymediations。LikewisewhenIseearight-angledtriangleIknowthatthesquaresofthetwosidesareequaltothesquareofthehypotenuse:Iknowthisimmediately，andyetIhavemerelylearneditandamconvincedofitthroughthemediationofproof。Immediateknowledgeisthuseverywheremediated，andPhilosophydoesnothingbutbringthistoconsciousness—

demonstratingthemediationwhichinpointoffactisalreadypresentthere，e。g。inreligion，&c。

ThephilosophyofJacobi，inasmuchasitsays:“ThoughtcannotproceedfurtherthantothefeelingofGod，”hasbeenacceptedutiliter；itwasmoreeasilyarrivedatthaninthecaseofKant。

Knowledge，however，issomethingverydifferentfromwhatJacobicallssuch；againstfiniteknowledgehisargumentsarequitecorrect。Immediateknowledgeisnotknowledge，comprehension，forthatimpliesthatthecontentisdeterminedinitself，i。e。isgraspedasconcrete。

ButinimmediateknowledgeitisthecasethattheonlyfactknownofGodisthatHeexists。ForshouldtherebedeterminationsrespectingGod，theymust，accordingtoJacobi，begraspedasafinite，andtheknowledgeofthemwouldagainmerelybeaprogressionfromfinitetofinite。TherethusremainsonlytheindeterminateconceptionofGod，an“Aboveme，”anindeterminateBeyond。ThisgivesaccordinglythesameresultasdoestheAufkl？rung，viz。thatthehighestrealityisultimate:wefindthesameinFrenchphilosophyandinKant—onlyherewestillhavetheopinionthatthisemptinessisthehighestphilosophypossible。Butifeachstandpointhasanaspectwhereinitisjustified，therealwaysrestsinthepropositionthatthehumanmindknowsGodimmediately，theimportantconsiderationthatwehaveherearecognitionofthefreedomofthehumanspirit:initwehavethesourceoftheknowledgeofGod，andallexternalityofauthorityisthusabrogatedinthisprinciple。Theprincipleisherebygained，butonlytheprincipleoffreedomofspirit；andthegreatnessofourtimerestsinthefactthatfreedom，thepeculiarpossessionofmindwherebyitisathomewithitselfinitself，isrecognized，andthatmindhasthisconsciousnesswithinitself。Thishoweverismerelyabstract，forthenextstepisthattheprincipleoffreedomisagainpurifiedandcomestoitstrueobjectivity，sothatnoteverythingwhichstrikesmeorspringsupwithinmemust，becauseitismanifestedinme，holdgooditstrue。Itisonlythroughthought，whichcastsofftheparticularandaccidental，thattheprinciplereceivesthisobjectivitywhichisindependentofmeresubjectivityandinandforitself—thoughinsuchawaythatthefreedomofmindstillremainsrespected。One\'sownspiritmustbearwitnesstospiritthatGodisSpirit；thecontentmustbetrue。Butthisdoesnotgiveauthenticitytoitselfbyitsbeingrevealedwithcertaintytome。Thisisthestandpoint，andwehavethusseenitsdeficiencyandthegreatnessoftheprinciplewhichisinvolvedinit。

1。Tenneman\'sGrundrissvonWendt，§406，p。531；Rixner:HandbuchdergeschichtederPhilosophie，Vol。III。§145，p。317；Jacobi\'sWerke，Vol。IV。Sec。1，p。3。

2。Jacobi:BriefüberdieLehredesSpinoza(secondedition，1789)，pp。85，86(Werke，Vol。IV。

Sec。1，p。110)。

3。Buhle:LehrbuchderGeschichtederPhilosophie，PartVIII。pp。386，387；Mendelssohn\'sMorgenstunden(secondedition，1786)，pp。293-296。

4。Jacobi:BriefeüberdieLehredesSpinoza，IV。Prop。pp。225，223(pp。223，216)。

5。Infra，pp。418，419。

6。Jacobi\'sWerke，Vol。II，pp。7seq。；p。221，note。

7。Jacobi:BriefüberdieLehredesSpinoza，supplementvii。pp。419-421，andnote(Werke，Vol。

IV。Sec。2，pp。149-151)。

8。Jacobi:BriefeüberdieLehredesSpinoza，supplementvii。pp。422-426(pp。151-156)。

9。Ibidem，pp。426，427(pp。155，156)。

10。Cf。Jacobi\'sWerke，Vol。III。p。277。

11。Jacobi:BriefeüberdieLehredesSpinoza，pp。216，217(p。211)。

SectionThree:RecentGermanPhilosophyB。Kant。

ThephilosophyofKant，whichwehavenowmoreparcularlytoconsider，madeitsappearanceatthesametimeastheabove。WhileDescartesassertedcertaintytobetheunityofthoughtandBeing，wenowhavetheconsciousnessofthoughtinitssubjectivity，i。e。inthefirstplace，asdeterminatenessincontrastwithobjectivity，andthenasfinitudeandprogressioninfinitedeterminations。Abstractthought，aspersonalconvictionisthatwhichismaintainedascertain；itscontentsareexperience，butthemethodsadoptedbyexperienceareoncemoreformalthoughtandargument。KantturnsbacktothestandpointofSocrates；weseeinhimthefreedomofthesubjectaswesawitwiththeStoics，butthetaskinrespectofcontentisnowplacedonahigherlevel。Anendlessaimingattheconcreteisrequiredforthought，afillingupinaccordancewiththerulewhichcompletionprescribes，whichsignifiesthatthecontentisitselftheIdeaastheunityoftheNotionandreality。WithJacobithought，demonstration，doesnotinthefirstplacereachbeyondthefiniteandconditioned，andintheSecondplace，evenwhenGodislikewisethemetaphysicalobject，thedemonstrationisreallythemakingHimconditionedandfinite；inthethirdplacetheunconditioned，whatisthenimmediatelycertain，onlyexistsinfaith，asubjectivelyfixedpointofviewbutanunknowableone，thatistosayanundetermined，indeterminable，andconsequentlyanunfruitfulone。ThestandpointofthephilosophyofKant，onthecontrary，isinthefirstplacetobefoundinthefactthatthoughthasthroughitsreasoninggotsofarastograspitselfnotascontingentbutratherasinitselftheabsoluteultimate。Inthefinite，inconnectionwiththefinite，anabsolutestandpointisraisedwhichactsasaconnectingbond；itbindstogetherthefiniteandleadsuptotheinfinite。Thoughtgraspeditselfasallinall，asabsoluteinjudgment；foritnothingexternalisauthoritative，sinceallauthoritycanreceivevalidityonlythroughthought。Thisthought，determiningitselfwithinitselfandconcrete，is，however，inthesecondplace，graspedassubjective，andthisaspectofsubjectivityistheformwhichfromJacobi”spointofviewispredominant；thefactthatthoughtisconcreteJacobihasontheotherhandforthemostpartsetaside。Bothstandpointsremainphilosophiesofsubjectivity；sincethoughtissubjective，thecapacityofknowingtheabsoluteisdeniedtoit。ToKantGodcannotontheonehandbefoundinexperience；Hecanneitherbefoundinoutwardexperience—asLalandediscoveredwhenhesweptthewholeheavensandfoundnoGod—norcanHebediscoveredwithin；thoughnodoubtmysticsandenthusiastscanexperiencemanythingsinthemselves，andamongsttheseGod，i。e。theInfinite。OntheotherhandKantarguestoprovetheexistenceofGod，whoistohimanhypothesisnecessaryfortheexplanationofthings，apostulateofpracticalreason。ButinthisconnectionanotherFrenchastronomermadethefollowingreplytotheEmperorNapoleon:“Jen”aipaseubesoindecettehypothèse。”AccordingtothisthetruthunderlyingtheKantianphilosophyistherecognitionoffreedom。EvenRousseaurepresentedtheabsolutetobefoundinfreedom；Kanthasthesameprinciple，buttakenratherfromthetheoreticside。TheFrenchregarditfromthesideofwill，whichisrepresentedintheirproverb:"Ilalatêteprèsdubonnet。”Francepossessesthesenseofactuality，ofpromptitude；becauseinthatcountryconceptionpassesmoreimmediatelyintoaction，menhavethereappliedthemselvesmorepracticallytotheaffairsofactuality。Buthowevermuchfreedommaybeinitselfconcrete，itwasasundevelopedandinitsabstractionthatitwasthereappliedtoactuality；andtomakeabstractionsholdgoodinactualitymeanstodestroyactuality。Thefanaticismwhichcharacterizedthefreedomwhichwasputintothehandsofthepeoplewasfrightful。InGermanythesameprincipleassertedtherightsofconsciousnessonitsownaccount，butithasbeenworkedoutinamerelytheoreticway。Wehavecommotionsofeverykindwithinusandaroundus，butthroughthemalltheGermanheadquietlykeepsitsnightcaponandsilentlycarriesonitsoperationsbeneathit。

ImmanuelKantwasbornatK？nigsbergin1724，andtherestudiedtheologytobeginwith；intheyear1755heentereduponhisworkasanacademicteacher；in1770hebecameprofessoroflogic，andin1801hediedatK？nigsbergonthe12thofFebruary，havingalmostattainedhiseightiethyear(Tennemann”sGrundrissderGeschichtederPhilosophiebyWendt，§380，pp。

465，466)，withouteverhavinglefthisnativetown。

WhiletoWolffthoughtasthoughtwasmerelypositiveself-identityandgraspeditselfassuch，wesawthenegativeself-movingthought，theabsoluteNotion，appearinallitspowerinFrance；andintheAufkl？rungitlikewisemadeitswaytoGermanyinsuchamannerthatallexistence，allaction，wascalledupontoserveausefulpurpose，i。e。theimplicitwasdoneawaywithandeverythinghadtobeforanother；andthatforwhicheverythinghadtobeisman，self-consciousness，taken，however，assignifyingallmengenerally。TheconsciousnessofthisactioninabstractformistheKantianphilosophy。Itisthustheself-thinkingabsoluteNotionthatpassesintoitselfwhichweseemakingitsappearanceinGermanythroughthisphilosophy，insuchawaythatallrealityfallswithinself-consciousness；itistheidealismwhichvindicatesallmomentsoftheimplicittoself-consciousness，butwhichatfirstitselfremainssubjecttoacontradiction，inasmuchasitstillseparatesthisimplicitfromitself。InotherwordstheKantianphilosophynodoubtleadsrealitybacktoself-consciousness，butitcansupplynorealitytothisessenceofself-consciousness，ortothispureself-consciousness，norcanitdemonstrateBeinginthesame。Itapprehendssimplethoughtashavingdifferenceinitself，butdoesnotyetapprehendthatallrealityrestsonthisdifference；itdoesnotknowhowtoobtainmasteryovertheindividualityofself-consciousness，andalthoughitdescribesreasonverywell，itdoesthisinanunthinkingempiricwaywhichagainrobsitofthetruthithas。TheoreticallytheKantianphilosophyisthe“Illumination”orAufkl？rungreducedtomethod；itstatesthatnothingtruecanbeknown，butonlythephenomenal；itleadsknowledgeintoconsciousnessandself-consciousness，butfromthisstandpointmaintainsittobeasubjectiveandfiniteknowledge。ThusalthoughitdealswiththeinfiniteIdea，expressingitsformalcategoriesandarrivingatitsconcreteclaims，ityetagaindeniesthistobethetruth，makingitasimplesubjective，becauseithasonceforallacceptedfiniteknowledgeasthefixedandultimatestandpoint。Thisphilosophymadeanendofthemetaphysicoftheunderstandingasanobjectivedogmatism，butinfactitmerelytransformeditintoasubjectivedogmatism，i。e。intoaconsciousnessinwhichthesesamefinitedeterminationsoftheunderstandingpersist，andthequestionofwhatistrueinandforitselfhasbeenabandoned。Itsstudyismadedifficultbyitsdiffusenessandprolixity，andbythepeculiarterminologyfoundinit。Neverthelessthisdiffusenesshasoneadvantage，thatinasmuchasthesamethingisoftenrepeated，themainpointsarekeptbeforeus，andthosecannoteasilybelostfromview。

WeshallendeavourtotracethelineswhichKantpursued。ThephilosophyofKanthasinthefirstplaceadirectrelationtothatofHumeasstatedabove(p。370)。Thatistosay，thesignificanceoftheKantianphilosophy，generallyexpressed，isfromtheverybeginningtoallowthatdeterminationssuchasthoseofuniversalityandnecessityarenottobemetwithinperception，andthisHumehasalreadyshowninrelationtoLocke。ButwhileHumeattackstheuniversalityandnecessityofthecategoriesgenerally，andJacobitheirfinitude，Kantmerelyarguesagainsttheirobjectivityinsofarastheyarepresentinexternalthingsthemselves，whilemaintainingthemtobeobjectiveinthesenseofholdinggoodasuniversalandnecessary，astheydo，forinstance，inmathematicsandnaturalscience。(1)Thefactthatwecraveforuniversalityandnecessityasthatwhichfirstconstitutestheobjective，Kantthusundoubtedlyallows。Butifuniversalityandnecessitydonotexistinexternalthings，thequestionarises“Wherearetheytobefound？”TothisKant，asagainstHume，maintainsthattheymustbeapriori，i。e。thattheymustrestonreasonitself，andonthoughtasself-consciousreason；theirsourceisthesubject，“I”inmyself-consciousness。(2)

This，simplyexpressed，isthemainpointintheKantianphilosophy。

InthesecondplacethephilosophyofKantislikewisecalledacriticalphilosophybecauseitsaim，saysKant，isfirstofalltosupplyacriticismofourfacultiesofknowledge；forbeforeobtainingknowledgewemustinquireintothefacultiesofknowledge。Tothehealthyhumanunderstandingthatisplausible，andtoitthishasbeenagreatdiscovery。Knowledgeistherebyrepresentedasaninstrument，asamethodandmeanswherebyweendeavourtopossessourselvesofthetruth。Thusbeforemencanmaketheirwaytothetruthitselftheymustknowthenatureandfunctionoftheirinstrument。Theymustseewhetheritiscapableofsupplyingwhatisdemandedofit—ofseizingupontheobject；theymustknowwhatthealterationsitmakesintheobjectare，inorderthatthesealterationsmaynotbemixedupwiththedeterminationsoftheobjectitself。(3)Thiswouldappearasthoughmencouldsetforthuponthesearchfortruthwithspearsandstaves。Andafurtherclaimismadewhenitissaidthatwemustknowthefacultyofknowledgebeforewecanknow。Fortoinvestigatethefacultiesofknowledgemeanstoknowthem；buthowwearetoknowwithoutknowing，howwearetoapprehendthetruthbeforethetruth，itisimpossibletosay。Itistheoldstoryofthewhowouldnotgointothewatertillhecouldswim。Thussincetheinvestigationofthefacultiesofknowledgeisitselfknowing，itcannotinKantattaintowhatitaimsatbecauseitisthatalready—itcannotcometoitselfbecauseitisalreadywithitself；thesamethinghappensashappenedwiththeJews，theSpiritpassesthroughthemidstofthemandtheyknowitnot。AtthesametimethesteptakenbyKantisagreatandimportantone—thatis，thefactthathehasmadeknowledgethesubjectofhisconsideration。

OntheonehandthiscritiqueofknowledgeappliestotheempiricalknowledgeofLocke，whichassertsitselftobegroundedonexperience，and，ontheotherhand，italsodealswithwhatclaimstobeonthewholeamoremetaphysicalkindofphilosophy—theWolffianandGerman—whichhadalsotakenupthelineofproceedingonthemoreempiricmethodwhichhasbeendepicted。

Butthislasthasatthesametimekeptitselfseparatefromthemerelyempiricmethod，inasmuchasitsmaineffortshavebeendirectedtowardsmakingsuchcategoriesofthoughtasthoseofpotentiality，actuality，God，&c。，haveastheirfoundationcategoriesoftheunderstanding，andthenreasoningfromthem。TheKantianphilosophyisinthefirstinstancedirectedagainstboth。KanttakesawaytheobjectivesignificanceofthedeterminationsoftheWolffianmetaphysics，andshowshowtheymustbeascribedtosubjectivethoughtalone。AtthesametimeJacobilikewisedeclaredhimselfagainstthismetaphysic，butsincehestartedmoreespeciallyfromthestandpointoftheFrenchandGermans，hispointofviewwasdifferent:heassertsthatourfinitethoughtcansetforthfinitedeterminationsalone，andthuscanonlyconsiderGodandSpiritinaccordancewithfiniterelationships。Onthepracticalsidetherereignedatthattimetheso-calledhappinesstheory，sinceman”sinherentNotionandthewaytorealizethisNotionwasapprehendedinmoralityasasatisfactionofhisdesires。AsagainstthisKanthasveryrightlyshownthatitinvolvesaheteronomyandnotanautonomyofreason—adeterminationthroughnatureandconsequentlyanabsenceoffreedom。ButbecausetherationalprincipleofKantwasformal，andhissuccessorscouldnotmakeanyfurtherprogresswithreason，andyetmoralityhadtoreceiveacontent，FriesandothersmuststillbecalledHedoniststhoughtheyavoidgivingthemselvesthename。

Inthethirdplace，asregardstherelationofthecategoriestothematerialwhichisgiventhroughexperience，thereisaccordingtoKantalreadyinherentinthesubjectivedeterminationsofthought，e。g。inthoseofcauseandeffect，thecapacityofthemselvestobindtogetherthedifferenceswhicharepresentinthatmaterial。Kantconsidersthoughtasingreatmeasureasyntheticactivity，andhenceherepresentsthemainquestionofPhilosophytobethis，“Howaresyntheticjudgmentsaprioripossible？”(4)Judgmentsignifiesthecombinationofthought-determinationsassubjectandpredicate。Syntheticjudgmentsaprioriarenothingelsethanaconnectionofoppositesthroughthemselves，ortheabsoluteNotion，i。e。therelationsofdifferentdeterminationssuchasthoseofcauseandeffect，givennotthroughexperiencebutthroughthought。Spaceandtimelikewiseformtheconnectingelement；theyarethusapriori，i。e。inself-consciousness。SinceKantshowsthatthoughthassyntheticjudgmentsaprioriwhicharenotderivedfromperception，heshowsthatthoughtissotospeakconcreteinitself。Theideawhichispresenthereisagreatone，but，ontheotherhand，quiteanordinarysignificationisgivenit，foritisworkedoutfrompointsofviewwhichareinherentlyrudeandempirical，andascientificformisthelastthingthatcanbeclaimedforit。Inthepresentationofitthereisalackofphilosophicalabstraction，anditisexpressedinthemostcommonplaceway；tosaynothingmoreofthebarbarousterminology，Kantremainsrestrictedandconfinedbyhispsychologicalpointofviewandempiricalmethods。